
The Classical Commentary
Histories, Practices, Theory

Edited by
Roy K. Gibson &
Christina Shuttleworth Kraus



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ROY K. GIBSON AND CHRISTINA SHUTTLEWORTH KRAUS

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ὁ Σαγχουνιάθων, ἀνὴρ πολυμαθὴς καὶ πολυπράγμων γενόμενος . . . πολυφροντιστικῶς ἐξεμάστευσεν τὰ Τααύτου, εἰδὼς ὅτι τῶν ὑφ' ἥλιον γεγονότων πρῶτός ἐστι Τάαυτος ὁ τῶν γραμμάτων τὴν εὕρεσιν ἐπινοήσας καὶ τῆς τῶν ὑπομνημάτων γραφῆς κατάρξας καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦδε ὥσπερ κρηπῖδα βαλόμενος τοῦ λόγου, ὃν Αἰγύπτιοι μὲν ἐκάλεσαν Θωύθ, Ἀλεξανδρεῖς δὲ Θώθ, Ἑρμῆν δὲ Ἕλληνες μετέφρασαν.

Sanchuniathon, a very learned and curious man, most carefully examined the books of Taaut, knowing that of all those under the sun it was Taaut who first conceived of the invention of letters and inaugurated the writing of commentaries, and making him as it were the foundation of his narrative, the man whom the Egyptians called Thouth, the Alexandrians Thoth, but whom the Greeks have translated as Hermes.

Philo of Byblos, 790 F 1 Jacoby (Eusebius, *Praep. Evan.* 1.9.24)

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CONTENTS

EDITORS' PREFACE

Who writes commentaries? Who reads them? Why? And perhaps most importantly, what for? These questions lie behind the current project, which assembles 16 contributions, primarily by practising commentators, on the classical commentary. Despite the wealth of studies on ancient commentators (especially the Homeric and Vergilian scholia), and on the medieval commentary tradition, contemporary readers and authors of commentaries on Greek and Latin texts have largely allowed this characteristic academic practice to go unexamined—except, that is, in the pages of review periodicals. Though a consensus seems to have grown up about what commentaries 'should be like,'[1] issues of scope, production, readership, authority, and the implications of such a traditional format (among others) are only now beginning to be addressed. It is our hope that these papers—which examine both specific historical examples of the genre and current (and future) practices in commentary writing—will continue, and broaden, recent interest in the classical commentary, and perhaps start some new directions of research.

But first, what is meant in this collection by 'commentary'? James O'Donnell has identified a range of uses of the term, including but not limited to:

(1) Transcription (with or without editing) of an oral exposition of a text read aloud to a broad public: e.g., many Christian sermons;

(2) Marginal notes and interlineations in an authoritative text (themselves often later extracted and made the center of a book, with the authoritative text reduced to lemmata): e.g., Pelagius on Paul;

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[1] Cf., e.g., F. Cairns, *JRS* 61 (1971) 306, "It is . . . instantly recognizable as a great commentary of lasting importance"; C. E. Murgia, *CP* 79 (1984) 314, "the overall estimate of a detailed commentary's worth must be based on its scholarly contribution: will the readers have much to learn from it? . . . A good commentary needs or aims at accuracy, good judgment, completeness, concision, and, where possible, originality"; D. Wardle, *CR* 45 (1995) 171, "one can have expectations of a good commentary"; and J. Holoka, *BMCR* 2001.08.06, "The commentary . . . is a model of its genre."

(3) Compilations of marginalia: e.g., the *Glossa Ordinaria* or the Talmud;

(4) A 'commentary' deliberately written as a vehicle for the exposition of the commentator's own views.

As O'Donnell goes on to point out, the final category manifests itself in many forms:

> from Hellenistic readers of Plato and Aristotle down to Aquinas down to the present—with the particular further distinction in our own time between the ambitious learned commentary, the humble commentary for students, and (very commonly practiced by classicists) the ambitious learned commentary headed by a *recusatio* purporting that the subjoined work is only a humble commentary-for-students.[2]

The present collection concentrates mainly on the last type: those nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries commentaries found on the axis between the 'ambitious learned commentary' and the 'humble commentary for students.' We have not aimed for comprehensive or systematic coverage, but rather offer papers on a representative range of critical issues associated with the methodology of commentary writing and with different types of commentary, asking especially how differences in the genre of the commented text affect the kind of commentary required. Among the subjects addressed are commentaries on the Homeric poems, whether 'traditional' (West) or 'modern' (De Jong); philosophical commentaries, both Greek (Rowe) and Latin (Dyck); commentaries on Latin poetry (Gibson), on historiographical narratives (Ash), on fragmentary (Stephens) and pseudonymous texts (Hunter); and electronic commentaries (McCarty). Although there is a bias towards the 'learned commentary,' less ambitious examples of the genre receive detailed attention too, including nineteenth-century 'school' commentaries on Xenophon's *Anabasis* (Rijksbaron), and R. G. Austin's famous 'sixth-form and undergraduate' editions of Cicero's *Pro Caelio* (Henderson). Furthermore, while the focus is primarily on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a number of papers draw attention to continuities (and discontinuities) between modern commentaries and their forerunners in antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance. Subjects covered include Galen's commentaries on Hippocrates (von Staden), the Byzantine scholar Tzetzes'

[2] *BMCR* 2000.05.19, Review of Most (below, n.4).

commentaries on Homer and other ancient Greek literature (Budelmann), the commentaries on Vergil by the Spanish Renaissance commentator La Cerda (Laird), and the evolution of modern Ciceronian commentaries from the *variorum* editions of the seventeenth century (Dyck). The collection is introduced by a discussion from one of the editors (Kraus) of some general aspects of commenting, and concludes with some personal reflections on the collection as a whole, the experience of commenting, and the economics of commentary-publishing (Fantham). With the exception of the first and last papers, which bracket the volume in a sort of counterpoint, the chapters are grouped in pairs, an arrangement intended to spark dialogue about the relations between the various essays. So, for example, Rijksbaron and Ash—though the one deals with nineteenth-century school editions, the other with modern commentary on Tacitus—both confront the sort of problems facing commentators on an influential ancient historian.

The collection has its origins in two panels on the subject of the classical commentary. The first was held at the British Classical Association AGM in Nottingham in April 1996, and the second at the American Philological Association AGM in Chicago in December 1997. At the time little in the way of sustained discussion of commentaries had found its way into print.[3] However in July 1997, between the CA and APA panels, Glenn Most hosted a conference on the subject of commentaries at the Internationales Wissenschaftsforum at Heidelberg University. The conference resulted in an edited volume,[4] and the reader may welcome some general explanation of the relationship of the present collection to the former, particularly as most of our contributors make reference to this prior volume and many engage directly with a number of its papers. Most's book comprises an editorial Preface and a concluding chapter on *copia*, papers on commentaries on religious texts (Babylonian, Hebrew, Greek Christian,

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[3] Some papers on classical literature and on Roman law can be found in the more broadly focussed collection edd. J. Assmann and B. Gladigow, *Text und Kommentar* (1995); on classical texts see G. W. Most, *The Measures of Praise* (1985) 30–41; J. Ma, 'Black Hunter Variations,' *PCPS* 40 (1994) 49–80; J. Griffin, 'The Guidance that We Need,' *TLS* 14/4/95:13–14.

[4] G. W. Most, ed., *Commentaries—Kommentare* (1999). See now also M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, ed., *Le Commentaire entre Tradition et Innovation* (2000). An LTSN conference on 'Learning and Teaching with Texts, Commentaries and Translations' was held in January 2002, and a London conference on 'Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries' is announced for June 2002.

Buddhist/Taoist, and Islamic), four on commentaries on scientific and philosophical texts (Babylonian, Hellenistic, and later Greek, including Neoplatonic exegesis and the commentaries of Galen), three on early modern and later European commentaries on paintings and sculptures, two papers on medieval reception and transformation of the commentary genre, and two on the commentary practices of modern classicists. In the first of this final pair Simon Goldhill investigates the critical methodology implicit in the practices of modern commentators (particularly those on Greek tragedy); in the second the late Don Fowler explores some of the possibilities offered to commentaries by developments in electronic media. As will be clear from the comments made earlier, the present volume is closest in its character and concerns to these two papers (and secondarily to those on ancient Homeric, Neoplatonic, and Hippocratic commentaries: respectively by I. Sluiter, J. Dillon, and J. T. Vallance). The ambit of the present collection is thus simultaneously both narrower and more focused than its predecessor.[5] We include no commentaries or commentators other than those concerned with the (mainstream) texts of the Greek and Roman classical tradition, and concentrate in particular (although not exclusively) on recent examples and current practices in commentary-writing; several contributors offer—and deconstruct—samples of commentary of their own devising. One of the reasons for this is practical: we hope that the collection, while of general scholarly interest, may also have some impact on how future commentaries are written, whether in codex or electronic form.

The editors wish to thank a number of people and organizations who aided the progress of this project in various ways: Pat Easterling and Catharine Edwards, who helped make the original CA panel a success; Stephanie West for the epigraph; the Classical Association of Great Britain, who sponsored our APA panel and funded part of the expenses; Michiel Klein Swormink and Gera van Bedaf (and

[5] This difference between the nature of the two collections is perhaps related to the disciplines of the personnel involved. For many of the participants at the Heidelberg conference—non-classicists—the commentary tradition was something mainly of historical interest; a number expressed surprise that commentaries were still being written. Of course, this ignores the dominance of the commentary format in biblical studies, and the fact that detailed commentaries are still published on modern literary texts: e.g., J. Fuller's recent six-hundred page *W. H. Auden: A Commentary* (1998).

before them Marcella Mulder and especially Julian Deahl) at Brill; the School of History and Classics of the University of Manchester, who helped with reprographic expenses; Tony Woodman for invaluable help with proofreading; Cambridge University Press for permission to reproduce extracts from R. K. Gibson, *Ovid: Ars Amatoria 3* (forthcoming, 2002); Oxford University Press for permission to reprint material from G. E. F. Chilver, *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus'* Histories *I and II* (© OUP 1979) and from E. R. Dodds, *Euripides Bacchae* (© OUP 1960).

RKG wishes to thank Glenn Most for his generous invitation to the Heidelberg conference on commentaries in 1997; the School of History and Classics of the University of Manchester, who funded part of the expenses of the trip to the APA in 1997; and Chris Kraus, for being patient.

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Manchester/Oxford December 2001/New Year 2002

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FURTHER READING

A list of works cited will be found at the end of each contribution to this collection. We offer below a select core bibliography drawn from those lists. We have not cited individual reviews of commentaries here, though as a class they are an important source of theorizing about commentaries.

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1. INTRODUCTION: READING COMMENTARIES/ COMMENTARIES AS READING

Christina Shuttleworth Kraus

I

> The foremost characteristic was an intense, conscientious, even virtuous concentration on the primary text, which is strongly valorized by the process of commentary.
>
> Ma (1994) 76

> If we want to draw a moustache on the Mona Lisa, we can.
>
> Fowler (1999) 438

Commentaries are funny things. On the one hand, they can be described as parasitic on a 'primary' text, whose needs (and the needs of whose readers) they serve as well as their own; on the other, they can direct our attention away from the text being commented on, supplementing that text with new meaning(s) and context(s).[1] If imagined in the first way, they can be described as following the rhythms and agenda of the primary text, and as thereby fundamentally untouched by ideological or interpretative issues of their own.[2] Especially in classical studies—the field with which this volume is concerned—commentaries have generally been seen as more closely

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[1] Parasitism: Vallance (1999) 232; outward gaze: Ma (1994) 77. Fantham (below) 403 speaks of 'loyalty' to the commented text. Individual exceptions to this and all the following generalizations will easily spring to mind. Rather than being exhaustive, this chapter tries to sketch broadly some of the issues raised by the commentary format, using the fundamental (but admittedly artificial) polarity outlined here as a reference mark. Though my own experience derives from writing commentaries on historiographical texts, I have tried to expand my focus to include other genres here.

[2] Cf. Ma (1994) 75–6 for some not untypical formulations: "[the historical commentary] just plows through the text . . . it does not have a strong line of argument . . . it was conceptually the easier [section] to execute. . . . [The commentary mode] leave[s] the responsibility of conceptualization to the reader."

related to philological/textual or historical work than to discursive studies;[3] this affinity is signaled in the very format of a commentary volume, which either includes or presumes possession and close consultation of the text on which it comments. You cannot (or should not) read a commentary *without* the text. Indeed, many—perhaps most—commentators are also textual critics, one of whose primary tasks is to establish the text on which they comment.[4] This close relationship is perhaps most obvious in volumes in which the commentary literally underlies the text; but all commentaries depend on a 'primary' or 'original' text in a way that literary-critical treatments—even those as text-dependent as new-critical 'explications de texte'—do not.[5]

This close relationship to historical and philological exegesis has attracted to commentaries evaluative adjectives such as 'empirical,' 'objective,' 'common-sense,' 'scientific' (in the sense of *wissenschaftlich*),[6] 'positivist,'[7] and—above all—'useful.'[8] Opposed to these are the adjectives often applied to 'discursive' studies (i.e., monographs): 'subjective,'

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[3] Again, I signal only a tendency; historical exegesis is itself interpretative in the most profound sense. For commentaries and 'philology' see Brink (1986) chapter 9, especially 186–7 and Fantham (below); for philology and literary criticism see Ziolkowsi (1990) and Harrison (2001); for a problematizing view of "traditional textual criticism, which tries on the whole to establish single, finite meanings," see Moles (1986) 59.

[4] This is less true of school commentaries, though some modern ones provide new texts while avoiding elaborate critical apparatuses and discussion of textual problems. Generally speaking, the more explicitly scholarly the commentary, the more textual the notes.

[5] Some of the best known to classicists are the 'Critical Appreciations' series published in the journal *Greece & Rome*: the very title of the series emphasizes the interpretative role of the receiver/critic over the primacy of the interpreted text.

[6] Griffin (1995) 13–14; cf. the Heidelberg series, Wissenschaftliche Kommentare zu griechischen und lateinischen Schriftstellern, or Teubner's Sammlung wissenschaftlicher Commentare; on the not unrelated concept of 'scientific' history see Grafton (1997) chapter 2.

[7] Classicists have (in general) given up on positivism, but outside perceptions of the classical commentary can be revealing: cf. Phillips (2000) 141, reviewing Fantham (1998): "the commentary [sc. format] . . . promotes empirico-positivism."

[8] E.g., Murgia (1984) 314, "Writers of commentaries, good ones, deserve our every encouragement. Few works are as useful, difficult, and dangerous." 'Utility' has multiple possible applications; one might single out (1) providing and arguing for a readable text; (2) serving readers' linguistic/grammatical needs; (3) providing a ground-cover of interpretation from which further readings can start. Rowe is the strongest advocate in this volume for the *utilitas* of commentaries, though all the contributors consider to varying degrees the commentary's functionality.

'transient,' 'rhetorical,' 'coherent.'[9] The relationship of commentaries to such discursive treatments, however, is complicated. Because commentaries draw on and refer to such studies, a slightly paradoxical relationship is created, in which the work of literary criticism, rather than being a self-contained unity, becomes a quarry for, or a fragmentary element of, a larger whole, providing a focused discussion of a very restricted point.[10] The commentary treats critical discussions in much the same way as it does parallel (ancient) texts, excerpting, concentrating, shifting the focus of the discussion to the commentator's new preoccupations. Yet commentaries also often contain their *own* extensive literary discussions: aside from the standard practice of including a general introduction, some move from detailed notes to synthetic essay,[11] while a few are essentially essays in the form of a running commentary whose organization is geared to the sequence of the commented text.[12] The shifting and complex relations among these different types of interpretation is well brought out by Brink's Preface to his third volume on Horatian literary criticism, in which he describes his arrangement (text with apparatus—brief summary + commentary—extended essays) as "rolling two, or perhaps three, books into one. . . . This procedure makes [the volumes] more difficult and time-consuming to use than a straight edition and a commentary," he continues; "on the other hand it shows where the road leads." He continues the metaphor of the road in describing the interrelations of the three types of exegesis, and their ultimate goal of (total) interpretation: "I believe I have learned, in wandering this rather rough road, that, if you want to get out of

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[9] Respectively Griffin (1995) 14, Henderson (1980) 204, Ma (1994) 75, Brink (1982) x.

[10] A phenomenon not, of course, unique to commentaries. The affinity of footnotes and other forms of annotation with commentaries is brought out by Grafton (1997) and will be exploited in this Introduction, as it is by Gibson and Laird (both below). See also von Staden (below) 129.

[11] Extended introductions to individual poems are common (e.g., Nisbet–Hubbard [1970], McKeown [1989]); Coleman (1977), followed by Morton Braund (1996), reversed the order so that the essay followed the poem. Appendices can also incorporate extended discussion, as, e.g., in Fraenkel (1950) or Goodyear (1972).

[12] E.g., Williams (1969), Barsby (1973), West (1995b). Fantham (1982) is lemmatic but incorporates a high degree of 'essay-type' material; see her remarks below, 410. Translation easily nudges into commentary: cf. Kennedy (1995): the "attention to linguistic tone . . . makes [his] translations as good as a commentary in themselves" and see Rowe 297, Stephens 81–3, and (on the Budé series) Fantham 417 (all below).

philologia what *philologia* has in it, then you must not cut it off before the end."

The complications which Brink perceives in writing his multi-layered study of Horace take us to a central problem about commentaries. One might read the last sentence quoted as implying that the *via philologiae* preexists: that is, that the text *and its problems* are both there before the commentator comes along to clear the road. Yet Brink goes on to suggest that the road is itself created by the commentator: "The field [of aspects of poetic analysis] is there, but we have to find our own paths through it."[13] For commentaries are readings: no matter what the *auctoritas* of a commentator (and it can be considerable), a commentary is first and foremost an interpretation. Neither the meaning of a text nor the problems perceived as obstructing/complicating that meaning are there to be found; both are created by readers.[14] Owing on the one hand (perhaps) to its ancient pedigree, and on the other (probably) to its dependence on another text,[15] it is a particularly orphaned interpretation, in which the status of the commentator-as-author has been progressively blurred, till the 'I' of the commentator tends toward the mute:[16]

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[13] Respectively Brink (1982) x, xii, xiv.

[14] So, e.g., Feeney (1996), "Nisbet kept his interpretative work on Horace's *Odes* for the commentary." Though some fundamental textual problems will be perceived by all readers, textual criticism is on the whole also interpretative: cf. Maas (1958) 40–1, "practically every problem in textual criticism is a problem of *style*" and, more radically, Vallance (1999) 224, "Textual criticism is a particularly artful and radical form of commentary [in which] the critic comments on texts by rewriting them."

[15] The question of which texts are selected for commentary is often oversimplified. Many assume that only already 'authoritative' texts are chosen (so, e.g., Stierle [1990] 19; Most [1999] VIII, "the author about whose text one writes a commentary is always an authority . . . these authoritative texts"); but the Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries series, for one, began in 1975 with an edition of Machon and has tended to emphasize texts without canonical status. Inclusion in such a series, of course, tends to generate attention and eventual inclusion, if not in 'The Canon' (however understood: see *Arethusa* [1994]), then at least in a list of texts approved and available for teaching, as has happened in the case of Martin–Woodman (1989), which has—it seems—made *Annals* 4 the most widely-read book of Tacitus on the planet. See further Gumbrecht (1999) 448 and (on texts lacking authority) Hunter, below.

[16] There are certainly exceptions; on Tzetzes see Budelmann and on the commentator's *persona* see Henderson (both below); see also my n.54. In modern commentaries it seems to be collaborative works which highlight the individual commentators' opinions where these differ among themselves, e.g., Nisbet–Hubbard (1970) and (1978), Woodman–Martin (1996). But the *tendency* is to efface the 'I'—partly, perhaps, a consequence of the pared-down style expected in commentaries

> the commentator inscribes herself into a pre-existing tradition . . . layers of commentaries, by their generic constitution, are always open for further information. . . . [They are] always potentially multi-authored—and their intrinsic complexity and open-endedness . . . does not require the structuring power of a single strong (author- or editor-) subject (Gumbrecht [1999] 449).

And yet. That single strong subject is in fact often heard clearly, and the model of the invisible commentator little more than a professional fiction. But the louder the commentator's voice, the more it may be judged obtrusive or overbearing, and the more it attracts parody and criticism. Alongside too much personal opinion comes the problem of too little self-restraint: so a reviewer might single out "the commentators' twin diseases of a rash of parallels . . . and a flush of bibliographical excess," or a humorist mock the genre as a whole for its tendency to pedantry and prolixity, the vices of the scholar who can't or won't shut up.[17] Though the genre by its nature attracts *copia*, having an ingrained desire to fill a text's margins to overflowing, when it does so the commentator may be criticized for drowning the text with information; criticism is especially loud when that information seems without guidance, lacking the paths through it that Brink adumbrates and reviewers often call for.[18] On this view, the characteristic 'mini-treatise' or long, compendious note, in particular, comes to seem not a mine of information but a distraction from the text on which we *should* be concentrating.[19]

(cf. Moles [1984] 242, "The presentation is needlessly expansive, with much use of the first person . . .").

[17] Craik (1995) 9, cf. Kenney (1971) vii, "leaving [the reader] in the lurch, the besetting sin of commentators"; humor: Jones (1983) 27–8, and above all, Nabokov (1962). A spirited response in Henry (1873) vii–viii, "Let not, then, the reader complain of the length of the work I have laid before him. It is in his own interest and his author's it is long. Whatever any individual reader . . . may happen to find too long, he can at pleasure curtail for himself. He would, perhaps, have found it less easy to lengthen anything I had curtailed."

[18] E.g., Taylor-Briggs (1994) 280, Osborne (1995) 254. Some distinguished commentators are famously laconic (e.g., Shackleton Bailey [1965–70]), but *copia* has been seen as an essential impulse of annotators. See especially Belloc (1948) 186 on the 'plague of footnotes'; Grafton (1997) 115–18, 191, and 196; Gumbrecht (1999); and de Jong (below) 50–1 on the dream of comprehensiveness; for a study of the most notorious margin-filler see Henderson (1998) and on marginalia themselves Jackson (2001). Some people just can't resist footnotes. . . .

[19] On the compendious note's virtues see Fraenkel, quoted below by Budelmann 161 and Gibson 344. Will the Internet relieve the pressures? See Section V and McCarty (below).

This distraction may be perceived as merely irritating, or as challenging the integrity and meaning of the commented text. What happens when, in the name of economy, a commentator anticipates a crucial, perhaps suspenseful, action in the main text, giving away the ending, as it were?[20] Or indeed, when a problem in the text is 'solved' by the note *ad loc.* but in a way which shifts the reader's interpretative energies and interests in a direction other than the one in which they were originally heading? How much damage—or influence—do notes, whether in their form[21] or their content, have on the reader's perception of the commented text? To what extent, finally, is reading against the grain something we value in commentaries, and does such cross-grained reading threaten, or creatively challenge, the 'primary' text's authority (see further Fantham 414 and Gibson 350, both below)?

The much debated death of the author was followed in the last century by an enhancement of status of both critic and critical material, together with a new emphasis on the role of the reader in creating meaning.[22] The Penelopean weaving between annotation and text characteristic of footnotes is also perceived as taking place between a commentator's notes and the authorial text. Instead of one voice annotating itself, there are two voices, two authorities intertwining and interacting, their paths traced (one might go so far as to say, created) by a third, the reader.[23] Commentaries may come to be

[20] See, e.g., Ash 290–1, de Jong 63–4, and West 34, all below, and cf. the discussion of Cairns (1979) chapter 6 (a reference I owe to Alan Griffiths).

[21] Commentary layout is an issue of considerable importance not treated extensively in this volume (but see Budelmann, Section 1); it is the subject of papers in Goulet-Cazé (2000). Cf.—more briefly—Pfeiffer (1968) 218 on the pre-codex format; Kenney (1974) 63–4 on the changes brought by typographical technology; Cancik in Assmann–Gladigow (1995) on Cicero; Grafton (1997) 214 and Lamont (1997) 59 on distinguishing visually between text and annotation in codex and hypertext format, respectively; and Boyarin (1999) on the format of commentaries on Jewish sacred texts.

[22] For an introduction to the issues involved in the critic's increasing visibility and importance see Patterson (1990) with Zons (in Assmann–Gladigow [1995] 405) on the collapse of distinctions between literature and literary criticism, text and metatext, text and commentary in a post-de Man world. For a start on reader-response theory for classicists see de Jong–Sullivan (1994) 284–5 and see the seminal discussion of Fish (1980).

[23] Penelope: Grafton (1997) 233. On the layering of readers see Mayer (1994) vii, "A commentary on a standard classical author is a dialogue with the dead. The commentator engages not just with the ancient text but also with [its] long exegetical tradition." Note that Brink (1982) xiv thanks three deceased classical scholars: Housman, Wilamowitz, and Bentley.

studied as cultural or ideological texts in their own right, with didactic aims of their own, steering the 'primary' text in a direction intended to answer very contemporary questions of meaning.[24] Even—or perhaps especially—sacred texts invite this kind of layered reading and (re)writing of commentary and commentary-reader.[25] From this viewpoint, no longer is a commentary a bridge between an eternal text and a transient, contemporary reader, but it takes on an authority that can compromise, challenge, and even replace the authority of the commented text.[26]

In the following pages I will briefly consider three areas which have received special attention both from the contributors to this volume, and in recent studies on commentaries: segmentation ('atomization,' 'morselization,' or 'lemmatization'), tralaticiousness, and parallels. In the process I will focus on the two readers impli(cat)ed in any commentary enterprise: the commentator (who reads the 'primary' text) and the commentary reader or audience, who reads both text and commentary. Their roles and the relationship between them raise fundamental questions, both theoretical and practical, about the status and nature of reading.

II. *Readers and/as Authors*

> In the text, only the reader speaks.
> Barthes (1974) 151

> I might be attaching to passages in my electronic text references to contributions available on-line alongside links to my own material: constructing what I know and feel in the form of a commentary, as a prosthetic extension of myself.
> Fowler (1999) 432

[24] On commentaries themselves having plots see Budelmann and von Staden (both below), with Vallance (1999) on the 'non-submissive commentary'; for commentaries becoming new cultural texts see Laird (below) on la Cerda, and further Cutler (1992) 549, 559–60, especially 565, "A commentator . . . is a spokesman for an interpretive community"; Minnes (below, n.26); and Roberts (1995) 290.

[25] See Boyarin (1999) with Grafton (1997) 27 on how "scribes and authors alike worked veins of commentary directly into the text of the Hebrew Bible"; this 'collaborative' kind of reading/writing is a standard type of interpolation in classical texts (Tarrant [1987] 290–7).

[26] Stierle (1990) 21 is good on commentary's ambiguous position; see also Minnes

'The reader,' 'the audience.' Not monolithic entities at the best of times; when speaking of commentaries, which cannot escape the fundamental need to be useful, the concept of 'audience' is a particularly pressing one.[27] The modern commentary on a classical text has, by and large, a single form (whether the notes lie under or after the text makes a difference to how we read, but is not a fundamental conceptual difference), but it has many incarnations.[28] These can be arranged in a sort of scholarly hierarchy, from the large or indeed multi-volume (sometimes multi-authored) commentary on a grand scale[29] to the middle-level commentary aimed explicitly at students but productively used also by scholars (the Cambridge 'green and yellow' series and Oxford 'reds' have a nearly proprietary niche here),[30] to the school commentary proper. The volumes at the lower end of the scale tend to come equipped with more in the way of basic help, including vocabulary lists. Because the commentary's deep structure comprises a set of answers to a series of (often unconnected) questions 'posed' by the primary text (but in fact asked by the commentator), matching the questions to the target audience is crucial to the success of a commentary, as measured by successful sales and peer reviews. So, for instance, that tolerance for the kind of 'distraction' produced by 'over'-abundant illustrative parallels and semi-digested notes discussed above is higher for volumes at the top of the hierarchy, where such raw material can be comprehended and manipulated by a professional rather than a student reader.[31]

in Assmann–Gladigow (1995) on medieval commentary beginning "to reconstruct itself as treatise" (at 328) and Allen (1979) 25 on commentaries as works of literature, records of an "appropriation and transformation of images." On the enhanced status of commentary see also McCarty (below).

[27] See recently Pelling (1997) on plurality of audiences; even a single reader may have different needs/reactions (Hinds [1998] 47). On utility see above, n.8. McCarty (below), following Fowler, emphasizes the equally essential role of intellectual play, which facilitates pluralism and polyphony, in commentary reading/writing.

[28] On format see above, n.21. Some self-styled 'commentaries' do modify the standard form: e.g., Goldhill (1984), Taplin (1977), Kahane–Laird (2001).

[29] For those on Homer see West and de Jong, below; on the monumental see McCarty (below) Section 4.

[30] On the latter see Henderson (below). In this category fall some of the volumes published in the Aris and Phillips Classical text series, aimed at the nearly Greek- and Latin-less reader but in some cases (e.g., Sommerstein [1980–2001]) now standard editions for classical scholars.

[31] On question-and-answer see (e.g.) Cutler (1992) 559–60, Beard–Henderson (1995) 58; on the pleasures of *copia* see above, n.18 and below, n.61.

The kind of questions asked will depend, of course, on the commentator's historical and cultural assumptions, both about the ancient world and about how to read a text, and on the expectations of the 'interpretive community' who will use—and judge—the finished product. If the classical commentator has tended to ignore larger questions of methodology—Brink's self-examination in his Preface is unusual, and in fact he claims *not* to have thought it "his business to conceptualize these links . . . or to theorize on method"—this may be because as a genre with a pedigree almost as old as classical literature itself it easily takes its own formatting and assumptions for granted.[32] In fact, however, the field of commentary theory is something of a battleground.[33] The issues are fought primarily in the professional review journals, but also between publishers and teachers looking for texts with the right level and kind of annotation to put before their students. The practical questions of appropriate lemmata, selection of relevant material, and inclusion or citation of parallel texts have actual economic repercussions—apart from any ideas of the symbolic capital, and issues of power and authority, raised by the commentary format.[34] On a more (ludic) theoretical level, the give and take between the text and its commentary, and between the commentary and its reader, is a complex manifestation of the pull of narrative desire: a commentary becomes a kind of meta-narrative, a story told about, and around, a text, based on the tension between the disorder created by a problematic, or multiply-meaning, source-text, and the order generated by the satisfaction of the text's teasing answered—or only deferred?—by the commentator's judgment; and, in a kind of mise en abyme, on the tension between the meaning fixed by the commentator's 'answer' and the plurality of meaning(s) inevitably opened by the new paths suggested by the very process of answering.[35]

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32 Brink (1982) xiii, cf. Griffin (1995) 14, "No general problem of hermeneutics is raised; we all know what it is to understand a text." The classic discussion of the 'interpretive community' is Fish (1980); see also Lamont (1997) 53–4.

33 Goldhill (1999) 381: a 'fierce arena.'

34 See especially Boyarin (1999) and Eikelmann (1999); cf. Grafton (1997) 18. Many of the contributors to this volume discuss the practical side of commenting; see especially Ash, Fantham, Stephens, and West.

35 On the concepts of narrative desire and order in this paragraph see Barthes (1974). The earliest known exegete of a Greek text, Theagenes of Rhegium, may already have allegorized his Homeric source text—that is, read *differently*; it is

III. *Segmentation*

Il y'a une coupure. . .
Goldhill (1999) 416

The general issues raised by the question of how, and how much, to lemmatize a commented text are similar to those raised by the question of reading itself, both in ancient terms (in *scripta continua*, how do you divide a text into legible units?) and in modern (what divisions, structural and thematic, do we impose on a text when we read?).[36] Specific questions of categorization (what elements do we choose to comment on? for what kind of commentary user?) are similarly related to broader issues of division in the field of classics as a whole (do we want 'traditional' philological minutiae or a 'broader' 'interpretative' approach? analytic commentary on single words or synthetic discussion of large sections of a text?).[37] More specific to the present discussion are three points: (1) how does one select the bit of text to lemmatize (are lemmata 'natural,' 'inevitable'?); (2) what freedom does one have in making this selection (what pressures are generated by the commentary level chosen?); (3) what happens from the reader's perspective both to the text that is *not* lemmatized, and to the lemmatized text as a whole?

It is worth lingering on the obvious: how we divide a text for reading and for commentary is of paramount importance. Both Most, in his lucid discussion of commentaries on Pindar, and Ma, in his

significant that his name is preserved, along with that of his author(ity). See Feeney (1991) chapter 1, especially 9–11, and West (below) n.38.

[36] On the broader issues see Fowler (1995) and (2000) 261–2, 296. Whether we read/write διαστήτην or διὰ στήτην ('on account of a woman') at *Iliad* 1.6 will change the way we perceive the prologue and hence the themes of the whole epic; for the ancient sources see LSJ s.v. στῆτα. Division is fundamental to ancient reading, i.e., *grammatike*: Bonner (1977) 220–6.

[37] The approach of Goldhill (1984), which builds deconstructive points on a close linguistic and textual analysis of the *Oresteia*, is an interesting case/problem in this regard. Demand for analysis of large segments of text is hardly new: cf. Dante to Can Grande, "If any one, therefore, is desirous of offering any sort of introduction to a part of a work, it behooves him to furnish some notion of the whole of which it is a part" (trans. Toynbee–Hardie, quoted in Minnes–Scott [1988] 6) and see further below, especially Gibson and Rowe. On categorization see O'Donnell (1988) and, more generally, Foucault (1974) especially xv–xxiv; on fashions in commentary style see (e.g.) Vallance (1999) 225, "notions of what is acceptable as commentary clearly change with shifts in the institutional frameworks within which commentators work."

sophisticated comparison of modes of academic discourse, refer to lemmata as 'atoms' and to the process of choosing them as the 'atomization' of a text—vocabulary that evokes images of a smallest, least divisible unit, and also of an *inevitable* unit: what is more 'natural' and more 'given' than an atom? Concentrating on the effect lemmata can have, Most writes,

> the singleness of being of the units of the atomized text is bound up with their methodological equivalence (for each presents a problem which the interpreter is called upon to answer) and their isolation from one another (for the problem is in each case unique).... [T]he parts of the text move across the interpreter's field of vision as though on an assembly line.

In this formulation the commentator appears to be the passive recipient of a sequence of discrete problems immanent in the text—though we are not told who is running the assembly line (the author of the primary text? the commentary tradition?).[38] But a frequent experience of reading commentaries can seem to confirm this sense of inevitability. Anyone who has used more than one edition of a particular work knows that it is not only the illustrative parallels cited on a given point that tend to be tralatician. Lemmata themselves are also passed down from scholar to scholar, with the result that readers—including subsequent commentators—may come to regard other parts of the text as less important because lacking an epexegetical tradition. For readers who consult a commentary without closely reading a whole text alongside—the 'hit-and-run' commentary user (which includes, I suspect, many researching scholars)[39]—the unlemmatized bits of the source-text may quite literally disappear.

I will return below to a more generalized discussion of tralaticiousness; here I discuss by way of illustration the commentaries of Weissenborn-Müller (1885), Heurgon (1963) and Ogilvie (1965) on Livy 1.47.4-7:

> "Quin accingeris? non tibi ab Corintho nec ab Tarquiniis, ut patri tuo, peregrina regna moliri necesse est: di te penates patriique et patris

[38] Most (1985) 36-7. The danger of reducing a text to 'a heap of units' can be compensated for by the freedom to "angle one's comments at different points from different sides and approaches" (Griffin [1995] 13, cf. Ma [1994] 75).

[39] Ash (below) 274. See also Goldhill (1999) 405-6: "This may be how writers of commentaries expect to be used, and this may be reflected also in some commentators' habits of composition." On shared lemmata see especially Rijksbaron (below) Section VI.

imago et domus regia et in domo regale solium et nomen Tarquinium creat vocatque regem. Aut si ad haec parum est animi, quid frustraris civitatem? Quid te ut regium iuvenem conspici sinis? Facesse hinc Tarquinios aut Corinthum; devolvere retro ad stirpem, fratri similior quam patri." His aliisque increpando iuvenem instigat, nec conquiescere ipsa potest si, cum Tanaquil, peregrina mulier, tantum moliri potuisset animo ut duo continua regna viro ac deinceps genero dedisset, ipsa regio semine orta nullum momentum in dando adimendoque regno faceret. His muliebribus instinctus furiis Tarquinius circumire et prensare minorum maxime gentium patres; admonere paterni beneficii ac pro eo gratiam repetere; allicere donis iuvenes; cum de se ingentia pollicendo tum regis criminibus omnibus locis crescere.

["Come! Do your work! You are no stranger, as your father was, from Corinth or Tarquinii. No need for you to struggle for a foreign throne: it is yours already; the guardian gods of your hearth and home proclaim you king! Your father's bust, his palace, his royal seat, his name and yours—in these is your title. You dare not? Then why continue to play the cheat? Why let me look on you as a prince? It were better to slink back to Tarquinii or Corinth—like your brother, not your father;—better to be humble again, as your ancestors were humble long ago." His wife's taunts pricked young Tarquin to action. To Tullia the thought of Tanaquil's success was torture. She was determined to emulate it: if Tanaquil, a foreigner, had had influence enough twice in succession to confer the crown—first on her husband, then on her son-in-law—it was intolerable to feel that she herself, a princess of the blood, should count for nothing in the making, or unmaking, of kings. Tarquin could not stand against her maniacal ambition. Soon he was about his business: in and out of the houses of patrician families—the 'lesser' families especially—he began to solicit their support; he reminded them of the favours his father had done them, and urged them to show their gratitude; to the younger men he offered money as a bait; he vilified Servius, and promised heaven on earth, should he succeed. Support for him increased; everywhere his influence grew (translation de Sélincourt).]

The earliest of the three commentaries has the following lemmata: **peregrina regna; moliri; patrii; imago; domus; frustraris; regium iuvenem; conspici; facesse; devolvere; fratris . . . patris; increpando; dedisset; monumentum . . . faceret; muliebribus . . . furiis; circumire et prensare; beneficii; iuvenes; regis criminibus; omnibus locis crescere**. Heurgon has **quin; accingeris** (cited by Weissenborn–Müller as a *comparandum* for 47.5 *devolvere* but not lemmatized); **<u>moliri</u>; di penates; <u>patris imago</u>; creat; parum animi; <u>facesse</u>; <u>devolvere</u>; stirpem tuam; his aliisque; nec conquiescere potest si; <u>momentum</u> <u>facere</u>; <u>furiis</u>; <u>mulie-</u>**

bribus; circumire; admonere; criminibus.[40] The French editor is noticeably independent from the German, a divergence which may be due partly to the relatively restricted scope of the series to which the former belongs. Finally, Ogilvie has: **quin accingeris; Corintho; di te penates; imago; facesse hinc; devolvere retro; fratri similior quam patri; muliebribus instinctus furiis; minorum . . . gentium; circumire et prensare; allicere donis iuvenes.**[41] Though Ogilvie tends to cite more text in a lemma than either precursor, only two of his lemmata (*Corintho* and *minorum . . . gentium*) are not derived from one of these two earlier commentaries.[42] Interestingly, his notes diverge widely from either precursor; that is, his choice of what is relevant for understanding these Livian sentences is *not* tralatician. But what he considers worth commenting on is.

The assembly line has serious consequences. Selecting from a text its commentary-worthy bits is an act of interpretation that reflects the commentator's ideological and theoretical background, preconceptions, assumptions, and judgment of what an audience requires just as any other act of interpretation. Whether we agree with Barthes that 'in a text, only the reader speaks,' or whether we think that as readers we are trying to hear the author's own voice, we must recognize that one person's lemmata may well be another's uninteresting bits. Even choosing to reproduce earlier lemmata is an interpretative act (shades of 'Pierre Menard, Author of *Don Quixote*'?), one implicated, on the one hand, in issues of *aemulatio* of and deference to scholarly authority (see further below, Section IV) and, on the other, in theoretical questions of the nature of repetition.[43] As a

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[40] Lemmata shared with Weissenborn-Müller are underlined (and textual differences ignored); but note that where the German edition has *patris* and *imago* separately, Heurgon isolates the noun phrase; the converse is the case at 1.47.7 *muliebribus . . . furiis*, where the French editor separates (and mysteriously reverses the order of) the words.

[41] Lemmata shared with Weissenborn–Müller are underlined, those shared with Heurgon but not Weissenborn–Müller are marked with dotted underline.

[42] There are many other commentaries on Livy Book 1; I have chosen from those which predate Ogilvie's great scholarly treatment only two of the best known. Scale (Heurgon's is the slimmest, Ogilvie's the most generous) and national identity will of course play a part in the differences; on the latter see Rijksbaron (below) Section IV; Kenney (1989); Grafton (1997) 8–12 and cf. Griffin (1995) 14, "The British reader, unless contaminated by Continental notions, will generally feel well content."

[43] Can we step in the same parallel twice? See Rimmon-Kenan (1980) 152–3. Author's own voice: West (1995a) 15–17, with appropriate qualifications; uninteresting

reflection of someone else's reading, lemmata can guide our interpretation—but if we are responsible readers, they are also an open invitation to challenge the commentator's articulation. If 'looking' is at the root of theory (θεωρία), then the processes of selection and lemmatization are fundamental to theorizing, as they put a pattern onto a text which shows it in a different light. A lemmatized text literally looks different, and the reader in turn sees the text differently. Unlemmatized text is absent, unmarked, invisible, whether literally (if one does not return from commentary to text)[44] or figuratively, as it is disregarded by the cumulative authority of the commentary tradition to date.

Moreover, the process of choosing and elaborating on textual morsels furthers the decentering of the text that begins with the very existence of commentary, the direction of attention away from a unitary 'original.' In Barthes's words, a commentator separates

> in the manner of a minor earthquake, the blocks of signification of which reading grasps only the smooth surface, imperceptibly soldered by the movement of sentences, the flowing discourse of narration, the 'naturalness' of ordinary language. . . . The commentary, based on the affirmation of the plural, cannot . . . work with 'respect' to the text; the tutor text ['texte tuteur'] will ceaselessly be broken, interrupted without any regard for its natural divisions . . . the work of the commentary, once it is separated from any ideology of totality, consists precisely in *manhandling* the text, *interrupting* it. What is thereby denied is not the *quality* of the text . . . but its 'naturalness.'[45]

Together with its text, the commentary forces us to confront the artifice-iality of writing and of the written product.

Lemmata can even go so far as to challenge a text's linearity, that (apparently) fundamental quality of its sentences, which proceed from first word to last just as the work proceeds from start to finish. For

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bits: Jones (1983) 28, "Thersites' *Lex commentariensis quarta*? Oh, that is that if a passage is really difficult, it will attract no comment whatsoever."

[44] Especially easy to do in an edition like Ogilvie's, which does not print an accompanying text. Poetic texts, particularly dense ones such as lyric, may have every word lemmatized; even so, the lemmatized text will take on a different look.

[45] Barthes (1974) 13, 15; quoted also by Landow (1997) 64 in 'Reconfiguring the Text'; cf. also Genette (1982) 147 on "the fetishism of the work—conceived of as a closed, complete, absolute object" and Gruenwald in Assmann–Gladigow (1995) 79, "Imposing any kind of interpretative perspective on a text may amount to deconstructing it." On the 'center' of a text see Lamont (1997) 58–9, Landow (1997) 88 ('hypertext thrives on marginality'), and McGann (1997) 40–5.

example: Thomas (1988) on *Georgics* 4.545–6 *inferias Orphei Lethaea papavera mittes | et nigram mactabis ovem lucumque revises.* Following a general discussion of the couplet, he lemmatizes **inferias Orphei . . . papavera mittes; Lethaea papavera; mittes | . . . mactabis . . . revises.** As the lemmata progress we are reminded that *papavera* has an adjective (initially sunk in the ellipsis); the commentary then takes *mittes* from the first lemma and extends our glance into the poem's next line, twin processes of expansion, internal and linear, which are not suggested by the first lemma. Whether the reader starts from the 'whole' text and proceeds to the commentary, or even (illicitly) starts from the commentary and goes back to the 'original' text, the effect is one of fragmentation, and—most importantly—of an invitation to put the sentences together differently from the way the author of the text once did. Instead of 'strongly valorizing' the text, commentaries challenge its authority, sometimes profoundly. The critic's segmentation is one of those challenges: whatever weave the author put into the work, the commentator inevitably deconstructs it, picks it apart, de-con-textualizes it.[46]

Such fragmentation raises the problem of textual wholeness, to which Barthes (quoted above) refers as the 'ideology of totality.' Intellectually we know that any text is a construction—it's something *made*, a fiction—but we still *want* it to be a 'natural' whole. (Consider, for example, how many discussions of ancient works begin by worrying about whether or not the work is a 'unity.') In the field of classics this question is particularly urgent: the fragility of the survival of classical texts raises deep unease about types of scholarship that either do not concentrate on that fragile text or that come all too close to reducing the painstakingly reconstructed whole to the tatters with which it began.[47] By classifying commentaries as an adjunct to 'pure,' 'heroic,' 'cleansing' textual criticism[48] scholars attempt (perhaps unconsciously) to domesticate what might otherwise be an awkward kind of reading, neither the original text nor a book about it, but something in between: a fusion of critic and

[46] Contrary—or complementary—to what several have singled out as crucial function of commentaries, i.e., situating a work in its cultural, historical, literary (etc.) context: see Stierle (1990) 21–2 and Dyck and Laird (below). On linearity see Lamont (1997) 57–8.

[47] In this volume see especially Budelmann, Hunter, and Stephens, and cf. Moles (1986) 59.

[48] Griffin (1995) 13; the Wild West metaphors below are also his.

author in which the former, all in the guise of employing the most traditional historical and/or philological methods—'manhandles' the text and shows it to be just what it is: something made. However that may be, in the best of all possible worlds I would like to see the commentary not as an 'instrument of settled education' deployed by those who follow in the footsteps of the gun-slinging pioneers of textual criticism, but as a map, or an adventure, in which nature and artifice combine not only to elucidate the text but also to make it new.

IV. *"Only be sure always to call it, please, research"*[49]

> Like all editors, I have pillaged my predecessors, sometimes with acknowledgment, but often without.
>
> Dodds (1960) vii

The well-known tendency of lemmata and illustrative material to reproduce themselves from generation to generation is perhaps the most shared point of discussion among the papers in this volume.[50] It is a tendency which contributes to the disappearance of the individual commentator's voice, which is submerged in the tide of 'previous commentators.' The tralaticiousness of lemmata seems to challenge the idea that commentators engage in a conscious act of interpretation: the windowless monads moving before their gaze may well be powered by the commentary tradition itself.[51] This tradition on the one hand becomes a repository of wisdom fueling the scholarship of the future: *variorum* editions visually represent the collected views of (selected) commentators, productively subsuming each individual voice to the whole; while Web commentaries, with their (theoretically) infinite capacity for expansion, provide a model for a new kind of (authorless?) *variorum*.[52]

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[49] T. Lehrer, 'Lobachevsky.'

[50] It is also a figure of fun: cf. Belloc (1948) 173–4 on the reference that had been since 1738 "first corrupted and then copied and recopied . . . by the University charlatans." See especially Henderson below on Austin's self-*aemulatio*/correction.

[51] Above, section III. On some major difficulties entailed by this respect for the *mos maiorum* see, e.g., Willcock (1994) 256 (problems arising from using Leaf's Homer as the basis of the Cambridge *Iliad* commentary).

[52] On the *variorum* see Fish (1980) 147–80 and Dyck (below) 320 on Cicero; on

And yet. Within the tralatician commentary runs a powerful engine of *aemulatio* and anxiety of influence. There are local, and temporal, fashions in commentaries which counteract the urge to reproduce a previous generation's morsels.[53] Ogilvie's notes on Livy 1.47.1–4 (above, 13) do not duplicate earlier material to the same degree as his lemmata. Given the unusually deep-seated tension in the genre between tradition and originality, however, and the felt need to cite the views of earlier commentators, whether for thoroughness or to produce an air of authority, this *aemulatio* can be relatively subdued. In this, as in other things—and despite the aggressiveness for which some commentators, especially in the Housmanian tradition, are famous—the commentator is often shy about saying 'I think.'[54] Yet in many ways, not least in the marshaling of ever more recondite parallels and bibliography, commentators vie with one another to produce increasingly learned, or pointed, works.

By way of illustration, I consider here two famous commentators' notes on Sophocles, *Ajax* 167–171:

> **167–171 ἀλλ' ὅτε γὰρ δὴ . . . πτήξειαν ἄφωνοι.** The most probable account of this passage is that **δ'** should be inserted after αἰγυπιὸν in 169 (cr. n.). 'We can do nothing without thee;—*no* (we are helpless), *for*, when they have escaped thine eye, they chatter like flocking birds; *but* (δέ) terrified by the mighty vulture, perchance they will suddenly cower,' etc. Note these points:—
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> (i) **ἀλλὰ;** prefaces a confirmation of the statement just made in a *negative* form (165 οὐδὲν σθένομεν): cp. *El.* 307. . . .
>
> (2) **ἀλλὰ . . . γὰρ** is elliptical; 'No (we can do nothing), for' etc.: cp. *El.* 223 . . . *Ant.* 155 . . . etc.
>
> (3) The reading **μέγαν αἰγυπιὸν δ' ὑποδείσαντες,** which allows the words μέγαν αἰγυπιὸν to *begin* the clause describing the sudden discomfiture of the foes, gives those words a signal force and spirit. They become much tamer, if, deleting ὑποδείσαντες and the stop after ἀγέλαι, we place a comma

the Internet see below McCarty, Stephens, and (skeptically) Fantham 418–19. Projects to digitize and/or cannibalize standard published commentaries raise new questions of tralaticiousness—to say nothing of intellectual property and the definition of authority. See in general Landow (1997) chapter 4, 'Reconfiguring the Author.'

53 Cf., e.g., Willcock (1994) 257 on Oxford's liking for Macleod's *Iliad* 24 commentary; and see Goldhill (1999) on rivalry among Aeschylean commentators.

54 On aggressiveness in commentators see Goldhill (1999) 390–1 and Budelmann (below) 149; on irenic commentary see Henderson (below) 213; on the 'I' above, Section I.

after αἰγυπιόν, and govern it by ἀποδρᾶσαι supplied from **ἀπέδραν**.

(4) This reading is confirmed by the fact that since **ὑποδείσαντες** refers to the foes of Ajax (and not, as the schol. took it, to the birds), there is a change from simile to metaphor: the 'vulture' is Ajax. This is quite in the manner of Sophoclean imagery: cp. n. on Ant. 117ff.—For other views, see Appendix.

ὅτε . . .δὴ, epic, 'when now,' 'when at length,' *Od.* 2. 314 νῦν δ' ὅτε δὴ μέγας εἰμί.—**ἀπέδραν**, for ἀπέδρασαν (Thuc. i. 128). . . .—**αἰγυπιὸν**, an Homeric image: *Od.* 22. 302. . . .—**τάχ' ἂν** can mean only 'perchance': we cannot take **τάχα** separately, as = 'swiftly'; **ἐξαί-φνης** should be taken with **πτή-ξειαν**, notwithstanding Alcaeus fr. 27, which the poet clearly had in mind. . . .—**σιγῇ πτήξειαν ἄφωνοι**: σιγῇ implies motionless awe; cp. Pind. *P.* 4.57. . . .

ἀλλ' . . . γὰρ as elsewhere (Denniston 103) resumes the main topic after a digression, and **δὴ** emphasizes the **γὰρ** (Denniston 244): 'Truly, however, when . . .'. But Jebb takes the **ἀλλ' . . . γὰρ** as 'No (we can do nothing) for,' comparing *El.* 223, *Ant* 155. For **ἅτε** (v.l. ἅπερ) = 'like,' see further in Denniston 526. **ὄμμ'** here 'sight, vision' (see Index). **ἀπέδραν**: the shorter form for – έδρασαν. . . . **παταγοῦσιν**: onomatopoeic: 'make a hubbub' (including fluttering and flapping as well as voice-noises: cf. LS). **αἰγυπιὸν**: 'eagle' here (not 'vulture' as often elsewhere) as in *Iliad* 17, 460, *Odyssey* 22, 302 (which has similarities to this passage): vultures do not pursue or terrify other birds: see D. W. Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds* (2nd edn., Oxford, 1936) and Snell-Mette, *Lexikon* at αἰετός. For the general notion cf. Alcaeus 52 . . . (closely resembling Sophocles's ἐξαίφνης . . . φανείης here): the *Simile* is more fully developed in Bacchylides, *Epinikians* 4,16–30. Perhaps an allusion to the etymology of Αἴας from αἰετός (see on 430) is intended. The general picture of the lesser birds and the eagle is clear, but the exact construction of 169 is uncertain; and all mss have **αἰγυπιὸν ὑποδείσαν-τες**. . . . I have followed Jebb and Pearson in accepting Dawes's insertion of **δ'**, without great confidence. Other suggestions are: σ' (Toup); γ' (Heath); delete ὑποδείσαντες (Dobree) or place it after φανείης (Lobeck): for more drastic suggestions see Harry 105–6 and in *Classical Philology* viii (1913), 88–90. ἐξαίφνης qualifies both φανείης and πτήξειαν (*cf.* on 153).[55]

There are tangible differences in layout, producing differences in clarity of analysis: the older commentary is visually easier to follow, partly benefiting the 'hit-and-run' user, and producing a series of notes whose sequence and relations are easier to digest. A couple of

[55] Jebb (1896) 35–6 (I have cut most of his extended quotations of parallel texts); Stanford (1963) 80 (I have again cut some quoted Greek and two short morphological notes).

points of detail: the note on δ', with which Jebb unlocks the section as a whole and which leads up to his point (4) on Sophoclean imagery, Stanford buries in his analysis, as a textual point incapable of resolution (though it receives a fair amount of space). Jebb, by contrast, postpones technical discussion of more major textual issues to the Critical Notes which follow the play. On αἰγυπιόν, the central point for Stanford is what kind of bird is meant (he appeals not only to etymology and ornithology, but brings in, in addition to Jebb's Homer and Alcaeus parallels, a passage from Bacchylides); for Jebb, it again feeds into the larger point about Sophoclean imagery. The older commentator is more visceral, less shaded: "the 'vulture' is Ajax." Again, detailed discussion of 'other views' is postponed to an Appendix. To some extent these differences (and one could find others) reflect the commentators' wider scholarly concerns: throughout his great Sophocles edition Jebb strives to present the playwright in the round, while Stanford is acutely interested in word play and ambiguity. But Jebb's commentary text is also, clearly, a text for Stanford to comment on—what Barthes might call a 'texte tuteur'—almost as much as is Sophocles' play. The relationship, however, is shaded. On their first point of disagreement (the meaning of ἀλλ' . . . γάρ), Stanford registers only a slight difference of opinion ("But Jebb . . ."); on the second, the meaning of αἰγυπιόν, he corrects Jebb ("not 'vulture' as often elsewhere") but without naming him (similarly in his last sentence, on the modifier ἐξαίφνης). A respectful attitude toward the great precursor. Agreement, where expressed, is—interestingly—lukewarm: "I have followed Jebb and Pearson . . . without great confidence" (and other possibilities, with learned references, follow, undercutting the concord).

Aemulatio in commentaries looks inward, rather than outward; it serves the professional needs of scholars, not of their non-professional or student readers. Dare you tackle a text with a prestigious commentary already ringing it round? Can you do better than Fraenkel, Dodds, Barrett, Mayor, Gudeman, Goodyear—whether aiming to replace them or continuing the job they started, on a different portion of the same text?[56] But one might ask, is it possible to write

[56] Clearly different times demand different commentaries—producing a new edition is not always primarily an Oedipal act. See above, n.42; Dyck (below) 324–7; and cf. the typical preface opening, "This is the first commentary in English on X in XX years. . . ."

the *first* commentary on a work? What would it look like? Or is a commentary-worthy text always already commented on?[57]

V. *A Net of Parallels; Or, the Reader's Response-ability*

The preceding discussion has tried to tease out the complexities of commentary: its highly personal, deeply communal nature, together with the tension between the need to be useful and find answers to discrete problems, and the tendency to complicate rather than simplify the voices of a text. These issues affect not only the critic but also—and particularly—the reader. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the system of instructions to that reader that every commentator uses: those little words, 'cf.' and 'e.g.,' together with the parallels assembled on a given word, phrase, or idea (for extensive discussion see Gibson, below).

These characteristic elements of 'commentese'[58] further demonstrate the duality inherent in commentaries and in commentary-interpretation. On the one hand, it is entirely possible to read a commentary without following up any of the trails it starts with 'cf.' and 'e.g.' The parallels and secondary literature simply guarantee the commentator's authority; rendering a text "safely immobilized, catatonic, and harmless,"[59] they can, on this scenario, discourage the reader from moving beyond the commentator's answers. The scholarly apparatus becomes emblematic rather than explanatory, a symbolic communication whose understanding does not require further research, but whose message concerns professional standing and competition, inspiring a kind of terror and respect in the reader.

If one chooses to follow the parallels up, however, one ends up with a commentary that "looks away from the theme it professes to consider in its own right" toward the texts that it adduces as *com-*

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[57] Commentary-worthy: above, n.5. Some editors make a point of *not* using earlier commentators: Dover (1968) viii.

[58] Laird (below) 196.

[59] Alan Griffiths *per e-litteras*. On commentary-writing and professionalism/professionalization see Index, s.v. professionalization. The whole discussion of Grafton (1997) on the development of annotation in academic history is relevant; see also Grafton (1983) 354 (Index, s.v. 'commentaries'). For the 'ritual adornment and terror' of the footnote see Belloc (1948) 186.

paranda.[60] I have discussed other aspects of this outward look above; here I want to consider it as it impinges on the reader. Many tend now to see rich collections of parallel texts, especially those lacking 'sufficient' guidance, as concomitantly a burden on the reader and as the commentator's shirking of responsibility. We do not much like commentaries such as Pease's any more: they are perceived as distracting, stifling, onerous, or just plain dull. Worse: in the process of documenting language and themes, the tutor-text itself 'disappears from view': commentators substitute for it their own 'literary-archaeological fragments.'[61]

There is certainly some truth in these criticisms. And one can add that even if one enjoys the heaps of material assembled in a big commentary, and even if one chases down all the references, this abundance of hand-picked information—like the choice of the lemmata themselves—may *reduce* the possibilities of meaning.[62] Yet, provided both commentator and reader are conscious of these limitations (and willing, therefore, to accept any comment as always provisional), rather than stifling or avoiding the responsibility of interpretation, the complementary processes of adducing and tracing parallels require writer and reader alike constantly to expand and revise their expectations and interpretations of the text in the process of reading. Even if the commentator wants to allow 'one and only one explanation' to each lemmatic problem,[63] for a reader the assembled parallels and cross-references create and highlight links both between parts of the text under scrutiny and between that text and many others. Parallels, after all, invite, even create, polyphony: they can, among other things, be deployed to question other commentators' authority, open up new lines of inquiry, suggest a previously ignored way of understanding

[60] Ma (1994) 77.

[61] But cf. Fowler (1999) 436 on the pleasures of big commentaries, and Vallance (1999) 224 on commentary as 'Wunderkammer,' eventually even becoming "a rather anarchic form of autobiography" (a new place for the personal voice in commentaries?). Judgment of how much guidance is required will partly depend on the imagined/implied audience; see above, Section II. Fragments: Henderson (1980) 203.

[62] So Goldhill (1999) 406–11 on parallels closing down meaning, arguing that classical commentary lacks the creative intertextuality of Midrash. In the same volume, Fowler and Gumbrecht argue the contrary.

[63] On this 'monofunctionalism' see Most (1985) 38; on leaving disagreements unsettled in notes see above, n.16 and Henderson 213–14, Rowe 303–5; on open-ended notes see Gibson, 336, Rijksbaron 252–3, Stephens 77 (all below).

an ancient author. What Grafton says of the footnote is true of the commentary note as well: "Cited documents necessarily [suggest] that a problem could be solved in ways other than that chosen by the historian."[64] The plurality of cited voices invites the dialogue between ancient authors and modern readers that is essential to each subsequent generation's understanding of a classical text—and that can even release a reader's creativity, awakening the writerly in the readerly tutor text.[65]

Parallel texts, and their management by the commentator/reader, may further professional aims as well. On the simplest level, they provide the raw material for a literary history, whether of ancient texts (Livy's intertexts) or modern (Austin's ditto).[66] And if we take the line that a commentary is designed primarily to fill the gaps opened by readers' imagined questions, then parallels serve an important function in communicating between the lacunose text and the target audience: they are the analogies, both metaphorical and metonymical, through which teaching and learning take place.[67] Parallels, then, are the basis of a kind of open-architecture learning.[68] Finally, in making previously ignored connections among texts, 'cf.' and 'e.g.' can construct a rich intertextuality that in turn will deepen our historical, cultural, and literary understanding.[69]

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[64] Grafton (1997) 143; cf. Barthes (1974) 76–7 on the 'and/or' necessary in explicating a text. Fletcher (1964) provides a good example: these *Annotations on Tacitus* comprise bare lists of parallels, but when followed through demonstrate (*inter alia*) the considerable and creative use that Tacitus made of his precursor Livy, opening up the possibility of a radical rethinking of the relationship between the two historians and (potentially) changing the prevailing scholarly view of both.

[65] Barthes (1974) 3–6. Cf. also Landow (1997) 8, "[Vannevar] Bush in other words reconceived reading as an active process that involves writing."

[66] Wellek–Warren (1949) 269–70, Patterson (1990); Dover (1986) viii and Goldhill (1999) 409–10 are skeptical of the usefulness of any such doxography. See also above, n.59.

[67] On levels and kinds of relationship and reference see Goodman (1981) and Gibson (below) Section 1. Didacticism in commentaries is frequently discussed; cf. particularly Budelmann, Laird, Henderson, McCarty (all below) and Sluiter (1999).

[68] Hyperlinks are often compared to the links in commentaries: see especially Landow (1997) and McGann (1997), but note the *caveats* of McCarty (below) Section 10. The same issues of guidance arise: see especially Lamont (1997) 61, "It is not encouraging to know that if one is lost in hyperspace one is probably theoretically as well as practically lost"; Landow (1997), especially chapter 5, and McCarty (below) Sections 5 and 7; on the reader's participation in (constructing) hypertextual sequence see (e.g.) Douglas (1992), Lamont (1997) chapter 6.

[69] Taking intertextuality in its original, broad sense, not in the narrower sense

VI. *To Infinity and Beyond*

> To turn from contemporary theoretical considerations of annotation to the electronic hypertext is to turn from a theology of guilt to a theology of liberation.
>
> Lamont (1997) 54

Commentaries are thriving. The vigorous debate in the review periodicals, grant-funding bodies, and publishing houses about their value and place in modern education has shown how robust a genre they are, both as a scholarly and as a didactic medium; they are even still being used as training grounds for new scholars (i.e., as dissertation topics).[70] New volumes on a monumental scale are being produced by important academic presses; relatively obscure texts continue to be catapulted into the mainstream by receiving a commentary; dedicated commentary series are thriving. In addition, the commentary's natural affinity with the 'nonsequential writing' of hypertext, seems to be guaranteeing this ancient genre a prime place in twenty-first-century scholarly discourse.[71] Like hypereditions the traditional commentary, however bound in the codex form, offers the theoretical possibilities of breaking the linearity, the monumental unity, of the text under discussion, on the way to putting it back together again enriched by a deepened knowledge of the codes, paradigms, and details of language that parallels provide. The serendipitous connection between texts of many kinds—epigraphic, literary,

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of 'allusion'; see, e.g., Stierle (1990) 21, "Le commentaire est la scène de l'intertextualité mise à jour"; Raible in Assmann–Gladigow (1995). Parallel texts dating from both before and *after* the tutor text can come into play: Laird 180 and Gibson 337–8 (both below); for intertextuality and the Web see, e.g., Sutherland (1997) 4.

[70] Though Fantham (below) 418 is concerned about some practical risks involved. Choosing, for whatever reason—pleasure, inclination, or invitation—to write a commentary can be (perceived as) a political move: that is, when scholars set out, or are as graduate students advised, to produce a commentary they may consciously or unconsciously align themselves with 'philologists' rather than 'theoreticians.' Depending on the academic climate and community, this may help or hinder their career.

[71] Hypertext definition by Theodore Nelson, quoted at McGann (1997) 45 n.1, with ample supplementary bibliography. For a challenge to the 'liberation theology' of hypertext see McCarty (below) Section 7. Some influential electronic commentaries on classical subjects—all with a primary didactic focus—are: The Perseus Project (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu); The Silver Muse (http: uts.cc.utexas.edu/~silver/index.html); The Vergil Project (http://vergil.classics.upenn.edu); cf. (on an archaeological site) The Stoa: Trajan's Column (http://www.stoa.org/trajan).

numismatic, artistic, or architectural—makes the best commentaries into treasure houses, interactive riches for the receptive reader, which can profoundly affect the questions we ask not only of a given text, but of the act of reading itself.[72] In exploring the shimmering alternation between Barthes' readerly and writerly texts that commentaries can produce, we hope in this volume to generate optimism—or at the very least, to further debate—about the genre and status of the classical commentary.

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2. STARTING FROM THE *TELEMACHY*

Stephanie West

> And Philip . . . heard him read the prophet Esaias, and said, Understandest thou what thou readest? And he said, How can I, except some man should guide me?
>
> *Acts* 8.30f.

> There can be no work more interesting to the student than the editing of Homer; yet, perhaps, no work more disheartening. When one calls to mind the names of the eminent men of letters, philologists, and critics, who have worked, and are working, in this field, one is painfully sensible of something like presumption in coming before the public as a commentator.
>
> Merry–Riddell (1886) vii

My title indicates the basis of my part in this production, a commentary (in two versions of rather different format) on *Odyssey* 1–4, which it is convenient to label the *Telemachy*.[1] Whatever my reflections on commentaries, and in particular on Homeric commentaries, are worth, they are based on the experience of producing one, and some account of its evolution seems needed.

Omero, Odissea was originally commissioned by the Milan firm of Arnoldo Mondadori and the Fondazione Lorenzo Valla in Rome, in the series Scrittori Greci e Latini. The epic was divided between six Homerists, the others being J. B. Hainsworth, Alfred Heubeck, Arie Hoekstra, Joseph Russo, and Manuel Fernández-Galiano. Each volume covered four books, including text and an Italian translation; the commentators were responsible for their texts, but not for the translation. The anglophone trio and Hoekstra wrote in English,

[1] Even if the problem of precise demarcation is a strong argument against supposing that we are here dealing with an originally self-sufficient composition lightly adapted to serve as prelude to an epic designed to rival the *Iliad*.

Heubeck and Fernández-Galiano in German and Spanish respectively; all contributions were then translated into Italian. The guidelines were generous, if imprecise: we were required to bear in mind the needs not only of students and scholars but also of the cultured general reader. The phraseology is familiar; that the publishers were seriously concerned to attract the latter group (probably to be equated with those who rely on a translation) is demonstrated by their practice of marking notes judged likely to be of particular interest to the non-specialist.[2] I do not know who was responsible for this operation, but so far as concerns my volume, he (or she) showed good judgment. It might be expected that we were all to some extent affected by the knowledge that what we wrote would have to be translated into Italian[3] and that the readership to be envisaged did not consist primarily of our fellow countrymen.

My volume, which also contains a general introduction by Heubeck, was published in 1981, a revised edition in 1993, and a further revision in 2000. The Oxford commentators, Hainsworth and I, were naturally delighted when Oxford University Press successfully negotiated with Mondadori the right to publish an English version, in a different format: three volumes, without text or translation; the first appeared in 1988. Though it has thus come to be known, outside Italy, as the Oxford *Odyssey*, its true origins should not be overlooked. OUP did not impose any modification of the guidelines which we had previously followed (though in practice abandoning the inclusion of text and translation within the same volume implied that we no longer intended to cater for the Greekless reader). Whatever overall differences may be discerned between our commentary and the Cambridge *Iliad* commentary produced under Geoffrey Kirk's leadership[4] should not be taken as evidence for different Oxford and Cambridge approaches to Homer.

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[2] A more positive approach than bracketing material deemed too technical or advanced. I may note that the series as a whole enjoyed an 18% discount during December 2000, suggesting that the publishers thought they might attract purchasers looking for Christmas presents.

[3] For my part the prospect of a potential translator's reaction was undoubtedly salutary; it ought to have restrained me from the comment on 1.84 which de Jong (below) 53 castigates as "an example of scholarship for the sake of scholarship" (though I think that at the time I could not quite convince myself that it really was irrelevant and hoped that I would provoke someone else to spot a connection which I had missed).

[4] Kirk (1985–93).

In the introduction to his *Commentaries–Kommentare* Glenn Most reviews some of the factors which motivate commentators.[5] His survey presupposes that the initiative comes from the commentator (as it apparently does with Irene de Jong's narratological commentary); but I wonder how common that is. St Philip, in the episode from which I have taken my first epigraph, was supernaturally instructed to undertake his highly successful exegesis. In my case the initiative came from the publishers, who had to fill the vacancy created by the lamentably premature death of the scholar originally chosen to deal with the first four books, Douglas Young, whose name is primarily associated with Theognis.[6] When I was invited to take his place, I was daunted; but the need was undeniable. A series or a multi-authored work acquires a momentum and appetite of its own, and while many unfinished projects enjoy success, an unbegun commentary would find a market only on 1 April. Moreover, I was offered a part of the poem which particularly appeals to me,[7] and could exploit what I had learned in teaching first- and second-year undergraduates; I knew what they found perplexing, and had benefited from their skepticism of my wilder ideas. No doubt this is a commonplace situation.[8] On some wider issues a commentary offered the opportunity to express support for views which I thought deserved more attention than they currently enjoyed, in particular regarding the date of composition[9] and the transmission of the text.[10] I also felt some disquiet about uncritical enthusiasm for oral poetry theory, together with a certain impatience at the widespread tendency

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[5] Most (1999) xiv.

[6] His Teubner text was published in 1971; see also Young (1950).

[7] A commentator clearly out of sympathy with his author is unusual; Sir Kenneth Dover on Plato's *Symposium* (1980) might be cited as an example.

[8] Budelmann's paper (below) on Tzetzes examines one distinguished example. See also I. Sluiter, 'Commentaries and the Didactic Tradition' in Most (1999) 173–205.

[9] The *Odyssey's* interest in Egypt, conspicuous in the tale of Menelaus' *nostos* (4.125ff., 228ff., 351ff.), is most convincingly explained as a reflection of contemporary developments, echoing the excitement of renewed contacts in the seventh century, under Psammetichus I. A seventh-century date for Homer is not thought as eccentric now as it was 25 years ago: see further Wees (1994), M. L. West (1995), Dickie (1995).

[10] There are many interesting ancient variants in these four books; the scholiasts' enthusiasm for recording them diminished steadily in the course of the work. In particular I relished the opportunity to highlight what I then thought were the implications of Zenodotus' text at 1.93, 285; in his version Athena planned to send Telemachus not to Sparta, but to Crete.

to treat the *Odyssey* as a slightly inferior appendix to the *Iliad*. So I accepted the invitation to join the venture.

The Homeric poems are not the only works of classical literature which it would nowadays be unrealistic to expect a scholar to cover single-handed in any depth. But *quot homines, tot sententiae.* Without a general editor recruiting collaborators whom he believes to be reasonably like-minded and in some degree controlling their work, inconsistency is inevitable. It is, of course, all too easy to be wise after the event; but diversity of approach and emphasis was only to be expected from a group representing England, Germany, the Netherlands, the US, and Spain, the most senior a quarter of a century older than the youngest. In composing a preface for the Oxford version Hainsworth and I referred to the recently deceased Alfred Heubeck as 'the leader of our θίασος'; this seemed an appropriate tribute to his valuable introduction to the poem as a whole, apart from his contribution of the largest share of commentary (Books 9–12, 23–4). But the phrase has been misunderstood, and I should emphasize that he was not a general editor. We were six individuals of significantly different intellectual formation, not a team. Hainsworth and I from time to time conferred, as we were anxious on the one hand to avoid the appearance of disagreement where we were substantially in harmony and, on the other, to make clear the grounds for disagreement where we were not. We regretted the lack of opportunities for similar discussion with our far-flung fellow-workers. "The Italians will have to do something about it," we would say, dreaming, unrealistically, of a colloquium in Rome at our publishers' expense. 'Unrealistically,' because the differences between us were not such as might be resolved by democratic discussion. More soberly, I think we expected drastic intervention by a high-powered copy-editor. Honest disagreement may be expected to enrich a work of this sort, and certainly intellectual homogenization is not wanted; there ought to be advantages in a diversity of standpoints, canceling out, to some extent, the prejudices and unjustified assumptions which might be expected in different traditions of scholarship. But some coordination is needed if the reader is not to be confused, and the sturdy independence of the several volumes has understandably attracted adverse comment; adverse comparison with the well-orchestrated Cambridge *Iliad* commentary is inevitable.

Certainly I found myself at times inhibited by reluctance to trespass on ground which might properly be regarded as another's

province. I felt this particularly acutely in discussing the summary of Odysseus' dealings with the Cyclops which Zeus gives almost at the start of the poem (1.68–75), in the course of the initial orientation made particularly necessary by the poet's decision to begin a story covering nearly ten years about a month before it ends. To my mind Odysseus' encounter with Polyphemus is absolutely fundamental to the structure of our *Odyssey*. I do not regard it as a migratory motif borrowed from folk tale,[11] but I believe that the poet has recycled an outstanding episode from Odysseus' disreputable trickster past, from the narrative existence which he enjoyed before he achieved the heroic respectability familiar from the *Iliad* (though I do not suppose that Odysseus' gentrification originated with the poet of the *Iliad*). The extraordinarily widespread diffusion of this type of story[12] is not incompatible with the hypothesis that from its first invention its hero was Odysseus and not some nameless, or at any rate insignificant, shepherd boy or petty thief. In this incident we see the true quality of a master trickster; hence the extraordinary detail of the narrative. Mine is not a widely held view,[13] and I did not imagine that Heubeck, who was responsible for Books 9–12, would present the episode in this light; conversely, I did not think that Zeus' résumé presented problems which might be solved on my view of the Polyphemus story but which remained intractable so long as it was seen as a folk-tale motif in which Odysseus had assumed the role properly played by some Jack, Hans, Ivan, or Osman. So I said rather less than I would have liked. On the other hand, I would have thought it pusillanimous to play down the apparent inconcinnity between the emphasis given in the proem to the sacrilegious gluttony of Odysseus' men in slaughtering the Sun-god's

[11] I dislike this term, which is confusingly equivocal (does it mean a story told by the 'folk' i.e., the illiterate peasantry, or a story peculiar to or characteristic of a particular ethnic group?) but it is not easy now to dispense with it.

[12] Aarne–Thompson (1961) No. 1137; see also Mondi (1983) (where references to earlier discussions may be found). The striking uniformity which has preserved the basic narrative in a recognizable form transcending immense cultural differences suggests the predominance in oral tradition of a small number of popular intermediary versions; see further O'Sullivan (1987). (Much would be explained if a version was included in the elementary reading material used in the primary schools of the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century, the great age of folk tale collection; but it seems impossible to go further with this speculation from this country. I am indebted to Dr J. S. G. Simmons for advice on this point.)

[13] I hope to argue the case more fully elsewhere.

cattle (1.7–9) and the impression created by the more detailed narrative of the episode (12.260ff.), where we see that the men are driven to this expedient by the very gods who punish them for it. The significance of this discrepancy is extremely controversial, and many scholars attach less importance to it than I do; but it is just as relevant to Book 1 as to Book 12, and needs to be treated at the outset.

This passage from the beginning of the *Odyssey* raises a further methodological point. Though one of the commentator's functions is to bring the contemporary reader nearer to the position of the ancient author's original audience, it often seems desirable actually to undercut the impression which the author presumably intended to produce; it is certainly common practice to draw attention to discrepancies with what is said later. Similarly commentaries may ruin carefully devised effects of suspense.[14] Any annotation to the *Prometheus Vinctus* can be expected to reveal to the reader far sooner than the dramatist intended the secret by which Prometheus hopes to gain his freedom. The construction of a satisfactory path to the fuller appreciation of an ancient text often seems to involve two rather different (if not positively inconsistent) operations. On the one hand, there is the elucidation of obvious difficulties, of obstacles to the reader's progress. On the other hand, the commentator is expected to draw attention to points which, though they present no particular difficulty, properly considered yield some insight into the author's purposes, or the different assumptions current in his day.

If we are inclined to see ourselves as Tzetzes' latter-day successors,[15] we must not overlook the vast difference which the invention of printing has made to our activity. The role of publishers in the production of modern commentaries should not be underestimated. It is refreshing to look to the future, and a pleasure to salute a publication which gets the *Iliad* off to a good start in the new millennium. One indisputably happy result of German reunification was the amalgamation of the Stuttgart firm of Teubner with the parent publishing house in Leipzig, and no enterprise could be more appropriate to this family reunion than the production of a successor to one of its best-sellers, the *Iliad* commentary of Ameis–Hentze–Cauer (1868–1913), under the firm direction of Joachim Latacz, who has enlisted a star cast of specialists. The first fruits, two volumes con-

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[14] See also de Jong (below) 63–4 and Ash (below) 290–1.
[15] See Budelmann (below).

sisting of (i) *Prolegomena* and (ii) text and translation of Book 1, have already (2000) appeared (unaffected, it seems, by the transfer of that branch of Teubner's activity to K. G. Saur [Munich and Leipzig]). No one would undertake such an ambitious project unless confident of a publisher's enthusiastic support, and amid more abstract considerations about the genesis of commentaries we should not ignore the influence of the book trade. Decisions about format, print runs, and above all pricing[16] will have a profound effect on the extent to which a commentary is actually used. The prestige of a series issuing from a distinguished academic publishing house adds considerable weight to the individual commentator's contribution. If Tzetzes appears too much inclined to blow his own trumpet, we should remember that the resources of an efficient publicity department were not there to be deployed on his behalf.

Latacz's enterprise is more ambitiously conceived than its forerunner. By the time it is finished, will its users clamor for electronic publication? Probably; we all like to dream about the potential of IT, without always considering exactly what advantages we expect from it and whether they will outweigh the disadvantages of complication and cost. We must find attractive the concept of a format which would allow for rapid updating independent of the routines of conventional book production; moreover, this form of publication would facilitate the provision of information matched to the needs of different types of user. But an e-book publication structure has yet to evolve, and will almost certainly profoundly affect the relationship between readers, content, publishers, and authors. Exploration of the glorious reality which may one day succeed the librarian's current nightmare (since this development will not come cheaply and some bold spirits will make expensive mistakes) calls for the genius of Stanisław Lem. But as regards Homeric commentary, the printed book surely has a long lifetime ahead of it.[17]

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[16] No doubt this last factor explains why so few commentaries have followed the excellent example set by Gow (1952) in including plates: "In Theocritus . . . there are a good many passages which are more easily intelligible with the aid of illustrations, and I have counted it part of an expositor's duty to provide the reader with the more important of them rather than send him to archaeological publications which may be unfamiliar to him, or inaccessible, or both" (vii). The Fondazione Lorenzo Valla Herodotus includes splendid plates for Books 3 and 4 (Asheri [1990] and Corcella [1993]); it is much to be hoped that the practice will become commoner.

[17] See further Don Fowler, 'Criticism as Commentary and Commentary as Criticism in the Age of Electronic Media' in Most (1999) 426–42 and McCarty (below).

Contemplating the differences between, on the one hand, the old Ameis–Hentze–Cauer edition and its English counterparts, the works of Leaf[18] and Merry[19] and, on the other, the Homeric commentaries published in English during the last twenty years,[20] we may be struck by the increasing prominence of literary criticism and evaluation. This is not, of course, a development peculiar to Homer; it is clearly fundamental to the editorial policy of the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series.[21] The nineteenth-century commentators were extremely reticent, and, so far as I can see, felt no need to justify an apparent lack of interest in aesthetic and evaluative criticism for its own sake (though of course the literary merits of a particular passage might be highlighted by way of rebutting doubts about its authenticity).[22]

We should beware of supposing that the greater emphasis given to this aspect nowadays reflects a general heightening of literary sensibility. There was a time when scholars judged that it was the commentator's job to clear the ground for an informed judgment by the reader; the latter might be expected to prefer to form his own views.[23] Roger Dawe, in the shrewd and perceptive introduction to his translation and commentary on the *Odyssey*, pertinently quotes Porson:[24]

> All persons of taste and understanding know, from their own feelings, when to approve, and disapprove, and therefore stand in no need of instruction from the Critick; and as for those who are destitute of such faculties, they can never be brought to use them; for no one can be taught to exert faculties which he does not possess. Every dunce may, indeed, be taught to repeat the jargon of criticism, which of all jargons is the worst, as it joins the tedious formality of methodical reasoning to the trite frivolity of common-place observation.

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[18] Leaf (1900) 1902.

[19] Merry–Riddell (1886).

[20] Apart from works already mentioned I have in mind, in particular, Macleod (1982), Rutherford (1992), Garvie (1994), and Griffin (1995).

[21] Thus the blurb for the first volume to be issued, Webster (1970), describes the series as "inaugurated to meet the increasing demand for editions of classical texts which are concerned as much with literary content as with linguistic and textual problems."

[22] See further Hunter (below).

[23] Thus we might suspect that Hoekstra (the most senior of the *Odyssey* commentators) would defend himself against de Jong's criticism (below, 53) of his note on 14.40–1 by arguing that having reached Book 14 a reasonably intelligent reader did not need to be alerted to a further instance of the dramatic irony so characteristic of the *Odyssey*.

[24] Dawe (1993) 8f.

The wisdom enshrined in the last sentence can never have called for more emphasis than is needed today.

We find a rather similar view, more tactfully expressed, in Samuel Johnson's preface to his annotated edition of Shakespeare's plays (1765):[25]

> The poetical beauties or defects I have not been very diligent to observe. Some plays have more and some fewer judicial observations, not in proportion to their difference of merit, but because I gave this part of my design to chance and to caprice. The reader, I believe, is seldom pleased to find his opinion anticipated; it is natural to delight more in what we find or make than in what we receive. Judgment, like other faculties, is improved by practice, and its advancement is hindered by submission to dictatorial decisions, as the memory grows torpid by the use of a table book. Some initiation is however necessary: of all skill, part is infused by precept, and part is obtained by habit. I have therefore shown so much as may enable the candidate of criticism to discover the rest.

Not all commentators would feel quite easy about leaving this aspect of their work 'to chance and to caprice,' but certainly Johnson's frank statement of his principles deserves our respect.

I came across an attractive formulation of the educational principles to be inferred as the basis for this approach in a much more recent work, Hermann Hesse's *Das Glasperlenspiel* (1943). This enigmatic novel centers on an organization obviously analogous to the Society of Jesus but dedicated not to religion but to the ultra-aesthetic (and to me incomprehensible) Glass Bead Game, which is played by scholars selected in boyhood and educated in élite schools. The Music Master, who is the speaker in the following passage, is an attractive figure, and his portrayal would lead us to regard as fortunate the boys whom he taught:[26]

> To be candid, I myself, for example, have never in my life said a word to my pupils about the 'meaning' of music; if there is one, it does not need my explanation. On the other hand, I have always made a great point of having my pupils count their eighths and sixteenths nicely.... If I were introducing pupils to Homer or Greek tragedy, say, I would also not try to tell them that the poetry is one of the manifestations of the divine, but would endeavour to make the

[25] Johnson (1984) 450.
[26] Hesse (1972) 116.

> poetry accessible to them by imparting a precise knowledge of its linguistic and metrical strategies. The task of the teacher and scholar is to study means, cultivate tradition, and preserve the purity of methods.

It should be the teacher's aim to make the poetry more accessible, and this is a matter of establishing the meanings of words and the syntax of phrases; guidance in literary appreciation is not thought relevant to this purpose. We should of course beware of equating a novelist's views with those of any of his characters, but it is difficult to avoid the impression that Hesse thought a good teacher would not spend much time on explicitly attempting to cultivate his pupils' powers of appreciation; 'practical criticism' would not figure on the syllabus. This passage appealed to me because Hesse is, so to speak, a disinterested witness: he cannot be held to be justifying his own practice. Admittedly, this is *philologia perennis* at the schoolroom level; but of course late-nineteenth-century schoolboys who stayed the course could be expected to reach a standard which would in many ways now seem quite unrealistic for undergraduates taking their final examination.

For those concerned with teaching the classics the decline in educational standards is a commonplace. But we ought to recognize that this is not limited to Latin and Greek, and the significantly greater attention to literary qualities demanded of commentators nowadays goes with an attempt to meet the needs of a readership much less familiar with literature in their own language than their counterparts were a hundred years ago.

The relatively austere approach followed in the first volume of the Cambridge *Iliad* commentary (1985) incurred some censure. Thus one reviewer declared:[27]

> It is an evasion of editorial responsibility to exegeticise on the assumption that the poet composed with nothing other in view than the line he was working on (and possibly the next one).... [L]ong-term issues remain, by and large, unexplored. The consequence is a depressing myopia.

Short-termism is of course always to be deplored. But 'long-term issues' raise some problems for a commentator not wholly committed to a unitarian standpoint. We know so little about the early

[27] Jones (1986) 1–2.

stages in the transmission of the great epics that those who suspect some interference at Athens in the latter part of the sixth century, under the patronage of the tyrant Pisistratus or of his sons, should not be dismissed as pedantic fossils ignorant of oral poetry theory. If such is the most likely provenance of *Iliad* 2.557f. (the entry for Ajax in the 'Catalogue of Ships'), 6.289ff. (the offering of a robe to Athena by the Trojan women), and Book 10 (the 'Doloneia'), might not sixth-century improvements have extended further? In the *Odyssey* a significant, and sympathetic, role is given to Nestor's youngest son, Pisistratus (introduced at *Od.* 3.36); his name appears to have been absent from the list of Nestor's sons given in the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women* (F35.10ff.), and we might wonder whether the part assigned to him should be interpreted as a mark of appreciation to a generous patron. I am not here arguing the case for belief in the Pisistratean recension or against the seventh-century credentials[28] of these particular passages; but I want to emphasize that a scholar sympathetic to analytic hypotheses will find treatment of what Jones calls the 'long-term issues' substantially more problematic than the unitarian does. Of course, we have seen the last of the kind of analysis which could confidently divide a verse between A (an original genius) and B (a bungling editor with an insecure grip on meter, grammar, and even the story so far); but a more subtle formulation of some unease is not intellectually disreputable. In any case, even a committed unitarian may suspect that, with either epic, the poet was uncertain about his stopping point until his narrative was quite well advanced, and had not, when he reached the last line, ruled out continuation.[29] The commentator who is sympathetic to analytic views will feel some inhibition about expressing opinions on larger literary issues. It is

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[28] On the dating of the *Odyssey* see above, n.9.

[29] Compare N. J. Richardson's comment in his introduction to *Iliad* 24 (Kirk [1985–93] Vol. vi: 272): "It is not the most obvious ending, given the tone of the rest of the poem. This could have come after Hektor's death, or (more quietly) after Patroklos' funeral. Alternatively, given the continuity of epic tradition, the story could have progressed further, for example as far as the death of Akhilleus himself. An ancient variant of the final verse in fact exists, linking the poem to the *Aithiopis*." For the case for supposing what follows *Od.* 23.296 to be a later addition see S. R. West (1989). I imagine that it was normal to conclude a recitation with a few lines referring to the occasion, perhaps combining good wishes to the audience with the prospect of a further installment of the tale hereafter if the singer is generously rewarded. The endings of a surprisingly large number of works of ancient literature are problematic; I hope to discuss this subject in more detail elsewhere.

not simply coincidence that a plea for literary and aesthetic comment is very often combined with a somewhat superficial or panglossian approach to the difficulties which have seemed to analysts symptomatic of multiple authorship.

The question of the role—or better, perhaps, the appropriate style—of literary and evaluative comment on the Homeric poems is complicated by oral poetry theory. There was a brief period when, in the excitement generated by the success of Milman Parry and A. B. Lord in bringing Serbo-Croatian oral epic into the mainstream of Homeric scholarship, there was a tendency to suppose that virtually all Homeric problems could be dealt with by an understanding of the techniques of oral composition. This was certainly naive, partly the result of a (predominantly Anglophone) tendency to see more novelty in Parry's work than it in fact possessed.[30] As with all Theories of Everything, this has proved to have less explanatory force than was originally supposed. It was easy enough to abandon the assumption of a fixed text in which every element was perfectly functional, every word well weighed (unless corrupt). But clearly exegesis could go too far in the opposite direction. Parry's desire to prove the all-pervasiveness of formulae in Homer at times created the impression that he, and his followers, saw as positively second-rate or incompetent any phrase for which it was not easy to find close parallels. The skilled oral composer, we were led to suppose, was no more likely than an icon-painter to favor any novelty of expression. But if we regularly seek to explain what we find puzzling or apparently inept by reference to the pressures of tradition dictating an epithet which seems simply out of place or requiring the development of an episode inconsistent with the main line of the narrative, could we feel confident that what seems particularly good is more than a happy accident, the result not of conscious choice but of unthinking use of a conventional formula?

[30] The relevance to Homeric study of South Slavonic traditional poetry had been noted even before F. A. Wolf published his truly epoch-making *Prolegomena ad Homerum* (1795). It was certainly appreciated by the indefatigable Vuk Stefanović Karadzić, whose publications (enthusiastically reviewed by Jacob Grimm, the greatest German comparative scholar of his day) made this material accessible to anyone prepared to learn Serbian; he was aware of a certain irony in combining his activity as a collector of oral poetry with another cause dear to his heart, the alphabet reform which facilitated Serbian literacy. See further Wilson (1970) and Koljević (1980).

In a still living tradition of oral poetry we might hope to trace the interaction between individual talent and centuries-old tradition,[31] but what we have are not tapes of authentic performances but two epic texts which, by virtue of their scale alone, cannot be typical products of Greek oral poetic narrative. No one working on Homer would dispute the general relevance of oral poetry theory, but its specific application leaves plenty of scope for disagreement. Still, a better understanding of Homeric style and craftsmanship has undoubtedly emerged over the last fifty years. Linguistic and metrical comment has become more subtle; the accumulation of parallels serves a clearer purpose, providing the means to relate a phrase to a wider store of formulaic expressions. Fixed epithets, set phrases to introduce a speech or conclude a fatal encounter, stereotyped descriptions of typical scenes (in which the lack of a familiar element may be the most significant feature)[32] are recognized as the marks of a high style which, though it would not have developed among people thoroughly at home with script, was not to be discarded with the advent of literacy. Homer has not of course been the only classical author to benefit from a general acceptance that the needs of a listening audience differ from those of a reflective reader.

One important aspect of this difference is a tendency to value overall coherence less than immediate effect. This seems to me much less characteristic of the *Iliad* than of the *Odyssey*, where it is combined with a reluctance to sacrifice interesting alternatives in favor of the main narrative line. The resultant inconsistency is generally not such as we should notice if we simply heard the poem read aloud and had no opportunity to consult a text (or, if we noticed, we should be inclined to distrust our recollection). Thus, the poet was unwilling to discard completely a version of the story in which Penelope was Odysseus' accomplice in his massacre of the suitors (as the ghost of one of the victims claims at 24.167ff.), though on the whole that is Telemachus' role; hence some confusion, which should not be diagnosed as carelessness. The poet was better able than we are to assess the preferences of his audience. "Those oft are stratagems which errors seem | Nor is it Homer nods, but we

[31] Turkic oral epic certainly offers a richer field for such study than twentieth-century Yugoslavia, but the linguistic obstacles are correspondingly more formidable; see further Reichl (1992).

[32] See further de Jong (below) 59–61.

that dream."[33] If we see it as one of the commentator's most important duties to bridge the gulf between the reader and the text created by the lapse of time and different cultural assumptions, the reader should not be allowed to lose sight of the demands and tastes of a listening audience and should be alerted to the stratagems particularly appropriate to that situation. The different requirements of verbal art in a society where reading for pleasure was extremely unusual are much more relevant to the Homeric epics than the illiteracy or literacy of the poet.

Of course, on occasion we may be uncertain whether we are faced with stratagem or error—not the poet's error but the effect of deliberate alteration or carelessness on the part of those involved in the transmission of his work. The Hellenistic scholars whose work laid the foundations of European textual criticism were alert to a tendency to expand the text of Homer with a line or lines drawn from roughly similar contexts in other parts of the epics ('concordance interpolation').[34] Very often comparison of one copy with a few others would have made it easy to identify spurious accretions. But they evidently suspected that this had happened with passages of which the attestation looked secure enough. We have an interesting example of their approach in connection with the enquiry which Nestor addresses to Telemachus and Mentor (really Athena) (*Od.* 3.71–4) and Polyphemus to Odysseus and his party (9.252–5):

> Strangers, who are you? From where do you come sailing over the watery ways? Is it on business, or are you recklessly roving as pirates do, when they sail on the salt sea and venture their lives as they wander, bringing evil to alien people?[35]

Aristophanes of Byzantium, the second of the three great Alexandrian Homeric scholars, objected to all but the first of these lines at their second occurrence; but Aristarchus argued against the authority of his master that they were much less appropriate in their earlier position: the diffident Telemachus and the aged Mentor with their small ship would not naturally suggest a raiding party, and if the question is treated as a routine inquiry, it loses much of its force in Book 9,

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[33] Pope, *Essay on Criticism* 179f.
[34] This convenient term was introduced by Bolling (1950) 3 n.6.
[35] Translation by Lattimore (1967).

where Polyphemus, finding intruders in his home, guesses that they are up to no good.[36]

Forced to choose between these two views, I think most scholars would side with Aristarchus. But it looks as if the lines probably stood in both places in the text of the *Odyssey* known to Thucydides, who observes (1.5.1–3) that the ancient poets show that of old raiding and cattle rustling were regarded as perfectly respectable, to judge by the questions regularly addressed to strangers who have put in to land:

> δηλοῦσι δὲ . . . οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων πανταχοῦ ὁμοίως ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λῃσταί εἰσιν, ὡς οὔτε ὧν πυνθάνονται ἀπαξιούντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τε ἐπιμελὲς εἴη εἰδέναι οὐκ ὀνειδιζόντων.
>
> [Witness . . . also the request in the ancient poets that men arriving by sea say whether they were pirates, as though those questioned would not deny the practice, nor would those who wanted to know blame them.[37]]

Note however the plural, 'the ancient poets.' Apart from the *Odyssey* the lines occur in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (452–5)—which Thucydides certainly assumed to be the work of Homer (3.104.4–6). It looks as if he found verses of similar content in archaic poetry no longer extant. From time to time, at least, the commentator needs to remind the reader that our view of the Homeric epics is severely blinkered; we must make the best of what survives from the immeasurable store of Greek heroic hexameter poetry, but the two great epics should not be treated as a closed system.

All this is quite a heavy load for a note on *Od.* 3.71–4; but it well exemplifies the way in which, at times, conscientious commentary must include some glimpses of the history of Homeric scholarship. So far as we can see, in the history of European literature the need for the kind of exegesis which a commentary provides was first felt in connection with the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.[38] These texts were so central to Greek culture that there could be no question of their

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[36] Compare also Aristarchus' doubts about 1.97–101 (discussed by de Jong below, 60).

[37] Translation Lattimore (1998), modified.

[38] A history of Homeric scholarship, including oral exegesis, would be extremely valuable. For a useful brief sketch see Latacz (2000) 1–22; see also Pfeiffer (1968) *passim* and Lamberton and Keaney (1992).

passing out of fashion, but linguistic changes and changes in the audience's outlook created problems. We have no idea what training might be offered in archaic Greece to a boy with some talent for heroic song: was it just a matter of making the most of opportunities for listening to skilled singers and in due course attempting to emulate them, or might a likely lad apprentice himself, making himself useful to his master while he absorbed songs and learned the meaning (or what his master supposed to be the meaning) of words long obsolete in ordinary speech? The lexicographical peculiarities of Homeric vocabulary must have been the object of lively discussion from a very early date; but questions of meaning cannot properly be divorced from problems of articulation and morphology, and there was practically limitless scope for the dissemination of misinformation. Often the peculiarities of Odyssean language appear to arise from idiosyncratic interpretation of identifiable Iliadic passages.[39] We should very much like to know more about rhapsodic training, but systematic instruction must surely have been rare, and the sense of a need for explanation may often have been blunted by the familiar solemnity of epic phraseology. The customs described or implied by the two epics were a matter of wider interest, in view of the preeminence of Homer in Greek education; Thucydides' inference regarding the ancient view of raiding and cattle-rustling affords a fascinating glimpse of the kind of discussion which they might fuel. The exegesis of Homeric problems was part of the Sophists' educational programme, not so much an exercise in literary appreciation as a form of linguistic training and a schooling in argument.[40] Exegesis in writing, as we see it in the remains of Aristotle's six books of *Homeric Problems*,[41] was a natural development. A remarkably large number of poets appear to have labored on (or at any rate had views about) the text of Homer. In the literary history of the Hellenistic age the relationship between philology and poetry is absolutely central; as regards Homer, we have a valuable monograph by Antonios Rengakos.[42] But it is not altogether simple to establish how far we

[39] See further Leumann (1950).
[40] For a very perceptive and succinct appreciation of this aspect of sophistic education see Dover (1993) 31; see further Richardson (1975).
[41] F142ff. Rose; *Poetics* 25 is devoted to such difficulties and their solutions. See further Richardson (1994).
[42] Rengakos (1993).

can treat poets' allusions to Homer as part of the tradition of Homeric exegesis; a creative writer must be allowed some licence in exploiting the associations and sonorities of earlier literature.[43]

The foundation of the Alexandrian Museum provided the ideal environment for textual scholarship, and exposed the need for it.[44] The work of the first two of the great Alexandrian Homeric scholars, Zenodotus and Aristophanes, is for various reasons difficult to assess. For commentary, however, we must wait for Aristarchus. We are fairly well informed about his principles and methods, since he composed both commentaries to accompany his text and monographs on particular problems, and his arguments are often recorded in the scholia. To the modern reader (as to some in antiquity) there is an air of pedantry in the concentration on textual *minutiae*, and the discussion may seem quaint to those who are well schooled in oral poetry theory.[45] But we take for granted the fruits of the labors which brought a high degree of standardization to the text of Homer, drastically restricted the proliferation of minor variants, and systematically established what was and what was not consonant with Homeric usage. We easily underestimate the problems faced by systematic scholarship in antiquity. We take for granted easy, generally accepted systems of reference. In antiquity nothing like a uniform line-numbering existed. Papyri occasionally preserve marginal numerals every hundred lines; but these represent a tally kept by copyists paid at piecework rates, and were not intended to assist the reader. Lack of uniformity at the most basic level made it difficult to record or verify impressions of Homeric usage; the indices and special lexica which we take for granted were inconceivable. The collection of *minutiae* was essential for setting the text on a proper basis, and extremely labor-intensive. It is easy to underestimate the importance of the work done in the third and second centuries when the foundations of Homeric commentary were systematically laid.[46]

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[43] Cf. Rengakos (1993) 37, "Die Tatsache, dass ein Dichter in *seinem* Werk einer bestimmten Homervariante den Vorzug gibt, braucht nicht unbedingt zu bedeuten, dass er diese Lesart auch im *homerischen* Text für richtig gehalten hat. Er kann sie sehr wohl als 'homerisch' falsch betrachtet haben, sie aber trotzdem in seine Dichtung aufgenommen haben, weil dei Lesart seinem unmittelbaren poetischen Anliegen angemessen erschien."

[44] For an excellent concise account of the evidence see Haslam (1997); see also M. L. West (2001).

[45] See further Nannini (1986) 28.

[46] I should emphasize 'systematically'; I do not intend to explore the implications

The heritage of Homeric exegesis is awe-inspiring, and the danger of overloading a commentary hard to avoid. The twentieth century saw a great enlargement in the range of material relevant to the study of the two epics; the process is likely to continue in the twenty-first. No commentary deals with (let alone, answers) all the questions on which it might reasonably be expected to throw light; those questions change with the passage of time, and the rate of change may be expected to increase.[47] How long a useful working life should be envisaged for the Homeric commentaries published in the last twenty years is hard to guess. But those who produce their successors will face some interesting challenges.

"Every work of this kind is by its nature deficient," observes Dr Johnson;[48] but that does not detract from the good fortune of those who have the opportunity to undertake it.

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for pre-Alexandrian Homeric commentary of the Derveni papyrus (on which see Laks and Most [1997]).

[47] For some stimulating reflections on the general topic see H. U. Gumbrecht, "Fill Up Your Margins! About Commentary and *copia*" in Most (1999) 443–53.

[48] Johnson (1984) 456.

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3. A NARRATOLOGICAL COMMENTARY ON THE *ODYSSEY*: PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS*

Irene J. F. de Jong

Introduction. The Traditional Format of Homeric Commentaries

For the past ten years I have been working on a narratological commentary on the *Odyssey*, which has come out in 2001. What sparked off my project back in 1991 was the feeling that the then most recent commentary on the *Odyssey*, produced by an international team (S. West, J. B. Hainsworth, A. Heubeck, A. Hoekstra, J. Russo, and M. Fernández-Galiano; 1988–92), did not do full justice to the extraordinary narrative qualities of the text. This seemed to me the result of their adhering to the traditional format of Homeric commentaries.[1] This format can be summed up by three terms: 1) problem-solving, 2) comprehensive, and 3) micro-textual.

Ad 1. Homeric commentaries are aimed primarily at explaining difficulties:[2] they elucidate problematic grammatical constructions or obscure words, provide the historical or archaeological background information needed to understand what is said, and summarize interpretations of puzzling passages. This problem-solving function is referred to explicitly by Kirk in his general introduction to the Cambridge *Iliad* commentary, again the work of an international team of scholars (G. S. Kirk, J. B. Hainsworth, R. Janko, M. W. Edwards, and N. J. Richardson; 1985–93):

> [This commentary] aims at helping serious readers of the poem by attempting to identify and deal with most of the difficulties, short of those assumed to be met by a general reading knowledge of Homeric

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* I wish to thank Mrs. B. A. Fasting for correcting my English.

[1] For a recent overview of the history of Homeric commentaries, see Latacz (2000).

[2] In fact, this seems to be an important function of *all* commentaries. Cf. Most (1999) xiii, "Most commentaries . . . seem to be directed consciously towards the solving of problems."

Greek, which might stand in the way of a sensitive and informed personal response to the *Iliad*.[3]

Ad 2. Homeric commentaries try to offer their users summaries of all that has been said about the problems in the text in question. Thus we find, side by side, philological, linguistic, historical, and literary comments. The range of subjects addressed is illustrated by the 'check-list' which a member of the Kirk team, Richard Janko, provides in the introduction to his volume of the *Iliad* commentary:

> In my view, one cannot do full justice to the songs of Homer without the benefit of many methods and approaches. These include Unitarianism, the view that each epic is a basically unified creation by a poetic genius; the proof by Parry and Lord that the epics belong to an oral tradition; the study of other such poems, both post-Homeric and from other traditional societies, especially in the Balkans; the recognition of Near Eastern influence on early Greece; the work of Burkert and the structuralists on myth; the work of Severyns and the Neo-Analysts on how Homer adapts traditional tales, especially those found in the post-Homeric Epic Cycle; Aristotelian and narratological literary theory; the decipherment of Linear B by Ventris and Chadwick; Greek dialectology and onomastics; Indo-European linguistics; Bronze and Iron-Age Aegean archaeology; the textual criticism of an oral-dictated poem, transmitted with oral and scribal variants in an open recension; van der Valk's work on Alexandrian scholarship; Erbse's edition of the scholia; and the recognition that our basic notions of 'literary' style have been decisively shaped by poems of oral origin.[4]

Similarly, the editor of the very recent Basel *Iliad* commentary, Latacz, notes that this comprehensiveness, however difficult to achieve, is the main task of all commentaries:

> Die Homer-Forschung hat . . . sich so stark spezialisiert, daß ein vollständiger Überblick über die Gesamtproduktion schon seit langem nicht mehr möglich ist. Den Versuch deswegen jedoch gar nicht erst zu wagen würde nicht nur dem wissenschaftlichen Ethos widersprechen, sonder auch an der Hauptaufgabe jedes Kommentars vorbeigehen, den Erkenntnisvorschritt durch Zusammenführung des bereits Gesicherten zu fördern.[5]

True to this ideal, Latacz has called the commentary which he edited a 'Gesamtkommentar.'

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[3] Kirk (1985) xx.
[4] Janko (1992) xi.
[5] Latacz (2000) VIII.

Ad 3. Homeric commentaries usually proceed word by word, or at most line by line.

These three main characteristics of Homeric commentaries should be seen in the light of their ancient predecessors: first there were the Peripatetic *zetemata* ('Problems'),[6] then the Alexandrian 'On X' literature (the discussion of linguistic or factual problems in the form of monographs) and *hypomnemata* (line-by-line explanations of the text), and finally the *scholia*, which offer excerpts of all this material in the form of word-by-word or line-by-line lemmata.

The usefulness of the traditional Homer commentaries is undeniable and is reflected in their continued existence until the present age. For one thing, there is their economy: they are easy and quick to consult and offer their readers a great deal of information within a short space. But there are also disadvantages.

Ad 1. Because of their concentration on specific problems, the text under discussion is dealt with selectively. Often a commentator is so distracted by the need to deal with a problem in line x, that he or she may miss an interesting point in the next line. This selectivity is reinforced by the authoritative nature of classical scholarship: once a scholar of name has stamped a word or passage as problematic, all later scholars feel obliged to respond.

Ad 2. Because of their comprehensive nature, a mass of heterogeneous scholarship is included. Often the relation to or relevance for the text under discussion is lost, and we end up with scholarship for the sake of scholarship.[7]

Ad 3. Because of their word-by-word nature, the meso- and macro-levels are left largely unexplored.

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[6] Cf. Geffcken (1932) 407, "Der peripatetische Kommentar ist das letzte, maßgebende, formbildende Glied einer Entwicklungsreihe die, von der Zeit der Sophistik und ihre Aporien ausgehend, Werke der Dichtung und der Philosophie als Problem empfand und behandelte und durch Erläuterung, Erweiterung wie Berichtigung die Grundlage des antiken Kommentars überhaupt schuf."

[7] This is in general a possible drawback of commentaries. Cf. Vallance (1999) 224, "Others see the composition of commentaries rather like the filling of a cabinet of curiosities, a 'Wunderkammer,' where masses of 'irrelevant' detail are juxtaposed, supposedly at the suggestion of the commented text, but just as often at the whim of the commentator." For a principal defense of the *copia* or abundance of commentaries, see Gumbrecht (1999). On ancient Homeric commentaries see also West (above) 44–5.

These three disadvantages—selectivity, heterogeneity, and neglect of larger structures—are illustrated by the Oxford commentary on the *Odyssey*.

The Oxford Odyssey *Commentary*

Before proceeding, I would like to stress that for the sake of my argument I have selected some of the less helpful comments, whereas many others do contain excellent material. My purpose is to show that the traditional format leaves many aspects of the text unexplored, a fact which is all the more regrettable in the case of a narrative masterpiece like the *Odyssey*.

Ad 1. Regarding 6.27 (Athena says to Nausicaa: σοὶ δὲ γάμος σχεδόν ἐστιν), Hainsworth gives the following comment:

> The matter of Nausicaa's marriage is raised also at 66, 180, 244, 277, and at vii 313. It adds a certain piquancy to the relations of Odysseus, Nausicaa, and Alcinous, but it is otherwise superfluous to this part of the *Odyssey*. There is no hint in the text of Odysseus' being detained, or desiring to remain, on Scheria with an amorous princess or her match-making parents, as he was detained by Calypso λιλαιομένη πόσιν εἶναι (i 15). It is likely that the marriage (and some other elements such as the games in viii) is mentioned because the poet is familiar with a folk-tale in which an unprepossessing suitor outwits glamorous but unworthy rivals, only to be revealed as a prince in disguise: see Woodhouse, *Composition*, 54–65.

What I suspect is that here Hainsworth's work as a commentator started from a problem raised by an earlier scholar, viz. the possibility that Nausicaa's marriage is the relic of an—imperfectly integrated—folk tale. This leads him to remark that the topic of Nausicaa's marriage is "superfluous to this part of the *Odyssey*," to the surprise of the many ardent admirers of Books 6 and 7. A commentator less distracted by the issue of hypothetical folk-tale origins might note that in fact the topic of Nausicaa's marriage, far from being superfluous, forms a suspenseful, amusing, and tragic *Leitmotif* in the first books of the *Phaiakis*: Athena uses it to move Nausicaa to the spot where Odysseus finds himself (6.27, 33); Odysseus employs it to compliment the girl ("blessed is the man who will marry you": 158–9, and cf. 180–5); for Nausicaa and her father, a marriage to the stranger

becomes a serious option (6.244–5, 275–85; 7.311–15); and it implicitly underlies Arete's anxious question to the stranger about how he got the clothes he is wearing (7.237–9). Not until Odysseus has revealed who he is and emphasized how he spurned earlier marriages with goddesses (9.29–33), is the issue dropped.

Ad 2. While Janko single-handedly manages to cover most of his check-list (quoted above), work has clearly been divided up in the case of the *Odyssey* team, each contributor being allowed to give special attention to his or her specialism. Thus we find a great deal about ancient text constitution in the books covered by Stephanie West, and about Mycenaean Greek in those done by Hoekstra. While this has clear advantages, it does mean that the net result is somewhat uneven. Seeing that only Heubeck—and to a lesser degree Russo and West—has literary interests, the users of the other parts of the commentary are poorly served in this respect. An example is Hoekstra's comment on 14.40–1 (Eumaeus says to 'the stranger'/ Odysseus: ἀντιθέου γὰρ ἄνακτος ὀδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχεύων | ἧμαι, "I sit here, mourning for and grieving over my godlike master"):

> ἀντιθέου γὰρ ἄνακτος: the 'neglect' of the digamma of ϝάναξ may have resulted from the insertion of γάρ, the original formula being ἀντιθέοιο ϝἄνακτος, cf. 20, xiii 185 nn.; more examples in Hoekstra, *Modifications* 54ff. On the gen. see xiii 219n.

At this place one would also have liked to hear something about the dramatic irony of Eumaeus talking about Odysseus in the presence of his unrecognized master, an irony to which the narrator alerted his narratees by introducing Eumaeus' speech with the words ὁ δὲ προσέειπεν ἄνακτα (36), and which recurs at many places in the *Odyssey* (cf., e.g., 8.73–82: Demodocus singing about Odysseus in the presence of the unrecognized Odysseus; 19.124–61 Penelope talking about Odysseus in the presence of 'the beggar').

An example of scholarship for the sake of scholarship is the following comment by Stephanie West on 1.84 (Athena proposes sending Hermes to Calypso):

> As a genealogical curiosity we may note that Hermes is Calypso's nephew (his mother Maia being like Calypso a daughter of Atlas, though not by the same mother), but the relationship is quite irrelevant here, as is the tradition that he was the father of Odysseus' maternal grandfather, Autolycus (schol. xix 432).

Although she herself notes that the information she provides is 'irrelevant'—and, one might add, presumably unknown to Homer's listeners, since Maia's relationship to Atlas is not mentioned in either epic—she cannot repress her commentatorial instincts.[8]

Ad 3. As for the levels of the meso- and macro-structure, it would be unfair to say that these receive no attention at all in the Oxford *Odyssey* commentary; there are introductions to books or sets of books which precede the actual word-by-word commentary. But where larger units are discussed within the commentary sections themselves, this often happens in an unsatisfactory way. A case in point is the type-scene, an element of the Homeric epics on which much excellent work has been done during the past decades and which merits a place of honor in every Homeric commentary (as it indeed enjoys in several volumes of the Cambridge *Iliad* commentary). The studies by Arend (1933), Edwards (1975, 1980), and Fenik (1968, 1974), however, are not mentioned at all, or are used perfunctorily (a mere reference to the relevant chapter in Arend), or unimaginatively (a list of the standard elements, without any discussion of the highly effective deviations which are often found). One example is Hainsworth's treatment of 5.81–4[9] in his comment on 5.55–147:

> Hermes and Calypso. The arrival and reception of a guest is one of the most formalized contexts in epic, see Arend, *Scenen*, 28–63, esp. 48–50. The following elements are usually present: (1) the scene is described, (2) the stranger presents himself, (3) he is welcomed and offered food, (4) lastly, he is invited to state his identity and business.

The reader is given a mere reference to Arend and a—very incomplete—inventory of the typical elements. There is no discussion of the exceptional lines 81–4; on only three other occasions (*Il.* 6.371–3; *Od.* 9.216–17 and 24.222–5) do we hear of an arriving character who does *not* find the person he is looking for. Here this variation does in fact have a great effect, which is worth noting: we have been waiting for Odysseus to enter upon the stage for a full five books,

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[8] On these two examples see West (above) 36 n.23 and 30 n.3, respectively.

[9] οὐδ' ἄρ' Ὀδυσσῆα μεγαλήτορα ἔνδον ἔτετμεν, | ἀλλ' ὅ γ' ἐπ' ἀκτῆς κλαῖε καθήμενος, ἔνθα πάρος περ, | δάκρυσι καὶ στοναχῇσι καὶ ἄλγεσι θυμὸν ἐρέχθων | πόντον ἐπ' ἀτρύγετον δερκέσκετο δάκρυα λείβων ("he [Hermes] did not find great-hearted Odysseus, but he was weeping, sitting on the beach, exactly where he used to; breaking his heart in tears, sobs, and grief he looked over the barren sea, shedding tears").

and now the narrator one last time teases us, just as we are certain of seeing him at last. Having been repeatedly told that Odysseus is in Calypso's palace, Hermes does *not* find him there. Odysseus' absence from the ensuing conversation between Calypso and Hermes is functional, in that it leaves him unaware of the divine will behind his departure; this, in turn, engenders a memorable scene between a distrustful hero and a coaxing goddess, who one last time tries to persuade her lover to stay with her, carefully avoiding any reference to Hermes' visit. At the same time, the evocation of Odysseus just before Hermes and Calypso's conversation ensures that, despite his physical absence, he will be the central focus of their talks.

Discussing these examples from the Oxford *Odyssey* commentary, I have in fact already suggested some alternative, narratological comments; it is now time to give a more detailed and systematic description of what a narratological commentary looks like.

A Narratological Commentary: The Principles

Ad 2. To start with the most important point, a narratological commentary is not comprehensive (and hence heterogeneous), but rather concentrates on one—admittedly large—aspect of the text, namely its narrativity. Thus, it is interested in the role of the narrator and narratees, methods of characterization, the handling of time (anticipations and retroversions, retardations and summaries, *in medias res* technique, etc.), and place (descriptions of scenery and objects, etc.). One example of a typically narratological comment is:

> **5.279–493**. The scene is a brilliant example of the 'zooming-in' technique, in that the narrator follows the perception of Odysseus as he slowly approaches Scheria: in 279–81 the mountains on the island of the Phaeacians—this detail must come from the narrator—become visible, the island, which to Odysseus resembles a shield (i.e., it rises up from the sea with a gentle upward curve in the middle); in 358–9 he sighs that land is still 'far off' (ἑκάς; contrast Poseidon's angry perception in 288 that Odysseus is 'near', σχεδόν, land and hence safety); in 392 for Odysseus too, looking intently ahead and lifted up by a wave, land is 'nearby' (σχεδόν) and in 398 he is able to perceive the woods; in 400–5 + 411–14 he hears the breakers and can get a good look at the steep coast; in 439–40 this makes him decide to swim on, looking out for a beach or harbor; in 441–3 he finally spots a place to go ashore, the mouth of a river, bare of rocks and out of the wind.

When I call my commentary 'narratological,' this term should be understood in a broad sense. While the word narratology was coined in 1968 by Tzvetan Todorov and most of the current theories were developed around that same time, the interest in and reflection upon narrative techniques is much older. Especially where the Homeric epics are concerned, there is a rich reservoir of scholarship. There are the exegetical scholia of ancient scholars, the aesthetic interpretations by Unitarians, the analyses of type-scenes by oralists, and the close readings by non-oralists. Here people may protest that it is methodologically incorrect to use all these approaches side by side, since they are based on very different conceptions as to the origin of the Homeric text. My answer is that on the level of interpretation, the origin of the text in which the story is contained, although not irrelevant, is not of prime importance.[10] As Anne Amory Parry once put it:

> All narrative poetry presents characters, recounts actions, describes a world, implies values and so on. At a certain level it makes no difference to a critical interpretation whether a poem is written or oral.[11]

Ad 1. If a narratological commentary is by definition more restricted in its scope than a traditional, comprehensive commentary, it is at the same time fuller, in that it is interested in the narrative as a whole, which means the text as a whole, not only those words or passages which in the past have been deemed problematic. Even a relatively uneventful stretch of text may call for attention. An example is 6.85–109: the narrator leisurely tells us about Nausicaa and her servants doing the laundry and playing a ball game, all the time taxing the patience of his narratees, who are anxious to see the promised meeting between Odysseus and the princess actually take place.

In addition, what is not problematical from the point of view of the Greek may call for comment from a narratological perspective. An example is the word δύστηνος in 5.436 (ἔνθα κε δὴ δύστηνος ὑπὲρ μόρον ὤλετ' Ὀδυσσεύς, | εἰ μὴ ἐπιφρονοσύνην δῶκε γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη, "there wretched Odysseus would have died against his fate, if owl-

[10] For more detailed defenses of this position, see de Jong (1991), (1995), and (1997).
[11] Amory Parry (1971) 14.

eyed Athena had not given him sagacity"). Here are no difficulties as regards textual criticism, semantics, or syntaxis, but the use of δύστηνος is nevertheless remarkable in that this is the only time it occurs outside direct speech (where it is found 21 times). Is the Homeric narrator for once abandoning his usual reticence and openly displaying pity for his hero, who is about to drown? Or is this Athena's focalization, who in the following lines will rescue her favorite hero?

This brings us to the speeches, which take up no less than 66% of the Odyssean text. In what respect is this dramatic element of interest in a narratological commentary? For one thing, many Odyssean speeches are carriers of embedded narratives. These introduce new points of interest, such as their function for the secondary narratees (characters listening to these narratives) and for the primary narratees ('the hearers/readers'), which need not be the same for both parties. An example is the embedded narrative of the fight between the Centaurs and Lapiths, which Antinous recounts in 21.295–304, by way of dissuasive paradigm, to 'the beggar'/Odysseus who, like the Centaur Erytion, might incur evil on account of his drunkenness. For the primary narratees, however, the same story, which recounts how Centaurs are killed after misbehaving during a feast, anticipates the killing of the Suitors because of their continuous feasting at Odysseus' expense. When a narrative is told more than once, as is the 'Oresteia' story, for example, there is the question of which details are told by whom, to whom, and why.

But even when a speech does not contain a narrative, it may be of narratological interest. Firstly, there is the question of the relationship between speech and narrator-text. How are speeches prepared for by the narrator, and how are actions announced in speeches carried out? An example of the latter question is:

17.199–203. The narrator's habit of faithfully reporting the execution of a character's words allows him to place a number of accents:

narrator	**speaking characters**
Eumaeus gave 'the beggar' a stick	Cf. 195–6: "Give me a walking-stick"
which would please his heart (θυμαρές reflects Eumaeus' kind focalization)	
The two went on their way,	Cf. 194: "Let us go"

while dogs and herdsmen remained behind to guard the farm.	Cf. 186–7: "I would rather leave you behind as guardian of the farm"
He led his master to town. (the periphrastic denomination ἄνακτα points up the dramatic irony)	Cf. 194: "You lead the way"

Secondly, there is a question which is particularly important in the *Odyssey*, namely the difference in the way speeches are received by primary and secondary narratees. For instance, the primary narratees, who often know more than the characters, may savor the dramatic irony of what is said by a speaker, as in:

3.41–2. In his speech-introduction the narrator alerts the narratees to the dramatic irony of the situation (cf. next note), by employing an unusually emphatic reference to Athena as the addressee of Pisistratus' speech (line 42 recurs thrice in the *Odyssey*, 13.252, 371; 24.547, but never as part of a speech-introduction).
343–50. Pisistratus' speech exemplifies the piety of the Pylians and his own good character, and offers the first *specimina* of dramatic irony. A goddess (in Pisistratus' perception a mortal man; cf. ξεῖνε in 43) is asked to pray to another god; specifically, Athena is asked to pray to her opponent in the *Odyssey*, Poseidon. Pisistratus also lectures Athena on the gods, employing in 48 a gnomic utterance ('for all men need the gods').

Thirdly, there is the matter of the structure of speeches and sets of speeches. As Besslich (1966) and Lohmann (1970) have shown, a formal analysis often yields important interpretative information as well. Thus characters may avoid replying to—parts of—their interlocutor's speech, omissions which are all the more revealing to the narratees. A famous example is:

7.240–97. In his answer Odysseus shrewdly exploits the Homeric custom of answering in reverse order: he first gives such a lengthy answer to Arete's questions C (how he arrived on Scheria) and B (who gave him the clothes), that the queen's first question A (who he is) in the end remains unanswered; an instance of the 'distraction' device.

Finally, there is the often observed fact that speeches are a major instrument of characterization. An example is:

2.242–56. Leocritus, one of the sixteen Suitors referred to by name, is given no explicit introduction by the narrator. He characterizes himself by his speech (the only one he is given). In 22.294–6 he will be

killed by Telemachus. His speech is a clear example of psychological warfare: "Mentor, mischievous man, wild in your wits (*abuse*), what did you say, exhorting them to stop us. It would be difficult even for more men (*Leocritus refers to Mentor's argument that the Ithacans surpass the Suitors in number*) to fight with us (*intimidation*) over a meal (*understatement, the suitors are in fact after Odysseus' wife and, indirectly, position*). Even if Odysseus himself desired to chase the dining Suitors from his house, he would suffer a bad fate, if he fought with more men (*by now Leocritus has cleverly turned Mentor's argument into that of the Suitors surpassing Odysseus in number*). You did not speak properly (*he returns to his opening words, concluding this part of his speech*). But let the people go home (*dismissing the assembly, he cuts short all further discussion*), and as for him (*not addressing Telemachus directly, he makes clear that he does not take the youth or his announcement to leave on a trip seriously*), his father's friends Mentes and Halitherses will bring about his trip (*disingenuous friendliness, since he knows that these two men are not able to give Telemachus a ship*). But, I think (*the modifier is ironic, in that he is in fact completely sure of his case*), he will never go on that trip."

Ad 3. After all that has been said, it will be clear that by its very nature a narratological commentary is interested in scenes rather than words, although words may occasionally be commented upon (cf. earlier on δύστηνος). I have already indicated the intrinsic narratological interest of type-scenes. Precisely because of their recurrent nature, these scenes are a mighty instrument: by simply adding, suppressing, or re-ordering the stock elements, the narrator can place accents, characterize, evaluate, etc. Here much is still to be detected, since there is a great difference between—paradigmatically—listing the elements of a type-scene and—syntagmatically—analyzing the effect of their actual implementation in an individual scene. In this respect I have been much inspired by an article by Mark Edwards, in which he works through Book 1 of the *Iliad* purely in terms of the way the type-scenes are exploited.[12] An example from the *Odyssey* is the beginning of Athena's visit to Telemachus.[13]

1.96–324. The meeting between Athena and Telemachus takes the form of a 'visit' type-scene: a visitor (i) sets off (96–102; here expanded by a 'dressing' type-scene); (ii) arrives at his destination (103–5); (iii) finds the person(s) he is looking for (106–12); (iv) is received by his host (113–35); (v) is given a meal (136–50); (vi) converses with his host (151–318); (in the case of an overnight stay) (vii) is bathed; is given

[12] Edwards (1980).

[13] Because this is an example I have omitted the references to scholarship.

(viii) a bed, (ix) a guest-gift (309–18n.), and sometimes also (x) an escort to the next destination, *pompe* (cf. 3.317–28). Athena's visit displays a number of anomalous features (pointed out *ad locc.*), which are the result of her divine status and the presence of the Suitors in Odysseus' palace.

96–101. Athena's departure on this important mission is given extra weight through the insertion of a 'dressing' type-scene (cf. Hermes in 5.44–8). She does not dress like a female, but puts on the same 'magic' sandals as Hermes (cf. 5.44–6) and, just as Hermes takes with him his magic wand, she takes along her spear. This is her attribute when she arms herself in martial contexts (cf. *Il.* 5.745–7 = 8.389–91). In the present peaceful context, the spear suits the male character she will be impersonating (cf. the explicit mention of it in 104, 121, and 127–9), while the ominous overtones of its description alert the narratees to the fact that her rousing of Telemachus is the first step on the road towards Odysseus' bloody revenge (soon to be graphically anticipated by the goddess in 253–66).

(This is the place clearly to state that the work of a commentator, as of any literary critic, is to a considerable degree subjective. Thus the ancient commentator Aristarchus athetized 99–101 as borrowed from the *Iliad*—an evaluation which Stephanie West is inclined to follow; oralists would defend these lines as the typical product of oral composition, viz. automatic and hence unproblematic, but also insignificant; while my own narratological interpretation will no doubt strike some as overinterpretation. Personally I have no problem with the unavoidable subjectivity of the commentator, as long as it is candidly acknowledged.)

106–12. Arriving at his destination, the Homeric visitor finds—and focalizes—the person(s) he is looking for while they are engaged in some activity. Here we have a—unique—variant (Athena finds not Telemachus, but the Suitors), which immediately brings home what is wrong in Odysseus' household: the Suitors are in a place where only Telemachus should be.

The activities engaged in by the persons found often characterize them or are contextually significant; cf. Nestor, who is engaged in a sacrifice in 3.4–67; Eumaeus, who is making his own sandals in 14.5–28. Here the Suitors are playing a game, while servants prepare a meal; throughout the story they will be seen amusing themselves with dance and sport (cf. 421–2 = 18.304–5; 4.625–7 = 17.167–9), and eating (cf. 144–9; 2.299–300, 322, 396; 17.170–82, 260–71; 20.122–62, 250–83, 390). The recurrent picture of the Suitors eating makes visible one of their crimes; they are literally consuming Odysseus' property (cf. 245–51). It is only fitting that they will ultimately be killed during a meal.

. . .

126–9. We hear again of a spear being placed against the wall in 17.29, but only here is there a reference to a rack for spears. This detail allows the narrator to remind the narratees once again of the rightful owner of the palace. They may also see the symbolism of Telemachus placing the stranger's spear—which from 99–101 they know to be Athena's spear "with which she is wont to kill the men she is angry at"—next to those of Odysseus; in Book 22 goddess and hero will fight side by side against the Suitors.
130–5. The typical element of offering a guest a seat is given an individual twist: Telemachus seats 'Mentes' at a distance from the Suitors, both out of embarrassed hospitality (he does not want his guest's meal to be spoiled) and shrewdness (he wants to ask him about his father and keep any information for himself; cf. his whispering in 156–7 and dissimulation in 412–20).
[etc.]

Themes and motifs also occupy an important position in my narratological commentary. An example of a theme, i.e., a recurrent topic which is essential to the narrative as a whole, is 'cunning vs. force': it lies at the heart of Odysseus' capture of Troy by means of the Wooden Horse (4.271–89; 8.499–520; 11.523–32), his escape from the Cyclops' cave (9.106–566), and his revenge on the Suitors; and it is mirrored in Demodocus' song of Ares and Aphrodite (8.266–366), in which lame Hephaestus defeats Ares, the fastest of the gods, through guile. An example of a motif, i.e., a minimal recurrent narrative unit, is the 'watchdog.' In several places in the *Odyssey* we hear about watchdogs at the moment of a visitor's arrival, and each time this is designed to bring about a specific effect: there are Circe's bewitched wolves and lions, who symbolize her world of sorcery (10.212–19); Eumaeus' watchdogs, who bark at Odysseus (14.29–36), fawn on Telemachus (16.4–5), and whimper at the sight of Athena (16.162–3); and of course Odysseus' watchdog Argus (17.291–327), who symbolizes the loyal part of Odysseus' *oikos*. A comparison with these passages helps to determine the nature of Alcinous' gold and silver watchdogs (7.91–4): they are 'immortal and ageless' (unlike Argus, who ages and dies), but in exchange for this they have turned into works of art, ornaments rather than real watchdogs (who bark, fawn, and whimper). Thus they symbolize the Phaeacian way of life: luxurious, but without dynamism, danger, or potential.[14]

[14] Hainsworth has missed this motif, cf. his comment on 7.81–132: "Some description is appropriate at this point, cf. the descriptions that ornament the arrivals of

Problems

Of course, the format of a narratological commentary as set out above also presents its own problems and disadvantages.

Ad 1 and 2. This is clearly a meta-commentary, i.e., a commentary which can only be profitably consulted after or alongside other commentaries which offer the necessary clarification of the problematic aspects of the text, and a full survey of the existent scholarship. Thus, it was only the existence of the Oxford *Odyssey* commentary (and of course Ameis–Hentze–Cauer, which still functions as an indispensable guide through the text) which encouraged me to embark on a selective and focused commentary.

Ad 3. But it was the expansion of the scope of the commentary, from words to scenes, which caused me the most problems. It took me a long time to decide how to divide up the text, and how to organize my lemmata. At first, I thought it would be possible to go through the text once, in continuous sections: 1.1–10, 11–21, 22–24, etc. However, it soon became clear that the same stretch of text can be looked at from different angles, as part of different constellations. Thus a particular set of lines can form part of a (type-)scene, a speech, a motif, etc. In the end, I decided that—unlike the Homeric narrator, who never retraces his steps—I would allow myself to cover the same text more than once, working from large units to small units with partial overlaps: 1–50, 1–10, 6–15, 13–20, etc.

This problem of lemmatizing brings me to a question which I have often been asked during the past ten years: why choose the vehicle of a lemmatic commentary at all, why not a running commentary, like Eisenberger's (1973) on the *Odyssey*, or a systematic study along the lines of Heinze's (1915) *Virgils epische Technik*, i.e., with separate chapters on 'speech,' 'characterization,' 'scenery,' etc.? I will start with the second suggestion. Here I return to what I wrote in connection with the type-scene. In my view, a syntagmatic discussion of recurrent scenes, themes, motifs, and narrative techniques

Athena at Ithaca, i 106ff., Telemachus at Sparta, iv 71ff. Hermes at Ogygia, v 63ff., Odysseus at Eumaeus' farmstead, xivff., and at his palace, xvii 264ff., but such descriptions may be very perfunctory and *this elaborate passage invites the suspicion of rhapsodic reworking*" (my italics).

has a great deal to contribute in addition to the paradigmatic analyses which by and large are already available for these scenes, etc. It is their specific context, i.e., the syntagmatic relation with what precedes and what follows, which gives recurrent elements their individual flavor and effect. Thus the motif of the suppression of Odysseus' name, i.e., the phenomenon that certain characters refrain from using Odysseus' name and instead refer to him by means of circumlocutions, acquires a different meaning in each new context: Telemachus in Book 1 is uncertain about his identity as Odysseus' son, Calypso in Book 5 continues her 'hiding' of Odysseus, Eumaeus in Book 14 fears the '*nomen est omen*' principle, and the narrator in his proem, referring at first only to 'the man,' signals the importance of giving and concealing names. In addition, (type-)scenes can be combined to form new wholes, as happens in 2.260–97, where a 'prayer' type-scene—uniquely—is followed by a 'god meets mortal' scene. In his excellent paradigmatic discussion of 'prayer' scenes in Homer, Morrison (1991) missed this combination, which effectively highlights both Telemachus' position as a youth who needs a 'mentor' and Athena's special relationship with Odysseus and his family. Finally, various type-scenes, themes, or motifs may all play a role at the same time: e.g., the meeting between Athena and Odysseus in Book 13 combines a 'god meets mortal' scene, which takes the special form of a 'stranger meets with local inhabitant' story-pattern, with the 'delayed recognition' story-pattern. Again, a paradigmatic approach by definition does not observe such combinations.

As regards the first suggestion, I think that here the advantages of a lemmatic commentary (speed of the user's orientation, precision of analysis, possibility of dealing with the same lines from different angles) in the end outweigh the disadvantages (primarily the artificiality of breaking up a continuous text).

The reference to the users of this commentary brings me to my final point. Another thing which kept bothering me—as I am sure it has bothered every commentator—is how to be 'user-friendly'; in other words, how both comprehensively and adequately to present the information which I want to provide. At this point each commentator is confronted with a variant of the hermeneutic circle: to convey the complexity or extent of a recurrent phenomenon, it is necessary to discuss all instances together; but in order to show the specific working of that same phenomenon in its individual contexts, it is better to discuss it *ad locum*. Most commentators solve this problem

by means of one discussion, to which they refer back at later occurrences of the phenomenon with the help of cross-references. I have occasionally used this same method, but for the most part I have tried to have my cake and eat it, by inserting both a synoptic discussion, in which the 'contours' of the phenomenon are sketched, and smaller individual discussions *ad locc.* A variant of this 'information distribution' problem, which I think is specific to a narratological commentary, is the question of users vs. narratees: on the one hand, one has to tailor the presentation of information to the needs of the users of the commentary, who must be informed about the full extent and complexity of, say, the topic of Nausicaa's marriage (see above) at an early stage and in one go; on the other hand, one must always remain aware of the fact that the narratees will acquire that same information only gradually, in the course of the linear development of the text. Quite often commentators confuse the perspectives of users and narratees, and employ their knowledge of what will follow later on in the text when *interpreting* an earlier passage.[15] Here I must admit that I myself have fallen into this trap from time to time, e.g., when arguing *ad* 18.257–71 that Penelope is *making up* Odysseus' instructions to remarry on account of the fact that in Book 19, during her intimate conversation with 'the beggar'/Odysseus, she will nowhere refer to these instructions. It was one of the readers of a draft version of my commentary, Douglas Olson, who drew my attention to this methodological error, here and in other places.

Conclusion

Comprehensive commentaries, such as those made for Homer by the Kirk, Heubeck, and Latacz teams, will always be useful, in view of the continuing scholarship which this text engenders. Even more so where less well-investigated authors are concerned, this type of all-embracing text remains a highly economical vehicle for helping readers to find their way. Thus every Hellenist will greet with enthusiasm the recent stream of commentaries on Apollonius Rhodius. However, in the case of authors who have already been the object

[15] Van Erp Taalman Kip (1990) discusses this pitfall extensively in connection with commentators of Attic tragedy. See also West (above) 34 and Ash (below) 290–1.

of many commentaries, such as Homer or the tragedians, specialized commentaries which focus on one aspect of the text are also to be welcomed. In addition to the narratological commentary described in this paper, I would also like to mention linguistic commentaries (e.g., that of Rijksbaron [1991] on Euripides' *Bacchae*) and dramaturgical commentaries (such as that of Taplin [1977] on Aeschylus).[16] As noted earlier, such meta-commentaries can do their specialized work only because they stand on the shoulders of their comprehensive predecessors. It is my firm conviction that the age-old instrument of the commentary will remain one of the mainstays of classical craftsmanship.

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[16] Cf. his remark on p. 2 of the Introduction: "Secondly the book takes the form of a novel kind of scene-by-scene commentary on Aeschylus' surviving tragedies from the aspects of dramatic and theatrical technique."

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4. COMMENTING ON FRAGMENTS

Susan Stephens

Commentaries occupy a paradoxical place in modern classical scholarship. We are dependent upon the information found in them to conduct our scholarly business, yet we fail to engage with them as we do with more straightforward works of criticism and interpretation. We simultaneously overvalue commentaries and commentary writers as authoritative, and frequently fail to question their pronouncements and procedures, while we undervalue them as creative, innovative, or very interesting. Again, paradoxically, commentaries are often valued as learned or authoritative in inverse proportion to their accessibility. Philology has been constructed as a transparent category with an imagined community of readers who are fluent decoders of a sign system that aspires to scientific objectivity, but more often than not functions to exclude, as it were to prevent the uninitiated from penetrating the mysteries. No non-classicists and very few classicists easily identify references like 'Sch. in D.P. 1, 317, 21 Bernh.',[1] yet commentaries regularly require readers not only to know the code, but presuppose that they have access to such cited material in order to follow and evaluate an editor's arguments. The accumulation of references serves to reinforce the authority of the editor—who, after all, if not the thoroughly learned would be able to assemble such evidence? But they also efface the process by which this supposedly corroborating material may have been gathered, the extent of indebtedness to previous editors or the editorial traditions, and most importantly the *a priori* principles informing the editor's understanding of the text. For example, debate over the exact nature of Sappho's sexuality preoccupied many male scholars in the first half of the twentieth century. Is it then a simple circumstance of scientifically objective editing that several attempts to repair the perceived linguistic anomaly[2] in Sappho's hymn to Aphrodite, fr.1.24:

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[1] G. Bernhardy's 1828 edition of Dionysius the Periegete with scholia (Leipzig).

[2] ἐθέλειν is unattested in Lesbian dialect. But see Gomme's remarks, (1957) 264.

κωὐκ ἐθέλοισα, incidentally removed the only indication that the object of Sappho's desire in this poem was female, and restored the possibility for heterosexual relations to the text and (coincidentally?) to Sappho?[3]

The text of Sappho provides obvious, even egregious examples of the problem that is endemic to writing a commentary on fragmentary texts.[4] It highlights as well the fascination that fragments exert over the reader, who is necessarily also a restorer of ancient culture. Classical literature itself is fragmentary: all but a fraction of it has perished, and it is at least the partial task of every commentary writer to supplement or minimize the lacunose state of our knowledge. It is therefore not surprising that texts that have survived only in fragments engage our attention, often out of proportion to their size or intelligibility, since they promise to add some small piece of information to our notional whole of the ancient world. But fragments are more difficult to edit and often require an even more specialized knowledge than does the editing of texts that survive intact, with the result that commenting on fragments exacerbates habits of authority and obscurity already observable in commentaries on works transmitted whole.

Consider, for example, the *Supplementum hellenisticum*, a collaborative effort of former and current Regius Professors of Greek at Oxford, devoted to the fragments of Hellenistic poetry, which, although published as recently as 1983, was nonetheless written in Latin. Very few current scholars would have the temerity to question its massive scholarship. Yet if we open the *Supplementum* to read its editorial principles we find a rather surprising *caveat*, namely, that serious scholars should not only consult the original editions out of which this collection was made, but the papyri themselves.[5] For whom then was

[3] K. J. Dover (1974) 176 n.10 comments on the subject: "Among the emendations designed to restore linguistic normality [to Sappho's phrase], some . . . have the effect of removing the only indication that the desired person is female." See DeJean (1989) 303–8 on the male scholars' interest in the nature of Sappho's erotic experiences. In recent years Sappho's poetry has become the focus of attention for feminist scholars, who in turn construct her sexuality in accordance with their own preconceptions. See duBois (1995) 39 n.9 for recent work on Sappho.

[4] For that reason I have chosen several examples from her poetry to illustrate my arguments. Other examples have been selected from very recent commentaries on Hellenistic poetry, especially the fragmentary texts of Callimachus.

[5] "qui serio his poetis studet, editionem consulat principem, legat posteriorum disceptationes, ipsum prae ceteris papyrum scrutetur ad litteram" ([1983] xi).

the *Supplementum* written if not for the 'serious' scholar? In raw numbers how many classicists who are not actively working on Hellenistic or related fields actually use the *Supplementum* or have thought to pick it up and browse through it? Although its editors implicitly suggest a wider audience, the structure of the collection alone restricts its accessibility. For all its bulk, the *Supplementum* prints substantially less in the way of conjecture or contextualizing material than is to be found in the original editions; it does not reprint the fragments of Callimachus found in Pfeiffer and prints only an index for the earlier collection of Hellenistic fragments, Powell's *Collectanea Alexandrina*, though Powell's texts are in some need of re-editing. In other words, the *Supplementum* provides a collection of texts with updated references for those classicists who have access to a considerable research library. It is not intended to be exhaustive,[6] nor does it pretend to make its material accessible even to a wider classical audience, let alone those outside of the field. It is fair to inquire to what extent the publication of this collection and similar editions have stimulated new interest in Alexandrian poetry, or whether in fact such a formidable edifice of arcane learning acts as a deterrent to working in the field for all but a limited number of scholars with similar technical proficiency.

One of these is Adrian Hollis, who produced an edition of the fragments of Callimachus' *Hecale* in 1990. Although Hollis writes his commentary in English, it is clear from its contents that he too writes only for the specialist, often setting out arguments the parameters of which are not necessarily apparent to the average classicist who might wish to use his text. For example, in his Introduction where he discusses how fragments of the *Hecale* have been extracted from the Suda lexicon, in accordance with (so-called) Hecker's Law, he never sets out Hecker's principles systematically, but enters into a complicated dialogue via a series of quotations from Hecker's Latin text ([1990] 41–3). This is particularly problematic when Hollis himself expresses difficulty understanding Hecker's dictum that a fragment should be 'alibi non inventum,' and he discusses two possible interpretations at some length ([1990] 43). For those not entirely familiar with Hecker's arguments, nothing less than recourse to Hecker's 1842

[6] Cameron, for example, remarks that "it is hard to complain when Parsons and Lloyd-Jones have given us so much, but the fact is that there is a substantial body of Hellenistic poetry that is not to be found in either *CA* or *SH*" ([1995] 270 n.42).

Latin commentary will suffice to follow the argument. In contrast, in a subsequent article on editing fragments ([1997] 123), because it is written for a wider scholarly audience that includes non-classicists, Hollis does not presuppose any familiarity, but sets out Hecker's Law with an admirable concision and clarity in one paragraph:

> The fine Dutch scholar Hecker in his *Commentationes Callimachae* (1842) propounded a rule which is now generally known by his name, as 'Hecker's Law': anonymous and otherwise unknown dactylic verse fragments in the Byzantine lexicon commonly called the Suda should be ascribed to Callimachus' *Hecale*. They seem to reach the lexicon via a commentary on that poem, probably the one by Sallustius which is mentioned two or three times in the *Etymologicum Genuinum*.

From this it is obvious that Hollis imagines that readers of his commentary are already familiar with Hecker's law, hence his engagement is on a far more complex level than is suitable for the more general classical audience. This tendency to address (and convince) those who are already participants in the debate is endemic in commentary writing and is exacerbated by the fact that one's chief readers in preliminary stages of text preparation must necessarily be the group who least needs (and might even be impatient with) the basics of an argument.

The fact that even so learned a scholar as Hollis finds Hecker's Latin ambiguous underscores the limitations of Latin as the vulgate for textual criticism, and particularly for the editing of fragments, where editorial clarity is essential at all times. Latin has not served as a common language for learned discourse since the nineteenth century, and the continued use of Latin for text editing is an archaism that is difficult to defend. It has often been justified on the grounds that members of the international classical community will surely read Latin more easily than modern languages, but this position is untenable in 2002, as it has been for at least the last forty years. Of course, these same scholars are required to read secondary sources in modern languages. Nor is there a sound historical reason for Latin to be used in the edition of fragments, the bulk of which derive from papyrus. Book fragments, whose collection began in the Renaissance, have a tradition of edition in Latin. But this is not the case for papyrus fragments. English, German, Italian, French, and Spanish are the languages in which fragments of literary papyri were originally published, because most papyri were published at the end of the nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries. When the Oxyrhynchus

papyri first appeared in 1899 their editors felt no compulsion to employ Latin, though subsequent re-edition of much of the literary material originally found in this series is now expressed in Latin.[7] As a result, what was originally written idiomatically in a modern language has been, for the purposes of textual criticism, converted into formulaic, sometimes opaque Latin. Instead of adopting the practice of the original editors, then, those who write commentaries on fragments deliberately archaize, and even in editions in which the commentary portion is written in a modern language, like Claude Calame's 1983 edition of Alcman or Giulio Massimilla's 1996 edition of Callimachus' *Aetia*, the apparatus continues to be formulated in Latin.

The effects of this may not always be value-neutral. For example, Edgar Lobel's description of a Sapphic fragment in his original edition in 1951 in the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (21.2291): col. i begins: "There are traces of ink in the margin above v.1 to the left." In the subsequent edition of Sappho and Alcaeus edited by Lobel and Denys Page this note becomes: "col. i 1 supra versum ad sinistram atramenti vestigia" (fr.99, [1955] 82). The crucial point about the margin is altered. That the ink is 'in the margin' suggests that it might belong to a scholium. But the Latin 'supra versum ad sinistram' conveys different information: ink 'above the verse at the left (margin)' could belong to a critical sign. Here the reversion to a dead language for communication not only restricts the circle of readers, but the act of translating English into formulaic Latin has resulted in an apparent inaccuracy. On the photograph, the ink is well into the margin.

Another common feature of commentaries on fragments is redundancy. Although commentators regularly omit much that would aid the reader's understanding of the fragment, they often compensate—taking up space in the process—by repeating certain types of technical material that is available elsewhere. Hollis's commentary on the *Hecale* is over 400 pages in length, yet most of the information in it is to be found already in Pfeiffer or in the *Supplementum*.[8] The presentation of Hollis's fr.40 can serve as an illustration of his editorial practice ([1990] 82):

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[7] All of the editions of Greek lyric, elegiac, and iambic poets published by Oxford University Press in the last fifty years fall into this category.

[8] On tralaticious commentaries, see Kraus (above) 11–13, 16–17.

40 (*SH* 285.1–6; 253.1–6 Pf.)

]. c Μαραθῶνα κατέρχομαι ὄφρακ̣ . . . . . .
]. δε καθηγήτειρα κελεύθου
]ηκαc ἅ μ' εἴρεο καὶ cύ [γε] μαῖα
]ι τι ποθὴ cέο τυτθὸν ἀκοῦσαι
] γρ̣η̣ΰc̣ ἐρ̣η̣μ̣αίῃ ἔνι ναίειc
]. ι γενέθλη

1–6 PSI 133 (= pap. 5), pagina recta (pagina versa = fr. 42)

1]α̣c,]ε̣c (ἐc) possis, vix]οc ο̣φρακ̣ . . . . . .: primo loco prob. ε; secondo η, π, τι?; tertio α, ε, θ, ο, c?; quarto ι, ρ?; quinto et sexto fort. η, ν, π, τί, deinde c vel ω (sed etiam de tribus litteris agi possit): κ' ἀπάρω (Pf.) legi nequit (*SH*) θῶνα pap. 2 fort.]η, vix]c̣ δὲ, -δε γήτ et λέυθ pap. 3 τὼς ἄρ' ἐμεῦ μεμάθ]η̣καc suppl. e.g. Vitelli cύ [γε] suppl. Pf. (cύ [δὲ] Vitelli) μ'έιρεο et μαῖα pap. 4 λέξον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐμο]ί suppl. e.g. Vitelli ποθὴcέο pap., tum ακούcαι in ακοῦcαι (vel vice versa) corr. 5 μ̣άιη et νάι pap. 6 init. e.g. χώρηι suppl. Pf. ἐc]τι suppl. Vitelli]. ὶ et έθ pap.

Inter frr. 40 et 42 stabant in pap. 5 fere 32 versus, quorum pro certo duos (= fr. 41) aliunde habemus.

Compare the text of the *Supplementum* ([1983] 124):

285 (fr.253 + 255, ? + 293Pf.)

(fr.253) 'Recto'

]. c Μαραθῶνα κατέρχομαι ὄφρακ̣ . . . . . .
]. δε καθηγήτειρα κελεύθου
]ηκαc ἅ μ' εἴρεο καὶ cύ [γε] μαῖα
]ι τι ποθὴ cέο τυτθὸν ἀκοῦσαι
] γρ̣η̣ΰc̣ ἐρ̣η̣μ̣αίῃ ἔνι ναίειc
]. ι γενέθλη

(desunt vv. c. 32)

Apart from the printing error (all too common when working with fragments) that has displaced line 5 too far to the right in Hollis, the texts are exactly the same. And much of Hollis's Latin apparatus, especially the matter describing letter traces, is almost completely coincident with that of the *Supplementum*. The *Supplementum's* apparatus on line 1 will suffice for illustration ([1983] 125):

1]. c: αc,]εc (ἐc) possis, vix]ο̣c. ο̣φ̣ρ̣ακ̣ . . . . . .: primo loco prob. ε; secondo η, π, τι?; tertio α, ε, θ, ο, c?; quarto ι, ρ?; quinto et sexto fort. η, ν, π, τί, deinde c vel ω (sed etiam de tribus litteris agi possit). ex gr. κε πόρτιc, κ' ἐπ' αἴηc, κ' ἐπ' οἴηc fort. possis: nequit legi κ' ἀπάρω (Pf.). μαραθῶνα pap.

In his apparatus Hollis prints the supplements from Vitelli's *editio princeps*, which was written in Italian. They are to be found also in Pfeiffer, though the *Supplementum* does not print them. So far nothing is new. If we turn to Hollis's commentary on the first line of this fragment we find ([1990] 177–8):

> 'I am going down to Marathon.' Hecale's cottage stands on high ground (fr.1, see ad loc.), probably on the slopes of Mt. Brilessus (cf. fr.169 inc. sed.). Before Μαραθῶνα,]ἐϲ is possible, but not certain. At the end of the line, ὄφρα κε or ὄφρα κ' is likely, but Pfeiffer's ὄφρα κ' ἀπάρω does not suit the traces (*SH*).

These remarks are typical: the first, which is about Marathon, reproduces Pfeiffer's Latin note almost exactly: "Theseus loquitur: se 'descensurum esse' Marathona; casam Hecalae in montibus fuisse sitam (v. supra fr.230) hoc verbo confirmatur."[9] It also illustrates a common phenomenon of such commentary writing, the occasional employment of translation as a medium of interpretation even though systematic translation of all the fragments is not provided. The second comment translates into English material that Hollis has already included in his Latin *apparatus criticus* which coincides with the *Supplementum*. Why are these latter details important enough to be included twice in his text? It is likely that Hollis himself feels the limitations of the Latin description of traces, and so repeats the note in English to make it clear that the obvious restoration of the preposition ἐς before Μαραθῶνα cannot be taken for granted, and that despite the enormous authority of Pfeiffer's text, his conjecture of ὄφρα κ' ἀπάρω cannot be right.

Hollis's comment on the second line is equally instructive: he tells us that Athena is no doubt the καθηγήτειρα κελεύθου, though not why that should be so; rather, he informs us that 'Call. likes words in -τειρα' ([1990] 178) and proceeds to list a number of Hellenistic sources. He then adds: "See further Hopkinson (*HD*) on H.6.42

[9] "Theseus is speaking: [he says] that he 'will go down' to Marathon; that Hecale's house was located in the mountains (see above fr.230) is confirmed by this word (sc. κατέρχομαι)" ([1949] 1.243). Pfeiffer's fr.230 = Hollis's fr.1. Hollis has renumbered the fragments, so some, like his fr.40, must now be cited by three numbers, Pfeiffer's (if it existed in his collection), *SH* (if it was also reprinted here), and Hollis. This habit of double- and triple- numbering provides a further illustration of the necessary interdependence of each edition in the series.

ἀράτειραν." The reference is to a far more thorough note in Hopkinson's edition of Callimachus' *Hymn to Demeter*. Hopkinson cites standard studies of Callimachus' language as well as a general principle to account for the phenomenon: "The Homeric fem. suffix -ειρα (= Attic -τρια) was a favourite for linguistic innovation in Hellenistic and later poetry" ([1984] 118). Hollis's information is clearly intended to supplement a subject already treated substantially elsewhere, therefore he does not cite the standard studies, but refers an interested reader to Hopkinson's note. This is common editorial practice. But is does raise a question. Why do editors not follow similar procedures when discussing traces? What is so significant about these fragmentary letters that editors cannot bring themselves to say: "for a detailed description of the traces, see X"? Hollis concludes his remarks on this passage with: "it is amusing to note a remarkable piece of prescience (mixed with other less plausible ideas) in Schneider's reconstruction (ii, p. 181) . . ." which he again proceeds to quote in Latin.[10] I have chosen to focus on this passage not to single out Hollis for criticism: there is nothing intrinsically wrong with his information or his presentation, and his practice can be paralleled by those of numerous other editions of fragments (including my own). My point is rather that collectively we are at fault: these traditional editorial habits do nothing to aid the reader who is unfamiliar with the passage under scrutiny, and for the experienced reader more often than not they merely duplicate material in texts that editors themselves expect the reader to know and use in order to engage with the commentary.

This duplication of effort, I submit, is not accidental but is generated by the nature of the fragment itself. The radical detachment of a fragment from its original context, either through the deliberate act of an ancient author who quoted it for his own purposes or because of the physical vicissitudes that the medium of transmission has experienced, cannot be considered an epiphenomenon.[11] To produce a 'text' of the *Hecale* is to detach words and phrases from their original—often lexicographic—medium of transmission to us, then to reorganize and integrate them with fragments of papyrus or parchment or wood. Thus each of the 179 fragments in Hollis's edition presents a unique survival narrative that can be rehearsed, just as

[10] He expands on this in (1997) 113–14.
[11] On the materiality of the fragment, see Gumbrecht (1997).

the physical condition of the fragments can be described. In doing so the editor retains control or authority over his disparate 'texts' while postponing or even displacing the assignment of meaning to his objects of study. In presenting book fragments editors can assemble 'testimonia,' that is to say, the complete list of contexts in which the word or phrase was cited in ancient texts, regardless of relevance or redundancy (that is, the habit that many ancient lexica had of borrowing entries from each other). In presenting papyrus fragments the condition of the material of transmission dominates the editorial process.

The fragment is adorned with dots and brackets and surrounded by an apparatus that attempts to reproduce physical reality by noting all spaces, traces, partial and/or doubtful letters. However scientific this practice may appear to be, the attempt to verbalize the visual is already an interpretative act. The editor can only set out what he *thinks* the letters may have looked like, and a brief glance at H. C. Youtie's list ([1974] 68–9) of Greek letters in papyrus documents followed by the letters for which they have been mistaken does not instill confidence in the utility of these descriptions. Even if we believe that it was important in an initial edition to attempt to describe the actual state of the writing in the event of further decay of the physical medium, since these descriptions usually displace other types of information, we might well question the value of continuing to repeat this information in subsequent editions—unless the new editor has made substantial alterations in the readings of the texts. For example, if we compare Lobel's original edition of several of Sappho's fragments in the Oxyrhynchus papyri with his subsequent collaborative edition with Denys Page (1955), we find that the original English edition not only provided information that was omitted in the critical edition, but also that Lobel when writing in English often expressed considerable doubt about his readings and provided his reader with clear explanations for his choices. In the subsequent edition all of this material is suppressed, while notes on the physical remains of letters have been retained. To be sure, the act of collecting and publishing all the fragments of Sappho together in one volume, which has been invaluable, required compression and distillation of the original editorial material, but I question the purpose in such an edition of reproducing the physical details of broken letter shapes while omitting the processual details that led to the printing of these specific texts, information that the initial edition includes.

The reification of the fragments, thus, presents the readers with a seemingly unmediated text—an objective reality—which obscures the true nature of the process of interpreting and editing a fragment.[12]

Further, the detachment of the fragment from its context necessarily alters the nature of the commentary as well as the reader's response. Whereas in the commentary on a whole text the text itself acts as a control over what the commentator says, editors of a fragment must locate their remarks in an hypothetical context, which is almost never clearly articulated (even to themselves), either because they are more focused on details than the wider issues of interpretation or because they are implicitly writing for other experts who already know the material. Editorial assumptions, therefore, tend to remain unstated, while the text and commentary is set out with an apparent objectivity that is almost impossible to withstand. For example, the average classicist may easily disagree with an individual editor's comment on a line from the *Hymns* of Callimachus, because his or her own reading or understanding of the whole poem makes such a remark seem incorrect, but that same reader is far less able to disagree with Pfeiffer's restoration of]τριτη ὁ Μίμν[ερμος in *Iambus* 13, line 7, even though there is no context to support the supplement, and it is clearly conditioned by the presence of Mimnermus at the opening of the *Aetia*, where the subject is elegy, and not obviously relevant in this poem, where the topic is the writing of iambic. The confidence with which the restoration is printed in this usually cautious text combined with scant comment (only 'suppl. Crusius,' and 'cf. fr.1.11') allows no room for doubt.[13] Christopher Dawson in his 1950 study of the *Iambi*, written shortly before the appearance of Pfeiffer's text, could write: "if the supplement Mimnermos is correct . . ." ([1950] 123) before proceeding to conjecture what it might

[12] Youtie remarks: "There is a correct reading, the reading that the ancient scribe intended to elicit from the ancient reader, and there are many possible false readings. The editor hopes that he is giving us the correct reading, and he uses the signs to give definition to what he sees. By the same token, however, the signs conform to the editor's vision of the papyrus. Where he fails to see what the scribe intended should be seen, they can only mirror his failure. They are not a guarantee of correctness, and they supply no warning of error" ([1974] 55).

[13] I am indebted to Benjamin Acosta-Hughes for this observation. Supported by reexamination of the papyrus in 1995, he suggests a possible alternative, a form of the name Mimnes (e.g., τὸ Μιμν[εῖον), who like Boupalos (1.3–4 μάχην . . . τὴν Βο]υπ[άλ]ειον) of the first *Iambus* was a subject for Hipponax's invective (Hughes [1996] 213–5).

mean.[14] In contrast, Arnd Kerkhecker, in his 1999 book-length treatment of the *Iambi*, not only prints Pfeiffer's text, but accepts the restoration without question or discussion of alternatives. Rather he attempts to create a context to accommodate the reading, presenting his conjectural understanding of the extremely fragmentary lines 5–10 within an authorizing framework of quotation marks: "Does this mean that [they] . . . are quarreling over different ways of following and imitating Mimnermus (and Hipponax)? This is supported by 11–14: 'you pretend to follow Mimnermus and Hipponax; but you have not even been to Ionia where their poetry still flourishes.'"[15]

The isolated character of the fragment grants considerable latitude to the editor for interpretation. But in reaction to this almost open-ended hermeneutic environment editors of fragments more often than not replicate the narrow agendas of the testimonia in their line notes, focussing on details of accent, grammar, lexicography, or citation rather than on meaning(s) of the fragmented passage within the now fragmented text. Indeed the editors of the *Supplementum* even elevate the avoidance of interpretation to a principle, telling us that 'interpretando saepe corrumpimus.' The principle is correct to the extent that interpretation that manifests itself in textual restoration ought to be avoided, the dangers of which Pfeiffer's printing of Mimnermus—and Kerkhecker's free-form expansion on it—illustrates. The unexpressed assumption, however, is that if editors avoid misleading restoration what they do print will be both objective and accurate, untainted by the corrupting act of interpretation. But even within this supposedly unmediated environment, objectivity is not possible.

Consider Lobel in his edition of P.Oxy. 2291 (above 71), when he comments on his reading of ọλ̣ịc̣β̣ δοκọịc̣: "the reading at the beginning of this line is manifestly very improbable, but the scansion as far as the second c corresponds to that at the beginning of line 3." He thus passes over in silence the possibility that Sappho may be talking about women who use dildoes. Lobel's laconism is in sharp contrast to Page's garrulity. In the latter's English commentary written in 1955, however, we learn less about the poetry of Sappho than about the psychodynamics of the editor. On the offending word he writes as follows:

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[14] See (1950) 6 for his comments on the relationship of his text to Pfeiffer's edition.

[15] (1999) 254–5. Footnotes omitted.

> I had written that there is no reliable evidence in the fragments of Sappho for any impropriety in the conduct of herself or her companions. This remains true as stated in that form, but the new evidence suggests that there would be much more to say on this topic if the Alexandrian collection of Sappho's poems had survived intact or at least in much greater bulk.

After a bit more skirmishing he tackles the problem:

> [T]he beginning of col. i 5 appears to prove [note the self-canceling language] that Sappho used in her poetry a word of quite unusual coarseness, referring to practices about which silence is almost universally maintained (except in Attic and Sicilian comedy and in Herondas, see Headlam, *Herodas*, p. 288). The judgement passed by the ancients on the women of Lesbos will now appear easily intelligible. . . . There remains the crucial question: is the reading of the first five letters in col. i. 5 certain, or probable, or merely possible? The answer is that it is practically certain that ολισβ- is what was written.

He then devotes ten lines to describing the traces of these letters, then adds in a last-ditch attempt to rescue the respectability of the poet: "it is not outside of the bounds of possibility that the author here is *Alcaeus*, not Sappho (Page [1955] 144–5)."

This note offers a graphic illustration of the failure of philology in the face of interpretation, which is always subjective. Page, who is caught within his own interpretative web, fails to make an obvious philological point: that the supposedly naughty word certainly cannot be ὄλιϲβοϲ or any form of it, but an unattested compound—*olisbodokois* or *olisbodokoisi*—the meaning of which is highly debatable. Nor is it predicated of people but (apparently) of the word for lyre strings (χόρδαισι). Page has no hesitancy in assigning it a linguistic register—'quite unusual coarseness'—without further discussion. But when ὄλιϲβοϲ occurs in Attic comedy and mime of the fifth and later centuries, it seems to have been the *vox propria* for the item in question. We have no information at all about its register in seventh-century Aeolic or in Lesbian culture (or even in Attic for that matter). What we do know suggests that in the minds of our principal sources, male writers and vase painters, it was by no means a marker of same-sex encounters but rather was used by wives and prostitutes in auto-erotic contexts, so its presence in a line of Sappho would not automatically make "the judgement passed by the ancients on the women of Lesbos . . . easily intelligible." Finally, I would note that Page's failure to translate effectively blocks meaning for any but the

Greek readers for whom the word ὄλιcβοc is familiar or who have access to the large LSJ. This in spite of the fact that interest in and interpretation of Sappho is now, and was at the time of Page's writing, by no means confined to classical scholars. Moreover, if Page had attempted a translation as part of his argument, the oddity of the expression and difficulty of interpretation would have been immediately apparent, and not least of all to himself.

Ironically, even for classical scholars, Lobel and Page's philology seems to have failed to communicate what it should do, namely, what we can know about this reading with some degree of certitude and what is conjecture. For example, Jane Snyder writes in *Lesbian Desire in the Lyrics of Sappho* ([1997] 115):

> To those eagerly seeking information about ancient lesbian sexual practices, however, it must be pointed out that even if these fragments could be definitely assigned to Sappho rather than Alkaios, the occurrence of the word *olisbos* here is far from certain: every letter of *olisb-* in line 5 is printed in the Greek editions with a dot underneath, a convention used by editors of papyri to indicate the uncertainty of the decipherment. The Sapphic dildo may be a figment of papyrological imagination—and if so, the question arises as to why scholars have been so eager to find it in an almost illegible fragment of dubious authorship and uncertain context. . . . In any case, we certainly cannot accept Giangrande's glib conclusion that this fragment "leaves us in no doubt as to what Sappho and her companions are up to."

In fact, the letters are not in doubt, although they are broken.[16] Rather, the dots under the letters objectify an editorial reluctance to accept the reading and make explicit the implicit interpretative act that caused the discomfort. Indeed, this has caused a kind of philological paralysis. Only one scholar that I know of has even suggested a possibility for the *hapax* that does not begin with *a priori* assumptions about Lesbian behavior. M. L. West remarks:

> If the compound occurred with a sexual meaning, it must have been abusive; but distaste for mechanical aids does not imply distaste for intercourse. Prima facie, the word agrees with χόρδαισι, which would mean that ὄλισβος was once a synonym of πλῆκτρον.

[16] An index of the correctness of the reading is that, despite the discomfort and the scholarly musings about the meaning of the word, no one has proposed simply reading it away.

Indeed, 'prick-receiving strings' has the merit of grammatical plausibility and lexical possibility.[17]

Snyder also questions the assignment of the fragment to Sappho. Lobel himself admitted it was on dubious grounds. It has been challenged by a number of scholars[18] and the fragment reassigned to Alcaeus in Voigt's 1971 text of Sappho and Alcaeus,[19] on metrical grounds as well as the consideration that abusive language can be paralleled in Alcaeus though not Sappho.[20] This equally interpretative gesture is typical of recent work on Sappho—her erotics may now be constructed as lesbian desire (in the modern sense)—but expressed only in lofty and decorous language.

Page's reaction to the reading of this papyrus dramatizes in extreme form the inherent danger of the fragment. Page's note on ο̣λ̣ι̣ϲ̣β̣ ̣δοκο̣ι̣ϲ̣ was attached to an already complete commentary in which he had spent considerable time discussing the nature of Sappho's relationships with other women, only to conclude that however intense they lacked 'impropriety,' that is, sexual intimacy. Five broken letters on a tattered scrap of ancient paper not only did violence to his neatly constructed edifice, but to Page's mind, at least, conveyed information that undermined the premises upon which his commentary was built. Page's circumstances are not unique. The field is littered with the corpses of interpretative models felled by the discovery of a new fragment, the most famous of which is the re-dating of Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, after the discovery of P.Oxy. 20.2256 fr.3, a fragment of an hypothesis to the Danaid trilogy. The havoc that the random discovery of fragments can wreak on years of scholarly effort has, I would suggest, a paralyzing effect on the commentator who clings to what 'facts' seem available whenever possible to avoid the abyss that interpretation presents. Hence the cluttering of commentaries with repet-

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[17] West (1970) 324. K. J. Dover conjectures that *olisb[o]dokois[* 'means 'receivers of the olisbos' and is parallel to a name for a satyr 'Phlebedokos,' that is, 'receiver of the vein' or the penis ([1974] 176 n.9); but see also Aloni (1997) 166–7. Both Dover and West make the point that the presence of the word itself does not imply same-sex activity (*pace* Giangrande [1980]).

[18] E.g. Snell (1953), Gomme (1957).

[19] Snyder too seems mesmerized by the 'Sapphic dildo.' Although elsewhere in her study she depends upon Voigt's texts and commentary, who on good grounds reassigns the fragment to Alcaeus, Snyder nevertheless both prints and translates the fragment.

[20] Gomme (1957) 216: ". . . it is more likely that Alkaios would use ὀλισβο- (ὀλισβοδόκοισι), if either of them did."

itive detail. In order to avoid having a text made redundant by the next discovery, fragments are packaged in such a way that the information they present is rarely controversial, but equally rarely does it extend beyond the technical to serious issues of interpretation.

Connected to this is another phenomenon. In most commentaries on fragments, translation of the fragments into a modern language has often been entirely lacking or has appeared only occasionally in line notes, as if translation were not part of the hermeneutic process, but rather a crutch for the less than philologically robust. In editing fragments, however, the act of translating not only serves to clarify for the editor both the limits and the possibilities of the ancient text, it allows the reader immediate access to the editor's understanding of the fragment. Notes or accreted parallels, in contrast, often locate the fragmentary passage within an ongoing scholarly debate—what Wilamowitz, Page, or Lobel thought, what the ancient grammarians said about this or that usage, without necessarily questioning or explaining the relevance of these particulars to a general context. Hollis, for example, does not translate. Yet the inclusion of a translation would hardly have rendered his edition less scholarly and would at the same time have opened up his commentary both for Greek and non-Greek readers. The danger is of course that translations, like interpretations, might go wrong, or that translation, by virtue of its accessibility, might appear to obviate the careful work of the commentary. Translation is necessarily a mediated response to the fragment in which the editor's own *a priori* assumptions will become apparent.

To gauge the effect of translation, let us consider what will seem to some an unfair and perverse example: Ezra Pound's poem 'Papyrus' and with it the text of the opening lines of fr.95 of Sappho from Lobel and Page on which it was based.[21]

(a) Sappho fr.95.1–4 (L-P):	(b) Papyrus
.ου[	
<—>	
ἦρ᾽ ἀ[	Spring . . .
δηρατ [	Too long . . .
Γογγυλα̣ [	Gongula . . .

[21] Seelbach (1970) is the first to recognize the relationship of Pound's poem (published in 1916) to an actual fragment of Sappho.

As a poet, Pound may seem to have an unfair advantage over the editor, and a deplorable knowledge of Greek. But this is only a matter of scale; the principle is the same for any translation. Pound's little poem is at once far more immediate and evocative of a response than the critical edition, which suggests nothing so much as unintelligibility. It offers us a potent illustration of the interpretative impulse, of the need to assign meaning(s) that the fragment provokes. Pound, of course, might be guilty of mistakes in translation, or for privileging an evocative word over accuracy. He mistranslates (deliberately?) the second line as 'spring' (ἦρ for ἦρ' ἁ) and probably also the next line as 'too long' (seeing in δηρατ[a form of δηρóϲ), but if the editors provide neither a commentary nor an accurate translation that outlines the possibilities for interpretation, the mistakes are certainly explicable and are mistakes even Greek readers who are unfamiliar with the protocols of commentaries on fragments might conceivably make.[22]

Translation, even of very fragmentary texts, can play a very important role in a scholarly context. By way of example, consider G. Massimilla's 1996 Italian edition of Callimachus' *Aetia*, Books 1–2. Massimilla prints the opening two lines of the poem as follows:

> . . . . . .]ι μοι Τελχῖνες ἐπιτρύζουσιν ἀοιδῇ,
> νήιδες οἳ Μούσης οὐκ ἐγένοντο φίλοι.

He also provides a translation: ". . . contro il mio canto mormorano i Telchini che, ignari della Musa, a lei non nacquero cari." His commentary on these two lines requires five densely argued pages, but the translation encapsulates a number of the salient issues: (1) he construes the opening as μοι τρύζουσιν ἐπὶ ἀοιδῇ ('il mio canto'), as Pfeiffer does, instead of as a double dative construction; (2) he understands ἐπιτρύζουσιν to mean grumble ('mormorano') not croak or twitter;[23] (3) he takes νήιδες with Μούσης from the relative clause ('ignari della Musa'), not independently; (4) he understands φίλοι as not directly taking a genitive Μούσης, rather he compensates by reinserting the Muse in the phrase 'a lei.' There are at least three different

[22] Even in his English commentary on the poem, Page does not translate this fragment and makes no remarks on these opening lines that would aid in interpretation ([1955] 84–6).

[23] Cameron (1995) 339–40, D'Alessio (1996) 367 ('gracidano'), and Magnelli (1999) 52 ('gracidano') prefer the other meaning.

ways of understanding these opening lines,[24] and by providing the translation Massimilla must make a decision about how he understands the text, as opposed to the strategy of sitting on the fence that the line notes allow. We might choose to disagree with his interpretation, and we might argue that a translation equally has the effect of privileging only one interpretation of a controversial passage. But translation by its nature opens up the text to a greater number of readers, and for the classicist, who can read the notes but may not choose to, translation can provide precisely the right short-cut. If the reader disagrees with Massimilla's translation, he or she can turn to the relevant notes for his supporting evidence. Finally, the translation makes visible the editor's understanding of his text, which has also conditioned the notes. Not surprisingly in his note on ἐπιτρύζουσιν Massimilla arranges his citations in such a way that they privilege the meaning of 'grumble,' while Cameron ([1995] 340), who prefers the meaning 'twitter' or 'squeak,' cites his evidence rather differently. Nor should we be surprised to read on νῆιδες . . . Μούσης . . . φίλοι: "A quanto pare, come osserva Vogliano p. 204, abbiamo qui una construzione brachilogica. Dal genitivo Μούσης, accordato con νῆιδες, si ricava un dativo Μούσῃ da collegare a φίλοι" (followed by a grammatical parallel). Arguments to the contrary are truncated and included only afterwards.

The creation of such commentaries as I have been discussing rests on two unarticulated assumptions, neither of which I suspect is unproblematic for the current generation of readers: first, that the very existence of material remains from the Greco-Roman world, however small or seemingly inconsequential, justifies scholarly attention, justifies publication. But fragments of literary texts are not like ceramic coarse-ware. They are not useful in the aggregate but for their specificity, for the imagined whole of which each is a remnant. Thus, fragments are of value only to the extent that they succeed in evoking for us as readers and interpreters of the past just what that whole might have been. As a string of arcane symbols—dots and brackets on the page—they are powerless. How much more suggestive of Sappho's poetry after all is Pound's mistranslation than the philologically correct text that Page prints? In other words the fragment depends upon interpretation to justify the effort put into its recovery

[24] Magnelli (1999) 52–8.

and edition. The traces that Lobel and Page resolve into *olisbodokois* are themselves of no consequence except in so far as their existence allows us to imagine (for good or ill) the behavior of Lesbian women in Sappho's poetry. Had the word occurred as part of a fragmentary word list, unattached to an ancient author, it would be no more than an obscure lexical entry in the most recent supplement to LSJ. But interpretation is always provisional; the past will always remain fragmentary for us and attempts to understand or explain it will always be subject to revision.[25] If we accept that editing fragments should be negotiation, an exploration of the possibilities rather than the transmission of dogma, then editors themselves might be willing to accept the possibility of error and to take more interpretative risks.

A second tacit assumption of this kind of commentary writing is that responsible philology requires the maintenance of the editorial standards such texts as I have been discussing exhibit, even as the pool of competent (or compulsory) readers, not to mention editors, continues to dwindle. An unexamined corollary of this premise, I suspect, is that readers who do not naturally gravitate to the description of the traces of broken letters in Sappho or Alcaeus in order to supplement or emend such texts for themselves are further down the scholarly food chain, hence are unlikely to have opinions worth expressing on these poets. But fragments are useless without a viable community of interpreters and it should be the editor's task, particularly the editors of fragments, to broaden, not restrict, that community by providing those without the requisite technical skills clearly articulated reasons for their editorial choices, particularly in today's world where scholars outside of the text-editing community or even outside of the field of classics are writing and interpreting classical material. Since editors cannot restrict the non-Greek reader, commentator, or translator (like Pound) from using their texts (however abstruse they may have made them), perhaps it is time to consider, as a viable alternative to the status quo, providing more accessible editions.

Given the limitations of the material, is it possible to produce a commentary on fragmentary texts that is both scholarly and accessible? I think the answer is yes. But to achieve this result editors

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25 duBois (1995) 39 states it well: "We have come to recognize that our access to the past is always fragmented, our construction of our past interested, particular, and historically determined."

themselves must be persuaded to privilege clarity and intelligibility over scholarly display. This could begin to happen if more non-specialists undertook to edit texts, particularly of fragments within their own areas of interest. It should be permissible to build on the technical expertise of a Lobel or a Page, particularly since individual fragments will have had at least one specialist publication, sometimes several, before appearing in a collected edition.[26] Presses considering the publication of commentaries, and subsequently the journals that review them should select reviewers who do not themselves write commentaries or edit fragments, hence are not part of the guild. Classicists in their own scholarship and teaching need to become more actively engaged with the editions they use. It is also important that they articulate their own expectations with respect to commentary writing. Finally, and most importantly, an effort should be made to produce editions of fragments that are accessible to those who do not read Greek or do not read it easily. Sappho is a case in point. Undergraduates, colleagues in other fields, not to mention the general public take an interest in her poetry, yet until quite recently no competent edition produced by a classicist has been available for them to read. A few may have stumbled across Page's commentary, but most rely on whatever paperback translation happens to be available. Those of us who edit fragments should be embarrassed to accept this state of affairs and we ought to be the first to encourage our colleagues to take an interest in the production of more readable editions.

Because fragments are necessarily incomplete, always in a state of 'becoming' instead of 'being,' I want to end by considering the potential of computerized commentaries on fragmentary texts as a way to create an environment in which interpretation can play a greater role, and at least in part obviate the continual need to re-edit if—

[26] Snyder, for example, prints Greek texts with translations as an appendix to her otherwise synthetic study of Sappho ([1997] 163–218). She covers the philological bases with this prefatory comment: "Greek text from the edition by Eva-Maria Voigt. . . . A list of the ancient source(s) for each fragment, similar wording from elsewhere in Greek literature, and further bibliography (including suggestions for alternate readings of the Greek text) may be found in her critical apparatus" (163). Note her glosses: testimonia = 'A list of the ancient source(s) for each fragment'; parallels = 'similar wording from elsewhere in Greek literature'; and variant readings = 'suggestions for alternate readings of the Greek text.' See also de Jong (above), 55–9, 62 on meta-commentaries.

or rather when—it goes wrong.[27] Computers offer numerous features that are already being adapted by classicists in general and papyrologists in particular.[28] The databases of Greek (TLG) and Latin (TLL) texts are now widely available, and digital imaging makes real the possibility of 'seeing' the fragment as part of the editing process, should one wish to do so. Thus, descriptions of traces and extensive testimonia might give way to hyperlinks that provide a visualization of the actual traces and a database of complete parallels. With respect to the visualizing of the papyrus, it ought to be possible to create programs built up from samples of actual letters from a particular papyrus that allow the simulation of supplements. The computer allows for a series of informational hierarchies: the evidence of testimonia could be so arranged that it is immediately clear whether the evidence comes from a source that depended on the poet in question, or from an intermediate lexicon or commentary.[29] Conjectures and supplements might be organized and accessed by a variety of means: physical, grammatical, or syntactical likelihood, ancient testimony, temporal priority, authorship, and categories that the individual user might like to create. Computers allow universal access to the information, and thus might serve to disseminate hard-to-find material to a much wider audience (as the TLG and TLL have done). They also allow a means of discussion and interaction for virtually every level of interest. Scholars working on a text could use a discussion format to test ideas, and to interact with those whose concerns are less textual than broadly interpretative. Finally, the computer allows a rapid response to inevitable changes. New fragments that perversely fall within the middle of a fragmentary corpus could

[27] On computerized commentaries, see also McCarty (below), but with the skeptical remarks of Fantham (below), 418–19.

[28] See Robinson (1997) for a very useful discussion of the possibilities and complications of on-line editions. He bases his analysis on an edition of Chaucer's *Wife of Bath's Prologue* available in CD-ROM format.

[29] A purist might object that much of what constitutes testimonia comes from sources that are themselves in serious need of reediting, and to depend on currently error-prone texts like Athenaeus or the Suda Lexicon would be irresponsible. This is undoubtedly true, but the scale of the problem is diminished when an individual fragmentary text is in question. For much of what the editor needs from these sources, the textual problems may be irrelevant, correctable, or capable of being limited. It would be possible to hyperlink to the TLG and simply indicate when the reader should beware. Or, in those cases where a testimonium is critical for interpretation, an editor could actually write a note (as he or she would inevitably do in a printed edition).

be integrated without disturbance or expensive new editions, while the computer would provide an ideal environment to experiment with placement of unlocated fragments.

In discussing these ideas recently with colleagues, I heard the following objection—'but where are you [i.e., the autonomous scholar/author] in all this?' The question is a real one, given the ways in which the academy structures its reward system. But it is also shortsighted. Computers are already changing the ways in which we conduct our scholarly business. Given the enormous expenditure of time and intellectual energy new editions require, those undertaking such commitments might well consider the possibility of computer collaboration as a feasible part of, if not a complete substitute for, a new undertaking. To continue to publish exclusively in a book format unfortunately guarantees ever more costly editions for fewer and fewer readers, and, increasingly, limits the likelihood of editing of important texts if the potential readership is deemed too small. Not the least advantage of computers is that they might well provide the best opportunity for text editors to participate more immediately in the discourse of the classical community. And should that happen, academic rewards would inevitably follow.[30]

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5. THE SENSE OF AN AUTHOR: THEOCRITUS AND [THEOCRITUS]

Richard Hunter

I. *Authenticity and its Consequences*

In the *Preface* to his 1995 Cambridge commentary on a selection of Ovid's *Heroides* Peter Knox explains the inclusion of the much debated *Epistula Sapphus* as follows:

> The *Epistula Sapphus*, which I do not believe to be Ovid's, is an interesting poem in its own right, and I have included it as an illustration of the principle that a judgement against authenticity does not necessarily imply aesthetic condemnation.

There is much of interest in this statement, beyond the question of the authorship of the *Epistula Sapphus*, with which I will not here be directly concerned.[1] It is probably fair to infer that Knox asserts this 'principle,' which one might have hoped did not need spelling out, because he is in fact aware that it has too often been honored in the breach, and anyone with any familiarity with traditional classical scholarship on poems of doubtful authorship will recognize at once that 'aesthetic condemnation' is indeed a dominant mode in such criticism. A proper account of the reasons for this would embrace much of Western cultural history, so I content myself here with two brief observations.

Although questions of style are naturally central to disputes about authorship (cf. below), subject-matter has been no less at the heart of these arguments at crucial periods of scholarly history. Classical texts were for many centuries—perhaps still are—read as, and proclaimed to be, sources of moral instruction; the lessons of literature were used to cultivate appropriate ethical attitudes in the reader or student, attitudes which could of course vary with time or place or the identity of the teacher.[2] The methodology and purposes of

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[1] Knox (1995) ix. The battle continues (of course): cf. Rosati (1996).

[2] Cf. Sluiter (1999) and see Index, s.v. didacticism.

Plutarch's *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry* remained one dominant mode of reading until surprisingly recently. A sense of the individual author, whose work could be represented as offering a clearly delineated profile from which truths of importance about his or her work, life, and culture can be won by study, was central to this didactic enterprise. Where better to look for a fulfilled example of someone who has learned those lessons than to the author himself? 'Euripides says . . .' soon passes to 'You should follow the example of Euripides. . . .' Once (the idea of) Euripides has become a guiding practical model, it naturally becomes vitally important not to accept non-Euripidean texts as the genuine article: choices about authenticity are not merely 'textual' matters, but concern the scholar's very moral health, and that of his or her students.

As far as style is concerned, descriptions of literary quality (in the broadest sense) very properly continue to play an important role in scholarly discussion of the authorship of literary works. Arguments that X's style differs from Y's must obviously lie at the heart of debate about whether a particular literary work is to be ascribed to X or Y. In one sense, it does not matter very much that in practice assertions of difference soon pass into assertions of superiority (of 'quality' in a narrower sense), though the dangers lurking here are plain to see: a poem judged 'good' will likely be assigned to a known poet of good 'quality.' The discussion of 'Style and authorship' in Kenney (1996), a kind of sister volume to Knox's, relies heavily upon such arguments (though with a tact and discretion which few could match),[3] and is admirably honest in its conclusion: "the literary historian must always be uneasily conscious of the vast gaps in the record and the dangers of arguments from silence. Nevertheless there is still much virtue in Occam's Razor: *Magni poetae non sunt multiplicandi praeter necessitatem*" (26). However tempted we may be to retort 'Why not?,' in the present context what is important is the way in which the need to justify such a (spoken or unspoken) principle sometimes leads, almost inexorably, to commentary whose

[3] Cf. Alessandro Barchiesi's observation: "thoughts of spuriousness almost unavoidably encourage negative evaluation, but also set higher standards for the opposite view. . . . Kenney's appeal to the quality of the double letters as a self-evident criterion for authenticity is bound to appear irritating—although it is more understandable, in its undisguised subjectivity, than recurrent, objectivist invocations of *Amores* 2.18 as a witness to the authenticity or spuriousness of the single letters" (1997) 40. For other considerations cf. Courtney (1998).

rhetoric is characterized by the award of 'merits and demerits.' The crucial distinction between 'not in the manner of X' and 'not very good' proves, in practice, almost impossible to maintain, with potentially ruinous consequences for the writing of commentary.

The 'authorless' text (or that which is judged so) has, on the whole, received a cold reception from classicists; for reasons which lie deep in the heart of the history of the subject, classicists have, on the whole, never been very comfortable with the anonymous, and this anxiety may indeed surface in 'aesthetic condemnation.' Knox's positive approach is therefore much to be welcomed, even though his observation that "the author [of the *Epistula Sapphus*] was in many respects a talented poet" (14) might be thought to fall some way short of actual enthusiasm. The reasons for this curious unease, if my sense is accurate, will be complex and cannot be pursued at length here. There has perhaps been a feeling that such texts have 'slipped through the net,' i.e. through that process of *krisis*, of collecting and categorizing, of filtering and selecting, which lies at the very heart of the notion of 'the classical' and which scholars rightly trace back to their spiritual ancestors, the great figures of Alexandrian scholarship. However unfair it might seem, free-floating, 'anonymous' poems are cheating the system, and criticism will have its revenge.

The range of possible situations with which the commentator is in fact faced is, of course, very large.[4] Works may become associated in transmission with the oeuvre of a particular writer, though their original author had no intention to imitate, let alone commit fraud; the corpora of fourth-century oratory apparently offer excellent examples of this phenomenon. 'Imitations,' on the other hand, may be subsumed within the body of the 'original' because of generic similarity (cf. Theocritus 8 and 9), or 'forgery' ranging from 'intention to deceive' (by author or subsequent editor) to more or less parodic homage, or simple accident. The questions to be asked of a 'spurious' text will to some extent, of course, vary as the commentator's view of the situation he or she is confronted with emerges, but it is the questions which are *not* asked, simply because of the view taken of the work's status, which most endanger the commentator's project.

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[4] Some of this variety may be traced through Speyer (1971) and von Fritz (1972).

To turn to the *Epistula Sapphus* itself:

(i) ecquid, ut aspecta est studiosae littera dextrae,
protinus est oculis cognita nostra tuis?
an, nisi legisses auctoris nomina Sapphus,
hoc breue nescires unde ueniret opus?
forsitan et quare mea sint alterna requiras
carmina, cum lyricis sim magis apta modis.
flendus amor meus est: elegia flebile carmen.
non facit ad lacrimas barbitos illa meas. (*ES* 1–8)

When you saw the letters formed by my learned hand, did your eyes immediately recognize them as mine? Or, had you not read the author's name, Sappho, would you not have known the origin of this short work? And perhaps you ask why mine are alternating verses, when I am more suited to the modes of the lyre: I must weep for my love; elegy is the song of weeping. The lyre does not suit my tears.

On 1–4 Knox comments: "the opening of Sappho's epistle is not well developed: the reason for her concern—Phaon is far away in Sicily—is not given until 11." What is important in the present context is not whether this note commands assent, though, for what it is worth, it seems to me to miss the mark. Sappho imagines Phaon's reception of the letter with two quatrains which each deals with one fantasized facet of that reception. Moreover, it is not Phaon's absence that is the cause of her concern, but rather what that absence may betoken about his feelings for her; hence the worry about whether he will instantly recognize her writing (if yes, perhaps she is still in his thoughts . . .), and whether he will be curious about her unusual choice of meter (if yes, perhaps he is still interested in her . . .).[5] It is also not important here whether we agree with Knox, quoting Richard Tarrant,[6] that *aspecta est* (1), is 'flat and lifeless'; in the meaning 'catch sight of,' 'get a (first) glimpse of,' the verb seems to me entirely appropriate, but this may be a matter of taste as well as Latinity. What *is* important is the mode of 'aesthetic condemnation' into which Knox immediately slips, despite the brave words of the *Preface*, in a work which properly sets out to demonstrate the inappropriateness of this mode of criticism.

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[5] On vv.5–8 cf. now Rosati (1996) 213–16.

[6] Tarrant (1981) 144; Tarrant in fact called the verb 'vague, flat, and lifeless,' and also noted that this would be the only example of the perfect passive of *aspicere* in 'Ovid.'

(ii) uror ut, indomitis ignem exercentibus Euris,
fertilis accensis messibus ardet ager. (*ES* 9–10)

I burn as the fruitful field burns when the raging East Winds fan the fire and the harvests blaze.

This comparison is said to be 'less apt' than in parallel Ovidian passages because Sappho's passion is ongoing, not a sudden conflagration. Despite noting the agricultural metaphor in *proueniunt* (v.14), Knox makes no comment upon the fact that Sappho's description of herself as a *fertilis ager* makes it clear to Phaon that, like an absentee landlord, he is neglecting his estate and its potential 'fruits' (cf. Soph. *Trach.* 31–3): he should not be in the *arua* of Sicily, but home in Lesbos. That the 'wind of love' may in fact come from a surviving fragment of Sappho (fr.47 Voigt) also passes unremarked.[7] Would there have been these silences if the commentator had thought that the poem he was commenting upon was by Ovid? Knox may indeed admire the *Epistula Sapphus*, but his commentary refers repeatedly to its 'odd,' 'inappropriate,' 'ridiculous' phrasing; it almost goes without saying that, in the poems considered to be by Ovid, such phenomena are regarded by the commentator (at least in the first instance) as a sign of probable corruption or interpolation. Even when the tone is appreciative, moreover, doubts linger. On v.154 we are told that 'the imitation is not inert' (as though inertness was to be expected), and the repetition in 123–4 'heightens the pathos':

(iii) tu mihi cura, Phaon; te somnia nostra reducunt,
somnia formoso candidiora die.

You, Phaon, are my love; you my dreams bring back, dreams brighter than the clear day.

'Pathos' there may well be, but perhaps the most striking thing about these verses is the etymologizing of Phaon's name, a subject which (I think) Knox nowhere discusses, despite the real Ovid's known love of etymology. I assume that the meaning of the name is relevant elsewhere also, such as in 23 (*fies manifestus Apollo*) and in 187–8,

tu mihi Leucadia potes esse salubrior unda;
et forma et meritis tu mihi Phoebus eris.

[7] For other relevant passages cf. Hunter (1989) on Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* 3.967–72.

> You can do more for my health than the water of Leucas; in both beauty and the help you give, you will be my Phoebus

where we must recall that Phoebus was connected (*inter al.*) with φάος 'light,' or glossed as λαμπρόν 'bright' etc.[8] How much of this weakness in the commentary (if weakness it be) can be put down to the commentator's view of the poem's authorship? Or, to put it another way, how does the 'authenticity agenda' affect the way commentaries are written? I have illustrated a general issue from Peter Knox's excellent Ovid commentary,[9] to suggest that we are not dealing with a problem merely confined to straw men from the bad old days of literary connoisseurship.

Knox's implicit acknowledgment that judgments about authenticity have often been associated with 'aesthetic condemnation' reveals the modern commentator to be (once again) the heir of the ancient. In considering the authorship of literary works, ancient scholars, for whom questions of authenticity, interpolation, plagiarism, and literary fraud were endlessly fascinating, had particular regard to χαρακτήρ, that is to the individual flavor of a writer's style:[10]

> Apollonios of Rhodes declared that the *Aspis* was the work of Hesiod on the basis of its *character* and from the fact that also in the *Catalogue* Iolaos is Heracles' charioteer.
>
> (*Hypoth.* Hesiod, *Aspis*)

> From its very *character* one would judge that this speech was not by Deinarchos (for it is diluted and weak and frigid), but one would rather assign it to Demokleides or Menesaichmos or one of their kind.
>
> (Dion. Hal. *On Deinarchos* 11)

Judgments of this kind were probably 'a purely subjective aesthetic criticism';[11] the anecdotal tradition is full of the mockery of writers who were not thought to measure up, and much serious ancient criticism has at its heart a sense that there are absolute standards of quality which some reach and some do not. The history of the study of 'interpolation' in Homer shows a constant reliance upon forms of

[8] Cf. *Et. Mag.* 796.55–7.

[9] I declare an interest: since Knox's commentary appeared, I have become one of the General Editors of the series (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics) to which it belongs.

[10] There is a useful collection of passages in Ritchie (1964) 13.

[11] Ritchie (1964) 14.

'aesthetic condemnation,' whatever other considerations are also in play. The recognition that subjects and styles have histories and contexts was in fact surprisingly slow to take hold in the critical tradition; Horace's witty claim that, if Lucilius had lived in his day, he would have obeyed 'Horatian' precepts (*Sat.* 1.10.64–72) constantly surprises by its unusual historical sense.

Knox's use of the phrase 'aesthetic condemnation' must not, of course, be pushed too hard. The problem is, at one level, merely one of terminology. If we replace his 'not well developed,' 'odd,' 'inappropriate,' and so forth with 'in my judgment non-Ovidian,' we may seem closer to ancient practice and on rather firmer ground. Thus Sir Kenneth Dover in the *Preface* to his commentary on select poems of Theocritus:

> In excluding certain poems I have been guided in part by aesthetic judgement, in part by the evidence for and against authenticity. These two criteria are for the most part in harmony with each other and have led me in the same direction as the majority of scholars. . . . ([1971] vi).

It is a pity that Dover did not spell out what kind of 'evidence' he had in mind, although he presumably meant 'anything which I judge to be relevant to the question of authenticity.' The two most obvious bodies of evidence, transmission and language, are both fraught with potential traps. The transmission of the Theocritean corpus poses particular problems for the scholar interested in the authenticity question; there is both sufficient consistency in the arrangement of the corpus (or corpora) in the ancient and medieval traditions to encourage a belief that positive results are possible, and sufficient uncertainty to discourage over-confidence.[12] If Dover was referring also to linguistic criteria, then that is an even thornier area, and it is somewhat surprising that he decided to say nothing about it. As for 'aesthetic judgment,' it may be worth observing that many critics, who lack Dover's discipline and rigor, have obviously found it very difficult to keep 'aesthetic judgement' and 'the evidence for and against authenticity' as separate critical processes until, with a gratifying mixture of pleasure and surprise, they find the two to be 'in harmony.' It is in fact unclear whether Dover means that he has

[12] Cf. Gutzwiller (1996). New papyri can, of course, always change the picture: cf. P.Oxy. 4431, fragments of *Idyll* 25 and see further above, 80–1.

excluded poems he does not think very good (whether Theocritean or not) or only poems he considers non-Theocritean, whether because they are 'unworthy of Theocritus' or not in the Theocritean manner or both. In the event, Dover omitted the poems which the scholarly consensus of the last century deemed non-Theocritean (*Idylls* 8, 9, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27), together with the Aeolic *paidika* (*Idylls* 29 and 30) and two further poems which have generally been regarded as Theocritean: *Idyll* 12, the monologue of a helplessly deluded pederast, and *Idyll* 17, the encomium of Ptolemy; he appears not to have particular doubts about the authenticity of any of these last four.[13]

The cases of Theocritus and Ovid raise different general, as well as particular, issues. The Theocritean corpus very likely contains poems which range in date from the third century BC into the Christian era. The language of the earlier poems—the genuine Theocritus, if you like—is neither uniform[14] nor, as far as we can tell, quite like any poetic language which had gone before. Any attempt to explore the linguistic character of these poems is seriously hampered by the various degrees of editorial and scribal 'normalization' (both in the direction of more and of less Doric coloring), which is presumably as concealed as often as it is overt in the papyri and the manuscripts. If we limit ourselves to what are usually understood as the 'bucolic' poems, it might seem a reasonable assumption that the language of such poems evolved over time, particularly as the 'generic solidification' of bucolic/pastoral literature is essentially a post-Theocritean development.[15] From one perspective, the invention of the 'bucolic genre' was an act (or series of acts) of historical interpretation imposed upon some of Theocritus' poems by later poets. The existence of the 'genre' then provided a series of linguistic and motival codes by which the status of a poem could be declared. Some of these linguistic codes—for example, how 'Doricized' the language was to be—will never be recovered with any confidence,

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[13] Cf. (1971) xviii, 270. *Idyll* 17, a poem which has only recently come into its own, was perhaps not to Dover's taste nor, in his view, to that of "the learner in the sixth form, at university, or later in life" ([1971] v); Gow (1952) II.325 calls it 'stiff, conventional, and sycophantic.' It is relevant that, in the Introduction to his commentary on *Idyll* 16 ('The Graces,' an encomium of Hieron of Syracuse), Dover claims that "Modern readers are commonly repelled by an ancient poet's flattery of a patron or potential patron" ([1971] 217).

[14] Cf. Hunter (1996) 28–45.

[15] Cf., e.g., Van Sickle (1976), Halperin (1983), Gutzwiller (1996).

for there are few clear signs, such as meter, which betray them with certainty. Moreover, the once confident belief that so-called 'hyperdorisms' are a mark of Theocritean imitators, not of Theocritus himself, is slowly dissipating in the face of a recognition that what constitutes such forms may often be as much a matter of reception and interpretation as of linguistic fact.[16] Be that as it may, only someone who believes that the 'meaning' of an ancient poem is separable from the language in which it is written will regard the state of the bucolic corpus with equanimity.[17] This, of course, is not to say that there are any easy paths which the commentator can follow in this matter. In his great Cambridge commentary on Theocritus, Gow essentially gave up on these problems, and anyone who has thought hard about them will have a certain sympathy for this resignation in the face of the seemingly inevitable.

The basis of our sense of an author—particularly an author doing something quite new—is indeed very often stylistic, and here problems of authenticity reveal how fragile our stylistic sense actually is; in asking us to distinguish between one style and another, between the language of a 'bucolic' poem of 250 BC and one of 150 BC, such problems raise central questions about the nature of poetic language and the construction of a poetic idiolect: just how *idion* is an idiolect? How this affects the writing of commentaries may be less important than the principle itself, but the practical consequences are serious indeed. A commentary upon a collection of poems handed down under a single name invites—indeed imposes—reading by 'author,' rather than by any other principle, such as 'genre.' The large-scale commentator, like Gow on Theocritus, traditionally seeks to build up a picture of a poet and his or her language; the 'perfect' picture will be a closed circle, its circumference guarded by internal cross references and parallels, like the movie campfire protected by a circle of wagons. Problems of authenticity threaten the foundations of this approach: other poets, all those pseudo-Theocrituses and pseudo-Ovids, keep getting in the way. They permit no closed circle, in which the 'style' of the author is fixed as a series of lists

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[16] Thus Fantuzzi (1985) 42 points out that editors have traditionally changed the transmitted φίλαμα to φίλημα in 'named' poets (Theocritus, Bion, etc.), but kept the 'hyperdoric' form in anonymous texts. For a further illuminating example and discussion cf. Cassio (1993).

[17] Cf. Hunter (1996) 31–2.

and the commentator builds up an alleged authorial style by a system of samenesses and differences, rather as in the analysis of a language. The different parts of a corpus are made both to explain and to confirm each other, and there is no place for the really anomalous; the 'grammar' of the language will not allow it.

'Pastoral' poetry offers a very special case, for here the 'anonymity' of the author is an important textual fact. Among the poems to which Vergil alludes in the *Eclogues* are *Idylls* 8 and 9, which are almost certainly not by Theocritus.[18] We may, if we like, assume either that Vergil himself had no reason to doubt their authenticity or that—something which, at one level, is plainly correct and is the standard explanation—the *Eclogues* are a *mimesis* of a poetic style, not merely of one poet (Theocritus). Already in the *Epitaphios Bionos* (? early first century BC), 'bucolic song' is 'Dorian song' or 'Sicilian song,' and for Vergil it is 'Syracusan/Sicilian verse' (*Ecl.* 4.1, 6.1, 10.51); to insist that this does not mean *just* 'the poetry of Theocritus' is not to split hairs. If Theocritus does not name himself in the *Idylls*, but merely confines himself to indications of his Sicilian origin (cf. 11.7, 28.16), so also Vergil remains strictly anonymous, though Mantua gets its due (*Ecl.* 9.27–8). We may contrast the *sphragis* at the end of the *Georgics*, where—in keeping with the very different traditions of a didactic poetry which, in various ways, exploits the sense of the authority which attaches to a particular teacher—Vergil inscribes his name upon his poem, as does Ovid (twice) upon the didactic *Ars Amatoria*.[19] Bucolic and pastoral poetry, on the other hand, which presents itself as the formalized version of the pre-literate songs of shepherds, whose names carry no resonance beyond their own locality, and which, so far as *we* can see, Theocritus instigated, emphasizes the shared continuity of a (constantly re-invented) tradition.[20] In exploiting poems by more than one author—a fact of which I, for one, would assume Vergil was conscious—the Roman

[18] For *Id.* 8 cf. esp. *Ecl.* 7.1–5 (~ 8.1–4), 7.54–6 (~ 8.41–8); for *Id.* 9 cf. *Ecl.* 1.45 (~ 9.3), 3.58 (~ 9.1–2), 7.51 (~ 9.20–1).

[19] *AA* 2.744, 3.812. Though Hesiod names himself only in the *Theogony* (v.22) and not in the *Works and Days*, no poem is more personally marked than the latter, addressed to his frequently named brother and telling the story of his father's move to Ascra and his own trip to Euboea in pursuit of poetic success; Aratus alludes to his own name at *Phain.* 2, Nicander names himself in an acrostic at *Ther.* 345–53, and cf. Dion. Perieg. 109–34 (Leue [1884]).

[20] Some good remarks in Hubbard (1998).

poet includes, rather than excludes, and this is true to the nature of pastoral poetry. The very idea of individual authorship is reshaped in the timeless sweep of tradition. Who was the first to 'sing' a particular song was not the crucial question.

Vergil's use of *Idylls* 8 and 9 is often ascribed to the nature of the 'edition' of Theocritus with which he was familiar, whatever that may have been.[21] The collected 'bucolic Muses' of Artemidorus of Tarsus (first half of the first century BC) remains a mysterious volume, but at the very least it is reasonable to believe that it contained poems by both Theocritus and his successors. Even the scholarly world, then, may have recognized the peculiar force of 'pastoral tradition.' The case must not, of course, be overstated. In the Augustan period Theon wrote a Ὑπόμνημα εἰς Θεόκριτον,[22] which (presumably) covered only poems he thought to be by Theocritus, and Wendel at least thought the same was true for the earlier 'commentary' of Asclepiades of Myrlea.[23] The matter is beset with uncertainty, but we can hardly doubt that there was some activity of *krisis*, i.e., of trying to sort out 'real' from 'spurious' Theocritus; the absence of certain poems from the papyrus record would seem to point in that direction.[24] Nevertheless, it seems at least curious that no trace of this activity is preserved in the grammatical tradition; there is no notice of the 'some say that this poem is not by Theocritus' kind. Distinctions were, of course, drawn. Quintilian praises Theocritus as *admirabilis in suo genere* (10.1.55), and Theocritus was by common consensus the best τῶν τὰ βουκολικὰ συγγραψάντων, though not in fact the first.[25]

II. *[Theocritus] 23*

'Late' (and imitative) poems become, almost inevitably, bad poems. Moreover, some of the poems in the Theocritean corpus which are almost certainly relatively late are also in a very bad textual state;

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[21] Few matters in the history of bucolic are more controversial. I have found most help in Wilamowitz (1906), Wendel (1920), Van Sickle (1976), Vaughn (1981), Halperin (1983), Gutzwiller (1996).

[22] Cf. Wendel (1920) 44–5, 80–3; *RE* 5A.2056–7.

[23] Cf. Wendel (1920) 78–80.

[24] Cf. Gow (1952) I.lxi.

[25] *Anec. Est.* p. 9 Wendel (cf. Van Sickle [1976] 18, 22–3).

this is of itself an interesting phenomenon, but one which cannot be pursued at any length here. Part of the reason presumably lies in the period of transmission before (probably) generic factors led to their inclusion in a canonical bucolic corpus, when some of these poems at least almost certainly did float free. Ancient scholars were, on the whole, as addicted to the cult of the famous name as are their modern counterparts, and unprotected texts suffered from neglect then as now. The second stage of the process is that poems which are 'late and bad (and corrupt)' scarcely merit serious attention. Thus, Gow tells us, problems of date and authorship with regard to *Idyll* 20, a monologue by a rustic whose charms have been scorned by a girl from the city, are "of slight importance in a poem so imitative and of so little merit."[26] On the contrary, we have so little Greek poetry from the crucial period in the late second and first centuries BC, when the Greek tradition passed to Rome, that anyone even remotely concerned with that transition *must* be interested in (at least) the date of *Idyll* 20.

An even clearer victim of the syndrome I have outlined is *Idyll* 23, the story of an *erastes*' tragic passion for a cruel and heartless boy who, in Gow's translation of v.6, "would not bend in speech and intercourse alike." Outside the beloved's door the *erastes* pronounces a final *paraklausithyron*, prescribes his own epitaph, and finally hangs himself; the heartless boy is killed by a statue of Eros as he swims in the gymnasium. This is a poem (and a poet) of the greatest interest for, *inter alios*, anyone concerned with Latin elegy, perhaps above all with the eroticization of death in Propertius. For Gow, however,

> the essential badness of the poem is plainly due to the author not to the scribes. The narrative is bald, frigid, and improbable; the sentiment is sloppy, and embodied in an address to the boy who, *ex hypothesi*, cannot hear it.

(This last feature, as Gow knew very well indeed, is common to virtually all literary *paraklausithyra*.) Gow is certainly correct that the 'text is grossly corrupt,' but his personal distaste for the poem has produced a commentary which, to borrow his own words about the

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[26] (1952) II.365. It must be stressed that Gow does not, in fact, operate with a simplistic 'non-Theocritean' = 'bad' principle, as the helpful discussions of *Idylls* 8 and 25 make clear.

Idyll, "is the least attractive of the whole corpus," one designed in fact, in Glenn Most's words, "to show that the text one is commenting on is not worth reading" ([1999] xiii). *Idyll* 23 does not groan under a weight of secondary literature, but Gow failed to mention the only serious literary discussion of the poem then available.[27] Even more serious is the very half-heartedness of his attempt to find a generic context for the poem. The narrative has important analogues in the exercises of the rhetorical schools, as Wilamowitz had pointed out,[28] and in the narrative in Book 14 of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* of how the heartless Anaxarete was metamorphosed into a statue (of Venus Prospiciens) after her poor admirer Iphis hung himself at her door.[29] Ovid's tale has long been connected with the very similar narrative of Arkeophon and Arsinoe, found in Antoninus Liberalis with the note that the tale occurred in Hermesianax' *Leontion* (fr.4 Powell). These 'source' notes in the manuscript of Antoninus are of disputed value, but at the very least we have here a cumulative circumstantial case for a thick (and early) Hellenistic literary texture; the reader of Gow's commentary would be pointed towards this background only by following up the brief hints in the note on vv.16ff.

It is, however, a great virtue of the commentary form that it demands from the commentator 'close reading' (in the best possible sense) of the commentated text, a kind of reading which Gow was very well qualified to perform, as his commentary shows time and again; the difference between 'commentary' and 'critical reading' has in fact been greatly overstated in classical studies,[30] more as the result of a particular style of nineteenth- and twentieth-century commentary than for any constraints inherent in the commentary form. The exaggeration is often manifested in the charge that the commentary form almost inevitably leads to a concentration upon the parts at the expense of the whole;[31] there are a number of well-known commentaries

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[27] Copley (1940), cf. id. (1956) 138–9. Radici Colace (1971) is a helpful study of the poem's *uariatio* of language and motifs drawn from Homer and Bion's *Epitaphios Adonidos*. *Idyll* 23 is also treated more sympathetically in the recent editions of Palumbo Stracca (1993) and Vox (1997).

[28] Wilamowitz (1906) 81, citing Sopater, V 59 Walz.

[29] Cf. Fauth (1966).

[30] For the more flexible situation in other disciplines see, e.g., the essays in Section A of Most (1999).

[31] Cf., e.g., Henderson (1980), Most (1985) 36–40, Ma (1994) 60–9, Goldhill (1999) 411–18. To what extent the charge itself suggests that those who make it

which could indeed be adduced to support such a view, though I have to say that I believe that the fault, where it exists, lies not in the form but in the commentator. Be that as it may, for poems such as *Idyll* 23, which are textually and interpretatively difficult and lack any real literary-historical context in which they can readily be placed, the difference between 'commentary' and 'critical reading' may be (almost) as much a matter of typography as of content. In what follows I will sketch an interpretation of *Idyll* 23 as an illustration of the artificiality of the barriers which classicists have too often erected.

The structuring irony of *Idyll* 23 is, despite the state of the text, clear enough:

γράψον καὶ τόδε γράμμα τὸ σοῖς τοίχοισι χαράσσω·
"τοῦτον ἔρως ἔκτεινεν· ὁδοιπόρε, μὴ παροδεύσῃς,
ἀλλὰ στὰς τόδε λέξον· ἀπηνέα εἶχεν ἑταῖρον."

Write also this epitaph which I scratch on your walls: "Love killed him. Traveler, do not pass by, but stop and say: 'He had a cruel friend'." (vv.46–8)

At one level, the closing ἑταῖρον, 'friend,' picks up a word which the doomed lover has already tried to place in the boy's mouth (45), because he sees their relationship in grandiose 'epic' terms, somewhat like the deluded fantasies of the speaker of *Idyll* 12.[32] This epic ideal of 'comradeship' is recalled in the request of 44 τόδε μοι τρὶς ἐπάυσον, "call out to me three times as follows," which is not merely a reference to the triple call necessary for the dead to hear, but alludes specifically to *Odyssey* 9.62–6:[33]

ἔνθεν δὲ προτέρω πλέομεν ἀκαχημένοι ἦτορ,
ἄσμενοι ἐκ θανάτοιο, φίλους ὀλέσαντες ἑταίρους.
οὐδ' ἄρα μοι προτέρω νῆες κίον ἀμφιέλισσαι,
πρίν τινα τῶν δειλῶν ἑτάρων τρὶς ἕκαστον ἀῦσαι,
οἳ θάνον ἐν πεδίωι Κικόνων ὕπο δηιωθέντες.

Thence we sailed on, glad enough to be snatched from death, yet sick at heart to have lost those others, the comrades that we had known;

are operating with a quite unreal sense of the kinds of claims commentaries should make for themselves and of how they are read and/or used may be debated. On 'atomization,' see Index, s.v. segmentation.

[32] Cf. Hunter (1996) 186–95.

[33] Cf. Radici Colace (1971) 333–4.

> nor had I let the ships go from there till the ritual call had thrice been made for each of these luckless men whom the Cicones had killed on the plain. (trans. Shewring)

The evocation of the epic past constructs the relationship as—perhaps pathetically—paradigmatic, and prepares for the moral with which the poem is to conclude. Unlike the speaker of *Idyll* 12, however, the ill-fated lover is able to control the future: he prescribes not merely the words with which the heartless beloved is to commemorate the dead on his tomb, but he also urges the boy to perpetuate his own heartlessness forever in the words of passers-by. The final act of kindness for which he asks is also his revenge; the 'ultimate' (πανύστατον, 35) favor he seeks from the cruel boy proves indeed to be the boy's last act. 'Eros killed him' is the epitaph of the lover (47), but is to be literally true of the *eromenos*.

The poetic justice enshrined in the narrative has something in common with that of the Ovidian story of Anaxarete, the stony-hearted girl who is turned to stone, but the poet of *Idyll* 23 has played this motif rather differently. The 'stony boy' (λάινε παῖ, 20)[34] who refused to make an offering of tears (38, 55) or to establish a permanent (stone) memorial is killed by a stone statue (58–60) and his spirit mingles with the ceaseless restlessness of water. The death in a pool, a familiar enough motif,[35] is here given further particular point by vv.22–6 where the *erastes* figures his own death as a journey to the water of forgetfulness:

> ἀλλὰ βαδίζω
> ἔνθα τύ μευ κατέκρινας, ὅπηι λόγος ἦμεν ἀτερπέων
> ξυνὸν τοῖσιν ἐρῶσι τὸ φάρμακον, ἔνθα τὸ λᾶθος.
> ἀλλὰ καὶ ἣν ὅλον αὐτὸ λαβὼν ποτὶ χεῖλος ἀμέλξω,
> οὐδ' οὕτως σβέσσω τὸν ἐμὸν πόθον.[36]

> I journey where you have condemned me, where they say is the universal cure for the sorrows of lovers, where there is forgetfulness. But even if I take it and drink it to the end, not even so shall I quench my passion.

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[34] Note the assonance of λεαίνας/λάινε (19–20).

[35] Cf. Segal (1981) 47–65.

[36] The transmitted χόλον 'anger' would have some resonance with the theme of vengeance after death (cf. above), but 'desire' seems the required sense. If, however, we should think of Helen's *pharmakon* at *Od.* 4.220–1, then this might lend some color to χόλον (cf. ἄχολον in *Od.* 2.221).

The *eromenos* is condemned to seek the *pharmakon* of 'forgetfulness'[37] in the Underworld, a motif which probably here reflects epitaphic, rather than initiatory or philosophic ideas;[38] though he foresees no respite even in death, we sense that he will be allowed to find peace. The *erastes*, however, whose cruel behavior revealed that he had forgotten the god's power, is taught a cruel lesson which he will remember (and pass on to others) forever: the concluding ὁ γὰρ θεὸς οἶδε δικάζειν probably means not just "the god is a vengeful god," but "the god *knows how to*, i.e., finds appropriate ways to, punish." The boy who 'forgot' to utter the words of the lover's epitaph is finally given the voice of realization after death.

The language of the lover's epitaph (47–8) has been anticipated by the final plea to the *erastes*: "do not pass by me, but stop and weep a little . . ." (37–8). The very first 'passer-by,' the generalized addressee of all epitaphs, is indeed the cruel boy himself. In refusing to heed the plea 'not to pass by,' just as he pays no attention to all the other requests the suicidal lover makes of him (38–42),[39] the doomed *eromenos* is cast in the role of a very resistant 'reader.' The poem thus not only celebrates the power of *eros*, but also dramatizes the power of an epitaph, and indeed of poetry generally, to enact its will. We may thus wonder about the context of *Idyll* 23: it is a brief anonymous narrative about love's power, and the most

[37] Cf. Hunter (1999) on Theocritus 11.1–6.

[38] Cf. *EG* 244.10 Kaibel, a dead woman is παυσιπόνωι λάθας λουσαμένα πόματι, "bathed in the grief-ending draught of forgetfulness," ibid. 204.11–12, a dead woman addresses her husband, "I did not drink the final water (ἔσχατον ὕδωρ) of Underworld forgetfulness, so that, even among the dead, I would find consolation in you." For such ideas in other contexts cf., e.g., Plato *Rep.* 10.621a, Nilsson (1960), Zuntz (1971) 378–81 (the gold leaves).

[39] There are some very difficult problems of text and interpretation in the parallel passages 36–40 and 53–6. Thus, the lover asks the boy to "place his own clothes around the [lover's] corpse," but in the event the boy "sullied all his clothes on the corpse." (Zimmerman [1994] 5 understands the clothes in question to be those of the dead lover ['sullied' by urinating?], but ἐφαβικά is difficult with this interpretation [cf. v.1].) If the idea is of pollution attaching to a corpse, this phrase might be connected with the theme, hinted at a couple of times, that the boy should beware lest the lover pursue vengeance from beyond the grave: note v.42, where διαλλάξεις με 'you will reconcile me' may well be correct. (For the first half of the verse Radici Colace [1971] 335 suggests οὐ δύναμαι σε διώκεν, cf. Bion, *EA* 53.) It is striking that in Ovid too the 'ghost' motif appears: *ipse ego, ne dubites, adero praesensque uidebor* | *corpore ut exanimi crudelia lumina pascas* (*Met.* 14.727–8). We are certainly not very far from Dido's prayer for an avenger to arise from her bones, and for Aeneas to carry with him the omen of her death (*Aen.* 4.625, 662).

'natural' context for it would be as part of an attempt by the narrator to persuade a young man to yield to his desires. Telling the story of the *erastes* who killed himself out of despair is part of a strategy for avoiding a similar fate.

III

Classical commentaries often aim not merely to explicate a particular text, but also to be works of 'wider interest,' which will be used, as indeed some of the most famous modern commentaries are used, not unlike reference works.[40] Of itself, such an aim seems both natural and welcome, just as the author of, say, a thematic study of a text may hope that students interested in other texts may learn from, and wish constantly to refer to, the approach taken, the questions asked, etc. The serious danger here is not that the accumulation of detail becomes an end in itself, divorced from *any* contact with the text it purports to illuminate, for in the (not infrequent) cases where this happens, readers and 'users' ought to be left to exercise their own discretion and judgment about the commentary they are reading and/or using. Rather, the greater danger is that such accumulation does not serve a particular argument about what a text means, but is used to offer a 'complete' picture of part of the ancient world, one whose completeness is allegedly confirmed by its apparent internal consistency (and *vice versa*). This drive for completeness may seem paradoxical, when what survives of ancient literature and the cultures which produced it is so scanty, but no one who has read far in the commentary literature of the last two centuries will doubt its existence.

It must, however, be admitted that, by comparison with 'books about' and 'literary studies,' the commentary form invites such ambitions, as (in some manifestations) it sets out to deal in sequential detail with the grammatical and linguistic structure of a whole text. If language, one might suppose, surely also 'meaning'? Relevant here are the 'natural' tendencies of commentary to exhaustive collection,[41] and the related fact that commentaries may reproduce material they

[40] Cf. Gibson (below) 344–6.
[41] Cf. Gumbrecht (1999).

have taken over from their predecessors almost without change;[42] the very layout of the form suggests a 'summation' of all that has been said about a text up to the date of the latest commentary. Kurt Latte in fact took Gow severely to task for taking over material not just from his predecessors but also from reference works, dictionaries, and grammars, which any scholarly reader of Theocritus would be expected to use alongside a 'commentary,' and thereby obscuring what was actually new in Gow's *Theocritus*;[43] most readers will, however, be very grateful for Gow's acquisitive habits.

Arrangement by 'author' has in the past proved a very useful organizing scheme by which such completeness can be set forth. The ancient world (or at least its literature) could be seen as a progression of 'great names,' each of which can be made more or less wholly accessible through 'comprehensive' commentaries upon their work. Works of doubtful authorship, on the other hand, are an unwelcome reminder of the vastnesses of our ignorance, which the misleading tidiness of the 'author' approach tends to conceal; such works are therefore to be shunted aside, as being unrepresentative 'sports' and/or simply second-rate. I exaggerate, of course, but I hope that it is clear that the issues which this paper has discussed stretch beyond the detailed interpretation of any particular poem and relate to the larger intellectual context and project of many traditional commentaries. The rhetoric of comprehensiveness, in fact, does a disservice not only to the commentary form, but also to our understanding of the ancient world. It will, however, also be clear that the situation I have described is, in many respects, already out-of-date, thanks in part to a series of intellectual and methodological shifts within classics and the humanities generally. This is, of course, clearest in the case of classical Athens, where the growth of the study of Athenian culture and society, and with it of texts as cultural documents or social signs, has inhibited both the rhetoric of 'completeness' and attempts to put that rhetoric into practice. It is, for example, my impression (no stronger) that, since Fraenkel's *Agamemnon*, Anglo-

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[42] On the tralaticious aspects of commentaries, see Kraus (above) 11–13, 16–17.

[43] Latte (1951) 257, cf. Stephens (above) 71–5 and contrast Legrand (1951) 371 who has nothing but praise for the 'summative' appearance of the work: "Cette édition monumentale . . . est une véritable 'somme' de tout ce que nous pouvons, à l'heure actuelle, savoir de Théocrite, de tout ce qui peut conduire à la connaissance et à la comprehension de ses oeuvres."

phone scholars at least[44] have on the whole held back from attempts to deal 'comprehensively' with any tragedy; there might now seem something quixotic (to say no more) in such an undertaking, whether it be in commentary form or any other. In this new climate of social and cultural history, 'peripheral author(ity)less texts' have a quite new standing, and the commentary form a whole range of new opportunities which it would be a shame to waste.[45]

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[44] There is an obvious irony here which I shall not pursue.
[45] I am grateful to Roy Gibson, Christina Kraus, Glenn Most, and audiences in Nottingham and Heidelberg for helpful criticism of earlier versions of this paper.

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6. "A WOMAN DOES NOT BECOME AMBIDEXTROUS": GALEN AND THE CULTURE OF SCIENTIFIC COMMENTARY

Heinrich von Staden

A rich tradition of commentaries on ancient scientific and medical texts reaches from at least the seventh century BCE to the present.[1] Most of the ancient commentaries have been lost, but a large body of extant evidence (see Part II below) provides detailed insights into the principles and practices of ancient commentators on such texts. The ample variety of surviving commentaries also invites reflection on the continuities and discontinuities between ancient and modern commentators. How similar or dissimilar are the ancients and the moderns, for example, with reference to the professional identity of the commentators, the formal and structural features of their commentaries, the intended readership, the social contexts of the production and use of commentaries, the roles of collectivities and individuals, the relation between oral exegesis in instructional contexts and written commentary, and the criteria of inclusion and exclusion of questions and subject matter? And why did so many pioneering ancient scientists write extensive commentaries on the texts of distant predecessors? Part I of this contribution explores some of these issues through a case study that focuses on the exegetical fate of a single sentence attributed to Hippocrates, while Part II tries to locate the results of the case study on a larger cultural, social, and scientific map, in part by taking up questions and perspectives to which the case study is not responsive.

I. *"A woman does not become ambidextrous"*

An instructive case study in the continuities and discontinuities between ancient and modern commentaries on medical and scientific texts is

[1] This contribution focuses on the Greco-Roman world, but there were extensive traditions of commentary in other ancient cultures. For example, cuneiform

provided by the interpretation of a famous Hippocratic aphorism: γυνὴ ἀμφιδέξιος οὐ γίνεται.[2] There is a modern consensus that the sentence should be translated "a woman does not become ambidextrous."[3] In antiquity, however, there was no agreement on the interpretation of this aphorism. Furthermore, the unanimity of modern translators masks an almost universal, though often unspoken, bewilderment as to the meaning of the aphorism.

In the earliest surviving commentary on the Hippocratic *Aphorisms*—Galen's extensive second-century work[4]—the lemma consists of the entire aphorism. Galen rarely divides the Hippocratic text into lemmata smaller than a sentence; his lemmata often consist of even larger sense-units, corresponding to one or more modern paragraphs. Even when his comments focus on a single word, he sooner or later reinserts the interpreted word into larger units of meaning. The interpretative strategies adopted under this lemma are characteristic of Galen's procedure. Recognizing that *amphidéxios* represents a more formidable challenge than the other words in the lemma, he makes four distinct exegetical moves to secure his interpretation of this far from uncommon word (but, as modern commentators would be quick to point out, within the Hippocratic Corpus the word occurs only here).

First, Galen tries to achieve semantic clarification by freely looking outward from the Hippocratic text:

> Euripides called a blade that cuts from either side *amphidéxios* [two-edged], while Homer called Asteropaeus *peridéxios* because he used both hands alike. In the same way Aristophanes in his *Tagenitae* called a person who was left-handed [clumsy] on both sides *ampharísteros* [left-

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commentaries (also on astronomical/astrological, medical, and physiognomic texts) from the seventh (and perhaps the eighth) century BCE to the Seleucid period are well attested. See below, n.52.

[2] Hippoc. *Aph.* 7.43 (IV 588 Littré).

[3] E.g., Littré (1839–61) IV, 589: "La femme ne devient pas ambidextre"; Adams (1946) 319: "A woman does not become ambidexterous"; W. H. S. Jones (1931) IV, 203: "A woman does not become ambidexterous"; Chadwick and Mann (1950) in Lloyd (1978) 233: "A woman is never ambidextrous"; López Férez (1983) 290: "Una mujer no llega a ser ambidextra"; Jouanna and Magdelaine (1999) 242: "Une femme ne devient pas ambidextre"; but more subtly Fuchs (1895–90) I, 134: "Ein Frau erwirbt nie auf beiden Seiten die gleiche Geschicklichkeit."

[4] Galen, *In Hippocratis Aphorismos commentarii I–VII* (XVIIIA, 1–195 Kühn [henceforth Kühn = K]).

> handed/clumsy on both sides]. Hipponax used *amphidexios* in the following iamb: "I am ambidextrous and I do not miss."[5]

Galen here invokes 'parallels' from a variety of genres, including tragedy, epic, comedy, and iambic poetry—all of which, in his view, prove that *amphidéxios* must mean 'ambidextrous' or 'right-handed on both sides' (but some of which in fact do not provide any such proof). I use the word 'parallels' with reticence, because the word has become a collective label of convenience under which scholars tend to cluster together quite heterogeneous relations of resemblance; Alexander Pope may have put it too sharply when he remarked, "None but thyself can be thy parallel," but he had a point. Galen's extra-Hippocratic excursion gathers 'parallels' from four poets, ranging from the Homeric use of περιδέξιος of Asteropaeus (who hurled two spears at Achilles at the same time, one with each hand)[6] to Aristophanes' antonymous coinage ἀμφαρίστερος ('left-handed on both sides') to designate an utterly clumsy person.[7] While some of these 'parallels,' notably Euripides' use of *amphidéxios* in the sense 'two-edged'[8] and Hipponax' use of *amphidéxios* for 'ambidextrous' or '[hitting] with both hands,'[9] suggest that *amphidéxios* at times does indeed mean 'dexterous' (*dexiós*) or 'right-handed' on both sides and hence 'ambidextrous,' Galen failed to consider other semantic possibilities, such as '*very* skilled, *very* dexterous, *very* expert'[10] (a sense also attested for περιδέξιος, just as its antonym ἀμφαρίστερος can mean '*very* awkward' or '*very* clumsy').

Were one to reproach Galen on methodological grounds for indiscriminately resorting to 'parallels' that are extrageneric and hence

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[5] Galen *In Hp. Aph. comm.* 7.43 (XVIIIA, 147.13–148.3 K) ἀμφιδέξιον Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε σίδηρον τὸν ἑκατέρωθεν μὲν τέμνοντα, περιδέξιον δὲ τὸν Ἀστεροπαῖον Ὅμηρος τὸν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς χερσὶν ὁμοίως χρώμενον, ὡσεὶ καὶ ἀμφοτεροδέξιον εἰρήκει. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀμφαριστερὸν Ἀριστοφάνης εἶπεν ἐν Ταγηνίταις ἄνθρωπον ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀριστερόν. Ἱππῶναξ ἀμφιδέξιον ἔφη κατὰ τόνδε τὸν ἴαμβον· "Ἀμφιδέξιος γάρ εἰμι καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτάνω." Cf. Galen, *Voc. Hp.* (XIX, 78.10–14 K).

[6] *Il.* 21.163. On the use of parallels in modern commentaries, see Gibson (below) 332–46.

[7] *PCG* III 2, fr. 526 Kassel/Austin.

[8] Eur. *Hipp.* 780–81.

[9] Hippon. fr. 122 Degani = 121 West. In Galen's quotation of Hipponax' verse, both here and in the Hippocratic lexicon attributed to him (XIX, 78 K), κόπτων (the final word of this iambic tetrameter) is omitted, but Erotian preserves it (p. 15 Nachmanson).

[10] On the 'intensifying' use of ἀμφι- in compounds see the examples in Schwyzer and Debrunner (1950) 437.

not necessarily pertinent, he—like many a modern commentator—probably would not be shaken by the objection. Although familiar with the constraints exercised by generic conventions,[11] Galen believed that ordinary usage is reflected not only in the language of Hippocrates but also in that of many poets, notably in comedy,[12] invective poetry, Euripides, and Theocritus. And everyday usage in his view has to be the basis of all scientific language, since ordinary speech, he optimistically held, is capable of literalness (as opposed to figuration), and literalness in turn, he argued, is a precondition of univocity, without which scientific theories and concepts cannot be communicated clearly and successfully.[13] Keenly aware that one of the more treacherous obstacles faced by science is its own textuality—i.e., that most science cannot do without language but that language constantly threatens to ambush the scientist—Galen is at pains to establish the univocity not only of problematic and obscure words but also of common terms in Hippocratic texts. It is in keeping with his theory of scientific language that a hermeneutics of univocity manifests itself in Galen's 'literal' interpretation of the polysemous *amphidéxios,* much as tacit assumptions of univocity underlie many a modern commentator's explications.

Galen's second exegetical move is an expansive, inflationary retelling of the original text in order to achieve doctrinal clarification:

> Men are often observed using both hands as right hands, whereas until now no woman [has been observed doing so], on account of the weakness of her nature. For, if in fact it is thanks to the strength of the faculty [capacity] in their nerves and muscles that some men use both hands [as right hands], then of necessity no woman will use [both]; she must be content to use only her right hand, and to do so moderately.[14]

The attempt to recuperate the univocal ancient voice requires a new story about how and why men and women differ in their use of

[11] For Galen's views on genre see von Staden (1998).

[12] Among Galen's lost works are *Ordinary Words in Eupolis* (in three books), *Ordinary Words in Aristophanes* (five books), and *Ordinary Words in Cratinus* (two books).

[13] For the Galenic evidence see Hankinson (1994), von Staden (1995).

[14] Galen, *In Hp. Aph. comm.* 7.43 (XVIIIA, 148.5–10 K) ἄνδρες μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς χερσὶν ὡς δεξιαῖς χρώμενοι πολλάκις ὤφθησαν, γυνὴ δὲ οὐδεμία μέχρι δευρο, διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς φύσεως εἴπερ γὰρ ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς χερσὶ διὰ ῥώμην τῆς κατὰ τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τοὺς μῦς δυνάμεως ἄνδρες τινὲς χρῶνται, δεόντως οὐδεμία γυνὴ χρήσεται, ᾗ γε ἀγαπητόν ἐστι τῇ δεξιᾷ μόνῃ χρῆσθαι μετρίως.

their hands. Upon the brachylogical, aphoristic, semantically elusive Hippocratic archetype the ancient commentator-scientist superimposes an amplification that presents itself as the self-evident facts of our historical experience of gender difference in 'matters manual,' up to this very moment (μέχρι δεῦρο). This is not only a move from philological interpretation to doctrinal explication, but also a move from the specific to the general, from the single word *amphidéxios* to the sentence as a whole, from handedness to a universal claim about the nature (φύσις) of women, and from the aphoristic to the empirical. Furthermore, Galen here tries to legitimate the voice of the Hippocratic original by clothing his exegetical amplification in the rhetorical armor of science: his, he claims, is a tale of repeated observational verification (πολλάκις ὤφθησαν); it is a causal account (διά) deploying the widely accepted conceptual armature of science, notably 'faculty' or 'capacity' (δύναμις) and 'nature' (φύσις); it is based on anatomical knowledge of gender-specific features of nerves and muscles (κατὰ τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τοὺς μῦς); it is a universally valid account to which there are no past, present or future exceptions (γυνὴ δὲ οὐδεμία μέχρι δεῦρο . . . οὐδεμία γυνὴ χρήσεται); and its conclusions are driven by logical necessity (δεόντως).

These well-known elements of scientific rhetoric ostensibly serve to render the obscure, centuries-old voice of a scientific giant clear and univocal, but they also are exploited to establish the transepochal, timeless scientific validity of the aphorism itself. That the Hippocratic aphorism itself said nothing about observation, cause, faculty, nature, nerves, muscles, and universal necessity is never emphasized. In some of his programmatic pronouncements Galen admittedly claims that the primary and proper purpose of commentary is to clarify (σαφηνίζειν) or elucidate an ancient text, and that other goals are subsidiary.[15] In his exegetical practice, however, he 'clarifies' numerous lemmata in such a way as to establish not only Hippocrates'

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[15] E.g., Galen, *In Hp. Aph. comm.* 3, proem. (XVIIB, 561 K): the ἔργον ἴδιον of ἐξήγησις is to clarify all that is unclear; similarly *In Hp. De fract. comm.*, proem. (XVIIIB, 318 K): the δύναμις of πάσῃ ἐξήγησις is to render all the things that are unclear clear; *In Hp. Epid. comm.* 2.3.2 (*Corpus medicorum Graecorum* [henceforth = *CMG*] V 10,1, p. 329.32–5). See Manuli (1983) 472; Manetti and Roselli (1994) 1532, 1558, 1607; Mansfeld (1994) 135, 148–54. Elsewhere Galen remarks, however, that one can never be sure of the precise meaning of truly obscure terms and therefore should not waste time on them. See below nn.82 and 83.

scientific 'truths' but also implicit or explicit agreements between Hippocrates and himself. Such doctrinal consonances depend, of course, upon interpreting Hippocrates 'correctly,' and Galen, who, *prima facie* at least, adored himself, rarely left any doubt that he considered himself the best, most trustworthy commentator on Hippocrates. This second move—doctrinal amplification, in part by means of 'empirical' evidence—hence also functions as a crucial stratagem in the commentator's legitimation of his own scientific authority.

Theoretical dissonances between the second-century commentator and the explicated classical text tend to remain unexpressed. For the most part (but not invariably), difference is mute, although there are in fact numerous differences between 'Hippocrates' and Galen, many resulting from major scientific discoveries made between the early third century BCE and the second century CE. At times Galen's conceit of a relatively unproblematic continuity between a text that preceded him by at least five hundred years and the scientific present leaves the impression of a self-canceling diachronicity, as Paola Manuli remarked in a different context.[16] At the beginning and end of the history of medical science, Galen's exegetical strategies tacitly suggest, stand two paradigmatic textual entities—Hippocrates' texts and Galen's—by which all doctrinal deviants have to be measured and judged. Moreover, as indicated above, in this process of historical collocation and exclusion, the two ancient canons—the earlier brachylogical and allusive, the later expansive and explicit—often are made to resemble one another, indeed to be identical in their scientific theories and in their medical practices. Text and commentary, as an ensemble, thus project a reassuring image of scientific systematicity and of a scientific truth that is not vulnerable to the vagaries of temporal context or cultural exigency.

Some of Galen's programmatic denials notwithstanding,[17] scientific truth, and hence his own scientific authority, thus are very much at stake in the recuperative elucidation of the obscure ancient voice. He is aware that his own, at times spectacular, scientific discoveries, like those of his Hellenistic precursors, had not been made by Hippocrates, yet in most of his Hippocratic commentaries these discoveries, if introduced, are invoked, paradoxically, to establish *not* any

[16] Manuli (1983) 475.
[17] See n.15 above.

difference between his new science and that of 'Hippocrates,' but rather similarity or identity. Overtly, the commentaries tend to dwell not on the theme of scientific progress and change since Hippocrates but on the permanence of Hippocrates' truths, not on challenges to the famous πρῶτος εὑρετής but on a clarification of Hippocrates' obscurities and a filling in of his 'ellipses' and 'elisions.' Galen's own elisions in his exegetical works—elisions of difference, of disagreements between himself and Hippocrates, of the up-ending and refutation of many a Hippocratic view by post-Hippocratic innovations, and of un-Hippocratic Hellenistic discoveries appropriated by Galen himself—therefore are masked by his acts of supplementation and assimilation.

A further kind of supplementation (practiced in modern commentaries too) is visible in Galen's third interpretative move: he supplements 'Hippocrates' with 'Hippocrates' by paraphrasing a passage from another Hippocratic work. At the very moment that an amplified transepochal scientific 'truth' has been constituted 'empirically' by his second hermeneutic move ('men are often observed . . . but until now no woman . . .'), Galen turns to a different Hippocratic text, *Airs Waters Places*, to confirm it. Juxtaposing the Hippocratic passage and Galen's paraphrase is instructive:

'Hippocrates':[18]	Galen:[19]
They [Sarmatian women] do not have their right breast. For, when the children are still infants, their mothers make a bronze implement, fabricated for this very purpose, red-hot and apply it to the right breast. And it is cauterized with the consequence that its growth is destroyed and all the strength and the largest quantity pass into the right shoulder and right arm.	He [Hippocrates] himself says that the Amazons cauterize the right nipple, in order that, since a greater amount of nutriment [thus] reaches the right hand, it may gain a robust strength, [and they do so] on the grounds that even this [the right hand of women] is weak, at least by nature.

[18] Hippoc. *Aer.* 17.3 (II, 66–68 Littré [henceforth Littré = L]; 230–231 Jouanna).
[19] Galen, *In Hp. Aph. comm.* 7.43 (XVIIIA, 148.11–14 K) τὰς γοῦν Ἀμαζονίδας αὐτός φησὶν ἐπικαίειν τὸν δεξιὸν τιτθόν, ἵνα εἰς τὴν πλησίον χεῖρα πλείονος τροφῆς ἀφικνουμένης εὐρωστία τις αὐτῇ προσγένηται, ὡς τῇ φύσει γε καὶ ταύτης ὑπαρχούσης ἀσθενοῦς.

In the Galenic paraphrase some of the departures from the paraphrased original appear inconsequential, others significant.[20] Despite the discrepancies, with '[Hippocrates] himself says' (αὐτός φησὶν) Galen signals his adherence to a well-known ancient exegetical principle which he advocates elsewhere:[21] to interpret an author out of himself (ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὸν ἄνδρα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, better known to modern scholars as the *Homerum ex Homero* principle that was much in vogue again in mid-twentieth century 'new criticism').[22] Galen does not appear concerned that this principle might have been violated by his first move, i.e., explaining Hippocrates out of Euripides, Homer, Hipponax, and Aristophanes. There are few signs that he senses any tension between elucidating an author by means of extra-authorial, extra-generic 'parallels' and explaining an author 'out of himself.'

The aim of Galen's paraphrased Hippocratic 'parallel' is to justify his own interpretation of the Hippocratic aphorism, in particular, (a) to support his claim that women are weaker by nature, and (b) to do so by showing that, according to Hippocrates himself, even a woman's right hand or arm is weak by nature. In the Hippocratic 'parallel' from *Airs Waters Places*, however, as in the aphorism, neither (a) nor (b) is stated (although the Hippocratic author might well have been inclined to agree with both claims). What 'Hippocrates' had introduced as an ethnographic curiosity, as an exceptional, exotic practice, Galen's paraphrase presents as evidence of a universal female condition: "since *by nature* (τῇ φύσει) this too (*scil.* the right hand) is weak" in women. Galen's transformative paraphrase of 'Hippocrates,' his elisions of parts of the Hippocratic original, and his own additions are commingled in such a way as to render the original and its exegetical accretions indistinguishable. And this new, single Galenic-

[20] For the Hippocratic 'Sauromatian (Sarmatian) women' Galen substituted 'Amazons,' but already Herodotus (4.110–17) identified the Sarmatian women as descended from Amazons (see also D. S. 2.45.3, 3.53.3, and Strabo 11.5.1 on the *Amazons'* cauterization of the breasts of their female offspring). Among the Hippocratic details omitted by Galen are that the Sarmatian women '*have no* right breast,' that the *mothers* cauterize the right breasts of their own female infants, that they do so with a task-specific bronze implement, that the growth of the right breast is destroyed, and that the right *shoulder* is strengthened. Furthermore, πᾶσα ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ τὸ πλῆθος becomes πλείονος τροφῆς . . . εὐρωστία τις and more significantly, Galen's paraphrase adds that the right hand of a woman is by nature weak.

[21] Galen, *De puls. dign.* 4.3 (VIII, 958.6–8 K). See also Moraux (1977) 6.

[22] See Mansfeld (1994) 204–205 on the continuing controversy about the origin of the use of Homer's name to formulate the principle.

Hippocratic 'parallel passage' from *Airs Waters Places* is superimposed upon a very different passage from a different Hippocratic work, *Aphorisms*, as evidence that will verify and validate the truth of the aphorism itself, as 'established' by Galen's first two interpretative interventions.

In a fourth and final characteristic move Galen records and dismisses rival interpretations:

> Some say, however, that [a woman] who comes into being in the right-hand part of the womb is called *amphidéxios*. And others, still more absurdly, say that Hippocrates' statement is about the so-called hermaphrodites, and that he was saying that in the male a female genital was added, whereas in the female the male [genital] was not added.[23]

The first rival reading appeals to the notoriously durable ancient theory that the conception and gestation of the male fetus occurs on the right-hand side of the uterus, and the female on the left. Features of this theory can be traced back at least to Parmenides[24] and Anaxagoras,[25] and many medical writers, including some Hippocratic authors[26] and Galen himself,[27] also subscribed to it.

It is noteworthy that Galen simply reports that "*some* (ἔνιοι) say that a female who comes into being in the right-hand part of the uterus is ἀμφιδέξιος," without telling his reader who the ἔνιοι are or why they are wrong. Since the aphorism states that a woman does *not* become ἀμφιδέξιος, this interpretation appears to read the aphorism as claiming that a woman does *not* come into being in the right part of the uterus. The first-century lexicographer Erotian[28] identifies Glaucias of Tarentum, an early second-century BCE Empiricist and

[23] Galen, *In Hp. Aph. comm.* 7.43 (XVIIIA, 148.14–149.2 K) ἔνιοι μέντοι φασὶν ἀμφιδέξιον εἰρῆσθαι τὴν ἐν τῷ δεξιῷ μέρει τῆς μήτρας γινομένην. καὶ τούτων ἔτ' ἀλογώτερον ἕτεροι περὶ τῶν ἑρμαφροδίτων ὀνομαζομένων τὸν λόγον εἶναί φασὶ τῷ Ἱπποκράτει τῷ μὲν ἄρρενι προσγίνεσθαι φάσκοντι γυναικεῖον αἰδοῖον, τῇ θηλείᾳ δὲ μὴ προσγίνεσθαι τὸ ἀνδρεῖον. Cf. Galen, *Voc. Hp.* (XIX, 78.15–16 K).

[24] 28B17 Diels/Kranz.

[25] 59A1(9), A42(12), A107; 31A81 Diels/Kranz.

[26] Hippoc. *Aph.* 5.48 (IV, 550 L) ἔμβρυα τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα ἐν τοῖσι δεξιοῖσι, τὰ δὲ θήλεα ἐν τοῖσιν ἀριστεροῖσι μᾶλλον. See also Hippoc. *Epid.* 2.6.15, 6.4.21 (V, 136, 312 L).

[27] E.g., Galen, *UP* 14.7 (IV, 171–72 K; II, 307 Helmreich).

[28] Erotian α.31 (p. 15 Nachmanson) ἀμφιδέξιος. ὁ δὲ Γλαυκίας φησίν ὅτι τὸ ἀμφιδέξιον οὕτω χρὴ ἀκούειν, ὡς εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ μέρη τῆς ὑστέρας οὐ γίνεται γυναικεῖον σῶμα διὰ τὸ "τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα ἐν τοῖς δεξιοῖς τὰ δὲ θήλεα ἐν τοῖς ἀριστεροίς" (the last part is Glaucias' quotation from Hippoc. *Aph.* 5.48; n.26 above).

Hippocratic lexicographer,[29] as the author of precisely such an interpretation. Within the Empiricist school of medicine, it apparently remained the standard reading for centuries; even Sextus Empiricus adopted it.[30] I shall return to the ominous ἔνιοι, but for now it should be noted that, while Galen agrees with the doctrinal left—right assumptions underlying this Empiricist interpretation (see n.27), his objections to Glaucias' use of the doctrine to interpret *amphidéxios* are philological (viz., that attested Greek usage confirms that ἀμφιδέξιος means 'ambidextrous'), empirical ('no ambidextrous woman has ever been observed'), aetiological ('because women by nature are weaker'), and internal ('Hippocrates himself says . . .').

The second (hermaphroditic) rival interpretation, again presented anonymously (ἕτεροι), is instantly dismissed as being even more unreasonable (ἔτ' ἀλογώτερον) than the Empiricists' right—left uterine interpretation. The provenance of the hermaphroditic interpretation is as murky as are Galen's objections to it, but his own reading of the aphorism suggests that he probably rejected it on both philological and doctrinal grounds.

Once these two rival readings have been rejected, Galen's exegetical explication or 'unfolding' (ἐξάπλωσις, ἐξαπλοῦν, as he sometimes calls it)[31] of the precursor text is complete, and he moves on to the next aphorism. He has 'clarified' the obscure, while allowing the scientific authority of commentator and original to become reciprocally legitimating. But much more is at stake in Galen's interpretative work on this Hippocratic lemma: his tactics tacitly signal a larger Galenic agenda.

Like introductions to modern commentaries, some prefaces to ancient commentaries reveal larger commitments. The Galenic proem, for example, often alerts the wary reader that the commentary will have more than just a sequence of lemmata and comments: it will in part be shaped by something resembling a plot.[32] In the case of

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[29] Deichgräber (1965) 318–19, 409 (lines 35–7), 413–14, 417, 418, and fragments 311a, 313, 318, 324, 326, 333, 344, 350, 354, 356, 361, 364.

[30] Sext. Empir. *M.* 7.50 ὅταν λέγῃ (sc. Ἱπποκράτης) "γυνὴ ἀμφιδέξιος οὐ γίνεται," τουτέστι θήλεια ἐν τοῖς δεξιοῖς μέρεσι τῆς μήτρας οὐ συνίσταται.

[31] E.g., Galen, *In Hp. Aph. comm.* 4.17 (XVIIB, 677.15 K); *In Hp. Fract. comm.* 2.64 (XVIIIB, 502.1 K); *In Hp. Off. comm.* 1.5 (XVIIIB, 669.14 K); *De diff. resp.* 2.1 (VII, 825 K). See also Erotian proem. (pp. 3.14, 6.18, 7.13–19 Nachmanson), and Mansfeld (1994) 149–50.

[32] By 'plot' I mean the design and intention of a narrative (in the present case

the *Aphorisms*, Galen's lengthy commentary on the famous first aphorism ('Life is short, τέχνη long . . .') also serves as a surrogate proem, as Daniela Manetti and Amneris Roselli have recognized.[33] Here Galen not only discusses the style, audience, and purpose of the *Aphorisms*, as well as their relation to other Hippocratic writings; he also indicates that his commentary will, in part, be shaped by a rescue plot closely linked to his own quest for scientific truth and for scientific authority. The story which Galen unfolds, along with his 'unfolding' of the Hippocratic text, is that the Hellenistic Empiricists' commentaries expropriated the *Aphorisms* as a work exemplifying Empiricism, in an attempt to legitimate their claim to Hippocrates as the founding father of Empiricism.[34] This Galenic tale is about (Hippocratic) truth endangered by exegesis; simultaneously, it is the performative story of a heroic rescue by Galen as commentator.

His interpretation of the aphorism about ambidextrous women appears to belong to this plot. When Galen dismissively rejects the interpretation offered by 'some people' (ἔνιοι), these anonymous interpreters turn out to be the Empiricists (see nn.28 and 30). By introducing 'nature' (φύσις), 'faculty' or 'capacity' (δύναμις), anatomy, and certain causal notions in support of his own interpretation, Galen himself foregrounds a conceptual and theoretical armature that is largely anathema to the Empiricists. And when he argues for a literal reading of *amphidéxios*, he is in fact adopting an interpretation similar to one already offered in the third century BCE by a 'rationalist' opponent of the Hellenistic Empiricists: Bacchius of Tanagra, an Alexandrian follower of Herophilus. Erotian reports as follows in his Hippocratic lexicon: "*Amphidéxios*: Bacchius says [it means] dexterous on both sides, just as when that which has been sharpened on both sides is two-edged (*amphekes*). And Euripides makes this clear in his *Hippolytus* when he says 'ambidextrous sword' for one that cuts from either side."[35] Well before Galen adopted Bacchius' literal interpretation,

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a story woven into an exegetical work)—what gives it a direction or what Peter Brooks (1984) called 'intent of meaning' extending through a work.

[33] Manetti and Roselli (1994) 1535. Galen did, however, begin his commentary both on Book 3 and on Book 7 of the *Aphorisms* with a programmatic proem.

[34] According to Smith (1979) 130 Galen in his commentary on the *Aphorisms* is "gentle in his general references to the Empirics," but Manetti and Roselli (1994) 1535–38 have correctly identified the Empiricists as Galen's principal target in this commentary.

[35] Erotian α.31 (p. 15 Nachmanson, s.v. ἀμφιδέξιος). On Bacchius' lexicon see von Staden (1992).

Erotian had supported it (even though he rejected 'two-edged' as a parallel): "One must therefore understand Hippocrates as saying that a woman cannot use each of the two parts [left and right] well, for in actual activity she cannot use them [both well]. . . ."[36] Galen was familiar, directly or indirectly, both with Bacchius' commentary on the *Aphorisms* and with his influential Hippocratic lexicon,[37] and his familiarity with Erotian is also attested,[38] even if more sparsely. Yet, not uncharacteristically, he gives neither Bacchius nor Erotian credit for having anticipated his own 'correct' interpretation of the aphorism.

The ancient battle between the two interpretations of *amphidéxios* first advanced by Bacchius of Tanagra and by his later Empiricist adversary Glaucias of Tarentum continued well beyond Galen, and it left its traces in the lexicographic traditions of late antiquity. In his gloss on ἀμφιδεξίοις χέρσι, Hesychius, for example, provided an explanation similar to Bacchius',[39] but in a separate gloss on ἀμφιδέξιον Hesychius offered a different explanation which, in key respects, is closer to Glaucias'.[40]

By the time of Hesychius, the 'rationalist' and Empiricist authorship, respectively, of these two rival interpretations of *Aphorism* 7.43 may have been lost from view. But the reader of Galen's commentary as a whole is likely to recognize his interpretation of *amphidéxios* as part of an interpretative story that begins in his explication of *Aphorism* 1.1 and is cunningly woven into the exegesis of other lemmata. It is a story of exegetical villains—the Empiricists—who tried to misappropriate an authoritative scientific text for partisan purposes, and of the learned true scientist, Galen, who, with supreme

[36] Erotian ibid. (last n.). Wellmann (1931) 15 argued that the view cited here differs from Bacchius', but the argument rests on unsubstantiated, speculative assumptions.

[37] See von Staden (1989) ch. XIV, especially 495–500 (*Ba.* 9, *Ba.* 12, *Ba.* 71; cf. *Ba.* 7–8, 10–11, 37, 78), for Galen's familiarity with Bacchius' exegetical works; also von Staden (1992).

[38] E.g., Galen, *Voc. Hp.*, s.v. κάμμορον (XIX, 107–108 K).

[39] Hesych. vol. I, p. 139 Latte, s.vv. ἀμφιδεξίοις χέρσι (from Aesch. *Telephus* fr. 240 Radt [*TrGF*, vol. 3]). See Aly (1906) 43–46. Galen's contemporary Pollux (2.159; vol. I, p. 132 Bethe) also agreed with this literal 'ambidextrous' interpretation of *amphidéxios* (unless the relevant passage is a later interpolation). Similarly Arist. *GA* 2.1.497b31, *EN* 5.6.1134b34 (see also *MM* 1.33.1194b34), *Pol.* 2.12.1274b13; ps.-Arist. *Pr.* 31.12.958b; Simp. *In Cael.* 7 (*CAG* VII, p. 393.30–31 Heiberg).

[40] Hesych. vol. I, p. 159 Latte (s.v. ἀμφιδέξιον).

philological *and* scientific expertise, rode to the rescue of venerable scientific truths. Galen's non-atomized lemmata comfortably allow such an interweaving of detailed local interpretations (which closely resemble those in modern commentaries) and more global narrative threads. While not formally discursive, the commentary thus accommodates a tacitly discursive dimension.

The most recent generations of commentators on ancient medical texts share major strategies and motivations with the earliest extant commentator on the *Aphorisms*. These include, for example, the first, third, and fourth hermeneutic moves traced in the case study above—'parallels,' interpreting the author out of her- or himself, mentioning and/or demolishing rival interpretations—as well as introductions that unveil a larger agenda. On the whole, however, recent commentators participate neither in what I have characterized as Galen's second move (validating the scientific truth of the original text by means of empirical evidence) nor in his tacit development of a 'plot.' Many modern commentators, liberated from a quest for scientific truth or therapeutic utility, unimpeded by the crosscurrents of contemporary scientific discovery and practice, and on their guard only against philological and historiographic but not against scientific or medical rivals, treat the ancient scientific and medical treatises as philological and historical objects that differ only partly in literary form and in language from non-scientific texts. They tend to write admirably erudite but largely plotless commentaries on molecularized scientific texts. Even in some of the most admirable late twentieth-century commentaries on medical texts one encounters numerous passages such as the following, stunning for its Herculean labor and erudite completeness, but silent on certain questions of interpretation and of practical usefulness for the τέχνη (on which see Part II below):

> P. 142, 25 οἷον ἰλύς τις καὶ τρὺξ: Galen compares the black bile in the blood to ἰλύς also in De plen. 11: VII 577,12 K.; De temp. II 3: p. 59, 21–22 Helmr. = I 603,9 K.; De tum. praeter nat. 9: VII 724,2; De comp. med. sec. loc. IX 6; X 2: XIII 197,3; 236,18 K. See also De usu part. V 6: II 273,4 Helmr. = III 373,1 K.; De plac. Hipp. et Plat. VIII 4,33: CMG V 4,1,22, p. 504,34; Meth. med. V 14; XIII 16: X 375,8; 916–14–15 K. He compares it to τρὺξ in De fac. nat. II 9: Scr. min. III 199,7–12 Helmr. = II 145,5–10 K.; De cris. II 12: p. 160, 9–10 Alexanderson = IX 694,8–9 K.; Meth. med. XIV 9: X 975–6; 978,7 K.; De comp. med. sec. loc. IX 2: XIII 238,1 K.; In Hipp. Aphor. comm. IV 21. 77; VI 11: XVII B 682,1; 683,6–7; 773,1; XVIII A 21,10 K.; In Hipp. De artic. comm. IV 39: XVIII A 730,11

K.; In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. VI: CMG V 10,2,2, p. 384, 36; De propr. plac.: Paris. Lat. 6865, fol. 174v col. 1. See also De san. tuenda I 12,22: CMG V 4,2, p. 30,19; De locis affectis V 8: VIII 359,11. 15 K. He compares it to both together, as in the present passage, in De purg. med. fac. 3:XI 335,16–18 K.; De atra bile 6,6; 7,12: CMG V 4,1,1, pp. 83,13–14; 87,9; In Hipp. Aphor. comm. VI 53: XVIII A 91,9–12 K. Cf. also De locis affectis II 5: VIII 85,16 K.; In Hipp. Aphor. comm. IV 21: XVII B 681,11–13 K. (with Durling).[41]

This bears little resemblance to Galen's use of 'parallels' or to the stated purposes of his commentaries. (But then, Galen did not have electronic search engines.) Galen's interrelated quests and stories inadvertently make the perils of plot amply clear; the perils of the plotless commentary become evident in many a recent commentary.

Galen's comments on the 'ambidextrous woman' had a tenacious influence on subsequent commentators, ancient and modern, even when they modified, expanded, resisted, or re-interpreted his explications. The extant sixth-century commentary on the *Aphorisms* by Stephanus of Athens regrettably does not cover *Aph.* 7.43,[42] but the exegeses recorded (perhaps in the ninth century) by Theophilus[43] and Damascius,[44] like two early mediaeval Latin commentaries known as 'Lat A' and 'Lat B,'[45] not only modify but also reflect and perpetuate features of Galen's commentary on the *Aphorisms*. Numerous other medieval[46] and early modern commentators, such as Maimonides, Martin de Saint-Gille, and Girolamo Cardano, are directly or indirectly indebted to Galen's commentary.

Even those who were sharply critical of Galen's commentaries on Hippocratic texts and of his pervasive influence often did not escape from his long shadow. I offer just one early modern example. In the

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41 *CMG* V 1,2 (1996) 203.

42 Stephanus' commentary is a transcription of his lectures on the *Aphorisms*. It is greatly indebted to Galen but ends at *Aph.* 6.55; see Westerink (1985–95).

43 On the manuscript evidence see Westerink (1985–95) I, 17–19; see the (unsatisfactory) text in Dietz (1834) II, 535.

44 Damascius, in Dietz (1834) II, 535.

45 See Beccaria (1961), Flammini (1992). Lat A, unlike Lat B, comments on *Aph.* 7.43. I am grateful to Klaus-Dietrich Fischer for generously making available to me some of his unpublished work on these two commentaries. The Latin translation of *Aph.* used by Lat A and B probably dates to the fifth or sixth century; like Galen, it adopted a literal reading of *amphidéxios*: *mulier ambas manus dextras habens non fit* (Müller-Rohlfsen [1980] 110; but cf. *ead.* 157, for the variant reading in Parisinus lat. 7099: *mulier ambidextra non fit*).

46 See Kibre (1985) 29–90.

sixteenth century Girolamo Cardano wrote his remarkable commentaries on the *Aphorisms* and other Hippocratic works in order to rescue the great Hippocrates from Galen. And indeed, Cardano's anti-Galenic commentary on the *Aphorisms* surpasses Galen's in detail, in classical erudition, and in hermeneutic sophistication. To interpret "a woman does not become ambidextrous" Cardano quotes rather than paraphrases the 'parallel' in *Airs Waters Places*; he introduces passages from several of Aristotle's biological works, from the Aristotelian *Problemata*, Plato's *Laws* and *Republic*, Censorinus, etc. to refute and correct Galen; and he chastises Galen for misinterpreting and not understanding the great Hippocrates.[47] Yet, as Nancy Siraisi has pointed out, "as a commentator, he [Cardano] claimed ... to understand Hippocrates' true meaning more accurately than Galen had done ..., [but] his interpretation was in reality largely shaped by existing medical, that is, Galenic, tradition."[48] Moreover, in his commentaries, Cardano "assured his readers that, as a result of his own efforts to disentangle the 'true' Hippocrates from the pervasive influence of Galenic influence," they would hear the authentic voice of Hippocrates for the first time; yet "his claims were in fact quite similar to those Galen himself had made. . . ."[49]

If Cardano's ardently anti-Galenic Hippocratism could not successfully resist the powerful influence of Galen, more recent annotators of the 'ambidextrous' aphorism have been no more successful. The only twentieth-century critical edition of the *Aphorisms* annotates the aphorism with a mere summary of Galen's commentary, without acknowledging Galen as the source.[50] The annotator makes no reference to the rich early modern struggle to move beyond the Galenic reading of *amphidéxios*, offers no alternative to Galen's interpretation (one could, for example, read *amphidéxios* as 'very handy,' 'very skillful,' 'very clever,' or 'very dexterous'),[51] and does not question Galen. Like most modern explications of this Hippocratic aphorism, it still stands in Galen's shadow.

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47 Cardano (1663) VIII, 559a–560a.

48 Siraisi (1997) 120. See also Grafton (1999) 132–3.

49 Siraisi (1997) 138.

50 W. H. S. Jones (1931) 203 n.3 (Jones's edition will be superseded by Caroline Magdelaine's excellent forthcoming critical edition). Similarly López Férez (1983) 290 n.199; Littré (1839–61) IV, 589–90 n.18; and, with a greater display of classical learning, Foes (1662) 27a–b. Fuchs (1895–1908) 134 n.43, however, expresses some doubts.

51 See. n.10 above. For a further interpretation see n.3 above on Fuchs.

II. *Contexts*

A brief consideration of larger historical and cultural contexts could indicate whether the case study has yielded representative results. Mesopotamian[52] and Greek commentaries on scientific and medical texts had a long history before Galen. The earliest surviving Greek commentaries on such texts are Hipparchus' second-century BCE *Exegesis of the Phainomena of Aratus and Eudoxus* and Apollonius of Citium's idiosyncratic first-century BCE commentary on the famous Hippocratic surgical treatise *On Joints*. Ancient evidence, in part quite extensive, confirms that numerous other—now lost—commentaries on a variety of scientific and medical treatises also circulated throughout the Hellenistic period, probably beginning no later than the mid-third century BCE.[53] During the Roman empire the still visible exegetical landscape was even more densely populated: a large number of Greek and Latin commentaries on scientific and medical works were composed between the second century CE and late antiquity, and many of them have survived the daunting vagaries of transmission (even if an even larger number of commentaries from this period have been lost).[54]

[52] On the cuneiform commentaries see Labat (1933); Meier (1937–39); Leichty (1973) 82–86; Civil (1974); Hunger (1976) on fourth- and third-century BCE cuneiform commentaries on medical, astronomical, and physiognomic texts (e.g. nos. 27–33, 36, 38–39, 41–42, 47, 49–55, 83, 90); Krecher (1980–83); Maul (1999) 11–12; A. Jones (1999) 147–156. Most of the cuneiform commentaries are philological in nature, offering explanations of rare and obscure words, of lexical and morphological archaisms, and of orthographic deviations, often by means of synonyms or graphic and etymological associations, sometimes in bilingual contexts. I am grateful to Paul-Alain Beaulieu for his generous help with the cuneiform material.

[53] See, e.g., Kudlien (1989) 355–376; Deichgräber (1965) 220–249, 317–322, 408–417; von Staden (1989) 427–29, 441–42, 452–56, 473 485–503, 521, 549, 555–56. 564; Hipparch. 1.1.3–7, 1.3.2–4, 1.3.9–10, etc. on Attalus and his other exegetical precursors. Pfeiffer (1968) regrettably failed to discuss the extensive Hellenistic tradition of commentaries on medical and astronomical works in his influential account of classical scholarship in the Hellenistic age.

[54] From the second century, for example, twelve of Galen's seventeen attested commentaries on Hippocratic works are still extant (one only in a ninth-century Arabic translation). From the late third or early fourth century Iamblichus' commentary on Nicomachus' famous *Introduction to Arithmetic* survives. The extant exegetical works of the fourth century include Pappus' commentary on Book X of Euclid's *Elements* and part of his commentary on Ptolemy's *Almagest*, as well as Theon of Alexandria's commentaries on the *Almagest* (partly extant) and his two commentaries—'Large' and 'Small'—on Ptolemy's *Handy Tables*. Extant commentaries from the fifth to the seventh centuries include Proclus' on the first book of Euclid's

The wealth of evidence allows one to reflect on several questions raised above. First, what was the professional identity of these Greek commentators? Galen and Apollonius of Citium were practicing physicians commenting on medical texts, Hipparchus an astronomer commenting on an astronomical text; they were in fact not atypical. In most instances the professional subcultures to which the numerous ancient commentators on medical and scientific texts belonged differed significantly from the disciplinary contexts within which their twentieth-century counterparts became professionally acculturated. Although non-scientists and non-physicians sometimes wrote commentaries on such texts in antiquity, the commentators tended to be practicing physicians and scientists, as were many of their exegetical successors in the early modern period and, indeed, until the nineteenth century.[55] Over the last hundred years, by contrast, professionally active mathematicians, astronomers, physicians, etc., have rarely included commentaries on the works of distant scientific precursors in the arsenal of literary forms by means of which they strive to establish scientific authority. One consequence of the disappearance of the commentary genre from twentieth-century scientists' and doctors' arsenal has been that commentaries on ancient Greek medical and scientific texts have largely become the *chasse gardée* of classicists (sometimes with little or no visible expertise in science), of a handful of professional historians of science trained in the ancient languages (particularly in the case of the exact sciences), and of an occasional specialist in Greek philosophy.

The reasons for this striking difference in the professional identity of ancient and contemporary exegetical agents are complex and varied. Conspicuous among them is that many ancient scientists and physicians believed that the quest for scientific legitimacy required

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Elements, part of a commentary by Marinus of Neapolis in Samaria on Euclid's *Data*, Eutocius' commentaries on Apollonius of Perge's *Conics* and on Archimedes' *On the Sphere and the Cylinder*, *Measurement of the Circle*, and *On Centers of Gravity (Equilibria) of Planes*; commentaries on Nicomachus' *Introduction to Arithmetic* by John Philoponus and Asclepius of Tralles; and commentaries on various Hippocratic and Galenic treatises by Agnellus of Ravenna, by three late Alexandrian Galenists (John of Alexandria, Palladius, Stephanus of Athens), and by several anonymous Greek and Latin writers. Numerous scientific questions also were taken up in the extensive Greek tradition of philosophical commentaries.

[55] For a similar tendency in the editions of texts see Reeve (1998). For tendencies in commentaries on philosophical texts, see Rowe (below) 296–8.

them to be not only overtly innovative scientific pioneers,[56] but also historians of science who engaged in the elucidation, rectification, and transmission of earlier texts, all in the service of science and τέχνη. The tasks of the scientific commentator thus included not only to clarify (σαφηνίζειν) venerable scientific 'truths'—often discovered centuries previously but 'expressed obscurely'—that remained worthy of transmission, but also to 'correct' scientific mistakes, flaws, inaccuracies or omissions, to add more precise or detailed scientific observations, to introduce new data and arguments, or to refute erroneous interpretations by previous commentators on the same scientific texts. The ancient scientists' and physicians' strong exegetical interaction with the scientific past therefore was not an exercise in historicism for the sake of history, let alone in antiquarianism or in philological virtuosity. Rather, the commentaries were—at least ostensibly—interpretative exercises that harnessed science, history, and philology to the search for, and preservation of, scientific truths and, in certain cases, to the efficacy at which their result-oriented professional expertise (their τέχνη) aimed.

Significant discontinuities between ancient and twentieth-century commentaries arise in part from this difference in professional identity. Unlike Hipparchus, Galen, Eutocius, and other ancient commentators, some of their more recent counterparts display little or no interest in the scientific validity of ancient observations, concepts, or theories, let alone in the efficacy of the scientific practices presented in the ancient texts on which they comment. Often more comfortable with minimal Greek lemmata that can be processed, one by one, through familiar philological, rhetorical or historical mills than with larger questions concerning the nature of scientific practices and theories, some recent commentators at times become vulnerable to the by now hackneyed charge that commentaries tend to excel at microscopic levels without making these sufficiently relevant to macroscopic issues addressed in, or entailed by, the original text.

Many recent commentators nevertheless have much in common with the ancients. Most current commentators on texts attributed to Hippocrates share, for example, Galen's keen interest in manuscript variants, in interpolations, in questions of authenticity and authorship, in collecting 'parallels' to elucidate obscure or ambiguous words

56 Lloyd (1987) 50–108.

and passages, in the historical provenance of concepts, theories, and scientific controversies (but see below on 'historical' vs. 'technical' knowledge), in criticizing or praising previous critics, and, of course, in establishing the superiority of the commentator's own readings.

Turning to the *formal features* of ancient commentaries on scientific and medical texts, one encounters considerable heterogeneity, despite certain recurrent structural and thematic devices. Some ancient commentators offer such a complete sequence of full lemmata that they reproduce the entire original text—even if in molecularized, segmented form—in the course of the commentary (thus providing an invaluable strand in the indirect transmission of the original text), whereas others introduce only a selection of lemmata. Most introduce lemmata in the sequence in which they appear in the original text, others deviate from this sequence. Some prefer brief lemmata, some very lengthy ones, while others mix minimal molecularized lemmata with ones more lengthy than any found in our contemporary commentaries.

Some commentaries were of course written in the margins of the original text, but in the commentaries using full, complete lemmata, the formal arrangement of the two ancient texts—the original and the exegetical—has significant implications for the socio-scientific dynamics of the triangle author-commentator-reader. Repeatedly embedded in the body of the commentary, the full lemmata that reproduce the complete original text—even if in broken form, its linearity constantly interrupted by exegeses—turn the reader into a continuous double reader: of the commentary and of the original. At the same time, the double text visually represents the ancient commentator both as a reader (of the original) and as a writer (of the commentary). If the provocative evidence concerning the ancient valorization of writing as superior to reading, and of the former as active and the latter as passive,[57] is reliable and generalizable, this continuous formal juxtaposition of the fragmented original text and its fragmenting exegetical parasite is a constant visual reminder of

[57] Svenbro (1988) 187–216. See also Morgan (1998) 92 on 'the bivalent approach to learning at every stage,' in which ancient pupils first learn to read and then to write, and on more people being able to read than to write. Cribiore (1996) 8–10 points out that the ability to read and the ability to write are not necessarily interdependent. For the transition in the Byzantine period from separate commentaries to commentaries written in the margins of texts, see Budelmann (below) 143–8.

the superiority of the commentator (the 'active' writing partner in this transaction) over his doubly 'passive' reading partner. The dependence of the commentator on the original which he 'reads' is of course also continuously visible in this formal textual arrangement, yet the double reader becomes complicitous in reversing this relation: for its clarification, validation, communicability, and dissemination, as for the mediation or reshaping of its scientific truth value, the original scientific text becomes dependent upon its own augmentation by the scientific writer of the commentary.

The *beginnings* of the ancient commentaries, on which much expert attention has been lavished in recent years, offer a further example of the heterogeneity of structures and forms (despite certain recurrent features, labeled *schemata isagogica* by Jaap Mansfeld, who has analyzed them in admirable detail).[58] Some ancient commentaries on scientific and medical works, for example, begin without any formal preface, whereas others have prefatory introductions of varying scope and form.[59] Some prefaces are addressed to individuals by name, some to collectivities, while others have no explicitly identified addressee(s). Some prefaces are in epistolary form, or at least use epistolary conceits, while others use non-epistolary conventions; some are perfunctory, others expansive; some are thoroughly impersonal, while others offer personal details concerning the author, his addressee(s), and other scientists, thus casting invaluable light not only on the social and cultural contexts of exegesis but also on the commentator's self-understanding or self-presentation. Galen is famous for offering such autobiographical, contextual comments in some of his prefaces, but this prefatory tradition reaches back at least to the earliest extant Greek scientific commentary, i.e., Hipparchus'.

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[58] Mansfeld (1994) and (1998); Flammini (1992); Sluiter (1999) 180, 188–91.

[59] Asclepius' commentary on Nicomachus' *Introduction to Mathematics*, for example, plunges directly into a lengthy explication of the first four (seemingly straightforward) words of Nicomachus' text (*hoi palaioì kaì prôtoi*). Galen's commentaries on the Hippocratic treatises *Prog.*, *Acut.*, *Epid. II*, and *Aph.* likewise have no formal prefaces (but see n. 33 above), whereas his commentaries on other Hippocratic works, such as *Nat. Hom.*, *Artic.*, *Fract.*, *Off.*, *Epid. I*, *Prorrh. I*, and *Epid. VI*, do. Marinus' commentary on Euclid's *Data* also has no foreword, at least not of the kind we find in Hipparchus and others (see below). By contrast, Proclus' fifth-century commentary on Book I of Euclid's *Elements* opens with a formal 84-page 'prologue' in two parts before turning to the exegesis of the Euclid's first sentence. Many surviving ancient commentaries on scientific texts begin with a preface—sometimes in epistolary form—considerably more limited in scope than Proclus' double *prólogos*.

Hipparchus opens his commentary on the *Phainomena of Aratus and Eudoxus* with a letter responding to a letter from his friend Aischrion, who had a keen interest in astronomy and in natural science.[60] He expresses his sympathy at the news of the premature death of Aischrion's brother[61] and proceeds to tell Aischrion that his commentary was motivated by earlier (now lost) inadequate commentaries on Aratus' poem, such as Attalus'.[62] Previous commentators, Hipparchus says, had tried to endorse and validate Aratus' and Eudoxus' views, including their egregious astronomical errors, and thereby perpetuated bad science contradicted by the *phainómena.* His purpose accordingly is to rectify these mistakes and to lead the reader to scientific truths.[63] In the prefaces to each of the subsequent two books of his commentary Hipparchus again addresses Aischrion by name,[64] thereby assuring that his opening remarks to his friend about the dreadful exegetical predecessors, notably about Attalus, hover over the entire work. By this formal device, as by his quotations from Attalus' commentary, Hipparchus continues to remind his readers of the scientific necessity of his 'rectifying' commentary.

Hipparchus does not suggest that readers might consult his commentary only on a single word or lemma (although there is no reason why an ancient reader could not have done so). Instead, like many other ancient commentators, he appears to assume that the commentary would be read all the way through from the beginning. Some ancient commentators, among them Galen, not only imply that their commentaries should be read as a single whole, but also repeatedly refer their readers to non-exegetical works, particularly to their own systematic treatises. They thus insert the commentary into a larger textual body with which the reader is expected to become familiar and, at the same time, expand the boundaries of the commentator's authorship and authority.

The ancient commentaries therefore not only exhibit a variety of relations to the original text—agonal, emulative, rectifying, elucidatory, perfective, idealizing, etc.—but, like their modern counterparts, also implicate a much wider range of texts, some written by the

[60] Hipparch. 1.1.1–11 (pp. 2–8 Manitius).
[61] Hipparch. 1.1.1. (p. 2.10–12 Manitius).
[62] Hipparch. 1.1.3–5 (p. 4 Manitius).
[63] Hipparch. 1.1.5–7, 1.1.9 (pp. 4–6 Manitius).
[64] Hipparch. 2.1.1, 3.1.1a (pp. 120.24, 216.20 Manitius).

commentator, some by other authors, including earlier commentators. As became clear in the case study (Part I), when ancient readers of an 'original' text turned to a commentary for help, they often became entangled in a thicket of heterogeneous texts implicated in the explication even of a single word or sentence, much as readers of modern commentaries do.

Unless Hipparchus' addressee, Aischrion, and the personal details in the preface to the first book of his commentary are literary conceits—not a very plausible hypothesis in the context of the Hellenistic community of scientific readers, onto which, for example, Archimedes' remarkable prefaces open many curtains—this foreword serves as an example of many ancient beginnings which are partly constructed of formal literary conventions but nonetheless display more than formal interests. They often articulate the commentator's motivations and purposes; they identify exegetical and doctrinal adversaries as well as the readership to which the commentator ostensibly aspires; and they evoke the professional and socio-scientific contexts of exegesis. When tracing *topoi* and recurrent rhetorical strategies in the opening sections of ancient commentaries, one should not overlook the diversity of dedicatory practices and of other formal and social features characteristic of scientific commentaries from the Hellenistic period to late antiquity, even in the works of one and the same commentator.[65]

Various *collectivities* are identified as the intended audience of some ancient commentaries. In one of his autobiographical digressions, Galen, for example, identifies the intended readership of his (prefaceless) commentary on *Prognostic* as a restricted group of younger companions or followers (*hetairoi*), who on previous occasions had already listened to his oral explications of this Hippocratic treatise.[66] Else-

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[65] A philosopher, Ammonius, is, for example, the addressee of Eutocius' sixth-century commentary on Archimedes' *On the Sphere and the Cylinder*, whereas his commentary on Archimedes' *Measurement of the Circle* has no explicitly identified addressee, and each of the first four books of his commentary on the *Conics* of Apollonius of Perge begins with a prefatory letter to a fellow-mathematician Anthemius. Some prefaces to ancient commentaries on scientific and medical texts are addressed to a powerful patron (e.g., Apollonius of Citium addresses the preface of each of the three books of his 'commentary' to 'King Ptolemy'). At times such formal differences entail different socio-scientific dynamics; a highly technical commentary explicitly addressed to an expert fellow-professional envisions a different readership from one intended for young students or an autocratic patron.

[66] Galen, *In Hp. Progn. comm.* 3.6. (*CMG* V 9,2, p. 328); *id.*, *In Hp. Nat. Hom. comm.*, proem. (*CMG* V 9,1 p. 3.14–19).

where he characterizes his exegetical audience as a circle of friends (*philoi*).[67] And the prefaces to his commentaries on *In the Surgery* and *Epidemics VI* are addressed to young people (νέοι) who aspire to practice medicine.[68] For other commentaries, however, such as those on Hippocratic surgical treatises, Galen envisions a much broader, far-flung readership that includes individual readers with a moderate level of literate culture who neither aspire to become practicing professionals nor participate in a formal pedagogic setting.[69] Galen's extensive remarks on the nature of the intended readership of his commentaries and on the readers' level of education reflect his image of himself as the ideal teacher, as Daniela Manetti and Amneris Roselli have recognized:[70] a masterful teacher trying to imagine himself at the level of his students, conscious of the difficulties his students will experience in their encounters with the ancient texts of 'Hippocrates,' dedicating his literary production to their education. In this respect too there is significant continuity between the self-understanding of the ancient commentator and that of some of his modern counterparts.

At times the production of commentaries was stimulated by sharp rivalries between collectivities that constituted distinctive *hairéseis* or 'schools' of thought.[71] A striking instance is the numerous commentaries written from the third to the first centuries BCE by members of the 'school' of Herophilus and by their arch-rivals, the Empiricist 'school.'[72] Many fragments of this exegetical *agon* survive, but the only extant commentary inspired by this 'school' rivalry is Apollonius of Citium's work on the Hippocratic *On Joints*. Apollonius, an Empiricist, leaves no doubt that his purposes include attacking the 'rationalist' Herophileans. He engages in explicit polemics against them, both collectively (οἱ Ἡροφίλειοι) and individually, singling out Bacchius and Hegetor for detailed refutation.[73]

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[67] E.g., *In Hp. Epid. III comm.* 2 proem., 2.4 (*CMG* V 10,2,1, pp. 60.4–6, 61.14–17, 78).

[68] Galen, *In Hp. Off. comm.* 3.33 (XVIIIB, 894.13–17 K); *id., In Hp. Epid. VI comm.* (*CMG* V 10,2,2, pp. 104.29–105.2).

[69] E.g. Galen *In Hp. Fract. comm.* 1.1 (XVIIIB, 335 K); *id., In Hp. Artic. comm.* 1, proem. (XVIIIA, 303.13–304.11 K).

[70] Manetti and Roselli (1994) 1592–93. See also Galen, *Libr. Propr.*, proem. and 6 (*Scripta minora* II, 92.13–93.16, 111–114). Cf., on Tzetzes, Budelmann (below) 155, 162–3.

[71] von Staden (1982) 76–100, 199–206.

[72] See Kudlien (1989) 362–70; Deichgräber (1963) 220–49, 317–22.

[73] Apollon. Cit. I, II, III (*CMG* XI 1,1, pp. 16.3–11, 28.2–14, 78.24–94.8).

The use of commentary as an instrument in doctrinal battles between rival scientific collectivities, each with distinctive doctrinal and methodological commitments, is, of course, not confined to the ancient world. As pointed out in Part I, in the Renaissance Girolamo Cardano used his commentaries on Hippocratic works to battle the Galenists. And in the Enlightenment the Spanish court physician and medical theorist Andrés Piquer deployed his detailed commentary on the Hippocratic *Epidemics* in the battle of Hippocratism against Galenism and iatromechanism.[74] In this struggle, Piquer's clinical science, constantly woven into his exegesis, and the Hippocratic text enter into a mutually validating relation. In antiquity as in the modern period (at least, before the twentieth century), a scientifically valid mega-text—part ancient, part modern—in the form of commentary thus is generated out of the context of an *agon* between scientific collectivities; it serves partisan demonstrations of the transepochal continuity of 'true science,' and it becomes an instrument of instruction within a 'school' or *hairésis* context.

A closely related thread in some prefaces to ancient commentaries is the *written* fixation of exegeses previously delivered in the context of *oral* instruction (a process that has continued to play a role in the modern production of commentaries). The ancient written commentaries that arose out of an oral pedagogic culture at times are depicted as intended to be read either in private or in 'school' contexts under the guidance of a teacher.[75] As Galen suggests in his commentary on *Epidemics I*, written commentary, in relation to its readership, becomes a locus of a difficult, in part stochastic, balancing act "aiming neither at the extremely uneducated alone nor just at those who have an adequate preparation."[76] He implies that oral commentary, by contrast, requires less pedagogic conjecture: the live, visible and audible, physically present circle of young *hetairoi* listening to the master's oral explication is replaced, in the case of

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[74] Piquer interpreted Hippocrates as representing a pure observational empiricism that will stand the test of time since it avoids the shifting sands on which theories are built, whereas he depicts Galen and the modern Galenists as system-builders who rely on the suspect reasoning of philosophy to produce 'scientific' theories that are likely to win no more than transient authority before they are replaced by other such theories. See Lopez Piñero (1987).

[75] See Snyder (2000) 57, 75–82, 100–6, 140–7, 226–7, on differences between various philosophical and religious collectivities with respect to the use of commentaries in instruction; Sluiter (1999).

[76] Galen, *In Hp. Epid. I comm.* 2.1 (*CMG* V 10,1, pp. 45.20–46.6).

written commentary, by the imagined, absent, future reader of the commentary.

Furthermore, the commentator's transition from oral to written exegesis is repeatedly depicted as involuntary. Indeed, from Hipparchus to at least the time of Galen, 'the reluctant commentator,' who has to be 'compelled' by others or by circumstances to commit his commentary to writing, is a recurrent *topos* in ancient commentaries on scientific and medical texts. A characteristic example occurs in Galen's commentary on the Hippocratic *Prognostic*:

> I am saying this to all of you, my companions (ἑταῖροι) who *compelled me*, though I had not made the choice for myself, to record my explications (ἐξηγήσεις) of Hippocrates' writings. . . . You know that I wrote these two treatises[77] with the intention that they should not be published but should remain only among you, yet it so happened that they got out and are in the hands of many, just like many other products of my writing. For this reason *I decided not to explicate* (ἐξηγεῖσθαι) any of Hippocrates' books in commentaries (ὑπομνήματα). In fact, all the things useful for the τέχνη [of medicine] that one should learn from him have been recorded by me in many treatises. . . . Since, however, some of Hippocrates' less clearly expressed sayings met with bad interpretations, and *you* consequently were not pleased with any of those who have written commentaries previously, and since *you* thought that I [in my oral explications] had taken better aim at Hippocrates' meaning, for this reason *you* deemed it worthwhile that I provide you, through *written* works too, with exactly what you have listened to during our association with one another through *spoken* discourse (ἐν ταῖς διὰ λόγων συνουσίαις). I have previously told you this too: the explications will necessarily be uneven [in length], because I do not explain all his sayings in the same fashion. Rather, those sayings which I have not mentioned anywhere in my expository treatises, I explain more completely [in my commentaries], but those of which I have already given a full account in my [expository] works, I interpret more summarily, so as not to be forced to write often about the same things.[78]

Several features of his not always consistent thinking about commentary emerge in this characteristic Galenic digression. These include the 'reluctant'—yet, as his audience knows, prolific—author of commentaries, 'compelled' as much by requests from friends, pupils, and companions as by the inferiority of his precursors to write lengthy commentaries (the latter motivation he shares with Hipparchus and

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[77] Galen, *De cris.* and *De diebus decr.* (IX, 550–941 K).
[78] Galen, *In Hp. Prog. comm.* 3.6 (CMG V 9.2, pp. 328.4–22).

a number of other ancient commentators); the 'unforeseen' wider circulation of the 'reluctant' author's works that had been intended for private use by a restricted circle of intimates; the emphasis on what is 'useful for the τέχνη' (though in practice his commentaries in fact dwell on numerous philological, historical, and terminological issues, on squabbles and *minutiae* whose utility for practicing medicine is far from evident);[79] the incompetent precursors whose commentaries stand in need of correction and refutation; the pupils who share not only Galen's dissatisfaction with previous commentaries but also his conviction that his own exegeses are superior; the necessity of interpretations of uneven length; the desire to avoid repetition (although he is in fact notoriously repetitive; indeed, Galen often uses a rhetoric of iteration to hammer home his points).

A further difference between most ancient and twentieth-century commentators on technical texts is illustrated by Galen's extensive remarks on what should be included in, and excluded from, such commentaries. Unlike recent commentators on Hippocratic works, he argues that the principal criterion of selection should be usefulness for the practitioner of medicine: the commentator should explicate only τὰ εἰς τὴν τέχνην (or θεραπείαν) χρήσιμα. Not all Hippocratic passages merit exegesis, Galen sometimes claims, since they do not all meet the criterion of utility.[80] Furthermore, he suggests that, even in the case of 'useful' subject matter in the original text, the commentator should exclude all linguistic and philological questions, also those concerning etymology, dialect, syntax, and other features of grammar. Such questions, he believes, are appropriate in commentaries on poetry, but they subvert the true purpose of a commentary on a technical scientific text.[81] Closely related is his view that

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[79] On the criterion of usefulness see next n. and Galen, *In Hp. Fract. comm.* 1.4, 2.69 (XVIIIB, 338, 518–9 K); *In Hp. Artic. comm.* 1.58, 4.15 (XVIIIA, 395.3–8, 685–6 K); *In Hp. Off. comm.* 3.33 (XVIIIB, 894 K); *In Hp. Epid. I comm.*, proem (*CMG* V 10,1, pp. 6.16–17); Manetti and Roselli (1994) 1561–2; Mansfeld (1994) *passim*.

[80] Galen, *In Hp. Epid. VI comm.* 2.37, 5.14, 5.27 (*CMG* V 10,2,2, pp. 104.1–5, 284.20–22, 306.21–22, 406.27–36, 413.5–30); *In Hp. Epid. I comm.* 2.85 (*CMG* V 10,1, pp. 99.22–100.2).

[81] Galen, *In Hp. Epid. III comm.* 2.9 (*CMG* V 10,2,1, pp. 94.7–95.2); *In Hp. Artic. comm.* 1.58 (XVIIIA, 395.3–8 K); *In Hp. Fract. comm.* 1.1, 1.4 (XVIIIB, 322–23, 338 K). See also *In Hp. Epid. VI comm.* 3.13, 3.30 (*CMG* V 10,2,2, pp. 141.1–7, 167–8).

questions concerning terminological precision should be excluded,[82] in part because they lower the level of commentaries on technical texts.[83] All these criteria are, however, repeatedly violated by Galen in his own exegetical practice.

Another criterion, according to Galen, is provided by the distinction between technical knowledge and historical knowledge. Unlike twentieth-century commentators on Greek medical and scientific texts, he rejects historical questions.[84] A telling example occurs in his commentary on the Hippocratic claim that "by [prescribing] walks, much wrestling, and vapor-baths—which are bad—Herodicus killed patients suffering from fever."[85] With reference to the question which of several persons named Herodicus might be meant, Galen remarks:

> It is *superfluous to inquire* which Herodicus he [Hippocrates] mentions here, i.e., whether it is the one from Leontini or the one from Selymbria. In another account I am in any case giving a detailed account of such things, but this [a commentary] is *not the right moment for historical inquiries*. . . .[86]

Despite this rejection of 'historical questions,' Galen in fact veers in the direction of such 'useless' and 'inopportune' historical questions concerning Herodicus.[87] Similarly, in his commentary on *Epidemics III* Galen repeatedly dismisses a learned, centuries-long Hellenistic dispute (about mysterious letter-symbols appended to the Hippocratic case histories in some Alexandrian copies of *Epid. III*) as a useless historical controversy, yet he provides a lengthy, detailed account of it.[88] He rejects the symbols as inauthentic post-Hippocratic interpolations but nevertheless weighs in with his own interpretations of

[82] E.g. Galen, *In Hp. Epid. I comm.* 3.5 (*CMG* V 10,1, pp. 115.33–116.3); *In Hp. Artic. comm.* 4.15 (XVIIIA, 685.12–686.1 K).
[83] Galen, *In Hp. Epid. VI comm.* 3.30 (*CMG* VI.10.2.2, p. 167.18–25).
[84] E.g. Galen, *In Hp. Epid. III comm.* 2.4 (*CMG* V 10,2,1, p. 78.14–26).
[85] Hippoc. *Epid. VI* 3.18 (V, 302 L; pp. 68–69 Manetti/Roselli; p. 242 Smith).
[86] Galen, *In Hp. Epid, VI comm.* 3.35 (*CMG* V 10,2,2, pp. 177.12–16); see also Galen, *In Hp. Epid. VI comm.* 3.13, 3.30 (*CMG* V 10,2.2, pp. 141.1–7, 167.18–25). Galen, *In Hp. Artic. comm.* 4.39 (XVIIIA 729.1–8 K), draws a striking contrast between Thucydides' 'historical' description of plague symptoms and Hippocrates' differentiating causal accounts.
[87] Galen points out, for example, that Plato refers both to the Selymbrian Herodicus and to the one from Leontini (Plato *Prot.* 316e and *Resp.* 3.406a vs. *Gorg.* 448b, 456b).
[88] See Wenkebach (1920), von Staden (1989) 501–503.

their history and meaning, citing and extensively criticizing the interpretations developed by his exegetical precursors.[89] Yet he leaves no doubt that this is precisely the kind of 'historical' question that should be excluded from commentaries on technical scientific texts.[90]

In his exegetical practice, Galen, like many a modern commentator, therefore often violated his professed principles, *inter alia* by including questions which, in theory, are to be excluded. His desire to put his matchless erudition on display, and likewise his tacit wish not to be bettered by any other commentator, living or dead, undoubtedly account in part for such local exegetical violations of the commentator's global principles. The discrepancies between the announced exegetical ideals and their lemma-by-lemma realization sound a *caveat* against the frequent modern tendency to characterize ancient commentaries on scientific and medical texts principally in terms of the ancient commentators' overtly indicated exegetical principles, without adequate attentiveness to the frequent lack of isomorphism between theory and practice. In the case of Galen—as in those of Cardano, Piquer, and other modern commentators on Hippocratic texts—it is, however, also a mistake to overlook the 'plot' of the commentary. The lemmatical fragmentation of the ancient text entails a fragmentation of the commentator's decisions. Like many other commentators, Galen had his mind on the here and now, on the lemma of the moment. But he also had an end in mind.[91]

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[89] E.g. *CMG* V 10,2,1 pp. 26–28, 46–47, 75–83, 85–88, 90–92, 110, 157, 169, 176.

[90] Galen, *In Hp. Epid. III comm.* 2.4 (*CMG* V 10,2,1, pp. 78.18–26), says, for example: "I would be ashamed to be diverted to such nonsense. . . ."

[91] I am grateful to Christina Kraus, Roy Gibson, and Elaine Fantham for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

[sic] *Lugduni edition*, with an introduction by August Buck, New York and London, 1967).
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7. CLASSICAL COMMENTARY IN BYZANTIUM: JOHN TZETZES ON ANCIENT GREEK LITERATURE

Felix Budelmann

The Middle Ages were a fruitful period for the classical commentary. Medieval scholars not only are responsible for preserving most of what remains of ancient commentaries; but they were also themselves active in the genre. Some of the detail of their work is notoriously elusive, but it is clear that they created a whole industry of compiling, editing, and expanding the material that had come down to them, as well as composing individual scholia and whole commentaries of their own. This chapter looks at one of the most prominent men who were busy in this industry, John Tzetzes, the twelfth-century (c. 1110–1180/1185) Byzantine teacher and scholar who wrote more or less extensive notes on Homer, *Iliad* 1, Hesiod's *Works and Days*, several Aristophanes comedies, Lycophron's *Alexandra*, and other ancient texts.[1]

Tzetzes, I will suggest, fits well into this volume because his works show that various questions that interest us as users, writers, and students of classical commentaries today are already raised by some much earlier commentaries. In particular, I am concerned here with what appears to be the dual status of commentaries: they are both subordinate to another text, and texts in their own right. More or less explicitly, this ambivalence has been the subject of scholarly discussions,[2] and it is known to everybody who is familiar with commentaries.

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[1] His authorship is uncertain in some cases; the Lycophron commentary is attributed in the manuscripts to John's brother Isaac, but John claims it as his in various places. On Tzetzes in general see Wendel (1948) and Hunger (1978) 59–63, with information about editions and bibliography (also on the authorship of the Lycophron commentary). Cesaretti (1991) 127–221 discusses Tzetzes' allegorical interpretations, and Wilson (1983) 190–6 gives a general account of Tzetzes' work on classical authors. In Magdalino (1993), a study of Byzantium under Manuel I (1143–1180), Tzetzes appears frequently.

[2] On modern commentaries see Gumbrecht (1999) and Kraus (above) 1–7; on medieval commentaries Huber (1999); and on ancient commentaries Vallance (1999), von Staden (above) 128–9, and Ineke Sluiter in a chapter of a forthcoming book on scholia, presented at the Cambridge Laurence Seminar 2000 on scholia.

On the one hand, obviously, every commentary depends for its existence on the ancient text it comments on. Moreover, it has its subject matter, and even the order in which it arranges it, dictated to a considerable degree by the ancient text. Commentators are there to serve the ancient text; discretion is often seen as one of their prime virtues. In this respect commentaries seem to obey different rules from monographs. Monographs also discuss ancient texts, but they have more elbow room. Their position is not clearly defined in relation to the ancient text. By contrast, the commentary is locked into a close relationship with the text, and this relationship is hierarchical: the commentary is subordinate.

On the other hand, it is easy to see that this characterization of the classical commentary, though (I hope) not misguided, is one-sided. For as it stands, it gives too little emphasis to the merits, prominence, and self-confidence of commentaries. Many classicists regard them as indispensable tools in interpreting texts, and even those who are critical of them tend to use them frequently. Therefore, commentaries still have considerable influence on how texts are perceived. Sometimes their long shelf-life is stressed. It is not surprising that writing a good commentary is considered a high achievement, and that scholars become known for their commentaries. After all, as much as writing a monograph, writing a commentary demands knowledge, imagination, and judgment. Whatever discretion the commentator exerts, he or she is not just the faceless servant of the ancient author but also an author himself or herself, and is regarded as such.

The two poles are not mutually exclusive. Some commentaries combine serving the ancient text and maintaining a strong presence, and even identity, without visible effort. But in other cases questions occur. To what degree should a commentator bring in his or her own person and views? Should a commentary argue a sustained thesis, and if so how? May it be provocative? Should commentators avoid using the first person? Some of these questions go to the heart of what a commentary is and does. It is, therefore, inevitable that there will always be disagreement over the correct answers.

My intention here is not to develop a position of my own on these questions. Rather, I will use the questions as a focus for the discussion of Tzetzes' commentaries. Although Tzetzes regards it as his function to help his readers in understanding the ancient texts, he is often not content, I will argue, with a completely subordinate

position. In various ways, his commentaries assert themselves as texts in their own right. It will become clear that Tzetzes is not a commentator who believes in keeping a low profile, and that he would probably have something to say about the status of commentaries—and not necessarily the same as his modern successors. Therefore, although the primary aim of this chapter is to explore some characteristic features of Tzetzes' commentaries, it will emphasize two more general points. First, Tzetzes is a reminder of the degree to which we have inherited, along with the genre of commentary, numerous specific practices, assumptions, and tensions. For better or worse, modern commentators are often not original in what they do. But, secondly, Tzetzes also emphasizes that within this tradition there is room for variation. Personality and (as I will explore in the last few pages) social context mold commentaries as much as they mold other genres. In his own way, Tzetzes will do what many chapters in this book do: remind us that not all characteristics of the classical commentary that we sometimes take for granted are necessarily a given.

I have selected four topics for discussion: the physical appearance of Tzetzes' commentaries (where does he comment?), Tzetzes' authorial presence (who comments?), so-called atomization (how does Tzetzes comment?), and the contrast between the original text as focus of the comment and as starting-point for more (again, how does he comment?).

1. *Physical Appearance*[3]

The basic layout of commentaries on Greek literary texts developed considerably over the centuries. Two changes are particularly obvious. In antiquity substantial commentaries (as opposed to material such as glosses of individual words) were written continuously, in a roll separate from the text that is commented upon. At some point in late antiquity or during the early Byzantine period scholia began to be arranged on the same page as the relevant portion of text, a development which coincided with the establishment of a, limited, body of scholia on a given passage.[4] With variations—commentary

[3] Cf. von Staden (above) 127–8. Goulet-Cazé (2000) 13–166 is also relevant to this section, but appeared too late to be taken advantage of.

[4] The date of the change in layout is notoriously uncertain; see Wilson (1984)

in all four margins, commentary below the text, commentary between the lines of the text—this layout became standard. Only in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries do we find again substantial numbers of manuscripts which carry the commentary separately from the ancient text.[5] Even then, separate layout was the exception rather than the norm, and more often than not early printed books, too, kept the format of text with commentary on the same page as the text. It was not until the nineteenth century that the present shape became dominant: text at the front, with commentary at the back.

Reasons for these changes are manifold and difficult to determine in detail. Often scribes (and printers) will have been influenced by practical considerations. The change to the medieval format, for instance, has been linked with the introduction of the book and the wider margins made possible by this format and especially with the change from majuscule to minuscule. In addition, changes in the way commentaries were used are bound to have affected their layout, as, vice versa, changes in layout will have caused changes in the use of commentaries. Unfortunately, not enough is known in this area, and the relation between many of the factors that are known is contested.[6] However, for present purposes it is perhaps possible to sidestep the question of what caused the changes and to concentrate on the presentation of the commentary on the same page as the text as a salient feature of medieval manuscripts. It marks off the commentaries not only from their ancient and modern counterparts; more important for this chapter, it also marks them off from most contemporary genres, including the treatise, and indeed the poetic texts themselves. Those were all presented as the main, and often only, text on the page. At least visually, commentaries are in a category of their own during this period, and this is remarkable.

Perhaps the most obvious interpretation is to regard the layout of the medieval commentary as a visual representation of the hierar-

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and McNamee (1998), who support the conventional early dating (fourth/fifth century). Zuntz's (1975) later date (eighth/ninth century) cannot be excluded. Generally on the layout of medieval scholia see Wilson (1983) 33–6 and the articles in Questa and Raffaelli (1984). Note also two discussions of Latin manuscripts: Holtz (1977) on grammatical manuscripts, with many general observations; and De Hamel (1984) on glossed bibles.

[5] A few examples for Tzetzes: Parisiensis gr. 2780 (Hesiod), Monacensis gr. 134 (Oppian: Tzetzes' scholia mixed with others), Leipzig gr. 32 (Homer), Parisiensis gr. 2839 (Lycophron).

[6] References in n.4.

chy to which I pointed at the beginning. Medieval manuscripts, the interpretation would run, both reflect and reinforce the dependence of the commentary on the ancient text. The ancient text, which was composed first, is now written first. The commentary has to fit around it, explaining individual words or lines in individual sections or phrases, and is shown not to have the same status as the ancient text or a treatise, the status, that is, of a text which can stand on its own feet. Tzetzes would not be an exception. To give just one example, the Milan Ambrosianus Graecus C222 inf. (= 886), written around the turn of the fourteenth century, contains the following material connected to Hesiod's *Works and Days*:[7]

219r– Tzetzes on Ps.-Proclus' commentary on *Works and Days*
219v– Hesiod *vita*
221r– Prolegomena about the Muses
222v– *Works and Days* with Tzetzes' scholia.

Various treatises are presented by themselves, but Tzetzes' scholia are written alongside the *Works and Days*. The manuscript subordinates Tzetzes' commentary to the ancient text.

However, there are three reasons why this is not all there is to be said. First, the interpretation is one-sided. Not only could one argue that the often substantial physical presence of the scholia on the same page swells the importance of the text, making it 'bigger.' Equally important, several scholars have stressed the power of the commentary to control access to the text. A commentary written on the same page as the ancient text is difficult to ignore and will influence the understanding of the text.[8] Yes, the commentary appears not to be able to exist without its ancient text, but this is not to say that it is subordinate in every way. Visually, the commentary shapes the text as much as the text shapes the commentary; the two come to exist together. The metaphor of the center controlling the margins can be countered by that of the margins closing in on the center.

Secondly, already before the fifteenth century, marginal and interlinear presentation of scholia was not universal, as is demonstrated by the Venice Marcianus Graecus 464 (written in about 1316–1319). The relevant sections are:[9]

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[7] According to Martini and Bassi (1906) 2.984–90.
[8] Allen (1982) xiii–xiv, Copeland (1991) 3–4, Gladigow (1995) 48.
[9] Information on this manuscript in Turyn (1972) 1.123–7.

20v– *Works and Days* with Moschopulean scholia
46v– Collection of Moschopulean scholia
78v– John Protospatharius on *Works and Days*
84v– Collection of Tzetzes' scholia on *Works and Days*
116v–143v Collection of Ps.-Proclus' scholia on *Works and Days*

Some of Moschopulus' scholia are presented along with the text, but those by John Protospatharius, Tzetzes, and Ps.-Proclus, as well as some others by Moschopulus, are arranged as separate groups, without the poetic text. The difference from the Ambrosianus is obvious. There still is a hierarchy in so far as the scholia follow the text, but they do not have to fit around the text: most pages are filled by scholia alone. Unfortunately, it is difficult to tell just how much weight one should put on this manuscript. There are no comparable pre-fifteenth century manuscripts of any Tzetzes commentary, and the Venice Marcianus is an autograph of Demetrius Triclinius, which may explain its peculiar composition: scholar that he was, he seems to have collected several sets of scholia and entered them all into one manuscript. But while the case specifically for Tzetzes manuscripts is ambiguous, the evidence becomes clearer once one looks farther afield. First of all, there are the numerous manuscripts containing commentaries on Dionysius Thrax, and various other grammatical scholia: they usually present the commentary without the text. Apart from the sheer bulk of these texts, the reason must be that they were used as school texts in their own right (a topic to which I will return). Something similar is true for the so-called Homeric D-scholia, a body of often elementary notes, containing many glosses, which go back to antiquity and were still much used in Tzetzes' own day.[10] They, too, usually appear without the ancient text. Finally, Tzetzes' contemporary Eustathius recorded his vast Homer commentaries in manuscripts of their own (bulk must again have been an important factor; later one finds abridged versions alongside the Homeric poems).[11] Even in Tzetzes' day, it appears, commentaries could be thought worthy of standing by themselves.

[10] On the D-scholia see de Marco (1932), van der Valk (1963–64) 1.202–302, and the relevant chapters in Montanari (1979–95).

[11] Eustathius in turn refers to the Apion and Herodorus commentary, the source of the tenth-century Venetus A, as a βιβλίον (1.45.14 van der Valk) and as ὑπομνήματα (1.76.14). The possible implications for the lay-out he had in front of him are disputed: see van der Valk (1963–64) 1.25–7.

My third point concerns Tzetzes in particular. As may be observed in a number of texts, he had a habit of commenting on his own works. For instance, we find scholia on his *Carmina Iliaca*, on the *Iliad* allegories, and on the letters, in the last case amounting to 660 ἱστορίαι of together over 12000 lines.[12] In some cases the works of his he commented on are themselves commentaries. Comments on comments are rare now. One finds references to addenda at the back (cf. Henderson below 213); and one also finds occasional footnotes. But these are exceptions. It is probably true to say that most classical commentaries today, with the exception of some large-scale works, have few footnotes, except in the introduction. Clearly, commentators and their editors want to avoid the three-level hierarchy text—comment 1-comment 2. But this is exactly what Tzetzes presents his readers with in the ἱστορίαι which I just mentioned, in the Porphyry commentary and in the commentary on *Iliad* 1.[13]

To give an example, in the Trinity Cambridge manuscript of the *Iliad* 1 commentary[14] there are three kinds of text (not counting late additions to the commentary entered into the margins). A portion of the *Iliad*, usually only very few lines, fills a segment on the left-hand side of the writing area (higher or lower depending on the place where the notes on the previous portion stop). The notes on each portion are written continuously in the space to the right of the main text, continuing, often for more than a page, below the text. Greek numbers in red ink linking the lemmata with the relevant words in the poetic text help the reader. Finally, the notes on the commentary are written in occasional places into the margins outside the main block of text. These notes are less frequent in the main body of the commentary than in the introduction, for part of which they are written in parallel columns with the text of the introduction itself; like modern commentators, Tzetzes thus makes a distinction between introduction and notes. But at the same time he obviously treats his notes as a text also worth commenting on, thus distinguishing himself from the majority of ancient, medieval, and modern commentators.

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[12] *Carmina Iliaca*: Schirach (1770); *Iliad* allegories: Matranga (1850) 599–618; letters and ἱστορίαι: Leone (1968).

[13] Porphyry commentary: Harder (1895) 318; *Iliad* 1 commentary: Bachmann (1835) 825–45, Colonna (1954), and Larizza Calabrò (1964); Papathomopoulos (1980) edits fragments of ancient authors contained in the scholia on the *Iliad* 1 commentary and on the *Carmina Iliaca*.

[14] Trinity R 16.33.

The effect is to boost the status of the commentary as a text in its own right. It does not just comment, but is itself commented upon. In general, then, the physical appearance of Tzetzes' commentaries seems to reinforce the hierarchy text—commentary, but clearly it also suggests that they are not *altogether* subordinate nor even *altogether* in a different category. Although as a rule they do not appear self-confidently on pages of their own as those of their modern successors do, they know how to hold their ground.

2. *Authorial Presence*

If the implications of the question 'where,' the question about the lay-out of Tzetzes' commentaries in the manuscripts, are not straight-forward, what about the question 'who'? In the conclusion, I will talk about Tzetzes himself, discussing the social and cultural contexts that shaped his commentaries. Until then, the focus will remain more narrowly on the commentaries, and at this level, too, there are questions to be asked about who comments.

I begin with a remark by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht.[15] According to Gumbrecht, "the discourse of commentary is normally anonymous." Applied to modern classical commentaries (as opposed to those written in the Middle Ages, to which I will soon return), this is at first a surprising statement. After all the names of commentators are always known. In fact, scholars have pointed out that commentaries help their authors make their name. Glenn Most talks about commentators writing commentaries in order to attach their "own easily forgettable name to the immortal name of a great author."[16] None the less, Gumbrecht's statement makes sense also in this context. It is part of a discussion of schools of commenting and commentary series which, like a corporate identity, may distract from the name of the individual commentator. Something like this may indeed be observed in the case of some classical commentaries. More classicists know about the Groningen commentaries on the novel or the Oxford *Odyssey* commentaries than are able to name each individual commentator. And although one only needs to look at the relevant vol-

[15] Gumbrecht (1999) 449.
[16] Most (1999) xiv.

umes to find out the names one does not recall, it is worth pointing out that these names are not always prominent. The lettering 'The Iliad: a commentary' on the spine and cover of Kirk's Cambridge series are considerably more noticeable, in color and size, than those of the commentators in question. The Cambridge green-and-yellow series has recently removed the commentator's name from the spine altogether: only ancient author and text are indicated. Although the question 'who' is itself easily answered, it is a question with ramifications.

Responsible for these ramifications must be again the dual status of the commentaries. Is a commentary a text in its own right—and one that has an author—or is it a faceless—and nameless—servant of the ancient text? This tension can be observed in the commentators' authorial presence in various ways. Explicit naming is only one of them. Another is, as already mentioned, the question of whether or not the commentator should use the first person. Commentators constantly make choices and judgments, but many of them avoid phrasing them in the first person, and the same is true for more than one commentary series as a whole. More than other scholarly genres, commentaries are still associated with objectivity.[17] Similarly, commentators tend to be less aggressive in their polemic and in promoting their own originality than are some authors of articles or monographs. On the one hand, commentators argue against views they consider wrong, and (of course) they have an interest in being seen as making new contributions, but on the other hand, their phrasing is usually less explicitly confrontational, and even expressions such as 'unlike previous scholars' or 'not previously noted' are probably less common in commentaries than in monographs. Vice versa, commentaries often do not acknowledge each individual borrowing from their predecessors (anonymity again), instead saying once in the introduction that they are building on all the work done on the text by earlier generations of scholars. Clearly, there are spoken and unspoken rules about how much authorial presence a commentator may show. Yes, commentators attach their names to those of well-known authors, but they rarely forget that they are in those authors' debt.

[17] See Kraus (above) 2–3, and compare 11–13, 16–17 on the tralaticious aspects of commentaries.

What then about Tzetzes? As already mentioned, medieval commentaries in general differ from their modern successors not only in layout but also in authorial presence. They may at times use the first person, but there is no question of how large the lettering for their names should be: many of them have no name. Gumbrecht's remark about anonymity fully applies. The names attached to ancient commentaries were usually lost as the commentaries were expanded, cut, changed, and conflated. The men who carried out this job, in antiquity and in the Byzantine era, have usually also lost their names. All we have today is the ancient author's name, which, as Most has noted, is much less forgettable. The hierarchy ancient text—commentary is again obvious. Compared to much of the Middle Ages, writing commentaries today is a certain way to fame.

It may come as no surprise that Tzetzes stands out from his context again, and is in some respects much closer to his modern successors. The very fact that he can be the subject of this article shows that his name is not lost. This begins with the titles of his commentaries in the manuscripts. Rather than just the name of the ancient author we find the ancient and the modern author. One example: ἐξήγησις Ἰωάννου γραμματικοῦ τοῦ Τζέτζου εἰς τὴν Ὁμήρου Ἰλιάδα.[18] In this case, the scribe provides name of ancient author and work, genre of commentary (ἐξήγησις, to be discussed below), and first and last name of the commentator. More than that, even Tzetzes' profession is stated: he is a γραμματικός. Clearly, Tzetzes is one of those Byzantine commentators (Eustathius is another obvious example) whose commentaries were treated not just as reworkings of older material but as new works.

One does not have to look for long at Tzetzes' writings to see that he made sure that this would not be otherwise. His authorial presence, in his commentaries and elsewhere, is obvious and even notorious. Terms like 'vanity' and 'arrogance'[19] run through modern scholarly discussions, and one can see why. There is, for instance, his concern with plagiarism.[20] In one of his numerous autobiographical digressions, he writes angrily about exposing "the jackdaw which glo-

[18] Cambridge Trinity R 16.33. Further examples below.
[19] Wendel (1948) 1965, Wilson (1983) 192.
[20] Cf. von Staden on Galen, (above) 133–4.

ries in our feathers" (*Iliad* 1 commentary 748.13–14 Bachmann), and explains in a scholion *ad loc.*

> Who is this jackdaw? One of my students, who listened to me and wrote down what I said on sheets, intending to publish (ἐξενεγκεῖν) it as his own. . . . When I learned about this, I began the present ἐξήγησις [more on this word below], <confounding> and thwarting the attempts of that man.

Similar anxieties are found in his letters, where he points out that the Lycophron commentary is not really his brother's but his own (21), and where he accuses others of appropriating his works (e.g., 42).

Perhaps partly because of this worry, he makes his name conspicuous. The *Iliad* 1 commentary begins with five hexameter lines, as follows:

> Βίβλον ἑαῖς πραπίδεσσι γλαφυρολύτειραν Ὁμήρου
> τήνδε παραιφασίῃσιν ἐμῶν ἑτάρων τολυπεύσας
> παισὶν Ὁμηριαδαῖς ἑρμήϊον ὤπασα δῶρον
> γραμματικὸς περίαλλα μογήσας Ἰωάννης
> τὸν Τζέτζη καλέουσιν ἐπωνυμίην ἐρέοντες.

> I produced with my (?) own intelligence this book, explaining Homer elegantly, through the encouragement of my companions. I gave the interpretation as a gift to the young Homerids, I, the very hard-working grammarian John, whom they call Tzetzes, using a surname.

Not only does Tzetzes attach his name to Homer's, but he also makes it as visible as possible (and that in Homer's own meter). Later on, he calls himself a 'son of Homer' (748.9), and imagines an opponent addressing him, "Tzetzes, you are in trouble here, even though you are a fighter for Homer . . ." (789.30–1). Again we are reminded of his name, and again Homer is not far away. In other commentaries, he uses similar strategies. Tzetzes made sure that his name was not so easily forgettable after all.

In a different way, his authorial presence is perceptible in his desire to distinguish himself from other scholars. Thus he opens his *Works and Days* commentary with references to Proclus, under whose name another commentary on the same work survives in several manuscripts (10–11 Gaisford): "The wise Proclus, providing an ἐξήγησις of this book here, Hesiod's *Works and Days*, not at all well, fitting with that man's wisdom, nor one that is worthy." And he continues at some length in this vein until he rounds off: "But the mistakes

made by the very wise Proclus shall not detain me; I must begin my ἐξήγησις." The passage is not exceptional.[21] Scholarly rivalry in antiquity often has to be laboriously reconstructed. In the case of Tzetzes the surviving evidence is copious.

Altogether, it is obvious that Tzetzes is not a reserved sort of commentator. His authorial presence is remarkable in the context of the frequently anonymous Byzantine re-workings of older commentaries; and in some ways it also goes beyond anything found in commentaries today. Later I will ask whether there are at least partial explanations for this apparent idiosyncrasy. For the time being, I wish to point out that contrary to the impression created so far, the tensions governing authorial presence in modern commentaries apply also to Tzetzes. Hard though it may be to believe, Tzetzes, too, felt that commentaries called for a degree of discretion. This becomes clear once his commentaries are held against certain other works of his: the *Theogony*, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* allegories, or his *Carmina Iliaca*.[22] Like the commentaries, these works roughly follow the plot and structure of the ancient texts in question. However, they form a separate group: they do not so much provide comment as they resemble new versions of the old texts. There is as much translation and imitation as there is of the 'this means' kind of discourse that is characteristic of commentaries. Unlike most commentaries, which sometimes have a verse preamble but no more, they are composed entirely in verse. What makes these texts interesting in the present context are passages like this, taken from the early parts of the *Theogony* (26–30): "I say freely that not even if there were a hundred Homers, Musaeuses, Orpheuses, Hesiods, Antimachuses, and Linuses, or indeed all the other poets and authors of theogonies, would they have written better on this subject matter."[23] Here Tzetzes does not just display a strong authorial presence but explicitly rivals the ancient author. Clearly, in a genre in which translation and imitation can quickly lead to comparison with the ancient author, he goes further than he does in a commentary. Even 'vain' Tzetzes has a sense of the com-

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[21] A second sustained example: the *Iliad* 1 commentary begins with a critical review of previous scholarship on the topic, culminating in ἡμεῖς δέ.

[22] *Theogony*: Bekker (1840); *Iliad* allegories: Boissonade (1851); *Odyssey* allegories: Hunger (1955) and (1956); *Carmina Iliaca*: Bekker (1816).

[23] Compare the introductory passage of the *Iliad* allegories, ll. 480–4.

plex status of commentaries—different though this sense may be from that of readers today.

3. *Atomization*

After the 'where' of the layout and the 'who' of the authorial presence, it is time to ask how Tzetzes comments on ancient literature. I will begin with a characteristic mode of many commentaries, Tzetzes' included, which has been repeatedly discussed in recent years: so-called 'atomization' or 'morselization.' The terms refer to the broken-up nature of the commentary: individual notes on individual lemmata.

As critics have pointed out,[24] atomization determines the way commentaries interpret texts. The organization by lemmata can favor the selection of certain kinds of material: material which clearly refers to one particular lemma, rather than that which is more general. It is harder for a commentator than for the author of a monograph to keep sight of the text as a whole and to develop sustained arguments. The danger is that an overall interpretation and approach is left to emerge by itself from the total of individual notes. Therefore, atomization is sometimes seen as one of the central challenges to commentators and their readers. What makes it relevant here are the obvious implications it has for the question of whether commentaries are texts in their own right. If all that a commentary does is interpret individual lemmata of a text, one might argue, the only thing that holds it together is the ancient text itself. Atomization not only fragments the ancient text, it does the same to the commentary itself: compared to a monograph, an atomized commentary is not so much one text as a plethora of texts. The point is neatly made by the plural term 'scholia': sequences of individual notes. The commentary appears subordinate to the ancient text to the point of not being a text any more. In its attempt to serve the ancient text, with whatever success, it gives up much of its status as a text itself.

Now, there are various ways of responding to this. Chris Kraus (above, 15) indicates one of them when she connects arguments about the effects of atomization to the notion of textual wholeness. The

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[24] Most (1985) 36–8; Ma (1994) 76; Goldhill (1999) 411–18; Kraus (above) 10–16; and Gibson (below) 354–5.

ideal of the coherent, unfragmented text, although by no means forgotten, is today regarded with much suspicion. Thus she suggests that the fragmentation of the text into lemmata can be productive in so far as it makes readers think about their notion of what a text is. A second kind of response would point to the different needs of different readers; not everybody reads a commentary from cover to cover. Atomization helps those readers who want information on one particular passage or a single word in a text. My focus on Tzetzes suggests a third kind of response, concentrating on the aspects of continuity which are clearly there, despite atomization.

To begin with, I will carry on with the question of terminology. Modern scholarship, including this article, varies between the terms 'scholia' and 'commentary,' not always using clear criteria to distinguish between the two. Consciously or unconsciously, this wavering replicates the usage of Tzetzes and other Byzantine scholars. On the one hand, both Tzetzes and Eustathius use terms like σχόλια or σχολιαστής.[25] Moreover, some of Tzetzes' commentaries (or collections of scholia) carry the title σχόλια in numerous manuscripts. For instance, one finds: Ἰσαακίου τοῦ Τζέτζου σχόλια εἰς Λυκόφρονα and σχόλια εἰς τὰ τοῦ Ὀππιανοῦ Ἁλιευτικὰ ὑπὸ Τζέτζου καὶ ἑτέρων. On the other hand, there is the term ἐξήγησις: Ἰωάννου γραμματικοῦ τοῦ Τζέτζου ἐξήγησις τῆς βίβλου τῶν Ἔργων καὶ Ἡμερῶν Ἡσιόδου, ἐξήγησις Ἰωάννου γραμματικοῦ τοῦ Τζέτζου εἰς τὴν Ὁμήρου Ἰλιάδα and τοῦ σοφωτάτου Τζέτζου ἐξήγησις εἰς τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην.[26] As has already become clear in the preceding pages, like σχόλια, the term ἐξήγησις appears in the body of the commentaries. The first couple of pages in Bachmann's edition of the *Iliad* 1 commentary alone have this term or the related verb no fewer than five times. And when Tzetzes refers to his commentaries in his letters, ἐξήγησις makes various further appearances (42, 56, 79).

[25] See the indices to Positano et al. (1960–64) and to van der Valk (1971–87). It is conspicuous, though, that in both Tzetzes and Eustathius these terms usually refer to the old scholia or, at least, to other scholars' scholia. Antiquity, too, has singular (in particular ὑπόμνημα, but also ἐξήγησις and others) and plural (in particular σχόλια) terms. There is no comprehensive study of their usage, but see Bömer (1953), Pfeiffer (1968) index s. vv., and Zuntz (1975) 63–8, and n.32 below.

[26] One example for each title: Lycophron: Neap. II D 4 (there is a debate over which of the brothers Tzetzes wrote this work: n.1); Oppian: Monacensis gr. 134; Hesiod: Ambr. gr. C222; Homer Cambridge Trinity R 16.33; Aristophanes: Vat. gr. Urbin. 141.

ἐξήγησις has a wide range of meanings—'explanation,' 'translation,' 'narration,' 'interpretation of an individual passage'[27]—and it is not easy to determine its precise nuance in Tzetzes. Yet the important point here is that, unlike σχόλια, it is used in the singular when it refers to a commentary. The regular use of this term in and for certain commentaries by Tzetzes suggests that these commentaries were perceived not just as sets of individual notes but also as continuous texts.

Furthermore, the notion of 'atomization' does injustice to the origin of Tzetzes' commentaries. Throughout, he makes it clear that he is a schoolmaster writing for the benefit of his students. However, before the invention of the printing-press, students were dictated textbooks much more often than they would buy a copy.[28] The scholion on the plagiarizing jackdaw provides an example of this practice: the student had noted down Tzetzes' lectures. At least originally, Tzetzes' comments on individual lemmata were held together by more or less continuous oral delivery. It is more than likely that he made changes before circulating the written version and that the written version will regularly have been consulted on individual points, but the origin in dictation is likely to have gone some way towards granting Tzetzes' commentaries the status of continuous texts, despite lemmatization.[29]

The obvious question that arises is how much there is left in the text of the commentaries reflecting this status. Everybody familiar with modern classical commentaries can think of ways in which the adverse effects of atomization can be limited (although this fact is sometimes ignored by critics attacking commentaries for atomizing interpretation; cf. Hunter [above] 101–2). Introductions, headnotes, and cross-references are perhaps the most important tools for making commentaries more than sequences of notes on individual lemmata. A look at Tzetzes will show that, at least sometimes, he takes measures similar to those of his modern successors.

Following the practice of medieval scribes, who often place general material before the scholia (e.g., the Ambrosianus discussed

[27] Apart from the lexica: Pfeiffer (1968) index s.v., Markschies (1999) 71–73.

[28] On the scarcity of books in twelfth-century Byzantium see Magdalino (1993) 323–5.

[29] For oral delivery of Tzetzes' commentaries, see also Gaisford (1823) 157 (Hesiod), and Positano et al. (1960–64) 3.952–4 (Aristophanes); cf. von Staden (above) 129, 132–4.

above), he provides introductions to his commentaries. In these introductions he gives his readers various kinds of information about the author and the work in question. Like modern commentators, he is clearly eager to prepare his readers for the lemmatized notes that follow. Of particular interest, if one looks for elements of continuity, is the way some of the introductions almost blend into the beginning of the commentary proper. The commentary on *Iliad* 1 is a good example. Tzetzes begins to round off the introduction on p. 774.7–11 Bachmann:

> Having traversed the courts and the door-way around the golden Homeric chambers and having gone past the pillars <of the roof?> and past Calliope herself, let us, too, now inquire first of all into the much-aired topic of why the poet began to narrate the battle by starting from the end.

Soon this question leads to another one: why did Homer start ἀπὸ τῆς μήνιδος (1.16)? A relatively long discussion follows, in which various reasons are given for Homer's choice of beginning. In the old scholia this sort of question is discussed under the first lemma (μῆνιν ἄειδε). Tzetzes (or a source) realizes that this discussion, while more specifically relating to the opening of *Iliad* 1 than the other topics covered in the introduction, gives it a space between the introduction and the first lemma, thus providing a gradual transition.

Moving into the lemmatized section of the commentary, one finds that Tzetzes sometimes gives a degree of continuity to what could be a set of unconnected notes. A group of passages concerning allegory in *Iliad* 1 will serve as an example. Allegory is a popular interpretative tool in Byzantium, used partly (though not only) to make ancient texts more palatable to a Christian readership.[30] Tzetzes is one of its main exponents. Unsurprisingly, the topic is prominent throughout the *Iliad* commentary. Already near the beginning of the introduction (748.7–11 Bachmann) Tzetzes announces that he will give allegorical readings of Homeric gods "in order to refute those who say that Homer talks about the gods in a mythical sort of way, showing that the suspicions they had are unworthy of his divine mind." Next, very early on in the commentary proper, in the long

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[30] For allegorical interpretation in Byzantium see Hunger (1954) and Cesaretti (1991).

note on θεά in line 1, he expands on this (776.5–781.20), setting out some of the principles and virtues of allegorical interpretation necessary for the interpretation of θεά. For instance, he argues that much ancient poetry is allegorical, and he explains the tripartite division, found elsewhere in Tzetzes and other writers,[31] into στοιχειακῶς (physical, interpreting gods as aspects of the natural world such as 'air' or 'sun'), ψυχικῶς (psychological, interpreting gods as emotions, functions and forces such as 'reason' or 'anger') and πραγματικῶς (historical, interpreting gods as humans). Once he has given these introductory explanations, he can be briefer when the subject comes up again. One example will make the point: in l. 9 the phrase Λητοῦς καὶ Διὸς υἱός calls for an allegorical reading. In the course of a (much shorter) note he says (788.36–9): "Whatever somebody wants, he will find in Leto. This I know well, that for the most part the name of each god is understood in three ways, στοιχειακῶς, πραγματικῶς, and ψυχικῶς, as I also have already said before," and then gives examples of all three kinds of allegorical interpretations of Leto. Knowledge gained in previous lessons or pages is presupposed. It appears that although Tzetzes' commentary is 'atomized' and miscellaneous, there is at least some sense of continuity. What Heinrich von Staden says about Galen, and what is true for some modern commentators (and of course for Homer and Hesiod themselves), is true also for Tzetzes: at times he seems to be able to give his texts a 'plot.'[32]

4. *The Text as Starting-Point*

The question of how Tzetzes comments on ancient literature reaches of course well beyond 'atomization.' Atomization is concerned with the connection, or lack of connection, between the individual unit and the whole. I have said nothing so far about the way Tzetzes

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[31] Hunger (1954) 46–52.

[32] See von Staden (above) 118–21. Some of the features described in this section are shared by Eustathius, but there are differences: although Eustathius has a long introduction, although he uses cross-references, and although he says that his work may be read with or without the text of the *Iliad* at hand (3.26–28 van der Valk), he stresses that it is not a continuous work, and explicitly rejects the title ἐξήγησις, speaking instead of παρεκβολαί, a title which points to the miscellaneous nature of the work (3.28–4.3).

treats the individual pieces of text in his individual notes. Many questions could be discussed. Does he concentrate on certain issues? Does he, in any sense of the word, 'force' the text? Does he like parallels? Obviously, the material cannot all be examined with the attention it deserves in the remainder of this chapter. What I will do instead is pick out one aspect of Tzetzes' methodology which is not only prominent throughout his commentaries but also shows Tzetzes once more not just serving the ancient text: his habit of not confining himself to elucidating the phrase in question and instead using the lemma as a starting-point for little treatises on various topics.

Like atomization, this topic is familiar. Tzetzes is not alone in his habit. Richard Hunter ([above] 105) warns against the tendency of commentators to say everything there is to be said on some aspect of the ancient world; Roy Gibson ([below] 352–3) discusses the danger of using the phrase 'cf. e.g.' in order to compile long lists of more or less relevant parallels which can distract from the understanding of the text; John Vallance speaks of the commentary as a 'cabinet of curiosities'; Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht suggests that the commentator's task of providing necessary knowledge to a variety of readers leads to an idea of fullness and exuberance.[33] One important point here is that both commentators and their readers sometimes treat commentaries as useful not just to those trying to understand the text that is commented upon. Fraenkel's *Agamemnon* or Headlam's Herodas have become sources of information on matters that reach far beyond the works in question. Closely related is the sense, familiar to every user of commentaries, that the commentator has lost sight of the ancient text, providing what appears to be superfluous or irrelevant material. The issue in the context of this article is not so much whether or not the material offered in the commentary is relevant to the text in question; this is a question which depends partly on what the user wants. Rather, I am interested in the fact that material is sometimes presented in discussions that can be read, perhaps even are best read, without the ancient text in mind. It is as though the commentators got their own back. Yes, they follow the words dictated by the ancient author, rather than conceiving their own plot as they like it; but within these constraints they declare their independence. Notes begin to stand on their own feet, able to

[33] Vallance (1999) 224, Gumbrecht (1999) 446–8.

function without the ancient text. The comment does no longer just comment *on* something. It gains a larger or smaller degree of independence, just like the ancient text itself, or like a treatise.

What then about Tzetzes? Anybody who reads Eustathius' statement that his *Iliad* commentary may be consulted with or without a text of the *Iliad*[34] may already suspect that Byzantine commentators (like some ancient ones) not only go further in this respect than even the most excessive of their modern successors but, which is perhaps more interesting, that they are happy to draw attention to this. Another look at the *Iliad* 1 commentary confirms this suspicion.

Tzetzes' note on ἱλασσάμενοι (*Iliad* 1.100: 13.6–9 Lolos) runs as follows: "participle passive and middle aorist first person nominative plural; ἱλῶ, the future is ἱλάσω, the aorist ἵλασα, the participle ἱλασσάμενος, Aeolic doubling of the σ; plural: ἱλασσάμενοι." The note is by no means irrelevant; it does give the reader help in understanding the text. But it does so in a rather long-winded way. The central part of it is taken up by a list of some of the parts of ἱλῶ. This part stands on its own feet and is fully transferable to other contexts. The point is driven home by a comparison with the following text: "ἱλασσάμενοι: participle passive and middle aorist first person nominative plural; this is ἱλῶ, ἱλᾷς and the future is ἱλάσω, the aorist ἵλασα, the middle ἱλασάμην, the participle ἱλασσάμενοι, with doubling of the σ." The resemblance to Tzetzes is close. However, this text is taken not from a commentary but from a collection of epimerisms.[35] Literally 'divisions,' epimerisms are sequences of short notes, each of which takes a word as starting-point for setting out aspects of accidence, accentuation, etymology, breathing, semantics, and similar matters.[36] The words they take as their starting-point are either alphabetically arranged (e.g., all starting with the letter α) or are taken in sequence from a well-known text (e.g., *Iliad* 1, as in this case, or a Psalm). Epimerisms go back to antiquity, but were particularly popular in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and were memorized as self-contained texts. Thus, the similarity of Tzetzes' note to an epimerism makes it obvious that the *Iliad* is the starting-point for a free-standing mini-treatise on parts of verbs. Tzetzes does

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[34] Above, n.32.

[35] 1.100A Dyck.

[36] In general see the introduction of Dyck (1983) and Robins (1993) 125–48.

two things at a time: explain the *Iliad* and use the *Iliad* as a prompt to talk about subjects of his own choosing.

Many more examples could be given, including not just basic information on grammar, but also ethical instruction, mythological material, lives of the ancient authors in question, and so on. Like Eustathius, it might seem, Tzetzes does not feel that all he should do is provide the necessary information for understanding the text. More telling in this respect than a wealth of further examples is the introductory passage to his notes on Oppian's didactic poem about fishing, the *Halieutica*.[37] Like the introduction to *Iliad* 1, it is composed in verse, in this case in the Byzantine twelve-syllable line:

χρησάμενος, παῖ, τῷ λογισμοῦ δικτύῳ
ἐξ Ὀππιανοῦ τοῦ βυθοῦ τῶν χαρίτων
ἄγραν λόγων πάγκαλον ἀνείλκυσά σοι,
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἵνα μὴ πάθῃς ἀηδίαν,
λαμπρῶς κατεσκεύασα τὴν πανδαισίαν.
ἐκ νουθετημάτων γὰρ ἀρτυμάτων
ἄνωθεν αὐτὴν καταπάττων σοι φέρω.

My son, using the net of my brain, I pulled up from the depth of Oppian's pleasures, a very beautiful catch of words for you. In order to spare you an unpleasant taste, I splendidly prepared the feast. Sprinkling it from above with advice as though with spices, I serve it up for you.

Tzetzes adapts his metaphors to the subject matter of the *Halieutica*: he pulls up a catch from the depth. The catch is a catch of λόγοι, and—this is the important point—it is served up for the reader's or audience's pleasure. There is no talk of explaining Oppian. Rather, Oppian is the source for the feast of words that Tzetzes prepares.

Tzetzes does not talk quite like this elsewhere, and it is obvious that one should allow for considerable variation between his various commentaries. In the introduction to the commentary on *Iliad* 1, quoted above, he sees it as his task to provide a ἑρμήϊον, an 'interpretation' or 'translation'; and it should be stressed that, like his modern successors, he rarely loses sight of this task. Even so, the introduction to the Oppian commentary makes a point that is generally valid. The tendency to use the text as a starting-point for more is not

[37] Taken from Colonna (1963). We have very little material on Oppian by Tzetzes. It is uncertain whether he wrote a full, now lost, commentary; see Colonna.

unique to modern commentaries. Medieval commentaries do it too (and a comparable case can be made for antiquity).[38] What is more, like Eustathius, Tzetzes is happy to advertise that he is writing notes which stand on their own feet. In the preface to his *Agamemnon* commentary, Fraenkel defends sections that "may at first sight look like mere digressions," arguing, first, that at least their starting-point, "and in most cases a great deal more," forms an important part of the argument and, secondly, that readers will find it easier to remember where they have read a particular note if it was in a commentary than if it was in a journal.[39] This shows up a contrast. Unlike Fraenkel, Tzetzes felt no need to defend or to explain. Clearly, to him the ancient work is sometimes there for the commentary as much as the commentary is there for the ancient work.

5. *Conclusion: Tzetzes in his Context*

It is time to look back and draw some conclusions. It should have become clear that Tzetzes had to arrange himself in the same potentially uncomfortable position between faceless servant of the ancient author and self-confident author of a new text in which modern commentators find themselves. He, too, had to live with the ambivalent status of commentaries. As a result, he has provided a historical dimension for our thinking about classical commentaries. Tzetzes reminds us of the fact that many of our ideas about commentaries go back a long way. As authors and users of commentaries, we stand in a tradition which inevitably shapes our notions of what a commentary does and how it relates to the text. Whether we like it or not, this is something to remember when we think about what is good about classical commentaries and what changes we would like to see. At the same time Tzetzes shows how much variation there is in this tradition. When he writes notes on notes, aggressively promotes his own name in his commentary and unashamedly advertises what many readers today would call digressions, then it is obvious that much has changed over time; and although some of these changes as such may seem trivial, they too are tied up with basic attitudes

[38] See for instance Vallance (1999).
[39] Fraenkel (1950) 1.ix–x, also cited by Gibson (below) 344.

to commenting on ancient texts. Timeless generalizations about commentaries are as dangerous as they are about other genres. Commentaries, too, are products of personal idiosyncrasies and are products of their time.

On this last point I wish to expand in the remaining pages.[40] So far I have treated Tzetzes' commentaries as texts that perhaps stand in a tradition—somewhere between Aristarchus and Fraenkel—but not as texts that have any grounding in the particular environment in which they were composed. For this I offer two excuses. First, the focus of this volume is diachronically on the classical commentary; it does not concentrate on any period. Secondly, a thorough synchronic account would demand the expertise of a Byzantinist, not a classicist. None the less, in the hope of understanding better those aspects that distinguish Tzetzes' commentaries from commentaries today, the effort should be made, I think, to look at the context in which they were written. One thing that will become clear is that for some of what might be regarded as his worst excesses, context can provide at least partial explanations.

First, I have already alluded to Tzetzes the schoolmaster. Commentaries for school use of course go back to antiquity, and the classroom is still a place where commentaries are employed frequently. Various ancient texts were studied in Byzantine schools.[41] Homer was particularly popular.[42] He was regarded as useful both in teaching the elementary skills of reading and writing, and in the more advanced subjects, such as rhetoric, philosophy, music, or astronomy.

This school context needs to be kept in mind when discussing Tzetzes' work. It presented Tzetzes with various kinds of challenges. Apart from practical problems such as the laziness of his students which he complains about in his letters (e.g., 22, 79), the most significant constraint was probably the need for low-level instruction. Although notes like those on allegory show that Tzetzes had some quite advanced students, he also provides basic help with the grammar of ancient Greek. This may point to a compilation of various kinds of teaching material into his commentaries, but it also reflects

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[40] The influence of the historical context on commentaries is stressed also by Goldhill (1999).

[41] On Byzantine schools see: Fuchs (1926), Lemerle (1971) 242–66, Vasilikopoulou-Ioannidou (1971) 53–70, Konstantinides (1982), Webb (1994), Browning (1997).

[42] Browning (1992) 136–40.

mixed-ability classes; and, generally speaking, it is likely that the importance of elementary teaching even at a higher level increased in an age in which the gap widened between the vernacular language and the learned discourse which was based on classical Greek (note the epimerisms). It is obvious that Tzetzes' situation cannot be compared to that of the scholars at the Hellenistic Museum. When he writes notes that can stand on their own feet, he partly does what commentators of all ages do, but partly he reflects the specific conditions under which he composes his notes. Again and again we find him (and indeed Eustathius) talking about his commentaries being 'useful.' Much more than in scholarly discourse today, the term had concrete implications: useful for his pupils who needed to learn all sorts of things, and had few books; useful as a text book. Tzetzes' lectures, and written commentaries, had to be practical. It was almost inevitable that the ancient text was used as a starting-point for his explanations.

Looking beyond the walls of the classroom, one needs to find a place for Tzetzes in Byzantine society and literary culture in general. Byzantinists, in particular Robert Browning,[43] have studied the attitude with which Byzantium looked at Homer, and ancient authors in general. Ancient literature was omnipresent. It was not just to be written out and memorized in schools, but appeared in countless new guises. As just mentioned, it gave Byzantium the language imitated in much educated discourse; it also served as subject matter for oratorical exercises; it was alluded to in various forms of Byzantine literature; it was summarized; and it was retold in new versions. Achilles even became a saint and a hero of a vernacular epic. One aspect of this omnipresence which is particularly important here is the potential that ancient literature kept throughout the Byzantine era of suffusing and even spawning new literary production. A good example is the *Christus patiens* (date uncertain):[44] it tells the story of

[43] Browning (1975) and Browning (1992). Also see Hunger (1969–70) and, for the twelfth century in particular, Vasilikopoulou-Ioannidou (1971), and Macrides and Magdalino (1992). Another body of work relevant here is the scholarship of the last thirty years on the medieval West, which tries to move the focus from authors to readers, exploring ways in which medieval reading was not passive but led to new creation. See Zumthor (1972) for a highly influential representative; specifically on commentary see Dagenais (1994), Gladigow (1995), and Huber (1999).

[44] In the most recent edition it is attributed to Gregory of Nazianzus: Tuilier (1969). Such centos are found already in the second century AD, and were much practiced in Byzantium: Hunger (1978) 98–107 and Usher (1998).

the Passion, with a third of its verses taken from Euripides and other ancient poets. The Messenger in the *Bacchae* becomes the angel who announces that Christ has risen, and Medea turns into Mary. Although old, ancient literature was felt to be ready and relevant enough to invite responses and new uses.

What I want to suggest is that this sense among Byzantine writers (and no doubt readers), that the ancient material is relevant and available for re-use, lessened what to us is the large difference between on the one hand commentary and on the other new versions, adaptations or—in the case of holy texts—sermons. The Byzantine (and indeed ancient) commentator, I would argue, reacts to, works with, and builds on, as much as he comments on, texts. If this is true, it provides a further explanation for Tzetzes' habit of treating his commentaries as free-standing new texts. When he goes further than modern commentators in using the lemma as a mere starting-point for more, perhaps he does so because in his cultural surroundings the ancient text is not just something to be explained but also ready source material for something new. The new text in his case is nothing like the Passion story of the *Christus patiens*; it consists of verb forms, ethical exhortation, allegorical interpretation, and the like, much of the material and even phrasing taken from other sources (although texts like his *Theogony* show that he can go further), but new it is in so far as it does not simply serve the old text. Perhaps more than anything else, this approach to the ancient text provides an instructive comparison to our own assumptions because it suggests that the elements in Tzetzes' (and indeed Eustathius') commentaries that seem alien to us today stem partly from an increased distance from the ancient text. Most criteria used in the scholarly interpretation of classical texts today are based on the perception that the ancient text is far away and not really 'ours.' History, for instance, or form are more easily discerned from afar. Byzantine writers of the twelfth century did not simply take the opposite view. They, too, knew that Homer had died a long time ago. But much more than we today, they felt that the gap could sometimes be bridged, and felt that the ancient material was still alive. When Tzetzes uses Oppian as the fishing ground to find food for his readers he is a man of his time. Probably nothing separates Tzetzes further from commentators today.

Finally, while this sort of attitude to the past is attested, with some variation, for many of the over 1000 years of the Byzantine empire,

there are also specifically twelfth-century phenomena which are relevant to the kind of commentary Tzetzes wrote. In particular, they will throw some more light on his nervous self-advertisement which, after all, is not shared by all other Byzantine commentators, many of whom did not choose or manage even to attach their names to their works.

Recent accounts of Byzantine culture in the twelfth century have argued against the conventional picture of repression and decline.[45] In the more varied and dynamic picture that they paint, this period appears in certain respects as a good time for literary and scholarly activity. Even in the West, Byzantium was acknowledged as a center of learning.[46] Interest in the Greek past increased—only in the mid-twelfth century did the Byzantines begin to call themselves 'Hellenes.' Scholarship was thriving in various disciplines. Education was considered an important asset. The romance or novel was revived, rhetoric flourished, production in the vernacular became important. It was a time of new literary activity and new self-confidence among scholars. Therefore, it is probably not an accident that only at the end of the eleventh and in particular in the twelfth century do scholars like Psellus, Eustathius, and Tzetzes show a "new freedom in the handling of traditional material"[47] in their works on Homer, and that the names of Homeric commentators get preserved with the commentaries. In this context, Tzetzes' love for polemics and his liberal use of his own name and autobiographical material is still excessive and idiosyncratic (compare the more subdued Eustathius) but, as various scholars have pointed out, it does not look completely out of place.[48]

Yet life was not all roses for the intellectuals in the reign of Manuel. One should not forget that the word 'repression' may be found somewhere in almost every account of the twelfth century. Even though nothing like the proceedings against the philosopher John Italos in the late eleventh century seem to have occurred in the twelfth, the scarcity of writings in risky genres like philosophy suggests that there must have been certain limits to the activity of the *literati*. Probably

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[45] Kazhdan and Epstein (1985), Magdalino (1993).
[46] Kazhdan and Epstein (1985) 126–9.
[47] Browning (1975) 25. Cf. Kazhdan and Epstein (1985) 134.
[48] Garzya (1973), Magdalino (1993) 401–404. By contrast, for Tzetzes as an extreme case, see Jeffreys (1974) 148–50.

the dominant genre of the time was display oratory, and for a reason. Perhaps more than previous dynasties, the Comnenians had a charmed circle of faithful relatives and friends around themselves. Personal relationships with persons in high places were necessary in order to establish oneself. Like others, intellectuals had to jockey for position in order to make a living. One might speculate that the noticeable penchant for polemics and for using one's own name among some scholars of the time reflects not only the self-confidence of a profession but also the nervous self-advertisement of individuals.

Tzetzes was not a typical courtier; he always remained on the fringe. Only his maternal grandmother was highborn, his paternal grandfather was uneducated;[49] unlike Eustathius, he never seems to have held a state or church post, but always remained a private teacher; he even complains about having to sell his books in order to survive.[50] Much of his literary production has to be imagined at a certain remove from court and church. However, not only might one imagine that the uncertainty of this situation is not a remedy against jealousy or nervousness, but Tzetzes' writings show that he, too, tried to maintain relations with various magnates. Early in his life he had a patron in the royal Isaac Komnenos, before he was dismissed in disgrace.[51] Later he wrote letters (51, 53, 54, 70, 79) to the abbot of the Pankrator monastery, in which he had a cell for a while—itself a sign of patronage. He dedicated his *Theogony* to Irene, the wife of Manuel's elder brother Andronikos Komnenos, and the first part of the *Iliad* allegories to another Irene, the former Bertha von Sulzbach, Manuel's first wife. When she did not reciprocate, he dedicated the second part to Konstantinos Kotertzes.[52] Tzetzes was active in many different genres and wrote very different sorts of works,[53] but much of his literary production was shaped by the need to make money and to establish himself. Browning calls him "one of the first men in European society to live by his pen."[54] Perhaps

[49] On Tztezes' family see Wendel (1948) 1960.
[50] *Iliad* 1 commentary, 753.30–6 Bachmann.
[51] *Carmina Iliaca* 31.137–56 Bekker.
[52] *Theogony*: Bekker (1840) 147. *Iliad* allegories: see the prologues to I and XV, pp. 1–2 and 192 Boissonade. See Wendel (1949) 1963–5 for further relations with magnates.
[53] Cesaretti (1991) repeatedly stresses the different contexts of the allegories and the *Iliad* 1 commentary, which also affect the way Tzetzes treats his material.
[54] Browning (1975a) 26.

these circumstances should make one more forgiving when he is so anxious to advertise himself. Quite possibly he was vain and arrogant, and it may well be that he was quarrelsome not only compared to commentators today, but even by the standards of his age. Yet even so, anybody who complains about the pressures that rest on present-day academics should have at least a little sympathy for John Tzetzes.[55]

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8. JUAN LUIS DE LA CERDA AND THE PREDICAMENT OF COMMENTARY

Andrew Laird

What should be the appropriate content—or form—for a commentary on a classical author?[1] The issue will be approached here by recourse to the once highly influential volumes of commentary on the works of Virgil, produced by the Spanish Jesuit scholar Juan Luis De La Cerda between 1608 and 1642. La Cerda adopted a pluralistic approach to his subject. His magisterial work displays a refined sense of Virgil's role in Augustan society and in the Greco-Roman literary tradition. At the same time La Cerda's commentary highlights the importance of its subject in his own time: for education and intellectual exploration in various fields (science, language, ethnography), as well as for poetic and literary innovation. La Cerda combines erudite antiquarianism with occasional displays of another kind of exegesis—contemporary cultural and ideological commentary. His project is markedly different from those of most nineteenth- and twentieth-century commentators on Greek and Latin texts. For all their claims to be comprehensive, more recent classical commentators have tended to isolate their fields of expertise from broader currents of thought and discovery.[2]

The discussion to follow will begin with a conventional narrative of the transition from renaissance to modern scholarship, with particular emphasis on the production of commentary. Details of La Cerda's life and work will precede a survey of the form of his commentary. An account of La Cerda's principles and examples of his actual practices in his exposition of Virgil will then be followed by a closing discussion of aspects of his work which could inspire or inform the commentary today. Commentators could seek to involve their work more directly with the contemporary cultural moment—

[1] The issues are raised in parts of Most (1999). Several individual contributions to that volume will be cited below.

[2] On commentators' claims to comprehensiveness, see de Jong (above) on Homer, also Goldhill (1999) and Gumbrecht (1999).

from which the study of antiquity and its texts at present seems so far removed.

I. *The Commentary from Renaissance to Modern Scholarship*

The academic study of Greco-Roman antiquity, as it is generally conceived today in Europe and North America, is credited to the Germans.[3] The perceived contrast between that 'scientific' (*wissenschaftlich*) model of German scholarship and the earlier achievement of Renaissance humanism can be straightforwardly presented. The humanists, perhaps best symbolized by Petrarch, fused the study of Greek and Roman literature and culture with artistic creation and progress in their own time. The study of antiquity consisted of the study of texts and of literature written in Latin and Greek. The purpose of that study was partly the restoration and exegesis of ancient authors, but it was also the *emulation* of those authors. In both respects commentaries played an important part: ancient texts provided the instruments as well as the objects of thought, eloquent speech, and writing, in all kinds of spheres. The humanist legacy of emulation, though diminished, has endured in certain guises: for instance university curricula in Classics have continued to attach importance to prose and verse composition and to reading of the orators.

The Germanic tradition on the other hand is characterized by its emphasis on the *reconstruction* of antiquity. Central to this reconstruction was the role of *Realien*. As many facts as possible had to be established about ancient culture, institutions, artifacts, and physical evidence in order to provide a firm historical background for the study of Greek and Roman civilization—a study which itself became primarily historical in approach. In this context, the form of the commentary, though far from new, came to enjoy a new prestige.[4]

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[3] The term *Altertumswissenschaft* was coined by Friedrich August Wolf, author of the influential *Prolegomena ad Homerum*, published in 1795. Wolf later used this neologism to christen the periodical he founded in 1807, *Museum der Altertumswissenschaft*; see Pfeiffer (1976) 176. Compare Sandys (1908) 60: "[Wolf] raised that study to the rank of a single comprehensive and independent science, and thus deserved to be reverently regarded by posterity as the eponymous hero of all the long line of later scholars." On emulating ancient authors see also Hunter (above).

[4] Budelmann and von Staden (both above) show that modern commentaries share some interesting and important continuities with ancient and medieval commentaries and scholia.

Its positivist techniques became a crucial cornerstone in the foundation of this new 'science' of the ancient world.

Histories of ideas inevitably involve misleading generalizations and omissions: the fact that we still operate with the deficient periodization and conception of the 'Renaissance' (popularized by Burckhardt) itself illustrates this.[5] And the standard narrative I have just presented—of an evolutionary trajectory from the Italian humanist tradition to the birth of modern scholarship at the close of Weimar—is no exception. The account to follow of Juan Luis De La Cerda's Virgilian commentary does something to undermine that standard narrative.[6] La Cerda was not alone in anticipating the pursuits that were styled as 'scientific' by nineteenth-century German scholars: Joseph Justus Scaliger ('the younger,' 1540–1609) has also been credited with anticipating Wolf's conception of *Altertumswissenschaft*.[7] In his *Thesaurus temporum* of 1606, Scaliger used contemporary astronomical knowledge to provide a basis for his historical chronology of antiquity.[8] One could hardly get more scientific than that—and this sort of aspiration is still reflected in recent classical commentary.[9]

But a second piece of information is more important for this revisionist agenda. Historians of scholarship now give some credit for the formation of *Altertumswissenschaft* to Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729–1812) whose lectures Wolf attended in Göttingen.[10] Heyne produced an edition with commentary on Virgil (1767–75). The revised edition by G. P. E. Wagner has been frequently reprinted, most recently in 1968. This acknowledges, and draws in places, from, the commentary

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[5] Burckhardt (1955).

[6] In a comparable way, the history of the phenomenon of the footnote in Grafton (1997) threatens the credit generally given to the nineteenth-century historian Ranke for inventing the scientific history via primary sources—and the use of the footnote.

[7] Pfeiffer (1976) 118 notes "his [the younger Scaliger's] view was that the history of the ancient world had to be known as a whole, if at all. With his knowledge of all ancient languages, classical and Oriental, as well as of ancient history, Oriental, Greek, Roman, and Christian, he undertook to reconstruct all the chronological systems of the ancient world."

[8] Pfeiffer (1976) 117, cf. Pfeiffer (1968) 163.

[9] E.g., Austin (1977) 109 on *Aeneid* 6.239ff.: "There is no geological evidence that Avernus was mephitic in antiquity, and it is inconceivable that so large an area could have been rendered dangerous to wildlife. . . . Modern commentators have made a similar assumption [to V.], that in antiquity, Avernus teemed with hot water and mephitic fumes. On the time-scale of modern geology many millennia must be reckoned with, and there is no evidence that volcanic activity has generally declined since antiquity in the Campi Phlegraei."

[10] Pfeiffer (1976) 173; Silk and Stern (1981) 381 n.13; Schindel (1990).

of La Cerda.[11] A *variorum* edition of Heyne's Virgil with notes of Servius and La Cerda, conjoined by Lemaire, was published in London in 1819. So it is in fact possible to trace a more direct lineage for the methods of German commentary to the baroque period in Spain. In many respects, Juan Luis de la Cerda can be shown to anticipate the practices of later commentators. Although his vast commentary on Virgil is obviously rooted in the conventions of Renaissance humanism, it exhibits some important departures and innovations.

II. *La Cerda's Life and Works*

Information and literature on the life and work of La Cerda is not abundant, although recent studies are beginning to cover some important ground.[12] Juan Luis (or *Joannes Ludovicus*) de la Cerda was probably born in 1558, son of Don Francisco and Geronyma de Zarati and joined the Company of Jesus at the age of 16, in 1574. In 1583 he became Professor of Grammar, moving to Murcia, and then to Oropesa in 1593 before becoming Professor of Poetry, Rhetoric, and Greek in Madrid in 1597. The following year he adapted for student use Antonio de Nebrija's *Introducciones grammaticales* and Gaspard Sanctius' *Minerva.*[13] Encouraged by the Jesuit order to pursue his *métier* in eloquence, La Cerda was chosen in 1603 to perform the funerary oration for the Empress Maria Augusta, founder of the College of Madrid. In 1607 he obtained from the Reverend Father of Toledo the imprimatur for the first volume of his Virgil commentary—on the *Bucolics* and *Georgics.* This appeared in Madrid in 1608; the two subsequent tomes on the *Aeneid* were published in

[11] For example Heyne's famous Excursus 15 in Wagner (1830–41) 247–8 on *pictura* in *Aeneid* 1.465 bears comparison with La Cerda's discussion of *pictura* in Virgil generally in Cp. 5 of his *Elogia* in the Prolegomena to the first volume of the commentary. See also Laird (1996) 98–9. Heyne calls La Cerda's endeavors 'disertissimos, eruditissimos et luculentissimos' (Lemaire's edition Vol. VII, 493).

[12] The small anonymous entry on 'Cerda' in the *EV* and a larger entry on his more famous contemporary, the mannerist poet Góngora, yield only two items of secondary literature: Stevens (1931–2) (a biography which I cannot trace) and Stevens (1945). A primary source not apparently known to Stevens is Nicolás Antonio's *Biblioteca Hispana Nova* (Madrid 1783). See also Simón-Díaz (1944) and (1952–9) i, nos. 547–8; Caro (1955); Griffin (1979) 46–69 at 51; Lawrance (1994) 181–5.

[13] For the tradition of Spanish humanism, particularly in relation to Virgil, see Ijsewijn (1978).

1617. This work established La Cerda's reputation, and further editions followed.

The first and second volumes of another commentary—on Tertullian—appeared in 1624 and 1630. A manuscript of a third volume lingered in the library of the Jesuit College of Madrid, but may have gone up in smoke during the revolutionary upheaval of May 1931. Further books followed: a treatise on sacred eloquence, entitled *Adversaria sacra, quibus fax praefertur ad intelligentiam multorum scriptorum sacrorum* (Léon 1626); an annotated edition of Solomon's Psalms in Latin and Greek, and a work of ascetic literature, *De excellentia sacrorum Spirituum, in primis de Angeli Custodis ministerio* (1631), as well as steady contribution to the revision of the Dictionary of Ambrose Calepinus. La Cerda also wrote poetry: a single sonnet can be found in Volume 42 of the *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles.* In old age he received a personal greeting from Cardinal Barberini, the emissary of Pope Urban VIII at the court of Philip IV. In 1633 he was still preaching; he died ten years later at the age of 85.

III. *The Virgil Commentary*

The verdict of the *Enciclopedia Virgiliana* on La Cerda's commentary is accurate and appropriately commendatory:

> Minute linguistic, mythological and historical analysis and criticism of the works of Virgil, rich in reference to Greek and Latin sources, and consolidated by shrewd use of medieval and humanist exegesis; a work on which the modern tradition of exegesis is based, and which constituted, just as it should constitute, a constant point of reference for criticism of the text.[14]

If this work has been relatively neglected by modern classicists, it might partly be because of its sheer magnitude: Henry's *Aeneidea* may have suffered a similar fate for a similar reason.[15] La Cerda's first volume on the *Bucolics* and *Georgics* consists of 535 folio pages in two columns, a fifteen-page *Index*, along with 22 pages which provide

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[14] *EV* 740, s.v. 'Cerda, Juan-Luis de la'; in relation to commentary, see Codoñer and González Iglesisas (1994).

[15] Henry (1873–92). Recent Virgilian commentaries which have (explicitly) made use of La Cerda include Harrison (1991), Clausen (1994), Hardie (1994), and especially Horsfall (2000). See also Van Sickle (1995).

Prolegomena for the whole *oeuvre*. The second, devoted to the first six books of the *Aeneid*, has 743 folio pages of two columns; the third runs to 782 such pages with a twenty-four-page *Index Rerum et Auctorum* and (in the Cologne edition of 1643) a larger eighty-three-page concordance compiled by Antonius Maria Bassus of Cremona.[16] The material is densely presented in a small typeface, with names and works of ancient authors being customarily abbreviated. The total undertaking comes to little under three million words.

The scheme of the Prolegomena to the first volume of the Commentary (*P. VIRGILII MARONIS BVCOLICA ET GEORGICA*) can be set out easily. The certification of the 'Imprimatur,' by Ferdinand Lucero of the Toledo Society of Jesus, is succeeded by a long dedication. Two sets of epigraphic verses in honor of the commentator follow overleaf: 18 elegiac couplets by Gaspar Sanctius (a Jesuit humanist senior to La Cerda, and author of *Minerva*) and 45 hexameters by Andreas Schottus of Antwerp. Then comes an *Elenchus Auctorum Veterum* listing over 300 ancient authors. This enumerates major sources that modern Virgilian commentators would expect to cite: Apollonius, Callimachus, Ennius, Livius Andronicus, and scholia on Sophocles, Homer, Aristophanes, and others. However, minor or little known poets such as Lycophron or 'Orpheus' and rhetorical theorists such as Theon are also listed, as well as other authors now deemed less pertinent to Virgil such as Heliodorus and Philostratus. Early writers and commentators on the poet are also given here: Macrobius, Servius, Fulgentius, and John of Salisbury. There follows a *Syllabus* of more recent authors which provides 150 names of later commentators, editors and humanists: these include Casaubon, Domizio Calderini, Petrus Daniel, Erasmus, Petrarch, Politian, Pontano, Fracastoro, Sannazaro, Julius Caesar Scaliger, and Henricus Stephanus. It is worth bearing in mind that several other authors not given here are cited later by La Cerda in the commentary itself—among those are the Venerable Bede and Thomas More.

The lengthy *Elogia* of Virgil comprises seven chapters which occupy sixteen folio pages. At the end of the *Prooimium* to this eulogy, La Cerda lists another 87 authors as sources for his *laudes* including Apuleius, Ambrose, Augustine, Casaubon, Cicero, Jerome, Ovid,

[16] The editions described are in the Codrington Library of All Souls College, Oxford. I would like to thank Simon Swain and the Librarians of the Codrington for facilitating my access to them.

Propertius, Martial, Plato, the Plinys and the Senecas, Vegetius, and Velleius Paterculus. A great number of the those listed here have *not* been listed in the previous columns: Cornelius Gallus, Domitius Afer, Jovianus, St Isidore, Juvenal, and Vives are among the further famous names, as well as many who are not so famous. The chapters of the *Elogia* follow the standard convention of the humanist *accessus*. However, in the first chapter La Cerda explains that he eschews the customary *Vita* of the poet because the material is familiar and easily found elsewhere. The moral and educational benefits of reading Virgil are amplified in the second and third chapters. This might be compared to the affirmation of Virgil's curricular utility by Italian commentators such as Landino or by Politian in his *Manto*.[17] The remaining chapters of La Cerda's *Elogia* provide an overwhelming compendium of testimonia and critical verdicts on Virgil principally from ancient sources.

Virgil's quality as a rhetorician and orator is given particular emphasis in the third chapter of the *Elogia*. Testimonia are assembled in three subsections to demonstrate that the poet is near to Cicero, equal to Cicero, or else—and of course this is the decisive verdict—greater than Cicero. The high profile of eloquence in humanist culture in general is well known, and the imperative of *informare ad eloquentiam* was a mainstay of Jesuit education in particular. In such an environment, exegesis of an epic poem typically reflected the contemporary enthusiasm for rhetoric.[18] However, what is unusual—and Stevens observed this in 1945—is how little emphasis La Cerda gives to rhetorical instruction in the actual commentary. Poetry is its real preoccupation: if Virgil's example is to be imitated, it is to be in poetry rather than oratory. The attention given to rhetoric and eloquence here in Chapter 3 is really conventional: the homage paid to Cicero is in accordance with the expectations of the time. I think this observation has a larger implication for the *Elogia* in its entirety. In spite of the erudition displayed in these chapters, their sentiments are as generic as the form in which they are expressed.

The prefatory discourse hailing the reader comes *after* the *Elogia*. This further suggests that the preceding assemblage of material is

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[17] For the curricular significance of the organization of Politian's *Sylvae* as a whole, see Galande (1988) 24–70; for humanist commentary on Virgil prior to La Cerda, see Hardie (1976) as well as Grafton (1985).

[18] Stevens (1945) and Giard (1995).

less pertinent to La Cerda's own reading of Virgil: the conspicuously larger lettering of the notice may well be significant.[19] The notice to the reader amounts to a statement of method which is of clear programmatic importance, as it explains how the commentator's observations are divided into *Argumenta*, *Explicationes*, and *Notae*, distinguishing the functions of each. Some aspects of the *Ad Lectorem* will be discussed in the following section.

IV. *Principles and Methods in the Commentary*

La Cerda's methods of commentary anticipate the modern notion of scholarship as hermeneutic reconstruction.[20] An account of the principles La Cerda professes will be followed below by consideration of his practice. Some specific passages of his notice to the reader (*Ad Lectorem*) draw attention to some of this commentator's innovations. The general approach is epitomized in La Cerda's account of the *Explicationes*:

> In explicando autem hanc saepe rationem teneo, ut synonymo aliquo (& saepe parenthesim incluso) mentem Poëtae aperiam. In hac parte (si quando est necesse ad captum novitii lectoris) litteram ordino, sed id perquam raro, nam Virgilius indiget perquam raro hac diligentia: cum illi, quantum est in rebus ipsis profunditatis, & reconditae doctrinae, tantum sit in verbis claritatis.

> In my Explaining then I often hold to this principle—to reveal the mind of the poet by paraphrase (often the paraphrase is enclosed in parenthesis). In this part (if ever it is necessary to engage a neophyte reader) I outline the literal meaning, but this is rare, because Virgil rarely requires this effort: since in his case, the extent of profundity and recondite doctrine in his subject matter is met by the clarity of his words.

The latter remarks hint at the traditional distinction between literal and allegorical interpretation in the reading of Virgil. This is a long-

[19] Compare Lawrance (1994) 185, "El comentario de Cerda comparte con cualquier edición moderna su forma, su formato tipográfico y sobre todo, su concepto de la crítica literaria." Genette (1997) 33–6 offers fascinating discussion of the paratextual significances of typographical choices. On the significance of layout in general, see von Staden 127–8, Budelmann 143–8 (both above).

[20] For some important background to La Cerda and his techniques of commentary, see the discussion of Renaissance commentaries in Grafton (1985), which provides some useful discussion of debates about hermeneutics among the humanists.

standing distinction which goes back to Fulgentius. La Cerda's lack of reference to *allegoria*, *allegoresis*, or related categories, once the commentary is underway, is striking. The remarkable absence of any mention of Dante Aligheri (an influential reader of Virgil for Landino and others) could be explained by this evident lack of interest in non-literal interpretation.[21] Concentration on more literal forms of interpretation came to characterize the Virgilian scholarship of nineteenth- and twentieth-century commentators and scholars.[22]

The rationalization of the *Notae*—the most ample part of the commentary—is correspondingly lengthier and more involved. The opening part of this rationalization further reveals a distaste for layers of signification in Virgil. Etymology is better used for casting light on the primary meaning than for constructing a further interpretative edifice:

> In his enim iam Explicationem meam firmo, adductis aut Auctoribus, aut testimoniis, quibus innitor: Iam profero alias aliorum explicationes, sed id raro, una, ut plurimum contentus: iam vim vocum, iam etymologiam persequor, si hac praesertim conducere ad sententiam potest.
>
> In these *Notae* I confirm my *Explicatio*, adducing authors and testimonia on which I rely. At some points I put forward other explications by others, but rarely, as for the most part I am content with one alone. At one point I pursue the force of the words, at another the etymology if this is particularly conducive to the sense.

What comes in the next sentence is no less important for appreciation of La Cerda's achievement and its legacy:

> Saepissime patefacio Graecorum & Latinorum loca, quibus Pöeta institit: saepissime item illorum loca, qui post Virgilium fuere, & qui institere illius vestigiis. Quod cur faciam, quaeso diligenter attende. Destinaveram aliquando Poësin docere, & hac de re laboris aliquid in lucem dare, sed abstinui ab his praeceptis, & satius duxi ipsa exercitatione praecepta

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[21] Calderini's conception of commentary in his work on Silius (of which La Cerda made use) is based almost exclusively on *Realien* and is different from the allegorical/rhetorical approach of the Florentine humanists. Again see Grafton (1985) with (1983), his biography of Joseph Scaliger.

[22] I am presupposing a sound distinction here between traditional allegory and the readings such as Griffin (1979), (1984), and even the Harvard 'pessimists' who, after Servius, can see contemporary Augustan figures behind Virgilian characters. Russell (1981) 97 clearly articulates the difference between ancient *allegoria* and such modern interpretative practices. However, the difference may be one of degree rather than of kind: on this see Laird (forthcoming).

patefacere. Qui? dices. Audi. Solet Virgilius saepissime ita Graecorum loca imitanda suscipere, ut, quae in Graecis desunt, addat; quae in illis redundant, adimat; quae in illis sunt imperfecta, & parum culta, perfectiora & nitidiora labore suo & industria reddat. Haec res ita est efficax ad docendam Poësin, ut nulla fortasse magis.

Very frequently I reveal the passages/places of Greeks and Romans in which the Poet has trodden: and very frequently again of those who were after Virgil and who trod in his footsteps. To hear why I do this, please pay keen attention. I had at one time determined to teach poetry, and to bring some of my labor on this activity to light, but I refrained from these instructions and considered it more than adequate to reveal my instructions by this very exercise. 'What?' you will say. Listen then. Virgil is very frequently accustomed to undertake the imitation of passages of Greek authors in such a way as to add things which are lacking in the Greeks, to remove things in them which are redundant, and by his labor and industry to render more perfect and resplendent things in them which are imperfect and too little cultivated. This activity is so effective for the teaching of poetry that there is perhaps none greater.

The first thing to note is the distinction drawn for the purposes of exegesis between Virgil's models and his successors; such chronological distinctions may seem intuitively obvious to us, but they were far from universally adopted by the humanists. Although for good reason many classical commentators today do devote as much attention to later 'parallels' as to sources, the distinction is still worth bearing in mind.[23] The second thing is the general importance La Cerda attaches to *Quellenforschung*—constantly in practice as well as in principle. His commentary is an abundant thesaurus of models—and for him successful *imitatio* is itself the essence of Virgil's own achievement. The deliberate manner in which the emulation of Virgil in turn is advocated is all the more striking. La Cerda was working in a time in which Virgilian imitation became as central to vernacular literature as it was to Latin.[24] Thirdly, there is considerable craft in the diction of these sentences: so in the reactivation of the dead metaphor of *locum*, the word for a place in a literary work becomes

[23] There is often good reason for this. The citation of later parallels can document development of a tradition: the later material indicates that the earlier examples of a word, device, or *topos* are not a chance confluence. See further Gibson (below) 337–8.

[24] See below, n.54 on *culturanismo*. Ercilla's *La Araucana* is an important example of Virgilian imitation in vernacular literature.

a place in which poets literally tread. More importantly, the diction identifies the mission of teaching poetry with the process of poetic composition: *saepissime, res,* and *labor* are paralleled in both contexts to this end. Identification of allusion becomes as much an art as the *arte allusiva* itself.

The currency of that term of Pasquali, along with *Quellenforschung,* creative imitation, and even of intertextuality suffice to show how contemporary commentary on Latin texts has a good deal of community with La Cerda's endeavor.[25] Modern commentators have identified and commended aesthetically passages in which Virgil is seen to transform and improve on his models. Austin's note on 6.309–12 is just one of innumerable instances of this kind of observation. For these verses:

> quam multa in silvis autumni frigore primo
> lapsa cadunt folia, aut ad terram gurgite ab alto
> quam multae glomerantur aves, ubi frigidus annus
> trans pontum fugat et terris immittit apricis

Austin lists and quotes precedents from Homer, Apollonius, Bacchylides, and Sophocles for Virgil's parallel similes here. He then remarks:

> Such were Virgil's models if he needed them. . . . These speculations can be tedious. What matters is Virgil's own art: the application of the two similes to their setting, and their treatment (especially in the bird simile), bear all the marks of Virgilian thought and sensitivity.[26]

Passages in La Cerda's commentary can also use examination of Virgil's successors to characterize Virgil's poetic technique, albeit in a prescriptive or evaluative way. One example comes in a note on the word *invadit* in *Aeneid* 4.265. The note opens by recalling the mission statement set out in the prefatory address to the reader:

> Dixi non semel, hunc meum laborem destinari tam explicationi Virgilianae, quam praeceptionibus poëticis, quae omnino hauriendae sunt

[25] Conte (1986) is the obvious influential discussion bearing on Virgil in particular. For a critical survey of subsequent debates about intertextuality in Latin literature (including Virgil), see Fowler (1997), Laird (1999) 25–43, and, specifically on commentary, Fowler (1999) 436, "recent theories of intertextuality demand of the commentator more than the assertion that the author 'may have been thinking of' a particular passage whereas another equivalence was 'probably an unconscious echo.' We expect now that an intertextual presence will be interpreted: that the commentator will document its markedness and tell a story about the impact of the recognition of the reference on the reader's overall interpretation."

[26] Austin (1977) 130. On Austin's commentaries, see Henderson (below).

ex Virgilio, quas ex eo melius disces, si illi animum des, quam ex illis, qui ipsas praeceptiones scripserunt, Aristotelem intellego, aliosque. Haec igitur tibi lector studiose praeceptio haereat, ut verbum aliquod non commune & obvium, sed exquisitum & investigatum praecedat orationes, si quas miscueris tuae Poësi. Hîc Mercurius in Aeneam invehitur, ergo *invadit.* Vidisti supra orationem Iunonis in Venerem, quae plena calumniarum: ergo,

Talibus aggreditur Venerem Saturnia dictis

Dido infrà AEneam tanquam reum *compellat,* & quae oratio sequatur, vides:

Dissimulare etiam sperasti perfide tantum
posse nefas?

Rectè ergo compellat illum, quem perfidiae reum appellat.

I have said more than once that my work is as bound to Virgilian interpretation as it is to poetic precepts which can be entirely absorbed from Virgil—precepts which you will better learn if you give your attention to him, than you will from those who have written those very precepts, by whom I mean Aristotle and others. Therefore, studious reader, stick to this particular instruction: an exquisite or underused word, not one common or obvious, should precede speeches, if ever you should blend them into your poetry. In this passage Mercury inveighs against Aeneas: hence *invadit.* You have seen earlier Juno's to Venus which is full of insults: hence

With such words Juno *attacks* Venus

Dido later on *accuses* Aeneas as if he is a defendant, and you see the speech which follows:

Traitor, did you expect to be able to conceal so great a crime

Rightly then she 'accuses' him, whom she admonishes as someone charged with treachery.

This manner of employing commentary as a didactic tool is not new to La Cerda: ancient Homeric scholia, for instance, use the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to teach a range of subjects from grammar to ethics—to the point of attributing specific educational motives to Homer himself.[27] Similar practices of commentary were employed in earlier humanist *praelectiones* to ancient texts—some of which in their turn prompted commentaries to explain the didactic elements those texts themselves contained.[28] The presence of forms of didactic discourse, whether in

[27] See Sluiter (1999), a discussion of commentaries and the ancient didactic tradition.

[28] E.g., the Latin commentary on Politian's *Ambra* attributed to di Petreio or Pietro of Puglia—see Perosa (1994)—a text which is itself an exposition of Homer's poetry; compare the way in which expositions of neo-Platonic commentaries pro-

commentary or *praelectio*, can thus do something to undermine the distinction now considered virtually self-evident between commentaries and the texts they are supposed to treat, in the sense that the commentary can itself become a kind of primary text. La Cerda's specific recommendations in the passages quoted here urge his readers to use refined diction in place of the common or obvious. These recommendations, appropriately enough, come from a contemporary of the Spanish mannerist Luis Góngora y Argote, a friend of Lope de Vega, and a teacher of Calderón de la Barca.[29] The work of all these vernacular writers exhibits highly evolved forms of poetic expression as well as the heavy Virgilian influence noted above.[30]

Contemporary commentaries for the most part do not aspire to meet broader educational agenda.[31] However, La Cerda's preface to the reader indicates a facet of his commentary which does resonate with current practice:

> Pergo ad alia, quae in Notis habeo. Interdum infero locos communes de re, quam Poëta attingit, ut de obedientia, de fluxu rerum humanarum, de aliis item: idque multorum precibus vexatus, nam quantum in me fuit, amputare hos locos voluissem. Fabulas porro, & historias multi enixe, ut narrarem, petierunt: sed vicit nemo, quid enim fabulas narrarem, quae vel in ipsis Dictionariis Latinis abunde exstant? Itaque, tantum de fabulis assumo, quantum necessarium est ad Vatis explicationem novam & indictam hactenus.

> I shall go on to other things which I have in the Notes. Sometimes I include commonplaces about a matter the Poet touches on, as on obedience, the flux of human fortune, and other things again. In this respect I was vexed by the requests of many, for as much as it was up to me, I would have wanted to cut out those passages. What is more, many strenuously sought me to recount myths and historical stories. But no one prevailed, for why would I recount myths which are abundantly obvious in Latin sourcebooks? So I take on board only as much about the myths as is necessary for fresh explication.

vide examples from the humanist era. However, then as now (consider the current interest in Fulgentius on Virgil, or Macrobius on the *Somnium Scipionis*), commentaries on ancient or late antique commentaries were often prompted not so much by the multi-leveled nature of the texts themselves, but by the antiquity of the authors.

[29] Lawrance (1994) 181.

[30] See A. Blecua in *EV* i.779–84, with extensive bibliography on works which mention connections between Góngora and Virgil; the *EV* articles on Calderón and Lope de Vega provide further material.

[31] See, however, Rijksbaron (below) on school texts still in use which present Greek 'elementary' texts primarily as a medium for learning the Greek language.

The impression of restraint given here is a little misleading. While it is true that obvious stories are not relayed, a huge amount of background material is included. Nonetheless this change of attitude to myths and *historiae* is interesting, given that recounting them was effectively a justification for some humanist commentaries.[32] The Servian distinction between poetic fiction and history, which was adopted by Domizio Calderini, is clearly manifested in La Cerda's enterprise.[33] It is in fact just as much concerned with sources which help a reader to understand Virgil's text in its cultural and historical background as it is with purely poetic sources. This concern reflects an interest, going beyond Virgil's poetry, in the nature of the society which produced it.

V. *La Cerda's Practice of Commentary: Observations on Aeneid 6*

I shall consider a few, deliberately varied, examples from the *Explicatio* and *Notes* on specific verses of the sixth book of the *Aeneid.* This book, involving as it does, Roman superstition, syncretism of philosophical teaching, and Augustan politics, allows a range of responses. Book 6 is also a good test case because it has a long history of prompting its critics and commentators to give freer rein to speculation and the personal voice.[34] One might expect this text to provide the perfect trap for an unsuspecting sixteenth-century Jesuit father in imperial Castile to fall into, forcing him to show his ideological colors and religious bigotry. Disappointingly, La Cerda does not succumb. Note 9 on verse 293, for example, gives a lucid account of the pagan conception of the relation between body and soul:

> TENUES SINE CORPORE VITAS
> Audis hic vitas tenues, & sine corpore, atque eas volitare sub cava formae imagine. Postulant haec omnia doctrinam veterum, unde pendent

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[32] Compare the preface of Paolo Marsi's commentary on Ovid, *Fasti*, published in Venice in 1482: *Invigilavi plurimum historiis & amp. fabulis: in quibus totius fere operis ratio versatur.* See also Moss (1984) and Alcina (1999) on the circulation of Landino's poetics in Spain—primarily via treatises on *mythology*.

[33] See above, nn.21 and 22. Frances Muecke will soon be publishing Calderini's commentary on Silius Italicus. On Servius' distinction, see Lazzarini (1984) and Dietz (1995).

[34] This 'tradition' goes from Fulgentius and Grimoaldus in Christian late antiquity to recent critics and commentators including Jackson Knight, discussed in Wiseman (1992) and Martindale (1993).

infinita Virgilii loca, & aliorum. Dividebant gentiles hominem in rem triplicem, videlicet in corpus, animam, imaginem. Extremam vocabant etiam, umbram, simulacrum, & Homerus εἴδωλον. Plutarchus de defectu oraculor. sic indigetat εἴδωλα κωφὰ, καὶ τυφλὰ, καὶ ἄψυχα: *idola muta, coeca, inanima.* Homerus 11 Odyss. νέκυων ἀμηνὰ κάρηνα: *mortuorum inania capita.* Sen. in Furen. *populos leves* & in Oedip. *exsangue vulgus, nebulae leves.* Ergo, corpus terrae mandabant; animam atque imaginem interdum coniungebant in inferis; interdum separabant, ut anima esset in coelo, imago in locis infernis, aut Elysiis. Hic tam frequens mentio apud omnes umbrarum, simulacri, imaginis, praesertim cum sermo est de re inferna. Hanc ergo doctrinam Sibylla Aeneae aperit, docetque vitas esse tenues, & sine corpore, ac volitare sub cava formae imagine.

SUBTLE LIVES WITHOUT BODY
Here you hear of insubstantial lives, without a body and that they flit about under the hollow image of a shape. All this presupposes the doctrine of the ancients on which countless passages of Virgil and other authors are based. The pagans used to divide man into a three-part entity, namely into body, soul and image. They also used to call the latter *umbra*, *simulacrum*, and (in Homer) *eidolon*. Plutarch in *De defectu oraculorum* thus invokes the '*eidola*, mute, blind, and lifeless.' Homer in *Odyssey* 11 refers to the 'empty heads of the dead', Seneca in the *Furens* to the 'weightless peoples' and in his *Oedipus* to the 'bloodless crowd, the weightless mists.' So then they used to commit the body to earth, while according to one conception they conjoined soul and image in the lower world; according to the other they used to separate them, so that the soul was in heaven and the image in the lower world, or in Elysium. Hence there is frequent reference in all sources of *umbrae, simulacrum, imago,* especially when the discourse is about anything infernal. So this is the doctrine the Sibyl reveals to Aeneas: she teaches that the lives are insubstantial and without a body and that they flit about under the hollow image of a shape.

This passage is all the more impressive because it is not the rehearsal of various ancient philosophical doctrines even though Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean ideas on the soul and immortality were all current in seventeenth-century Spain.[35] Instead La Cerda makes an attempt to reconstruct and cohere the more folkloric or at least mythological-poetic conceptions of life after death from ancient literature.[36] It is striking in this respect that Seneca's *plays* are quoted, as opposed to his philosophical works, for this perspective. The note

[35] See (e.g.) Gómez-Sierra (1999) and Taylor (1999).

[36] Gibson (below, 344–6) discusses the tendency of commentators to provide 'reference book' material in their work.

that follows—on Aeneas' vain efforts to strike the shades with his sword—again exhibits the positive presupposition that Homeric and Virgilian accounts of the dead can be systematized. Most modern interpreters perhaps give up the ghost too soon and assume that ancient superstitious belief (to the extent that it might be reflected in Virgil's poetic *katabasis*) is too oneiric and incoherent to be subjected to any degree of systematization.[37]

But the critical observations can also display a sensibility for history which is more specifically Roman. The brief comment on the Sibyl's question to the spirits in verse 670 is very telling. She asks in what place Anchises is held. La Cerda's detection of a contemporary Roman association in the diction of that question is interesting:

> QUAE REGIO] Allusum fortasse ad Romanam urbem, quae divisa in regiones.
> QUAE REGIO: Perhaps to allude to the city of Rome, which was divided into 'regiones.'[38]

A sense of the immediate historical context in which the *Aeneid* was composed is also evidenced by the *Explicatio* of the famous verses of Anchises' speech in *Aeneid* 6.847–53:

> EXPLICATIO
> Pulchre ex tot ducibus dilabitur ad militarem virtutem Romani populi praedicandam, quasi is omnes artes contemnat prae arte imperandi, atque in illis vinci se patiatur, non in hac. . . . Arrogat Romanis artem imperandi, pacificandi universa, parcendi subiectis, superbos debellandi. Quod procul dubio fecit suo adulans Augusto, qui claruit his artibus, non quod re vera gentes aliae in aliis artibus superarent Romanos.
>
> He gracefully passes from listing these numerous commanders to proclaiming the military strength of the Roman people, as if he despises all arts except the art of ruling: as though in those other arts he allows himself to be vanquished but not in this one. . . . He confers upon the Romans the art of ruling, of pacifying everything, of sparing the subjected, of making war on the proud. There is no doubt whatsoever that Virgil did this to fawn upon his Augustus, who was renowned in these arts, and not because [Virgil really thought that] other people outdid the Romans in those other arts.

[37] See for instance Austin (1977) 276 on the horn and ivory gates at the close of *Aeneid* 6: "The matter remains a Virgilian enigma and none the worse for that."
[38] Compare Servius *ad loc.* and on Latinus' palace in *Aeneid* 7.170f.

By using the subjunctive *superarent* ('outdid'), as opposed to an indicative form, after the causal conjunction *quod*, La Cerda conveys it was not *in Virgil's own opinion* the case that other races excelled the Romans in arts like sculpture, oratory, and astronomy.

In an important article on humanist commentary in Spain after Antonio de Nebrija, Jeremy Lawrance acknowledges that we find in La Cerda's work on Virgil a model for a modern *explication de texte.* "Nothing in it would discredit a modern commentary on Virgil," he remarks, "to the extent that in many respects, La Cerda's commentary has not been surpassed."[39] The comments on *Aeneid* 6 briefly excerpted here may serve to demonstrate La Cerda's caliber as a commentator, even by contemporary lights. However, even though La Cerda's commentary has a tendency to fix legislatively its interpretations of Virgil's *mens*, it is far more fluid and open-ended than this demonstration has so far indicated.

VI. *La Cerda and the Boundaries of Commentary*

Literary criticism, contemporary ethnographic observation, anecdote, and the expression of personal (or political) points of view are further elements of La Cerda's work. Such elements have endured as features of the discourse of commentators, even if they are not currently deemed appropriate in principle for commentary. However, these features in La Cerda are not easily separable from his capacity for Virgilian explication as it has been outlined and illustrated so far. Nor, in La Cerda's commentary at any rate, are these features of literary criticism, ethnographic observation, anecdote, and intrusion of personal voice easily separable from one another. The purpose of the remainder of the chapter is to suggest that those features, taken together, could highlight interesting possibilities for future conceptions of the classical commentary.

'Literary criticism,' so far as it is partial and evaluative, involves the personal voice, and for this reason it is often regarded as alien to the form of the commentary. Don Fowler has adroitly exposed this misconception:

[39] Lawrance (1994) 184.

> The commentary is often figured as an impersonal and objective form of scholarship compared to the monograph or article, despite the distinctly personal tone of many of the great commentaries, from Mayor to Nisbet and Hubbard. This is clearly not so: commentaries like any other genre of criticism can only ever give us one person's view.[40]

Certainly La Cerda's commentary can go well beyond philological glossing and historical exegesis, as this excerpt from a lengthy note on *Aeneid* 12.950 (*ferrum adverso sub pectore condit*) serves to show:

> Advoco ad exemplum duos viros, qui errarunt, ut inde teneas prudentiam Maronis. In uno peccavit Hom. in altero Ludo Ariost. Vir alioquin admirabilis Hom. ergo cum assumpserit Achillem atque Hectorem, etiamnum post tot secula Lector dubitat, uter dignior vita fuerit, &, si me consulis, dignior certe Hector. Nam Achilles saepe impius inducitur, & etiam supra modum mollis, cum lachrymis praeter decorum, aliquando vecors, temerarius, furiosus, praeceps, factitans digna indignaque, fanda & infanda: cum contra Hector pius sit & religiosus, nunquam mollis, non lacrymabundus temperatus, mitis, & prudens, ac iustus: in fortitudine vero certe pares, ac proinde dignior vita Hector iudicabatur, & Homeri fabula non est bene morata.

> I invoke as an example two men [i.e., epic poets] who have erred [i.e., in ending their epics], so that you may comprehend Virgil's prudence. Homer has sinned in one way, Ariosto in another. Homer is otherwise admirable so when he takes up Achilles and Hector, even after so many centuries, the reader is in doubt as to which of the two is more worthy of life, and if you ask me, Hector is certainly more deserving. For Achilles is often presented as impious, soft beyond the limit, with tears that are beyond acceptability, sometimes silly, rash, frenzied, hasty, constantly doing things worthy and unworthy, speakable and unspeakable, while Hector is pious and dutiful, never soft, not prone to tears, temperate, gentle, prudent, and just. In bravery Hector is certainly equal to Achilles, and thus Hector was judged worthier of life and Homer's story is not well resolved.

The account of Virgil's epic technique has opened out to an elaboration of Aristotelian poetics in which a conception of epic as part tragedy has informed La Cerda's verdict. This elaboration in turn is extended to criticism of Homer here, and next to a still harsher judgment of an Italian epic: the *Orlando Furioso* of Ludovico Ariosto (1474–1533):

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[40] Fowler (1999) 441. See further Kraus (above) 1–7.

> Pergo ad alterum. Debet Epica definere in Tragicam, & caedem ad promovendum affectum, quem nullum movet Ariostus. Nam quale est, ut ad extremam caedem servaverit Rodamontum, quem Ruggierus interficit, hominem temerarium, praecipitem, stupratorem virginum, impium, abominandum ac nulla praeditum virtute, tantum bellluinis viribus praestantem? Hoc tantum abest ab excitando affectu, ut potius, qui legunt, gaudeant tantam pestem abolitam. Vide, ut ab utro scopulo Virgilius caverit.
>
> I move to the other case. Epic should end in tragedy and the death should prompt emotion, which Ariosto does not produce. For what kind of poem is it that saves for the final kill Rodamonto, whom Ruggiero slays, a man who is rash, impulsive, a corrupter of virgins, impious, hated, endowed with no virtue, and excelling in monstrous strength? That ending is so far from arousing emotion that those who read it are delighted that such a nuisance has been wiped out. See how Virgil has been careful to avoid either of these reefs.

At the same time the qualities currently considered strictly conventional for a classical commentator are very much in play. La Cerda quotes from the *Poetics* of Julius Caesar Scaliger ('the elder,' 1484–1555) in his *Explicatio* of *Aeneid* 12.940–952 which configures the death of Turnus as an ancient sacrifice.[41] And at the beginning of the *Nota* on 12.950, La Cerda develops this by drawing parallels from Livy, Plutarch, and Euripides.[42] Philological *comparanda*, poetic and aesthetic prescription, and criticism of a work of vernacular literature are inextricably involved: these comments here have a didactic function, but

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[41] "Hanc partem ita expendit Scal. lib. 3. Poët.c. 12. *Quare neque deprecantem Turnum interfecit, donec alteram fortitudinis partem potiorem ducat, ultionem scilicet necessitudinem. Itaque ne se quidem auctorem vult facere, ut alibi, Aeneae magni dextra cadis; sed reiicit in necessitatem, pulcherrima nempe figura etiam à Rutilio descripta, Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas immolat, tanquam inferias illi pro victima, non tanquam hostem, qui bellum intulerit: non rivalem qui uxorem petat: non fortunarum depopulatorem, qui Regno fatali arceat.* Geminatio illa *Pallas, Pallas,* indicat indignationem Aeneae, & *poenam scelerato ex sanguine* quasi scel[era] admiserit Turnus in pueri Pallantis caede. Iustissimus est ergo, ut ab scelerato homine poenas repetat etiam pius. Hoc enim a pietate non est."

[42] "Non absimile facinus Virginii apud Liv. Lib. 3. ubi post interfectam filiam respectat Appium. *Te, inquit, Appi, tuumque caput sanguine hoc consecro.* Neque vere dubium, quin Virg. respexerit morem, quem satis aperui lib. 10 quo hostes mactabantur pro defunctis in bello, quod Plut. in vita Themist. dixit κατάρξα[ ], & καθιερῶσαι. Nam fiunt tanquam victimae, & hostiae. Notetur locutio Eurip. qui in herc. loquens de hominibus, qui tanquam victimae offeruntur, dixit θύματα. Cum tamen saepe alibi usitatiore voce σφάγια." I will discuss the way La Cerda's observation eerily foreshadows Philip Hardie's Girardian interpretation of the poem's close in a forthcoming paper on "Roman Epic Theatre."

more importantly, in passages such as this the commentary is becoming as much the focus of our attention as the text of Virgil which it is supposed to illuminate.

This consideration also bears on La Cerda's accommodation of contemporary and recent historical events, notably the Spanish conquest of the New World. One example is a note on *Georgics* 1.234. The pertinent verses of Virgil (*Georgics* 1.233–4) are as follows:

> quinque tenent caelum zonae; quarum una corusco
> semper sole rubens et torrida semper ab igni . . .

La Cerda writes:

> Hanc [terram] magno errore putaverunt veteres esse inhabitabilem. Otiosi sit contrarium probare in tanto luce huius aevi, cum praesertim constent omnibus navigationes Hispanorum, qui vere nunc terrarum domini, perlustrato ab ipsis et perdomito orbe novo, enavigatis novis aequoribus et usque in hoc aevum inaccessis: adeo gens nostra labore pertinax, praestans virtute, cui qui invident virtuti invident.
>
> The ancients to their great error thought this land was uninhabitable. It is otiose to prove the contrary in the great light of this age, when all agree that the voyages of the Spaniards, who are really masters of the earth have thoroughly illuminated and thoroughly subdued the new world, navigating new seas utterly unreached right up to this age: so persistent is our race in labor, so excelling in *virtus*. Those who envy that envy *virtus* itself.[43]

And a note on the burning of the Trojan ships at *Aeneid* 5.661 glorifies Cortés who, on reaching the Mexican coast, ordered his men to burn the ships that could take them back to Cuba. "No nation will produce an equal to him," La Cerda says of the great Marquis, significantly transposing a form of words which the Spanish chronicler Bernal Díaz Del Castillo attributed to the conquistador himself: "No nation will be our equal."[44] Passages like these clearly

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[43] The Spanish conquests provide La Cerda with abundant material for intercultural comparison. However such comparison is not restricted to analogies between customs of pagan antiquity and those of the New World. Consider this note (13) on *Aeneid* 6.245, when the Sibyl plucks bristles from between the horns of the bullocks she is about to sacrifice: "ET SUMMAS CARPENS MEDIA INTER CORNUA SETAS & C videlicet de tonsura in vertice capitis, quae nunc in Christianis sacerdotibus in usu est. Illam enim Hartungus Decur, 2c, 7 refert ad hanc pilorum evulsionem. Nam quem admodum illa fuit indicium victimae iam devotae, & separatae a profanis usibus."

[44] See Armstrong (1953). Bernal Díaz tells us that Cortés himself, who benefited

function to tell us more about La Cerda and his cultural environment than they do about Virgil.

Numerous folkloric vignettes about La Cerda's contemporary Spain are to be found in the commentary. These too might at first appear to be mere decorative digressions, diverting readers from the 'real' subject: the exposition of Virgil. However, the reverse may be the case. Consideration of such passages proves central to my own understanding of the nature of La Cerda's project. Three examples will be quoted and briefly discussed before some of their broader implications for the interpretation and production of classical commentaries today are aired in Section VII below. First, La Cerda's note on the word *ausus*, describing Daedalus' flight in *Aeneid* 6.15:

> Placentiae Hispanorum quidam ad asilum eclesiasticum confugerat, ut solet fieri, metu saecularis potestatis evadere inde cum vellet alas sibi aptavit humeris, ac se e summa turre caelo credidit; civitatem totam volando transmissit, ac longe a muris decidit fessus agitatione corporis. Nunc locus ruinae ostenditur: huius facti testes oculi omnium Placentinorum, qui hominem viderunt.

> A certain man had sought ecclesiastical asylum at Plasencia in Spain, as often happens, through fear of secular authority. When he sought to escape from there, he fitted wings to his shoulders, and from a high tower entrusted himself to the sky. He traversed the whole city in his flight, and fell some distance from its walls, exhausted by the physical exertion. Now the location of his fall is pointed out. The eyes of all the inhabitants of Plasencia who saw this man are witnesses to this feat.

This is quoted by the historical anthropologist Julio Caro Baroja in a study of institutional roles of individuals in Renaissance Spain.[45] Here again, the commentary seems to be diverting our attention from the 'primary' text of Virgil.

That tendency is even more marked in a note on *Aeneid* 6.749 which involves Iberian etymology and tradition:

> LETHAEUM AD FLUVIUM
> Sunt qui putent Hispaniae fluvium *Guadalete*, dictum quasi fluvium oblivionis ex voce Arabica, & Graeca. *Guadal* enim Arabibus flumen

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from two years of Classics in Salamanca, modeled himself on Alexander the Great. On La Cerda and Bernal Díaz Del Castillo's history of the conquest of New Spain (written in the 1570s) see Stevens (1945).

[45] See Caro Baroja (1968) 162.

> est, Inde Guadalquivir, fluvius magnus. *Guadiana* quasi Guadalana, fluvius Ana. Ut igitur Arabes cum voce *Ana* coniunxerunt suum *Guadal*, cur non etiam cum *Lethe*? ad signandam internecionem illam, quae res Hispaniae oblivioni dedit iuxta hunc amnem, Roderico victo & Gotthis deletis.
>
> There are those who think that the River *Guadalete* in Spain is named as the river of forgetfulness, from an Arabic word and a Greek one. For *Guadal* is 'river' for the Arabs. Hence *Guadalquivir*: 'great river.' Guadiana is named as *Guadalana*: the river *Ana*. So as the Arabs joined their word *Guadal* with the word *Ana*, why not also with *Lethe*? It was in order to seal up the slaughter which brought the Spanish rule to oblivion, when by this river Roderic was defeated and the Goths destroyed.

Etymology is a common tool of Virgilian interpretation for La Cerda, as he explains in the passage of the *Ad Lectorem* quoted earlier, and this commentator's subscription to the tradition of appropriating Isidorean glosses is well established.[46] The discussion here, though, is about *Spanish* etymology—and post-Latin influences at that. This is another instance of commentary as *didaxis*: something of broader educational interest appears to have been wrapped into a note on a verse of *Aeneid* 6. But something else is going on too. The Latin of the last sentence commands attention: it is strangely compact and difficult to unravel. This might be because of a mischievous word-play: the collocation of *oblivioni* ('oblivion' and 'forgetfulness') with *amnem* (which evokes *amnesia* 'forgetfulness') and the last word *deletis* ('destroyed') which assonates with *Lethe* (the river of forgetfulness). The logopoeia is easy to miss, but it ludicly takes us back full circle to the Virgilian text *Lethaeum ad fluvium* to which the note was devoted in the first place. La Cerda is engaging in a peculiar form of *écriture*. Has he temporarily shed the role of commentator to become a playful author in his own right? I would argue that the slippage between the two roles might be a more pervasive—and important—feature of this commentary than current scholars would like to accept.

My third and final example—La Cerda's note on the word *avena* in *Eclogue* 1.2—should demonstrate even more effectively a way in which this commentary can be an object of literary interest in itself. The note appears to offer an anecdotal, autobiographical reminiscence:

[46] Lawrance (1994) 184–5. Spanish etymologies similar to those treated by La Cerda here are to be found in Spaltenstein (1986–90) *ad* Sil. *Punica* 1.236.

Novi iuvenem Hispanum in regia Philippi Regis Magni prodigio similem, qui cum nullas sciret literas; prima ipsa Musices elementa, tamen suavissime modulabatur, & ore ipso exprimebat voces omnes omnium instrumentorum, avenae, tibiae, buccinae, classicae, cornuum, organorum . . . dicebat vero in vita pastorali usum se tantum magisterio rupium, & arborum, cum in eas ventus ingruit, edit varia murmura, strepitus, sonores, raucedinem, mugitum: tum etiam attendisse ruentium fluminum cataractis & fragoribus, & inde excepisse quicquid sciret non aliunde. Si quis tantum, neque videret, putaret se mera instrumenta videre, non humanam vocem.

I knew a young Spaniard in the reign of Philip the Great who was akin to a prodigy. Although he was illiterate, he knew the elements of Music and played very pleasantly. With his own mouth he could make all the noises of all the instruments: the reed, flute, bugle, trumpet, horns, organs . . . he honestly used to say that in his pastoral existence he had only the teaching of rocks and trees, when the wind blew into them and issued various murmurs, whirrings, echoes, roars, and bellows and also when he paid heed to the rushings and crashing of running rivers, and from this absorbed what he could not learn anywhere else. If anyone was only to hear and not see him, he would think that he was witness to real instruments, not to a human voice.

First, a more routine point: La Cerda often uses the word *Hispania* or its cognates, indicating that knowledge of people and places, even those famous in his own time and country, is not presupposed. Hispanocentric uses of *nos* or *noster* are actually very rare. By expressing himself in Latin, and especially by doing so on Virgil, La Cerda seems to anticipate a pan-national and even a pan-temporal readership.

But is the reminiscence applied to this particular note on *avena* really autobiographical anyway? Even leaving aside the fantastic and implausible content of this anecdote, there are strong grounds for being skeptical about this. The reminiscence looks as if it could be a recollection of Socrates' outline to Adeimantus of his recommendations for discursive mimesis in Plato *Republic* 396b7–397b:

And will people represent horses neighing, bulls bellowing, rivers splashing, the sea crashing, thunderclaps, and so on and so forth?
"No." he said. "We've already forbidden them to behave abnormally or like madmen."
"So what you're saying if I'm getting it right," I said, "is that there are two kinds of style, two kinds of narrative. There's one kind which a truly good person would use, when called upon to deliver a narrative; and then there's another, quite different kind, which would be the staple narrative method of someone who by nature and upbringing was the opposite of truly good. . . . [397a] The less good he is, the less

he'll be inclined to omit any of the narrative and regard anything as degrading. We'll end up with someone who's prepared to represent anything and everything, and to do so seriously and publicly. He'll even represent sounds and noises and cries like those of the things we mentioned just now—thunder, wind and hail, axles and pulleys, trumpets, reed-pipes, wind-pipes, and every single musical instrument, and also dogs, sheep, and birds. . . ."[47]

Again in Plato's *Laws*, Socrates objects to the practice of reproducing the noises of wild animals on musical instruments as a kind of showmanship or conjury (θαυματουργία).[48] If such Platonic passages are being evoked by La Cerda's note, what in the end we are to make of that evocation is a puzzle. This note could offer an encrypted or ironic reflection on his technique as a commentator. Might the practice of the character attacked by Socrates who is "prepared to represent anything and everything, and to do so seriously and publicly" offer some kind of parallel to the encyclopedic, compendious nature of La Cerda's enterprise?[49] La Cerda's enthusiastic interest in his compatriot's capacity to mimic all kinds of musical instruments could have an affinity with his own inclusive capacity to accommodate all kinds of texts—themselves instruments of imitation.

But most importantly, this 'reminiscence' occupies a very conspicuous place. It comes right at the beginning of the commentary as a whole. Had an anecdote of this kind come later on in the work, less significance could be attached to it. But located as it is, *à propos* of *Eclogue* 1.2—the second verse of the first poem discussed in the first volume of the commentary—this unusual note virtually inaugurates La Cerda's whole project. Even if the resemblance between the story of the Spanish mimic and the preoccupations in Plato is a matter of coincidence, that story alone still provides something to rival the interest of the second verse of the first *Eclogue*. Once again, the commentary is drawing attention to itself—not to Virgil.

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[47] Translation: Waterfield (1993) 92–3.

[48] For further discussion and bibliography on these passages of Plato, see Murray (1996) 177–8, 180.

[49] On *copia* in commentary, see again Gumbrecht (1999).

VII. *Resuscitating the Dead Art of Commentary*

The passages from La Cerda discussed in the previous section do something to undermine customary perceptions of the relation between a commentary and the text it interprets. The opposition between the two has never been terribly clear. Glenn Most, noting that works of authors like Apollonius, Virgil, and Milton not only draw from their predecessors but also from traditions of scholarly commentary on those predecessors, has observed this:

> Their own poems can in certain cases be profitably understood as poetic commentaries on the works of their models, in which they deal with problems in the texts they read by offering solutions in the texts they write. Where does the border between text and commentary run? Are there poetic texts which are not in some sense commentaries?[50]

But La Cerda's practice, at least as I am presenting it, threatens that opposition in a different way: his commentary does not play the simple role of *ancilla* in relation to the text of Virgil, but becomes an object of interest or—in more audacious modern terms—a creative work of art in itself. If this is so, there are consequences for how other commentaries (especially from previous centuries) are to be read and understood.

The first section of this chapter highlighted the difference of outlook between humanist scholarship which was partly characterized by emulation of ancient authors, and the modern perspective which is more exclusively based on the reconstruction of antiquity. That difference of outlook should prompt very careful consideration of the cosy distinction between a 'commentary' and a 'text'—something which postmodern theory and critical practice has already destabilized.[51] But in the field of classics, that distinction has become if anything more pronounced over the past century in the wake of

[50] Most (1999) xiii. I hope to show elsewhere that Petrarch's *Africa* is an extremely explicit example of this tendency: it is an epic written in a personal voice which reconciles (the reading of) Virgil and Livy with the exigencies of a Christian worldview.

[51] Barthes' *S/Z* (1970) and Derrida's *Glas* (1981) are two well-known experiments in modern literature and/or theory which achieve this by changing the role and repertoire of contemporary commentary. The implications these works have for classics are considered by Goldhill (1999), especially 419–20. Bennington and Derrida (1991) offers a further innovation. This is the *Circonfession*: the lower third of each page of Bennington's text about Derrida is devoted to a commentary by Derrida himself. On the boundaries between text and commentary, see also Budelmann (above) 148–52, 157–61, 163–4.

Altertumswissenschaft on the one hand, and 'literary criticism' (understood as a genre of discourse devoted to surveying and evaluating literature) on the other. Thus discrimination between texts which are designated for study and material written *about* those texts is virtually axiomatic for most classicists. However, even the staunchest traditionalists among them are bound to accept (as was noted in Section IV above) that the presence of didactic discourse in commentary is one thing which undermines the distinction between the commentary and the texts it treats, causing the 'commentary' itself to become a kind of primary text, which can prompt a further commentary.

In addition, the fact that humanists like La Cerda wrote in *Latin* further problematizes the relation between their commentary and ancient texts. Although Latin was a medium for many kinds of written discourse, it is important to emphasize that Latin was, and is, a literary language. This is not just to say that Latin was a language literature could be written in, like Spanish, Italian, or English; the more central point is that Latin itself, as a kind of analytic language, as a *langue*, of texts, was always akin to literature itself. Latin—even the Latin of a commentary—is a language which is defamiliarized, connotative, laden with echoes and registers for those who used it and read it, in ways that a vernacular just could not be. The aestheticization of Latin is almost logically prior to its instantiations in various genres of prose and poetry: with Latin goes Latinity. Latin in La Cerda and other commentators is not an innocent meta-language, serving only to provide a view of an ancient author through a transparent window. A commentator writing in Latin ends up as a *belle-lettriste*, no matter what environmental factors predetermined his or her disposition to use that language.

Now that commentators less frequently write in Latin, the divide—for classicists at least—between commentary and text is more rigid than it might have been. The forms of classical 'commentese' that have evolved in modern vernaculars further reinforce that divide.[52] The language of a commentary is written in an idiolect which is as generic (and as opaque to the uninitiated) as the style of the ancient work to which that commentary is devoted. And the form of the classical commentary is, to a great extent, fixed and closed—whether

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[52] See the passage of commentary on Ovid quoted at Gibson, below 334 (with his ensuing discussion), and on Latin in commentaries see further Stephens (above) 68–71.

by the inclination of its author or by the control of its publishers. Some modern commentary series (the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics from Cambridge University Press for instance) go so far as to prohibit use of the personal pronoun 'I' in an endeavor to curtail explicit self-expression on the part of the commentator.

Such protocols of form produce protocols of content. The suppression of the personal voice entails suppression of certain kinds of observations and reflections on texts and on details those texts contain, confining them within the boundaries of the discipline of classics as it has been (relatively recently) 'professionalized.' Professionalization is rarely a good thing. The more an area of interest or an occupation becomes professionalized, the more unattractive it becomes, either because it turns into the haven of an élite or—less glamorously—because it fails to arouse the interest of intelligent non-professionals. Professionalization of a field like classics now leads to an excess of specialization, and thence to cultural marginalization—just as it did in nineteenth-century Germany.[53] It cannot be denied that La Cerda's acquisition and dissemination of knowledge was institutionalized and thus conditioned by his Jesuit allegiance. However, his commentary does demonstrate practically that Virgil can be an instrument of *contemporary* general education. La Cerda's Virgil is not sealed in an antiquarian vat—though Virgil's culture, historical situation, and mentality are by no means ignored. La Cerda also shows, however, that innovation and exploration of new things can actually interact with researches into ancient poetry. And the success of that interaction is shown by the momentous development of *culturanismo* and baroque scholarly poetics in the vernacular literature which was contemporary with La Cerda's teaching and writing.[54]

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[53] Cf. Silk and Stern (1981) 13–14 on classical scholarship in nineteenth-century Germany: "The fragmentation of classical studies from 'life outside' and the further fragmentation within classical studies itself ironically symbolize the much wider disintegration which had been deplored by the Romantic philhellenes and which had evoked their yearning for Greece in the first place. And ironically again, the increasing specialization of Greek scholarship made it increasingly problematic for German writers to draw on Greek literature and its *topoi* as wholeheartedly as they once had. Specialization thus emerges as a contributory factor to the loss of momentum suffered by German Hellenism as a cultural force after Weimar." See also the discussion of Stephens (above) and, more generally, Kraus (above) 13.

[54] Compare Lawrance (1994) 184, "Los niños que seguían la *ratio studiorum* en el Colegio Imperial de Madrid recibían, tal vez sin saberlo, el entrenamiento literario más ilustrado del siglo." *Culturanismo* is the poetic style which gave prominence to

The literary nature of La Cerda's work in conjunction with his remarkable erudition is salutary for those writing classical commentaries today. There are good reasons for encouraging more flexible, fluid, and adventurous methods of exegesis and to plead for a discourse of commentary which is not merely academic. This is not a capricious demand for innovation for innovation's sake. On the contrary, a style of writing which compounded creativity with scholarship would 'resuscitate the dead art' and restore to the content of commentary some features of interest which go well beyond current disciplinary boundaries. Cosmopolitanism in the form and content of commentary and even a renaissance of Renaissance techniques would make the domain of classics less parochial, and perhaps more accessible and interesting to those 'outside' the discipline.[55] This is a tall order and it is part and parcel of another lofty exhortation. That is the plea made to contemporary commentators, at the opening of this chapter, to "involve their work more directly with the contemporary cultural moment." Of course that is easier said than done—but at the same time it *has* to be done, because, methodologically, it is the only honest thing for a commentator to do, as I now hope to make clear in closing.

Above all, a classical commentator's job is in practical terms to explain *past* meanings—of words, expressions, categories, and ideas in ancient texts. Those meanings can never be stable or closed, and as successive communities of readers and commentators encounter them, some are forgotten and others are recalled. Yet a good many nineteenth- and twentieth-century commentators have attempted, or have been encouraged, to explain past meanings almost exclusively by marshaling and explaining other past meanings. In seeking to efface themselves, those commentators have effectively pretended to be part of the same past—or at least to identify with their chosen author. This fallacy was exposed by Mikhail Bakhtin in one of his

diction Hispanized from Latin and Greek. This was best exemplified by Luis de Góngora y Argote (1561–1627) and his followers. The most important articulation of Spanish baroque poetics is Gracián's treatise *Agudeza y arte de ingenio* (1642, 1648). See Croce (1909) and (1922), and Curtius (1979).

[55] Kahane and Laird (2001)—a contemporary *variorum* commentary on the Prologue of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* which encloses an example of the standard form of commentary on the text by Harrison and Winterbottom—is an attempt to move in this direction.

last writings, on the state of Russian literary and classical scholarship in 1970. The long quotation from this neglected essay is fully merited:

> There exists a very strong, but one-sided and thus untrustworthy idea that in order better to understand an alien culture, one must enter into it, forgetting one's own, and view the world through the eyes of this alien culture . . . but if this were the only aspect of this understanding, it would be merely duplication and would not involve anything new or enriching. *Creative understanding* does not renounce itself, its own place in its time, its own culture; and it forgets nothing. In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who does the understanding to be *located outside* the object of his creative understanding—in time, in space, in culture.
>
> It is only in the eyes of another culture that alien culture reveals itself more fully and more profoundly (but never exhaustively, because there will be other cultures that see and understand even more). A meaning only reveals its depths once it has come into contact with another, foreign meaning: they engage in a kind of dialogue, which surmounts the closedness and one-sidedness of these particular meanings, these cultures. We raise new questions for an alien culture, ones that it did not raise itself; we seek answers to our own questions in it; and the alien culture responds to us by revealing to us its new aspects and new semantic depths. Without *one's own* questions one cannot understand anything other or foreign (but, of course the questions must be serious and sincere). Such a dialogic encounter of two cultures does not result in merging or mixing. Each retains its own unity and *open* totality, but they are mutually enriched.[56]

This argument still has important consequences for the theory of commentary; it would seem to vindicate the strategy of a commentator like La Cerda, and to add support to the agenda proposed here for a more creative (even literary) form of exegesis which not only acknowledges the commentator's situatedness in his or her own place and time, but is actually inspired by it.

A recent account of Christian Gottlob Heyne, the German Virgilian commentator, commends him for his "reconstruction of the literary, historical, and cultural life of the ancient world and [for bringing] the knowledge thereby gained in relation with the present."[57] That

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[56] Bakhtin (1970) 335, translated in part by Todorov (1984) 109–110 and in Bakhtin (1986) 6–7. The quotation here makes use of both translations. Compare also Bakhtin (1975) 373, "There is no first or last discourse, and dialogical context knows no limits (it disappears into an unlimited past and into our unlimited future)." This is in fact from Bakhtin's last ever (!) piece of work, written in 1974.

[57] Schindel (1990) 177–8.

judgment is all the more appropriate for Juan Luis De La Cerda: especially given that he himself directly contributed to Heyne's breadth of vision. But most importantly, La Cerda's commentary, while it succeeds in presenting Virgil as a scholarly poet of Augustus' Rome, also shows that its subject can be read—and re-read—from a markedly contemporary perspective.[58]

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9. THE WAY WE WERE: R. G. AUSTIN, *IN CAELIANAM*

John Henderson

I

> Philology takes what it wants from wherever it wants—and brings it to bear on the text.
>
> Thomas (1990) 72[1]

Roland Austin set the standard for the commentary in English on texts from the Latin canon. His six contributions between 1933 and 1977 to the Oxford maroon, or 'red,' series—Cicero, *Pro Caelio*, Quintilian Book XII, and the four *Aeneid* books, IV, II, I, and (posthumously published) VI—provided the paradigm for Classics in the postwar heyday of a pragmatic professionalism defending a Latinity still strongly rooted in British schools, and bidding for its share in the booming university scene through from the 1950s and into the 1970s. Their model—supplemented by Deryck Williams' 'odd' *Aeneids*, on books V and III, and Robin Nisbet's Cicero, *In Pisonem*—survived the twentieth century as the norm from which all revisionary or experimental ventures in Latin commentary departed. The main lines, and ideology, of the red-backed Austin commentary were retained in later efforts, as in Adrian Hollis's Ovid, *Metamorphoses* VIII (1970), which (I think) takes a step 'up' into heavier scholarly apparatus,[2] and his *Ars amatoria* I (1977), which veers a little 'down' into a more racy accessibility[3] (both of them in blue, not red, cloth).

[1] I hope it's half-proper to start with a half-truth (in sing-song). In this essay, I refrain from taking any view on Cicero. And very little of what I say here takes a view on Roland Austin (whom I never met). Instead, I make him tell us about his work. I just emphasize at the outset that I learned to be a Latinist from his books, and I have not set out to make him implausibly sarcastic, but (I insist) critically caustic at his own expense, and all the better a teacher and scholar for it.

[2] A sign of the new world: this was a revised (B.Phil.) Oxon thesis (v, 'Preface'; supervised by R. G. M. Nisbet). Though it flies the ('Austinian') flag of address—"primarily for undergraduates, but I hope that it will also interest professional scholars"—the expansive 'Index Locorum' runs up the true colors. No trimming away quotation in Greek here.

[3] Prefaced (vi) with a memorable gauntlet from Robin Nisbet: "A commentary should not be duller than the text on which it is based."

True, the uncontested reign had ended at Oxford with the consciously radical departure made by Gordon Williams (Austin's protégé at Cardiff, recommended by him to Balliol) in his Horace, *Odes* III (1969),[4] appropriated as a model by John Barsby's Ovid, *Amores* I (1973).[5] But the fresh impetus of 1980s reissues of Austin in paperback—all but the *Quintilian*—has led to their retention to date (witness, at time of writing, the OUP catalogue for 2000–1), and I think it fair to say that most senior Latinists in the UK would still point to the 'Austins' in the roseate terms of my first sentence above—with the gloss that they need, and needed when they were written, drastic overhaul if they are to serve their clientele. The commentaries were first welcomed, then acclaimed.[6] A typical red-carpet accolade:

> The virtues which the public already look for in Austin's work are everywhere in evidence: learning, good judgement, sensitiveness of appreciation, and the ability to assemble a great abundance of relevant and often hitherto unnoticed illustrative material from widely diverse areas of literature and history.[7]

[4] Williams (1969) v–vi, 'Preface,' "This edition is intended primarily for sixth-formers and undergraduates. . . .[;] the traditional type of commentary, in which a series of difficulties are picked out separately for comment, seriously inhibits readers from grasping the meaning of a poem as a whole . . . [;] a continuous running commentary, which has the purpose of subordinating the explanation of single difficulties to the exposition of poet's process of thought. . . .[;] This is an experimental edition, and I should welcome criticisms or suggestions from readers."

[5] Thus (Barsby [1973] v, 'Preface'), "This edition is intended primarily for sixth-formers and undergraduates. . . .[;] the time is ripe for a new kind of interpretative edition, especially of the shorter Latin poems, of the kind exemplified by [Williams (1969)] . . . [;] . . . the understanding of the poet's process of thought is essential . . . [;] a continuous running commentary is therefore likely to be more illuminating than a series of disconnected notes on isolated problems. . . ."

[6] (1) Welcome: "well and thoroughly done . . . clear and satisfactory introduction . . . commentary very full and good . . . many valuable linguistic notes . . . a work that maintains so high a level of excellence" (Greenwood [1933] 192–3: but "The style of some of the English renderings is unpleasing: *e.g.* . . . A few more criticisms of detail"); "Introduction très satisfaisante. . . . L'apparat critique est clair et suffisamment meublé, le commentaire ample et varié. . . . La présentation est plaisante, comme d'ordinaire celle des éditions anglaises. Type d'édition à recommander" (Marouzeau [1935]).
(2) Acclaim: "The commentary could hardly be better" (Bruère [1956] 205); "great work . . . crowning achievement . . . best in modern scholarship . . . a penetrating literary sensitivity . . . nothing static about Austin's scholarship. . . . It is the overall impression which is so admirable, the sure touch, the happy phrase, the finger on the poetic pulse, the *anima naturaliter Vergiliana*" (Williams [1979] 33), etc. etc.

[7] Maguinness (1974) 207. *CR* could be a vitriolic, even purulent, crew back then; but Maguinness rightly goes on to dignify Austin (*emeritus*) with just about the only

R. G. Austin (1901–74) went from Balliol College in Oxford to a lectureship in Glasgow, then the Chair of Latin at the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire, Cardiff (1937–54). He saw out his career as Professor of Latin at Liverpool (1954–68), retiring to his native Gloucestershire (his father was public librarian in Gloucester), and just managing to complete his commentary on Virgil's book of the afterworld, *Aeneid* VI, a couple of days before his own death (Austin [1977] v, 'Preface'). Lacking an introduction, and in need of none, the last commentary poignantly opens its first note, on vv. **1–13**, with "A brisk introduction," and its last entry sums up: "**900**. A quiet ending."

The posthumous volume backs up, and takes on home, the *Aeneid* I project, which itself represents a second, more integrative and expansively-conceived, stage in Austin's thinking on the poem, and on the commentator's mediatory role between classic and reader; the earlier approach had taken the 'even' books, IV and II, as isolatable 'episodes' which could, with most benefit to all concerned, be studied, as if in their own terms, as gateways to understanding and pleasure in great literature.[8] The effect of alternation with the Williams commentaries worked powerfully in favor of the individual book unit[9]—to an extent that is no longer easy to recover, since it

really critical response to his work in print: Austin's readership will have trouble balancing on the two stools of simplificatory simplicities and inaccessible *arcana*—the foreign language reference books; the shuffling between so many editions and commentaries as if students all inhabit specialist classical libraries; the barrier of unexplained technical terms, and philology as jargon. . . . And then there is Austin's Virgil—"always right, or better than anyone . . . with whom he can be compared," and his Aeneas—defended to death (pp. 208–9).

Hardie (1956), too, is "delighted . . .: attractively clear and balanced, and usually convincing . . . never hedges, but argues unhurriedly and reaches a firm conclusion. . . . A personal and deeply felt interpretation of a great book, full of humane and sensitive appreciation"; but adds an abrasive critique: the "extensive quotations from translations . . . and parallels and imitations from other poets . . . could be dispensed with"; Austin has a short way with 'sources'; 'love' is anachronized, and "he incautiously uses the words God, sin, and the flesh"; the 'Introduction' should have found room for locating *Aeneid* IV in its literary tradition (esp. Apollonius . . .), for setting out (and so acknowledging) critical differences of opinion, and for construing the compositional structure of the book unit as a whole. . . .

[8] Austin (1955) vi, 'Preface': "It might have been omitted, with no apparent lacuna in the epic theme. But. . . ."

[9] Best encapsulated in the editorial entrées: "The fifth book of the Aeneid is outshone in brilliance by the books before and after it, but . . ." (Williams [1960] v, 'Preface') and "This is not a book of high emotional intensity like the books on either side of it, but . . ." (Williams [1962] v, 'Preface'). Naturally, both these commentaries acknowledge help and inspiration from Austin and Austin's Virgil(s) (*locc. citt.*).

was masked and marginalized by the arrival of Williams' compact double-volume Macmillan (1973) on books I–VI and VII–XII. More palpable today is the permanent invitation to compare the 'lower' and 'higher levels' of classical scholarship on display in the two presentations of Virgil's epic—flagship of all classical studies which work, as we say, in the original language. In crude shorthand, the ratio works out thus: 'Macmillan: coursework :: Austin reds: research.'

Austin "lived a low-key life" and "he wasn't in any way extraordinary as a personality" (Niall Rudd, *per litteras*), which is to say, "a very notable personality, urbane, humane, kind, good with children, letter-writer of great charm" (Robin Nisbet, *per litteras*): no anecdote-ridden crank or casualty ripe for sensationalism (and no John Mayor). Yet it is no empty flourish of memorial pietism when his Cardiff protégé, and then life-long friend and executor, Leighton Reynolds writes, plain and clear, that "his commentaries reflect his personality to an unusual degree and will communicate to those who knew him, and to others too, a measure of that humanity which infused his life and scholarship and won him the deep affection of generations of pupils, colleagues, and friends" (Austin [1977] vi). R. G. A. was indeed a commentator, and is still a—the—commentator's commentator, and the *persona* constructed in his work represents the personal investment of a committed working life, in the service of a set of values which are promulgated by every page he wrote. Indulging in first-person comment or idiosyncratic expressivity rarely enough for it to come as a (designed) surprise,[10] this voice deploys the full armory of self-deprecatory tropes, and pursues exegesis minus fuss, prating, and posture.[11] It would threaten the whole project if there were a red-hot legacy of cult apophthegms, hidden lives, contoured adventures, and I for one certainly am glad to know of none, not

[10] Cp., for a start: "The death of Miss E. A. Hahn . . . took from me a close and dear friend" (Austin [1948] 237f., 'Additional Notes') with: "I do not now feel that the arguments brought against [Clark's conjecture] in my note amount to much. . . . Certainly as the years go on I find Clark's proposal very attractive" ([1960] 165). By the element of calculation, I mean crises such as Austin (1955), note on *Aen.* 4. "69ff. . . . Virgil's pity is clear, even though he has just shown Dido as not candid. Some personal experience must lie behind both this passage and vii. 483ff.," preparatory to the induction: "Note Cowper . . . Shelley . . . and remember Marvell. . . . Such a genealogy of thought is of the very stuff of poetry." See also Kraus 4–5 and Laird, Section VII (both above).

[11] Perfectly captured in, e.g., "The more I read Virgil, the more uncertain I am of this or that interpretation, but I hope . . ." (Austin [1971] v, 'Preface').

one. For 'R. G. Austin' really did name for me what 'Latin' means, his Virgil commentaries *were* (as it happens) my teachers in Latin scholarship as school student and (Oxford) undergraduate through the 60s.[12] And they all parade, where it cannot be missed, a dedicated mission to teach the lesson that Roman culture meant to teach 'Latinity' as its lesson. Austin explains how his authors teach the formation of the responsible person by education; they profile the process, in their respective idioms.

In poetry, Virgil licks his hero into shape: he shows how to comment unobtrusively—impersonally—on the civilizing habits inculcated in Aeneas the pupil ordained by Roman destiny, while through every line his own civilizing influence is put at the disposal of every studious reader willing to learn how/who to be. It took Virgil long devotion to learning his craft before he could acquire the authority on which eloquence must be founded if it is to meet the requirement of ethical purpose; and writing the epic transformed Virgil's conception of his ideal, his route to realizing it, and the requirements that this imposed on his own management of the project. Austin schooled himself for *his* great mission by baptism in Cicero's holiday oratory, followed (through the twin ordeals of a world war and admin overload: Austin [1948] v, 'Preface': 1937–48) by confirmation in Quintilian's ecstatic realization of the perfect Roman graduand, as he put the final touches to his portrait of the complete pupil in the last book of his manual.

What he was to learn once he dared poetry, and Virgil, makes a grand story for any Latinist, as the first forays yielded to his final account; much happened to his 'reds' over the three decades of their devising.[13] But Virgilian Austin had made sure before he ventured on the *Aeneid* that he had at his command the seasoned and mature medium required for the (impossible) task ahead.[14] To learn how the Austin commentary came about, and to appreciate the lessons inscribed in its formation, we need an archaeology of (his '*Eclogues*' and '*Georgics*'

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[12] I had to wait, and graduate, to own *Pro Caelio* (3rd ed.): '7/71. 75p C' from Blackwell's, at least fifth hand.

[13] *Aeneid* I as 'reprise' of *Aeneid* IV is a piquant trajectory—one followed by many a student/Latinist, for IV has been excerpted as the text set for early examination syllabuses so regularly that it always already *does* come first.

[14] Austin was in no doubt about the centrality of his project: "The study of Virgil brings with it the richest of all the rewards that Latin has for its initiates . . ." ([1955] xii, 'Introduction').

equivalents) the *Pro Caelio* and *Institutio oratoria*. Austin cut his scholarly teeth on the speech where Rome's greatest rhetorical eloquence was devoted to a masterly performance of studied nonchalance and levity, "one of [his] most brilliant and entertaining speeches" (Austin [1933] ii, 'Preface': the first words). Defending the naughty ex-pupil and top-flight prospect as orator and politician protégé, Caelius, twenty-six years young,[15] the consular patron gets himself and his audience/readers into the mindset of the post-adolescent jetset of contemporary Rome. He stars as the understanding, paternal, 'coach' in Romanness who can impersonate the whole range of options available for fathers aiming to bring up sons—to the point where he can applaud the efforts of the promising young pupil who is, for the best of familial and filial motives, ranged opposite, among the prosecuting counsel—Atratinus, just seventeen according to Jerome,[16] and a gift to patronize. Not the cosmic issues of world empire or the agonizing traumas of terminal revolution, but technique deployed with unashamed aplomb and festive buoyancy—"a successful defence of an apparently hopeless case [and] a social study of contemporary manners" (Austin [1933] ii). This is the great orator's playtime, his chance to strut with red-light district cameos of Catullan scurrility, all rouge and blusher. To give, and take, pleasure in a lighthearted initiation into the critical phase of 'graduation' to responsible adulthood.

Yes, on first acquaintance, this scarlet speech is an occasion when authority is at a discount, and rhetoric off the leash—just the target to set a novice, just the paradigm for a canny tiro to choose for himself. But if you should embrace the performance, if you got into it and let it get into you, it would teach plenty of lessons worth learning—and that is what happens when a classic is studied closely, closest of all in a detailed commentary. For 'we' all must find our path, Cicero instructs the court and his readers, but only the best of us will ever manage to reflect back on the 'moral' of our stories with such cogent empathy as the emperor of oratory finds on his and 'our' behalf. One day (these) ruddy kids—Caelius and *Atratinus*—will run the show, and it will be their turn to see if they can find in themselves anything approaching the jovial forbearance and mag-

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[15] Austin (1960) 144, 'Appendix I' (supported by Nisbet [1961b] 267). In his early thirties in 56 BCE, according to Wiseman (1985) 62.

[16] Austin (1960) 154, 'Appendix VI': his suicide recorded under 21 BCE—"fed up with being ill."

nanimous warmth which their inspirational predecessor managed to find for their, and his, days of immature japes and precocious fumbling.[17] If this double-take reaction to the *Pro Caelio* puppet-show eludes everyone at the time, this isn't surprising—we readers are massaged as fans and jurors rolled into one (bent jurors, then), and our immediate role is to be willingly charmed and eagerly duped by each red herring from Cicero, as he saves a budding hopeful from chicanery hoping (he pretends) to exploit the mere letter of the law. But this doesn't mean that Cicero's meditation on retrospection and maturity was lost on us.

Entirely plausible to include the debutant commentator in our number, just as unaware at the outset of the gift of hindsight which the oration offers every reader. But teaching and learning are like that; it may take years before the penny drops, one red-letter day. On the other hand, when the vastly experienced professor Austin begins his commentary with:

> The exordium to the *pro Caelio* won the admiration of Quintilian, who often illustrates his principles from it ([1960] 41).

he does *very* little more than tweak what the tenderfoot Austin's first paragraph of commentary had already proclaimed, at its end:

> Quintilian, who often alludes to this speech in illustration of his principles, refers several times to its prooemium ([1933] 41).

Certainly in retrospect Austin's choice of *Pro Caelio* for 'his' Oxford Cicero inaugurated a life-project from which he never departed: his scholarly effort was pledged to the training of citizens for a civilized—a *civil*—society.[18] For the commentator on *Pro Caelio* is obliged to be, or get, intimate with the whole of Quintilian's *Training of the Orator*, and in many ways the comments of Cicero's great admirer, the 'professorial'—royal—tutor Quintilian, afford an undeniable

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[17] Quintilian underwrites Cicero's sincerity here (11.1.68); but for Cicero's hamming as casting carefully implied aspersions on the prosecutors, their oratory, and style of conduct, cf., e.g., Gotoff (1986).

[18] The preordained circle closes at Austin (1948) 155 (n. on 12.10.11, "**indolem**] 'natural talent'"): "Q. has many illustrations both from Caelius himself and from Cicero's speech in his defence" ("see my introduction to Cic. *Cael.*, p. xiii)." The note on "the *argumentum longius repetitum*" at 12.8.7 ("**unde volent repetita**] 'traced back as far as they wish,'" p.120) is one signal example among many of the involved intertwining of Quintilian 12 with the *Caeliana* (§18).

nucleus of strong interpretation that fills in the message which the advocate could only *perform* in court. Quintilian spells out the 'thinking' dramatized by the classic speech-text. At the same time, *as* 'commentator,' Quintilian adumbrates and pioneers a path and scripts a role for all Quintilians to come. For the 'Austins' of the future.

The *Institutio* is no bijou. And making its acquaintance is a long haul, as the mature didactic scholar has learned. Book XII is "a supremely interesting social document" (Austin [1948] xii, 'Introduction'), but it is "perhaps the most difficult book of Quintilian to edit" (v, 'Preface'), and "[t]he modern reader will find this part of the book somewhat verbose and tiresome in its moralizing" (xiv). Expect neither indulgence nor self-indulgence in these parts:

> The twelfth book is a monument to Roman practicality and sterling worth.... There is a steadfast sincerity of purpose throughout that redeems it from *mere* moralizing: it typifies the solid decency on which the real greatness of Rome was ultimately based, and which we are sometimes liable to forget in our contemplation of more lurid things (xii, xiv).

There is no disputing the analysis, either, not short of expending as much energy as Quintilian and his scholars, for "his ideal of the *uir bonus dicendi peritus* is something more than a piece of theorizing: it represents the ambitions of a father" (x), and, accordingly, "[t]here is no half-way house for him; he is uncompromising in his insistence that his orator must be first and foremost a good man" (xii). Make no doubt about it: "it is the very strength and fire of his ethical convictions that makes [*sic*] his work so compelling" (x), and: "if there ever was a writer who knows how to keep to the point in a methodical and succinct manner, that writer is Quintilian" (xxx). Above all, finally, "Quintilian was a teacher fighting a rearguard battle" (xxv).

So Austin in 1948 tried—a desperate bid—to put to work *the* explicit training model for showcasing and transmitting Roman core values to a new world. Set out accessibly and explicitly for the syllabus of fresh "generations of *studiosi iuuenes*, as well as of *studiosae puellae* (Quintilian might well 'stare and gasp'), who will never know how much they have helped me by being present in Cardiff and in Glasgow for me to teach" (v, 'Preface'). He went for the book where success gets trumpeted, and congratulations are in order, striving on every page to pack in the massive impact of Quintilian's vast gospel of faith in humanistic schooling.

Even as he consolidated the skills needed to establish any commentary which takes on one segment of a monumental classic, in preparation for his assault on episodes from Virgil, he was, characteristically, looking back critically at his first shifts at composing notes on a text. The second edition of *Pro Caelio* appeared in 1952 (xxxii + Pp. 163). Students and education had changed since 1933; so had Austin; and so had Roman studies, and standards of Latinity. Supplementary items could squeeze in alongside corrections and changes of mind. But that was not the game. Not at all. Instead—uniquely among the Oxford reds—this is 'a drastic revision' of the commentary: 'entirely re-written' ([1952] iii, 'Preface'). The permanent, third, edition of 1960 (xxxii + Pp. 180; in a new font) compounds the effect with mere *additamenta*—most obviously, some re-worked 'Appendices,' plus a substantial body of 'Additional Notes' (pp. 162–75)—but these are only postscripts.[19] What really counts is that the 3rd edition's routine 'Preface' replaced the 2nd edition's crestfallen 'Preface.' What I am presenting as *the* lesson of Austin's red-faced *Caeliana* was the casualty. None of the many Latinists who use Austin's Cicero could ever guess there is even the ghost of a story here.

My proposal is that for Latinists a golden legacy of the Oxford 'Austins' consists in the thinking represented by the changes and adjustments between the *Pro Caelio* of 1933–edited by "Roland G. Austin, M. A. | Lecturer in Humanity, Glasgow University | formerly Exhibitioner of | Balliol College" (i)—and its replacement of 1952/1960—"edited by R. G. Austin | Professor of Latin, University College | Cardiff" and "| of Liverpool" (i; i).

The methodical and succinct *persona* of the model commentator, irenic, if anything, to a fault, had no space for contentiousness or spleen: he was on guard against any such thing in his writing. But the castigation of his juvenile scholarship in the final, classic, *Pro Caelio* adds up to a relentless indictment of the youthful commentary—as tough as Herennius in 56 BCE, prosecuting, ever was on

[19] Nisbet (1961b) 266 corrades the reddition: "a second edition, with substantial additions and alterations, was published in 1952. Naturally there is less that is new in the third edition." Nisbet's review of Austin's third *Pro Caelio* is both detailed and positive: "indispensable alike to the undergraduate and to the professional latinist. . . . Few points in the commentary leave room for disagreement." Just *ten* points, to be precise.

Caelius![20] I don't suppose for a moment that Austin ever plotted to obliterate his first edition:[21] the point of the present essay is, rather, to analyse the transferable skill in self-criticism which the return to his maiden speech stages for our instruction. Few commentaries, and certainly none of the Oxford reds or blues, have undergone anything like such a public self-rebuke (worse than oblivion or pulping?): "An editor seldom has the chance to atone for youthful ignorance" ([1952] iii, 'Preface').

For any would-be Latinist, wherever libraries have resisted the urge, and need, to cull prior editions, the case of the *Caelian* is an invaluable prompt to think over the methodology of the commentary. What we can watch in the revision of the immature commentary is *in nuce* the excogitation of the state-of-the-art *Latinitas* that bossed the last half-century. As such, Austin's caustic '*In Caelianam*' is itself a classic.

First off, the issue of magnitude: how close can the focus afford to be? What strategies should govern the provision of comparative material? With what implications for particular kinds and combinations of readership? One strong model available to the young Austin was that of Denniston (1926), written, so he claims, for "Hertford passmen before the war" ('Preface', iii). His

> main ob' t [was] to state the difficulties clearly, and to present the reader .th the materials available for their solution...[:] I conceive it to be an editor's business to formulate such problems as occur to him, and, where he cannot solve them, to admit his inability with frankness.

The *Philippics*, as I remarked, mattereo, and 'hould matter, to political historians of the Late Republic, and invective against Cicero thrusts itself through every tangled twist in the commentary's struggle to recover the legal and institutional procedures of the Roman state:[22]

> Some readers will think that I have done less than justice to Cicero, as a man and as a statesman.... [T]hroughout the greater part of his career he lacked, in my opinion, both a definite policy and the courage to carry one out (Denniston [1926] iii).

[20] Cf. Gotoff (1986).

[21] The third edition can nowadays even be referenced without noticing its status, e.g., Craig (1993) 105 n.1, "The best commentary is R. G. Austin," etc.

[22] The 'Introduction' is avowedly 'historical.' The 'Appendices' give the flavor: 'I Provinces; II The Equites and the Juries; III The Roman Auspices.'

The Classics of Austin this is *not*:

> some rather long notes. . . . In compensation, I have cut down the grammatical notes to the barest minimum (iii, 'Preface').

At the other extreme was the Victorian-Edwardian paradigm represented (e.g.) by the *Pro Milone* of Poynton 1902[2] (revised from 1892[1], "to suit the needs of those who offer the speech for examination at College" [iii]). The 'Introduction' here is, again, all 'History,' and though the basic format of the twentieth-century 'maroons' is already there, this is a 'thin' volume, half the size of Denniston's historical onslaught, with double spacing and larger font than we have been used to, and on inspection the notes turn out to be mainly aids to translation, and the commentary teaches none of the philology we expect. In the Oxford version of things, these humble contributions to Latin studies[23] had their swansong as late as the embarrassingly amateurish *Aeneid* VI of Fletcher, the anomalous product of dark days in 1941. Here, commentary is "not overburdened with irrelevant learning [. . ., but offers] sufficient information to enable the student to discover for himself and appreciate the meaning of what he reads"; the objective was "to enable [the student] to read a great book, even if it be a subject for examination, with understanding and appreciation and enjoyment" (vi, 'Preface'). With hindsight, the baby thrown out here with the bathwater should give us pause, for professionalization (has) meant eschewing explicit 'enjoyment.' Neither 'Preface' nor 'Contents' page signals the 'Vocabulary' specially customized for the book, which is included *ad calcem*. Here, then, was another slender volume, but for the last time (so far) an Oxford red brought its readers this practical aid, at the expense of reams of exegetic notes that might have been.

Insignificant and underambitious commentaries in the order of 120 pp. were well and truly knocked on the head during Austin's career, and to a considerable extent by his example. At his elbow from the start were sober and uncompromising scholars with their sights trained much higher up the scholarly ladder, as high as Denniston, but with the aim of ascertaining and presenting Latin philology kept firmly in their sights: comparison between Robert Nisbet's austerely grand *De domo* (1939) and the classic wit of Robin

[23] Thus they were given Anglicized book titles, 'Cicero, *Pro Milone*,' *not* '*M. Tulli Ciceronis Pro Milone oratio*,' etc. (not *etc.*). On school commentaries, see also Rijksbaron (below).

Nisbet's *In Pisonem* (1961) gives a strongly suggestive model for the development of the mid-twentieth-century classical commentary, Oxford style. On one side, Nisbet *père* played the ponderous Scholar while presenting his Cicero as a feast of feisty rhetoric:

> [C]omparatively little read. Its difficulties, which are painfully numerous, and the steady denigration, in certain quarters, of the four Post Reditum speeches, have naturally repelled readers and possible editors. Yet it contains much that is interesting and important for the understanding of an eventful decade; the syntax often merits and repays consideration; and not a few passages, when they are properly understood, are as mordant, spirited, and effective as anything that Cicero ever wrote ([1939] iii, 'Preface').

De Domo served up its fair share of technical problems: quagmires of religion and quicksands of cult, besides the impasses of Roman History and *Staatsrecht*, plus vigorous defense of Cicero, at least in his pertinent conduct. But this commentary aims to teach its readers Latin, teaching us how to learn, how to conceive, and how to conceive learning, Latin, in a heavy-handed display of grammar and accidence.[24] At the same time, since the authenticity of the speech had been impugned by a series of scholars (notably Markland and Wolf), *De Domo* features some stirring satire: "How rich is their vocabulary of invective! . . . Haman need not have built his gallows quite so high" (xxxiv, 'Introduction').

Nisbet *fils* took the commentator's *persona* down a peg or two from this. He ranged round the mid 50s BCE and Latinity in much the same style, but, as the rollicking nature of the attack on Piso dictated, focussed most particularly on the cultural history of Rome, including the Catullan world of scurrilous mouthing off, as featured in Austin's *Pro Caelio*.[25] Nisbet thus presented a Cicero who sails so

[24] Witness the 'Appendices': 'I the cryptic gibe at §7; II [demonstrative pronouns/interrogatives]; III [*de caelo seruare/seruatum sit*]; IV §47; V The Problems Connected with Cicero's House; VI Consecration and Kindred Topics [*consecratio/dedicatio* etc.]; VII §145.' A *tour de force* and treat: p.183 on the 'so-called sympathetic dative' (and other daft names for it).

[25] 'Appendices' feature: 'I Piso's Proconsulship of Macedonia 57–55 BC; II Piso and Catullus; III Piso and Philodemus; IV Piso and the Villa of the Papyri; V Gabinius; VI The *In Pisonem* as an Invective; VII Piso and the *Invectiva in Ciceronem*; VIII The Date of Delivery and Publication.'

Just as Austin hides away his 'Appendix III Caelius and Catullus' ([1960] 148–50: thoroughly re-written for the third edition), so Nisbet's acclaimed 'Appendix VI' on insult as jousting with *topoi* was an afterthought scheduled very late in the day (pers. comm.). Austin at any rate realized that the 'Catullus' angle could be the making

close to the wind of opportunistic advocacy that he must surely discredit any Quintilianic hagiography: "[t]he *in Pisonem* is a masterpiece of misrepresentation" (xvi, 'Introduction').

II

> We are made aware of the ineluctable forces that control the lives of men. We are reminded also that no man can escape responsibility for his own actions.
>
> Austin (1955) xii, 'Introduction'

Austin's second/third Cicero learned to pursue very much the same targets as the *In Pisonem.* The commentary is shorn of any strain to be momentous, or to show strain. Readers must simply and tacitly want precise understanding of rhetorical moves and tropes, of syntax and idioms, so as to master more texts, through the Ciceronian corpus and over the Latin canon. Nisbet confines wit 'within' the commentator's writing style, rarely releasing it into open flourishes, and resists any temptation to project invective into his notes. Austin invented a more featureless level tone, but as I have explained, hooked what he says to an avowed and explicit educational bid to improve young readers through Roman eloquence.

In renouncing the smaller scale of the first edition (Pp.xix + 131[1] > Pp.xxxii + 180[3]), however, the commentary still did not *quite* take on the whole repertoire of the grander 'reds.' In particular, Austin's recantation of his earlier heresy—an edition written without command of the higher mysteries of 'textual criticism'—was more loud than effective. The *Quintilian* had *announced* that it "does not pretend to be a critical edition" (v, 'Preface'):

> I cannot pretend to have made myself much contribution to the textual criticism of the book, for I am ill equipped for such work.[26]

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of his Cicero: ". . . in this way his defence of Caelius is of special importance to the literary historian" ([1960] 150: the last words!).

[26] Austin (1948) xxxv, 'Introduction.' On this topic, cf. the thoughtful response of Wells (1949) 204, particularly struck by (1948) 84 (n. on "**generales . . . uersatas**]"): "However, to use a pleasant phrase of Buttmann's, *uiderint peritiores*!" Cf. Austin's fuddled and straggling 'new' textual note on *Pro Caelio* §37 ([1960] 99, **o . . . sceleste**): "The problem is one for a metrical expert to decide. . . . *Viderint peritiores*! . . . I cannot myself see how any certain metrical arrangement of the passage can be reached. I am grateful to Professor E. Fraenkel for his guidance in this problem."

And the Second *Caelius* ate dust:

> Previously I had scarcely touched on textual matters; now, by paying proper attention to the patient work of Klotz and others, I have been able to treat Clark's text with a measure of independence.... I hope that the result is a better book ([1952] iii).

If there had to be 'sides' in British *Latinity*, then Austin was to be counted with 'teachers,' not 'scholars.' In brutish asininity, on both sides, this polarity regularly threatened to pit 'provinces' against 'Loxbridge,' even for teacher-scholars like Austin, forever spiritually suspended between Cardiff/Liverpool/Aberdeen and Balliol, as they fetched Classics to the new (red-brick) universities/the sticks. The touchstone was commitment to a certain conception of 'real' students in class, and this was the watchword: "But without the receptive minds of my Cardiff students this edition would never have been begun" (Austin [1955] v, 'Preface').

Virgil began in:

> lectures... to pass-degree students at University College, Cardiff, in 1948[:] I felt then there was room for a commentary which should try to show something of Virgil's method, thought, and art to a type of student for which the existing editions were not designed....[;] a fresh approach seems needed.... [;] as a rule they know little Greek, often none at all; they understand little of the music of the Latin hexameter... [;] they never had the opportunity of constructing verses, however unpoetic; and they have often been taught by those who are similarly handicapped... [; t]hey need to be reminded that Latin literature is not something hermetically sealed, but is related to other literatures that form part of many degree courses. They need to be shown Virgil as a poet, with a poet's mind, not as a mere quarry for examiners... [;] something new is needed also by the young university student... [;] as the wise Quintilian remarks, 'inter uirtutes grammatici habebitur aliqua nescire'. I have tried not to overload this book with detail.[27]

When prefaces sloganize the twin needs "of students in the upper forms of schools and in universities, and... more advanced Virgilian

[27] Austin (1955) v, 'Preface.' Note in particular: "If some rather elementary points of metre or prosody appear to have been stressed too much, or to be over-simplified, it is because I know something of the difficulties that the modern student finds in such things; but I have dealt also with certain subtleties..." (vi). And, to rub it in that Austin feels 'watched': "Everyone will notice omissions of this or that point, or of reference to this or that book" (vi); "I have purposely consulted few commentaries and few books about Virgil" (xii, 'Introduction').

scholarship,"[28] readers are used to inquiring how far toward the latter pole, and away from any plausible category of school student, the drift will prove to be. In professorial Austin's case, the busy editorial hustle throughout his Virgils represents a deliberate policy of catching them young—many a gem of bathos results from pursuit of exactly this objective, above all in the notorious erotics of the *Fourth Aeneid*:

> His Dido and his Aeneas are a woman and a man in love. . . . It is a book which in the last resort must be interpreted by its readers in their secret hearts, without the chilling guide of what Dryden calls somewhere 'pedantic pains'. . . . The tragedy of Dido's passions might, in essentials, occur at any time in the Little Hintocks of today ([1955] v, 'Preface').

> In the final reckoning the tale of Aeneas and Dido, as Virgil has told it, is a universal; he has told it so, because that is his poetry's interpretation of an aspect of human experience which transcends all others in its meaning for man . . . ([1955] xii, 'Introduction').

The risk is still courted, ineluctably, in 'late Austin':

> The tale of Dido, in the form which has stirred the human heart to pity for nearly two thousand years, was Virgil's own creation in a moment of intense poetic vision ([1971] xii, 'Introduction').

And, all the while, (naturally) such pearls sit alongside *arcana* from the inner *sanctum* of Latin metrics and usage as they walk the line of arid technicality. If we try to identify the Austin touch, I think we will find it in a rhetoric which combines two main traits: (1) stripped-down jargon; (2) mimetic impact. The result is a marvel, though forever asking rather too much of any actual classroom, and obliging the class to see that they aren't (yet) the right class to really see:

> [(1)] The rhythm is accommodated to the sense (no third-foot caesura, marked clash of ictus and accent, and elision), producing an effect of [(2)] headlong violence ([1964] 169 on v.408).

The hare I mean to start here, however, is not the vagaries of Virgil as they are showcased in Austin's *Aeneid*, but rather (as promised)

[28] Williams (1960) v, 'Preface' (cf. "the needs of students in universities and upper forms of schools, and . . . more advanced Virgilian scholarship," Williams [1962] v, 'Preface'). Both these 'odd' *Aeneids* beg indulgence for, and so advertise, a special penchant for "rhythmic effects whether of metre or sound." See also Kraus (above) 8–9. For the pedagogical interests of La Cerda's sixteenth century commentary on Virgil, see Laird (above) 181–3.

the do's and don't's of *Ciceronian* commentary, as imagined through the censorious eye of Austin's favorite anxiety-figure, and lifelong friend:

> My debt to Professor W. S. Watt, of the University of Aberdeen, is again deep: my added material owes much to the way in which he laid an unerring finger on points that I had previously left either untouched or hopefully vague.[29]

This final 'Preface' replaces, not the original hype (already quoted: ". . . most brilliant and entertaining . . . not only . . . successful . . . but . . . social . . . contemporary . . ."), but its shamefaced predecessor, with a slice of its own humble pie:

> I have corrected some errors of statement and translation, and Appendix III has been rewritten . . . my previous treatment was unsatisfactory . . . some historical slips . . . Watt . . . ([1960] iii).

But these '*lacrimae . . . et luctus*' are a pale shadow of the predecessor which, in effect, they serve to erase from the record:

> I have had constant kindness and help from Mr. W. S. Watt, Fellow of Balliol, whose shrewd and searching criticism has taught me many lessons. Professor G. B. A. Fletcher . . . showed me innumerable errors. . . . Mr. L. D. Reynolds . . . spent long hours in careful bibliographical research for me. . . . Bodley itself did not possess [ ] the Teubner volume of 1919 containing Klotz's important preface, to which Mr. Watt first drew my attention, and which I had no business never to have discovered before ([1952] iii).

Here, finally, is my own version of the main commandments which I have distilled from the changes made by mature Austin[2–3] in order to save young Austin[1] from himself:

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[29] (1960) iii, 'Preface.' Cf., e.g. (as they say), Austin (1955) v; (1964) v, ". . . would have contained countless errors which, fortunately for me, are known to him alone"; (1971) v, "I should not care to reveal the number of inaccuracies (and worse) from which Professor W. S. Watt . . . has mercifully delivered me," plus 8 (*eight*) 'Additional Notes' in (1960) 162–73. Cf. Nisbet (1961a) iii, 'Editor's Note.' In 1933, Austin had had "Mr. R. G. Nisbet and Mr. C. J. Fordyce . . . offering much acute criticism, adding much exceedingly valuable material, and removing many errors" (ii, 'Preface'), and in 1948, "Mr. C. J. Fordyce castigated the entire commentary in manuscript, as only he knows how to do; he removed innumerable errors and made many admirable suggestions, teaching me much and laying me under an obligation that I can never properly repay" (v, 'Preface').

'Hopefully vague' I would rate the most haunting phrase in all of Austin.

i. *You must* on no account *suppose that you will get away with bracketing off text and transmission as if they do not concern you.* (It could cost you the recognition of an 'F. B. A.')

In the 'Contents,' "Note on the Manuscripts . . . xv" (1933) became "The manuscripts . . . xvii | Selection of Readings from Ox, Pap. X. 1251 (*Π*) . . . xxii | Collation of the Oxford and the Teubner Text . . . xxiv" (1952). This radical re-write does take on board more lucubrations from Klotz, but is chiefly bothered to iron away amateurish exegesis. Having dutifully re-organized the data on A. C. Clark's critical contribution,[30] Austin could not resist appending a commemorative page ([1952] xx–xxi): "I am glad of this opportunity of reminding a generation for whom Clark is necessarily a now distant name. . . ." "One very important change [to] the text in §5" does get proudly signaled in the 1960 'Preface': "This has necessitated certain adjustments in the relevant notes, and also the revision of Appendix II," but it hardly seems that Austin's heart was really in all this. No: scruples reassure scholars, but students can always skip:

> This passage has an interesting textual history . . . ([1952] 76–7, n. on §24).

ii. *Resist speculation which puts the chosen author down.* (The principle of 'critical benevolence': unknown to a Denniston.)

Thus (e.g.): "It is much more reasonable to suppose that Cicero had intended to deliver the whole of §§39–50 as he had prepared them, but that Herennius' θέσις made him decide to omit his own, so as not to weary the jury further, and to allow §§44–50 to do what was required" ([1933] 83, on §§39–43) represents Austin's biggest regret. Beneath 'Appendix VIII | Note on the Present State of the Speech' ([1952] 159–161 < 'Appendix VIII | Note on the Composition of the Speech' ([1933] 122–5), he subjoins the footnote:

> In my first edition I took a completely wrong view of §§39–43, and was led to an improbable conclusion ([1960] 161 n.1; cf. p.78, n. on §§25–26, p.102, n. on §§39–42; cf. [1933] 88, n. on §§48–50; etc. etc.).

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[30] He rather buries notice of the papyrus that (amazingly) "shows that Cicero was being read in Egypt in the fifth century" ([1952] xx).

Having accepted once that Cicero permitted a 'double recension' to sully his 'composition,' the commentator was not to be seduced again: "The whole passage is an integral part of his line of defense, by which his case stands or falls, and forms an artistic and impressive climax to the solemnity of his plea for Caelius as a man of sterling worth" ([1952] 109–10. n. on §§48–50). Identify in this recantation the real impulsion to re-do the *Pro Caelio*—besides Commandment (i) above, and the accumulation of accruing annotation. And feel the wholehearted surge of restored solidarity with our hero.

iii. *Do not, on any account, run out of steam.* Youth shows up at its worst when it flags. The finale is to receive no less care than the rest.

The *peroratio* occupies the last §§10 (of 80), and just over three sides of notes ([1933] 105–8, out of pp.41–108). No fewer than 17 notes on the 43 original lemmata are removed, and chunks of another seven or eight have been pruned away. Abundant new material stretches the remnant over almost nine sides ([1960] 133–41, out of pp.41–143), and miserable shutdown turns into climactic flourish when a two-pages plus disquisition is put in place, and Professor Austin creates a 'peroration' of his own:

> In reading a speech of Cicero, it is essential to remember the part that voice and gesture would play in its delivery. The evidence comes mainly from Quintilian. . . . Cicero would not simply be speaking *for* Caelius: in a certain sense, he would *be* Caelius, just as a great actor assumes the character of his part. And the whole scene would have an animation which it is hard for us to picture. . . . Quintilian (xii. 5. 5). . . . Quintilian treats the whole subject in great detail in book xi . . . with several illustrations from the *pro Caelio*. . . . The whole topic is of immense interest. . . . Quintilian remarks (xii. 10. 61). . . . The student will find it profitable to detect [swift and subtle changes of mood] for himself. . . . The *pro Caelio* explains so much of Cicero's success as an advocate; in many ways it is a masterpiece of . . . *Latiae facundia linguae* ([1960] 141–3).

In Austin's *own* 'double recension,' this grand postlude is compounded with a further supplementary note across two sides—about "the 'atmosphere' of a [Roman] court" ([1960] 173–5). This 'Additional Note' takes wing to figure nothing less than the commentator's 'sphragis' on his entire oeuvre. You will find that, and why, I have made *its* finale mine, too.

iv. *Systematize* your style of reference, citation of works of reference, bibliographic conventions, & c., for all you hope to be worth. (The devil's in the detail.)

The 'Indexes' of 1933 *and* 1952 are out; 'Indices' are in, for 1960 ('Contents').

The 'Bibliography' is expanded, tenfold, and sectioned: 'I. Editions. II. Textual Criticism and General Comment. III. Biographical, Historical, and Legal, IV. Grammar, Style, etc.' Entries are cued "to the system of *L'Année Philologique*," and up-dated in style:

1933:
BÄHRENS, E. Revue de Philologie, viii (1884), pp.33–54.
>
1952:
BÄHRENS, E. Ad Ciceronis Caelianam (*Revue de Philologie*, viii, 1884, pp.33–54).

And so on. Power names jack up the ambiance: Housman's *Ciceroniana*, a raft of bores on the *Lex Lutatia de Vi* and (naturally) the *Lex Plautia de Vi*, and (desiderated by Marouzeau 1935) "Antoine, F. Lettres de Caelius à Cicéron. Paris, 1894"; for Latin philology, the key new arrivals will be Landgraf's *Kommentar* on *Pro Roscio Amerino*, Löfstedt on syntax, and Nisbet's *De domo*.

References are re-jigged, from 1933 > 1952: not "*Fam*. ii. 8. 1," but "*ad Fam*. ii. 8. 1" (so too "*Att*." > "*ad Att*.," but *stet* "*Q. F*."); not "p.12f.," but "pp.12f.," not 'S. Hier.," but "St. Jerome" (pp.v; vi n.1, and *passim*).

It all adds up to a livery—connoting scholarship *à la mode*.

v. *There is elegance in maximal correction with minimal change*. So:

| Pompey to his dictatorship. He had much inflamed the people | ([1933] viii)
>
| Pompey to his sole consulship. He had inflamed the people | ([1952] ix)

And, where "He had already lent his support to the 'law of the ten tribunes' which specially permitted Caesar to stand" needed correction to "He had already withdrawn his opposition to the 'law of the ten tribunes' which permitted Caesar to stand" ([1933] x > [1952] xi), there was the chance to cut a flabby footnote to make room for

reference to the important 'new' article by Elton on the topic in hand ([1933] n.2 > [1952] n.1).

But what could begin to touch the slam into reverse?

> The subject is *familiaritas*, not Caelius, as W. supposes (H., p.208, note 1).
> ([1933] 50, n. on §10 **debet**)
>
> \>
>
> The subject is Caelius (but cf. H., p.208, note 1).
> ([1952] 56, n. on §10 **debet**)

vi. Don't stint on *quoted Latin.* Minimize use of the Greek language. Not just because it is expensive to typeset, but because Roman texts are the engine-room of classical studies: no call (yet) to translate Latin excerpts. A truth borne in on post-war 'teachers,' however uncongenial to 'scholars,' for the majority of students outside Loxbridge now took degrees in Latin only, and British universities only abolished bloody 'Compulsory Latin' in 1958—"the last remaining institutional prop for the study of classics in schools."[31]

The first Greek to go was four lines of Demosthenes, now reduced to just the two words κατηγορία and λοιδορία: new parallels from Livy and Apuleius are joined by the directive "See Quintil. xii. 9. 8 ff. for an interesting and sensible attitude . . ." ([1933] 48 > [1952] 52, n. on §6 **sed . . . accusare**). A not untypical instance. Salt is rubbed in these excisions of the old when six 'new' lines of Plutarch are plonked down as a 'cf.' to make up one of the 'Additional Notes' ([1960] 163, n. on §13: courtesy of Mr. W. M. Calder, of Concord, Massachusetts).

The *Virgils* did clip Austin's wings, but he never really renounced the right to copy out lovely great bites of Latin by the paragraph. *Pro Caelio*^{3} chipped away at the hoard in *Pro Caelio*^{1}, but nature outs in the 10 (*ten*) continuous lines of Cicero which occupy another of those unfettered 'Additional Notes' ([1960] 166, n. on §27). In truth, Austin can only have been, or played, deaf to all murmurs about dilation, demoralization, and distraction, on the part of publisher, student, and colleague. (Cf. ix below.)

Oxford reds just didn't do translation for you; instead, *you* did (some of you, some of the time). By the time a commentary was read, so (in theory) was a fair slice of Lat. Lit.

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[31] Stray (1998) 277, cf. 271–97 on 'The Realm of Latin, 1920–1960.'

vii. *Write the liveliest plot-summaries you can*, as your notes move into each new section: this is your best chance to give readers the will to live, through the pages of Latin text and those of your commentary. Stake vigorous colloquialism against instant obsolescence.

Almost all the entries of this kind were thoroughly re-cast. Here is one peach from a cluster:

1933:
§§48–50. '*But really, a man must be strict indeed if he will frown on the easy amours of youth. When a gay widow behaves so freely, who can blame her lovers? Clodia, you must answer me: for either from very modesty you will assert that Caelius has had no shameful dealings with you, or from very shamelessness you will yourself give him a means of defence.*'
>
1952:
§§48–50. '*But really, when a lady of easy virtue is concerned, what reason is there for complaint? Such amours worry no one. I will be quite explicit about her conduct, and you can draw your own inferences: and if the cap should happen to fit Clodia, there is obviously no case against Caelius.*'

The same oration? The same commentary? *Varium et mutabile semper*?

This is where we come in—or, to hit the mimetic nail on the head, this is where 'you' come in, as the reader is apostrophized as if present and upstanding in court:

1933
§§ 1–2. EXORDIUM. 'Caelius is being tried on a feast-day under a *lex de vi*. But he has committed no crime; and although Atratinus is nominally the accuser, the real attack comes from a woman behind the scenes.'
>
1952
§§ 1–2. EXORDIUM. '*You are in court on a day of public festival, to try Caelius under the* Lex de Vi. *But he has committed no crime competent to this court. His accuser is nominally Atratinus; but the real attack comes from behind the scenes, the work of a woman—and a bad woman.*'

These things can always be managed better, always written worse. Commentaries must try to be up to date, so they must get out of date.

viii. *Note well*: (1) eliminate frigid pomposity—(2) quell facetious irreverence—(3) bar academic *odium*. Eschew (such) adjectival modifiers: *Laconize* for all you are worth.

(1) Second time around, the hoary censor sheds hoary English, and a shaft of telling reflexivity fizzes home:

Cicero could hardly have chosen a more telling example of a scholar and a gentleman to rebuke a flighty descendant.
([1933] 76, n. on §33 **Caecus/Caecus ille**)
>
Cicero made a good choice of this fine old Roman gentleman to rebuke a flighty descendant, to whom his ways would no doubt seem curiously fusty.
([1952] 92, n. on §33 **Caecus/Caecus ille**)

(2) Lap up spilt milk:

Aulus Gellius (xvii. 1) quotes this passage to illustrate the carping criticisms made by the authors of a 'Ciceromastix', *liber infando titulo*. Caelius, they said, could not 'repent' of what lay outside his control . . . **The passage is interesting as showing the futility of much ancient criticism**. *Paenitet* has a quite definite sense of 'regret', without necessarily implying responsibility.
([1933] 48, n. on §6 **paeniteat**. *My emphasis.*)
>
Yet this passage is quoted by Gellius (xvii. 1) to illustrate criticisms brought against Cicero's latinity by the authors of a 'Ciceromastix', *liber infando titulo*: Caelius, they said, could not 'repent' of what was not in his control . . .
([1952] 51, n. on §6 **paeniteat**)

Spare neophytes their penitence/repentance? It can't be done.

(3) The greenhorn wrote (he had supposed) for graybeards:

Humbert, p. 165, imagines that Cicero puts the questions here because he knew that he would not be present at the *interrogatio*!
([1933] 60, n. on §19 **si prodierit**)

Here the graybeard axed the greenhorn's note: a commentary is no place for Mohock sarcasm—a red rag for the Latinist's cross-nibb'd pen.

There is—is there not?—all the difference in the world of letters between "Vollgraff's remark on § 45 is amusing . . ." and "Some earlier notes make odd reading now . . . Vollgraff . . ." ([1933] xvi n.2; [1952] xx n.1). Put the two modalities side by jowl, and moral and method are surely hard to miss:

W.'s revolting explanation . . . may have some truth . . . cf. Fra . . . and Harnecker . . . for even more uncontrolled imagination. . . . H., p.252,

discusses the passage with admirable caution . . .; but the best commentary still remains in Cicero's own words '*percipitis . . . quid velim vel potius quid nolim dicere*'.

([1933] 105, n. on §69)

>

For some highly coloured attempts at explanation, see Maggi . . . van Wageningen . . ., Fra., . . . Harnecker. . . . Heinze discusses the passage with admirable caution . . .; Cicero himself gives timely warning, *percipitis . . . quid nolim dicere.*

([1952] 132, n. on §69)

ix. *No apologies for presuming that readers want to read more Latin classics.* Reading with a commentary is not confined to accessing the text in hand; it is a chance to stack up (finer) points for occasions to come. Or, rather, this is (surely) where Latinists traditionally implant the habit of fascination with the intimate behavior of this art language, and here the critical metalanguage of the industry can be acquired, absorbed *in agendo.*

Just make sure the general points do have a pay-off *ad loc.*, before you slip away into a red-eyed lecturette. However magisterial, did it *ever* cut it with class? I'm not certain:

Students seldom realize that *culpare* is a comparatively uncommon word: Cicero does not use it; it occurs in Plautus, in the Augustan poets, and in Silver Latin, but not with any degree of frequency.

([1952] 44, n. on §1 **reprehendat**)

Ditto for the 'cultural' take on reading texts, as when red-blooded *Pro Caelio* pulls out all the stops for the '**lacrimae . . . luctusque**' of the classical courtroom—Serjeant Buzfuz and all ([1952] 49)—and introduces us to broadside 'social documentary,' as in the most celebrated note in the commentary, the ticklish mini-essay on *urbanitas* ([1952] 53). Here Austin gamely takes a page to tell us: "An adequate translation of *urbanitas* is impossible. . . . *Urbanitas* of style is similarly indefinable. . . . Quintilian gives a definition of it . . .; his own definition is . . ." His *pis allers* are scare-quotation, *je ne sais quoi* French, evocative Latin quotation, and ultimately (Quintilian's own *pis aller*) Hellenism: 'good form,' '*politesse*,' Catullus 86–"there is the indefinable ingredient of *urbanitas*"—and ἀττικισμός.

x. *Love the words.* Rise above the 'dictionary fallacy'—for us moderns, meaning arises, and is embedded, in use.

There is a pattern, and here it is: "The word derives its colour from its context," "the word takes its tone from its context," "the word is not always complimentary, but takes its tone from the context," "the word takes its colour from its context," etc. etc. ([1952] 43: on **audaciam**, 44, on **libidinem**, 64, on **diserti**, 110, on **incessu**).

xi. *When one is an authority, one will waffle at the right moment*, ditch discipline for raw anecdote, and for odd gleanings from casual reading.

The rosy-faced lecturer wound up his (Mayorian) stroking of Roman *beards* with this flash flourish:

> For the orient peoples there is an elaborate statistical monograph on the subject by H. Mötefindt, *Zur Geschichte der Barttracht im alten Orient* (Leipzig, 1923), and for the fashions of this country the curious may refer to Butler's *Hudibras*, i. I. 241ff., ii. 1. 172, with Zachary Grey's notes (London, 1772), Inigo Jones, *Verses upon | T. Coryat, and his Crudities*, and John Taylor the Water Poet, *Superbiae Flagellum.*
> ([1933] 75–6, n. on §33 **barbatis**)

He was just asking for it, but gets off pretty lightly:

> The curious would find interest in H. Mötefindt, *Zur Geschichte der Barttracht im alten Orient*, Leipzig, 1923.
> ([1952] 91, n. on §33 **ex barbatis . . . non hac barbula**)

But (in return) could a Professor Austin[4] have stomached the dross creeping in among rusty Austin[3]'s own 'Additional Notes'?

> . . . in the preface to the *Memoirs of the Life of Sir Stephen Fox* (published in 1717), the author says of his works that they 'have not met with so ill a reception . . . as to fling him into the list of *triobularian* scribblers'. (I owe this reference to Professor Mark Thomson.)

and

> How did the talented author of the *Ephemeris belli Troiani* happen to remember this scrap of Cicero? It is tantalizing that the Tebtunis Papyrus has a lacuna here (see Eisenhut's edition, Teubner, 1958, p.136); but it is clear, from a comparison with the versions of Malalas and Iohannes Antiochenus, that this is one of the passages where the Latin writer expanded his Greek original (see Ihm, *Hermes* xliv, 1909, p.18; *Tebtunis Papyri*, Part II, p.17).
> ([1960] 171, nn. on §62, §63)

Still there, students of Glasgow, Cardiff, Liverpool, Oxford, Cambridge? Do I believe you? Then say *which* Austin was it who commented:

> Caelius must have been an objectionable young man . . . full of show and swagger; cf. the young Disraeli (A. Maurois, *Disraeli*, p. 62): 'He went to Caroline Norton's in a coat of black velvet, poppy-coloured trousers broidered | with gold, a scarlet waistcoat, sparkling rings worn on top of white kid gloves.'

Or, if that's too hard:

> **obsequio:** 'devotion'; the modern sense of 'obsequious' has lost this aspect of the Latin root, which older English retained; the meaning of 'officious' has likewise changed. An epitaph in Gloucester Cathedral, where it is said of a girl 'obsequiosa viro fuit, officiosa parenti', would suggest a strangely unattractive picture if the adjectives were given their present-day sense.

Caught red-handed?

xii. *Keep the text yours*—take notes in case a new edition materializes, add them at the end. And if it comes up, you'll have to decide for yourself if you have what it takes to rubbish your earlier self by re-writing its best efforts. If it happens, it will speak volumes about your scholarship, your propaedeutic. A commentary's worth.

See below.

III

A woman worthy of Aeneas[32]

The *Pro Caelio* since Austin[33] has prompted three initiatives, two he would take to at once, and one that would leave him beached (marooned):

(1) The discovery that the oration deploys a theatrically scripted movement 'down' toward dismissive jollification and joshing, from mock tragedy through comic impersonation to farcical mime, realigns and reintegrates the diffractive notes that commentary 'section*itis*'

[32] Austin (1971) xviii, 'Introduction.' In full: "Dido is a woman whose high-mindedness and honour match the most exacting Roman ideal of conduct and person: a woman worthy of Aeneas."
[33] An efficient review from a decade after Austin[3]: Classen (1973).

had sundered (as its format always must): Geffcken (1973), Wiseman (1985) 54–91.

As ever, we say, Latin classics should be grasped through their culture—their Romanness.

(2) Reception of the speech as casting itself to act out the hits currently on the bill at Pompey's spanking new theater: Arcellaschi (1997). So producing an uncanny 'double' for the *ludi Megalenses*, with 'that woman'—Clodia—as a burlesque queen of the carnival, and stand-in for Cybele: Salzman (1982).

Rome, Roman culture, delivered through Latin texts, business as usual.

(3) Quite beyond olde worlde chivalry: revisionary critique of gender politics from the 70s on: from Dorey (1958) and Ramage (1984), through Craig (1993) 108f., *Pro Caelio* has moved towards exposure *as* so much macho victimization of woman. Satire that stains and exposes all concerned, orator and commentator, jurors, fans, and readers.

Not Quintilian's timeless ideal of goodness on legs, but Antiquity opened to reception, to revision by successive modernities.

Putting all this aside, we have outlined how 'plain man's' advocacy of Roman eloquence knits together the prestigious series of red 'Austins.'[34] And this leaves *us* to ponder, without much help or joy from the editor, the question that he expressed/repressed in his (very) last word on *Pro Caelio.* Here he winds up through that far-from-plain-style finale on "the importance of voice and gesture in pleading."

It ends in the paraded self-reflexivity of a last paragraph that opens loudly with "A good commentary on the whole subject . . .," before rising to the red-hot *fulminatio in clausula*:

> Such passages, and many others, help to show the immense personal power for good or ill that a republican orator could wield. It was the existence of such power that made Quintilian in a later age stress at every turn the ethical aspect of an orator's function: he must be, in old Cato's words, *uir bonus dicendi peritus* (Quintilian xii. 1. 1), or he

[34] Austin's notes on Quintilian 12.10 amount to a tense and sustained comparative stylistics of Greek and Latin oratory: producing them would be an education in style; reading them is a lesson.

will betray his trust. In a famous simile (*Aen.* i. 148ff.), Virgil sums up the whole ethical issue:

ac ueluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta est
seditio saeuitque animis ignobile uulgus,
iamque faces et saxa uolant, furor arma ministrat:
tum, pietate grauem et meritis *si forte uirum quem*
conspexere, silent arrectisque auribus adstant;
ille regit dictis animos et pectora mulcet.

(Austin [1960] 174–5)

Looking forward to his final (1970s) phase of commentary, looking back to his start in 1933 . . .—does Austin's playhouse come crashing down around his, and our, ears? Had (any) Cicero really served the *good* in defending (a) Caelius? Would rumination on Virgil eventually *destabilize* the political ostrichism or dissimulation of any Quintilian, tutor to Domitian? (Who missed Mussolini and Hitler first time round?) Or is faith in the civilizing influence of a classical education all that we *can* put between us and the *evil* of rhetoric in the wrong hands, from the wrong mouth?[35]

As the Quintilian commentary took shape (as he said) between 1937 and 1948, Austin bet his entire project on that crucial rubric in the *Training of the Orator*:

NON POSSE ORATOREM ESSE NISI VIRUM BONUM, XII. 1 ('IMPOSSIBLE TO BE AN ORATOR WITHOUT BEING A GOOD MAN'),

where total vindication of Cicero the Roman Demosthenes—*saepe dixi dicamque perfectum oratorem esse Ciceronem* (§19: "I have often said, and will say, that the compleat orator is Cicero, and Cicero is the compleat orator")—leads directly into beatification of the successful graduand through citation of precisely the Virgilian *locus classicus*: with vv.151–2 interpreted as defining the *uir bonus*, and 153 as adding the essential qualification *dicendi peritus* (§27).

Putting to one side the politics and philosophy of education for a moment, along with the politics of the philosophy of education, let

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[35] How self-deceived was he, and is this: "In his insistence upon his ethical ideal, which must be inborn in his orator and not something that he is to seek from outside, Quintilian has made a final stand for intellectual honesty . . ." ([1948] xxvf., 'Introduction')? Is this curtains for education and (so) for Classics, before and after all?

World War II gave Austin no ammunition: the 'Great War' must still haunt his readers in the 60s—those students in schools and universities—cf., e.g., the epigraph and opening page of the 'Introduction' to Austin (1964).

us focus on the red-rimmed commentator. He is delivering his mission statement, in the mimetic form of projection into his didactic text. This stands as itself commentary on his performative oration and on his sublimated narrative alike. More, he has used the model of the utilitarian—pragmatic and strenuous—protreptic text as *commentary on itself*, and, hence, on its commentary. On himself:

> Quintilian never forgets that he is a teacher, writing for his pupils.
> (Austin [1948] 42, n. on 12.10.6)

The freshman commentator had noted:

> In Quintilian can be seen a determined and enthusiastic effort to lead men back to the ideals of the *de oratore*.
> (Austin [1933] 87, n. on *Pro Cael.* §46 '**obterendae . . . deserendus**')

His professorial censor struck this out entirely. Its prompt was retooled, from immature sloppiness and false tonality into a fair specimen of that unmistakable Austin *voice*:

> **In Cicero's time the *tirocinium fori*** still **ensured hard and careful training** for the young orator who took his career seriously, but with the beginning of **the empire** it became little more than **a formality**, and in part at least its disappearance was responsible for such a state of things as Seneca depicts.
> ([1933] 87; **bold** text where retained in the revision)
> >
> In Cicero's time the *tirocinium fori* ensured hard and careful training, and its reduction to a formality under the Empire had serious consequences.
> ([1960] 108)

There you have it, or at least my best shot at it. A flaming story of Latinity, in Oxford re(a)d.

Now I too can look back, red-cheeked, at *my* tirocinium—at my 'Austins':

> *Pueritiae* in the next sentence suggests a smile, rather than a sneer as Manutius thought.[36]

[36] (1960) 45. I have recently done time revising 'commentary (and satire)' that was written but not published in the 1970s. Explanation enough of this essay? Possibly, but it now betokens further work in progress. I have to thank and apologize to R. G. A., R. G. M. N., N. R. (whose corrections amounted to another lesson in commentary form), and C. S. None of them can approve of any of it.

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10. THE XENOPHON FACTORY: ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY YEARS OF SCHOOL EDITIONS OF XENOPHON'S *ANABASIS*

Albert Rijksbaron

I. *Introduction*

In 1862, shortly after Easter, thirteen-year-old Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf (1848–1931) was admitted as an 'Untertertianer' to the venerable Landesschule Pforta in the province of Saxony. At home he had received his primary education, which in the final years also included Greek and Latin. He now entered a school that had an outstanding reputation and a long tradition in the field of classical education. Yet young Wilamowitz was less than enthusiastic about his Greek lessons:

> das Griechische war nicht mehr als ein Anhang zum Latein. Formenlehre ohne jeden Hauch von sprachwissenschaftlich orientierter Grammatik, Pauken der nutzlosen Akzente, nachher jene ungriechische, auf den unpassenden lateinischen Leisten geschlagene Syntax. . . . Auswahl der Lektüre ungeschickt, Xenophon immer weiter,[1] Lysias, Arrian. Eine Rettung war erst, daß die Odyssee in der Untersekunda, die Ilias in der Obersekunda durchgelesen wurden mußte.[2]

Wilamowitz's verdict must have been influenced by his teacher, who fares badly at his hands. In his memoirs Wilamowitz does not tell us what his school curriculum looked like, but it will not have been much different from the curriculum that is printed in the tercentenary anniversary edition of the Pforta schoolbook from 1843.[3] In

[1] An allusion to ἐντεῦθεν ἐξελαύνει? Incidentally, the Greek text had to be translated into Latin!

[2] "Greek was no more than an appendix to Latin. Accidence with no trace at all of a linguistically oriented grammar, hammering home the useless accents, next that un-Greek syntax which was modeled after the unfitting Latin one. . . . Reading selections unsuitable, Xenophon ever going on, Lysias, Arrian. Our only salvation was that the *Odyssey* had to be read in the 'Untersekunda' and the *Iliad* in the 'Obersekunda'" (Wilamowitz-Möllendorf [1928?] 71).

[3] Kirchner (1843).

that year 61 hours were devoted to Latin, distributed over five classes, and 27 to Greek, again distributed over five classes. For a better understanding of the system in which Wilamowitz received his education, and of the role of the classics in general and Xenophon in particular in that system, it is necessary to say a few words about its background.

II. *Nineteenth-Century Education, in Germany and Elsewhere*

From 1812, the organization of school teaching in Germany was determined by a new curriculum, which in turn was the result of the Laws on Education established by Wilhelm von Humboldt. In 1810, at the end of a brief career as the Prussian Minister of Education, this multi-talented scholar[4] and diplomat had profoundly reformed the educational system. His reform was based on the following premise: "Es gibt, philosophisch genommen, nur drei Stadien des Unterrichts: Elementarunterricht, Schulunterricht, Universitätsunterricht."[5] The 'Schulunterricht' comprised advanced education, and was subdivided into the 'Bürgerschule,' a kind of professional school, and the 'Gelehrtenschule,' whose objective it was to prepare for higher education. At the end of that school

> [ist] der Schüler reif, wenn er soviel bei anderen gelernt hat, daß er nun für sich selbst zu lernen imstande ist. Sein Sprachunterricht z. B. ist auf der Schule geschlossen, wenn er dahin gekommen ist, nun mit eigener Anstrengung und mit dem Gebrauch der vorhandenen Hilfsmittel jeden Schriftsteller, insoweit er wirklich verständlich ist, mit Sicherheit zu verstehen, und sich in jede gegebene Sprache, nach seiner allgemeinen Kenntnis vom Sprachbau überhaupt, leicht und schnell einzustudieren.[6]

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[4] Especially in the field of linguistics. The Danish linguist Otto Jespersen considered Humboldt "one of the profoundest thinkers in the domain of linguistics." He is of course also known as the founder of the University of Berlin.

[5] "There are, philosophically speaking, only three stages of education: elementary education, school education, university education."

[6] "the pupil is mature when he has learned so much with others that he is now capable of learning all by himself. Thus, his linguistic education at school is finished when he has reached the point that he understands with certainty, using his own forces and the available aids, any author, in as far as he can really be understood, and may get acquainted easily and quickly with any given language, using his general knowledge of the structure of language at large" (Humboldt [1809/1964] 12ff.).

Humboldt's school system was introduced with remarkable speed and has been immensely influential, also outside Germany, to a certain extent up to the present day. One important consequence of this reform was that the 'Gymnasium' became a 'pre-academic' institution, and this created an enormous need of 'Hilfsmittel,' whose availability Humboldt apparently took for granted. In the case of Xenophon, who already before the reform had been a favorite elementary author, this led to a real explosion of editions with 'Erklärungen,' whether or not 'für den Schulgebrauch.' Remarkably enough, this development was not confined to Germany but took place, almost simultaneously, in other countries as well. A common feature of these editions is that the notes, with a few exceptions, were no longer given in Latin, but in the vernacular. Thus, in the German-speaking countries the language of the notes was, from Krüger's 1830 *Anabasis* edition onwards, German.[7] With this, and more particularly with the second edition of his commentary, Krüger set the fashion for all later commentaries.

III. *School Editions of the* Anabasis

On the assumption that Wilamowitz, presumably at the end of his first year, in the so-called 'Obertertia,' started reading the *Anabasis* (as is strongly suggested by the words 'immer weiter' in the above quotation),[8] his teacher could choose from no fewer than five school editions: Kühner 1852, [4]Krüger (i.e., the fourth edition) 1854, [3]Hertlein 1857, [2]Vollbrecht 1861, [2]Matthiä 1859 (see the table below). Regrettably, Wilamowitz does not tell us which edition his school used, nor what the 'ungriechische' syntax was which so provoked his wrath. It goes without saying that it is no small task to establish in what way and to what extent the elementary stages of the learning of Greek influence the later views of a professional classicist, apart from

[7] I have found a few references to this edition in German, but it is not mentioned in any of the Dutch University libraries. The language of the edition by Graff 1842 is probably Latin, but I was not able to establish this as a fact. Greek (school-)grammars in German had been available for quite some time, e.g., that of Ph. Buttmann, of which the 10th edition appeared in 1837.

[8] It appears from the anniversary book (above, n.3) that in 1843 the *Memorabilia* were on the programme, but these may of course have been replaced by the *Anabasis* in the course of the 20 years between 1843 and 1863.

the stimulating effect that may or may not have been brought about by teacher, reading, and coursebook. Such influences cannot be ruled out, for some things learned in school may have a very persistent life indeed. The 'vividness' allegedly expressed by the historic present (see also below), or the idea that 'the' aorist expresses 'pastness,' are perhaps cases in point. Be that as it may, it definitely made a difference whether the one or the other edition was used: the number of the notes, their layout, degree of detailedness, clarity, scholarly qualities[9]—on all these points there are considerable differences between the school editions. Thus, the pupil who used Rehdantz's edition was bound to get a completely different idea of the functions of the genitive and the present indicative from the pupil with Krüger on his desk.

Below I shall treat in some detail the quality of the grammatical notes of these and other editions. But first, I present in tabular form a survey of a large number of school editions of the *Anabasis*. By way of introduction to this survey, perhaps a few words about the dominant position of Germany, notably with respect to the US, are in order. An eloquent and unequivocal testimony of the German influence on the American classical world is to be found in B. L. Gildersleeve's article 'English and German Scholarship'; in this article, the great American classicist (1831–1924) looks back at his formative years.[10] "Such philological schooling as I have had is wholly Teutonic," he says bluntly, because his "American teachers did not understand their business."[11] Actually, this 'Teutonic' schooling was not self-evident, for in spite of the Revolution, whose echoes still resounded loudly in the first half of the nineteenth century, the American classical world was very much oriented towards Great Britain, and initially this also applied to Gildersleeve. But he went to Germany (Bonn) for an academic training in Greek and Latin, and it was only there that he got an education that was worthy of that name. Reacting to an article by Gilbert Murray, which also

[9] In this connection it is worth noticing that up to the present day no scholarly commentary on the *Anabasis* has been published, on which school editions might have drawn.

[10] Gildersleeve (1930) 365.

[11] In Gildersleeve's youth, school editions of the *Anabasis* in English were, in the US, still scarce. In the 1840s a teacher could choose between Cleveland, published in 1834, and Owen, in 1843.

deals with the learned classical worlds in Germany and Great Britain, Gildersleeve summarizes his views as follows:

> it is not to be denied that for the American classical teacher who wishes to fit himself for his work in life the only sensible course is to familiarize himself with German methods, and in my day that could only be encompassed in Germany itself.

In the same article Gildersleeve pronounces in passing a harsh verdict on the phenomenon of the school edition:

> an Oxford Don once lamented to me the modern mania for writing books. If he meant the run of school editions he was quite right. Most of them are absolutely negligible for the advanced student, and no book ought to be published that does not contain some individual contribution to what is already known.[12]

How true his observation on the 'run of school editions' is, becomes apparent from the following survey. The question whether these editions should be considered 'negligible' will be addressed after the survey.

TABLE 1. A Survey of (School) Editions of the *Anabasis* in Germany, the United States, Great Britain, and some other Countries, 1826–2000[13]

PERIOD OF PUBLICATION	GERMANY	UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN	OTHER COUNTRIES
1820–30[14]	[1826, C. G. Krüger, Halis Saxonum]			
1830–40	[1830, K. W. Krüger; notes in German]	1834, C. D. Cleveland,[15] Boston	[1830, F. C. Belfour, London] [1834, ²Belfour] [1835, A. Negris, Edinburgh]	

[12] Incidentally, Gildersleeve's ire was not so much directed at school editions, as to certain (unnamed) British classicists, for he continues as follows: "But one waxes impatient at the reputations that have been gained in England by infinitesimal productions. Where else on God's earth would a man gain immortality by an Introductory Lecture?"

[13] I may have missed a couple of editions, but on the whole I believe that the survey is fairly complete, at least for the nineteenth century and for Germany, the US, and Great Britain. I am indebted to Dr. T. Rood (Oxford) for pointing out to me the existence of many British editions from the nineteenth century which I initially had overlooked, and to Mr. M. de Bakker (Oxford) for providing me with copies of some of these editions. Of many editions, not only the American and British ones, but, e.g., also those of Hertlein and Bersi, I have been able to consult the copies in Widener Library (Harvard University). I am indebted to the

TABLE 1 (*cont.*)

PERIOD OF PUBLICATION	GERMANY	UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN	OTHER COUNTRIES
			1838, J. T. V. Hardy,[16] London [1839, D. B. Hickie, Books I–II, London]	
1840–50	[1842, G. Graff, Leipzig] 1845, K. W. Krüger, Berlin, bei K. W. Krüger (in German; 'zweite Ausgabe') [1849, ²Krüger] [1849, F. K. Hertlein, Berlin: Weidmann]	[1843, J. J. Owen,[17] New York: Appleton & Co.]	[1841, C. S. Stanford, Dublin] [1844, ²J. A. Phillips, Dublin; year of 1st ed. unclear] [1847, J. F. Macmichael,[18] London: G. Bell & Sons] [1847, J. T. White, London] [1848, Ch. Anthon,[19] London] [1848, J. S. Fergusson (or Ferguson), Edinburgh] [1849, ²Hickie, London, 'rev. ed.']	

Widener staff for their assistance in collecting the material. Prof. H. T. Wallinga (Utrecht) was so kind as to lend me his copy of Brownrigg's edition.

Square brackets around a given name indicate that the edition concerned was not seen by me (which unfortunately occurred quite often, especially in the case of many British editions from the first half of the nineteenth century). Some editions cover only selections from the *Anabasis*; this is sometimes but not always indicated in the survey.

[14] Apart from Krüger's edition there appeared, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, still many other editions, all with notes in Latin; sometimes these were new, sometimes reprints of eighteenth century editions. Some examples are: 1825, Bornemann, Lipsiae; 1827, Poppo, Lipsiae; 1821, Schneider, Oxonii; 1825, Hutchinson, Glasgow (originally published 1735). Since these editions played no role in schools, I have not included them in the survey.

[15] "Professor of the Latin Language and Literature in the University of the City of New York."

[16] "Assistant Master in University College School."

[17] "D. D., Ll.D., Formerly Principal of the Cornelius Institute, and now Professor of the Latin and Greek Language and Literature in the Free Academy in New York City."

[18] "B. A., Trinity College, Cambridge; Head Master of the Grammar School, Ripon."

[19] "Ll.D., Professor of the Greek and Latin Languages in Columbia College, New York, and Rector of the Grammar School." This edition was apparently first published in London, and only afterwards in New York (see below under 1868).

Table 1 (*cont.*)

Period of publication	Germany	United States	Great Britain	Other countries
1850–60	[1850, [3]Krüger] [1851, K. Matthiä, Quedlinburg] 1852, R. Kühner, Gothae, notes in Latin [1854, [2]Hertlein] 1854, [4]Krüger, Berlin: K. W. Krüger's Verlagsbuchhandlung; simultaneously published in London and New York 1857, [3]Hertlein [1857, F. Vollbrecht,[20] Leipzig: Teubner] 1859, [2]Matthiä	1857, J. R. Boise,[21] New York: Appleton & Co.	[1850, [2]Fergusson] [1852, [2]Anthon, new ed. rev. by T. Doran] [1853, Browne,[22] trans. of Hertlein 1849 with add'l notes, Arnold's School Classics] [1853, [2]Macmichael] [1853, J. T. V. Hardy & E. Adams, London ('portions only')] [1854, [4]Fergusson] [1854–5, H. Young,[23] London] [1857, [3]Macmichael, 'new ed.']	France: [ca. 1860, F. Dübner, Paris]
1860–70	[1861, [2]Vollbrecht] [1863, C. Rehdantz, Berlin: Weidmann] [1865, [3]Vollbrecht] 1865, L. Breitenbach, Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses [1869, [4]Vollbrecht]	1867, [2]Owen, preface dated 1861 ("Since that time [viz., 1843] about 35,000 copies have been printed and sold") 1868, [3]Anthon	1860, Macmichael ('new edition') [1860, [6]Fergusson] [1866, [9]Fergusson] [1866, [2]White] [1866, K. S. Isbister, London (Books I–III)] [1868, Macmichael ('new edition')] [1868, J. S. Watson, London]	
1870–80	[1871, [6]Krüger] [1873, [5]Vollbrecht] 1877, [6]Vollbrecht ("up to and incl. the 5th ed. 20000 copies sold")	[1875, A. Crosby, New York]	[1872, Macmichael ('new edition')] [1877, A. Pretor,[24] Cambridge: CUP., repr. 1878] [1879, R. W. Taylor, London]	

[20] "Rector zu Otterndorf."
[21] "Professor of Greek in the University of Michigan."
[22] "Prebendary of Chichester."
[23] "Second Master of the Grammar School, Guildford."
[24] "Fellow of St. Catharine's College, Cambridge."

TABLE 1 (*cont.*)

PERIOD OF PUBLICATION	GERMANY	UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN	OTHER COUNTRIES
1880–90	1888, [6]Rehdantz, bearb. von O. Carnuth[25] [1889, E. Bachof, Paderborn] 1889, [7]Krüger, besorgt von W. Pökel	[1889, F. W. Kelsey[26] & A. C. Zenos,[27] Boston]	1880, W. W. Goodwin[28] & J. W. White,[29] London: Macmillan 1881, [2]Pretor (repr. 1882, 1885, 1891, 1894, 1900) 1882, A. S. Walpole,[30] London: Macmillan (repr. 1885, 1888, 1891, 1894, 1896, 1898, 1900, 1902, 1903, 1906, 1909) 1882, H. R. Parker,[31] Dublin (Book I)	Austria: [1884, R. Hansen, Wien] Italy: [1886, A. Bersi, Torino]
1890–1900	[1890, A. Weidner, Leipzig: Freytag] [1895, F. G. Sorof, Berlin: Teubner] [1896, [9]Vollbrecht, bes. von W. Vollbrecht[32]]	1892, Kelsey–Zenos ('third edition' but actually = ed. of 1889) 1895, [4]Kelsey–Zenos ('fourth edition,' but now revised; repr. 1948 as 'sixth edition')	[1892, A. H. Allcroft & F. L. D. Richardson, London (Book I)] [1894, C. E. Brownrigg,[33] London: Blackie & Sons] [1885–92, J. Marshall,[34] Edinburgh] [1896, [2]Allcroft & Richardson] [1897, Fergusson & W. Coutts, Edinburgh ('new ed.')]	Austria: [1890, A. Weidner, Wien (same as the German ed., but with another publisher)] [1894, [2]Weidner] France: [1896, P. Couvreur,[35] Paris] Holland: [1899, J. Mehler & H. O. de Jong, Utrecht] Italy: [1893, [2]Bersi; "of the 1st ed. 4000 copies sold"]

[25] "Professor Dr., Direktor des städtischen Gymnasiums in Danzig."
[26] "Ph.D."
[27] "M. A."
[28] "Ph.D., Eliot Professor of Greek Literature in Harvard College."
[29] "Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Greek in Harvard College."
[30] "M. A., Formerly Scholar of Worcester College, Oxford."
[31] "Ll.D. Headmaster Methodist College Belfast. Ex-scholar and Senior Classical Moderator, Trinity College Dublin."
[32] "Dr., Professor am Christianeum zu Altona."
[33] "M. A., Headmaster of Magdalen College School, Oxford."
[34] "Rector of the Royal High School."
[35] "Ancien Maître de Conférences à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Lille."

TABLE 1 (*cont.*)

PERIOD OF PUBLICATION	GERMANY	UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN	OTHER COUNTRIES
1900–10	[1905, [4]Weidner] 1907, [10]Vollbrecht		1901, G. M. Edwards,[36] Cambridge: CUP (Book I) 1902, [2]Brownrigg [1908, Goodwin–White, unalter. repr. of 1880?]	France: 1900, [2]Couvreur Italy: 1905 1905, [3]Bersi (repr. in 1912)
1910–20	1912, [7]Rehdantz–Carnuth, bearb. v. E. Richter	1912?, M. W. Mather & J. W. Hewitt, s.l.		Austria: [1919, [5]Weidner] France: [1913, [5]F. Dürrbach, Paris]
1920–30	1929, [8]Sorof, bes. von G. Sorof[37]			
1930–40				Holland: [1933, H. Rogge, Zwolle]
1940–50	[1947, Ed. Bornemann, Frankfurt/M. ('Auswahl')] [1949, A. Clausing ('Auswahl')]	1948, Kelsey & Zenos; on the titlepage 'sixth edition,' but actually unaltered repr. of 4th ed.		Holland: [1947, A. M. Bent, Nijmegen]
1950–60	[1952, [2]Clausing] [1954, Bornemann ('neue Ausgabe')] [1956, [6]Bornemann] [1956, [3]Clausing]			
1960–70	[1960, [4]Clausing] [1962, [9]Bornemann] [1963, [10]Bornemann]	1962, Mather & Hewitt (reprint)		Holland: 1963, [7]Bent
1970–80	[1974, [14]Bornemann] [1979, [23]E. Krämer, Münster; printing history could not be traced]		1980?, J. Antrich[38] and St. Usher,[39] Bristol: BCP[40]	

36 "M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge."
37 "Geh. Stud. Rat Prof. Dr., Oberstudiendirektor i.R."
38 "Head of Classics, Godalming Sixth Form College."
39 "Senior Lecturer in Classics, Royal Holloway College, University of London."
40 On the titlepage: "Xenophon. The Persian Expedition." Actually, however, it is a small anthology.

What can we learn from this survey of what with only a little exaggeration may be called 'the Xenophon factory'? (I confine myself to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[41]) In Germany, the high point of the *Anabasis* school editions falls between 1850 and 1870, in the US slightly later, between 1860 and 1880. In Great Britain, on the other hand, one can hardly speak of *a* high point, for during the whole of the nineteenth century the school editions of the *Anabasis* kept pouring out in all parts of the British Isles. This is connected with another difference. In Germany there appear, from 1840 onwards, three editions that for some or a long (and sometimes a very long) time will dominate the market. In Germany, Krüger's editions, of which the 1845 edition should be considered the first 'real' edition, gets heavy competition from Vollbrecht and Rehdantz, for the first time in 1857 and 1863, respectively. Of Krüger, Vollbrecht, and Rehdantz there appeared respectively *in toto* seven, ten, and twelve (usually revised) editions. Kühner's 1852 edition was something of an anomaly, since the notes were in Latin. This may explain why there appeared just this edition: for pupils it was probably unfit. (His fellow editors made extensive use of it.) But in Great Britain and Ireland the situation was different. Although there were a number of editions which remained popular for several decades (Macmichael, Fergusson, Pretor, Walpole), the market was certainly not dominated by these. Every now and then yet another edition appeared. Between 1830 and 1900 the Xenophon factory in the British Isles employed all in all some 22 authors, that in Germany eleven.

Some other conclusions impose themselves. In Great Britain, the wide variety of editors was paralleled by an equally wide variety of publishers. In Germany, on the other hand, the classical market, both the academic and the schoolmarket, was largely in the hands of two big publishing companies, namely Weidmann and Teubner. The history of the first went back to 1680, while Teubner, established in 1811, started publishing classical texts from 1821.[42] All big publishers profited enormously from Humboldt's reform, and it was only to be expected that they would include a favorite, and thereby

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[41] Observe that after the Second World War in Germany two new *Anabasis*-commentaries appeared, of which that by Ed. Bornemann became very popular. Unfortunately, from lack of material I could not compare these with their predecessors.

[42] There is a direct link with the measures taken by Humboldt: see Garzya (1983) 19.

commercially very attractive, school author like Xenophon in their list.[43] Also, the success of Krüger, a dangerous outsider who published his books with his own firm, will not have gone unnoticed. That the competition was heavy, and commercial success bitterly fought, can be inferred from the stray remarks that we find in some Introductions. Thus, Vollbrecht notes in 1877 that of his preceding editions 20000 copies have been sold, apparently a fact to boast about. From the survey it also appears that it was very unwise to publish your edition with a small, provincial, publishing house. See the editions by Matthiä (1851, reprinted once), Breitenbach (1865, no reprint) and Bachof (1889, no reprint).

Furthermore, it is worth noticing that Weidmann all of a sudden changed commentators: in 1857 Hertlein had published his third edition of the *Anabasis*, but only six years later he is replaced by Rehdantz. The reason is a matter of guesswork. It cannot have been lack of success, for within 10 years there had appeared three editions by Hertlein. Nor was he deceased, for he kept editing other texts for Weidmann. A comparison with his successor, Rehdantz, suggests that Hertlein's notes may have been too summary, and that Weidmann would lose the battle with the new edition by Vollbrecht, that had been published in 1857 by its arch-rival Teubner.

Another remarkable fact is that at the end of the century Teubner simultaneously published two *Anabasis*-editions: from 1895 onwards Vollbrecht with his own publisher gets competition from Sorof, who is very successful, too, and eventually ousts Vollbrecht: in 1907 the latter's edition is revised for the last time. The same happened in Great Britain and the US: in Great Britain, Macmillan was the publisher of both Goodwin–White 1880 (reprinted once) and Walpole (from 1882), and Cambridge University Press published both Pretor

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[43] For such responses by publishers to changes in the curriculum there are also modern parallels. Thus, in Holland the reform of the classics in secondary schools which started in the 1970s was followed by a whole new series of coursebooks and annotated editions; the format of the latter was completely different from the earlier school editions, since the emphasis was now on providing continuous help in studying the text, notably by giving very copious lexical annotations. Likewise, as Roy Gibson pointed out to me, the "insistence in the Cambridge 'green and yellow series' on 'commenting on texts as literature' is in good part a response to the changing demands of the syllabus in secondary schools, where less emphasis is now placed on knowledge of the language." See further Stephens 84–5 and Henderson 213, 218–9 (both above).

(at least until 1900) and Edwards (in 1901); for the US see Owen 1843 and Boise 1857. Had the earlier editions become too learned, perhaps because of changes in the curriculum in the 'Gelehrtenschule' and its Anglo-Saxon counterparts? In the case of Teubner, the latter explanation is not unlikely, for Sorof's edition no longer covers the whole *Anabasis*, but only a selection. Also, while the notes are very copious they are also very brief, and often they are just translations.

IV. *Cultural Differences*

In the footnotes to the survey I have indicated how the editor presents himself. It appears that there are considerable cultural differences between on the one hand Germany, and on the other the US and Great Britain. In the US and Great Britain the editor nearly always mentions his credentials;[44] in Germany this is very exceptional. In Germany, it was apparently self-evident that someone who edited the *Anabasis*, or indeed any classical text, was qualified to do so, while in the other countries an appeal to the *auctoritas* of the editor was needed. Only in the course of the nineteenth century does the German practice change, see, e.g., Carnuth 1888 and W. Vollbrecht 1896.

There is another clear and striking difference, now between Germany and the British Isles. Whereas in the latter, especially in the 1880s and 1890s, many popular editions are simply reprinted, often at a remarkable pace (cf. notably Pretor 1881 and Walpole 1882; but there are exceptions, such as Macmichael and Fergusson), in Germany this never occurs, strictly speaking. Always the fact that some edition has been sold out leads to the next edition being 'verbessert,' possibly even 'sehr verbessert.'[45] Often the reasons for correcting the previous edition are mentioned in the Preface: these may be the experiences gained by the use of the book in the classroom, or the appearance of new publications on the *Anabasis*, or of other editions. Commercially, this publishing policy was both risky (readers could not go on for ever purchasing new editions) and attractive (one really

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[44] There is only one exception, Mather and Hewitt 1962, but this may be a feature of the reprint. I have not been able to consult the original edition of ca. 1912.

[45] In this respect, too, the situation in the US was similar to that in Germany, although in the US the success of most editions was limited; only Kelsey and Zenos's edition was revised and reprinted several times.

could not afford to ignore the latest insights). Was the scholarly conscience of the German editors and their audience better developed? Or was this situation rather due to the competition in Germany being heavier? If one editor decided to revise his edition, the others naturally could not stay behind. Or perhaps the role of the public authorities was the decisive factor. In Germany, the educational material was prescribed for all schools by the provinces, and the authorities possibly saw to it that this material was not outdated.

V. *'Für den Schulgebrauch'—Or is There More to It?*

All editions mentioned in the survey are, practically speaking, school editions. One might expect this to be mentioned, e.g., on the title page. Also, one may expect a preface, which gives some information about the intended audience, and accordingly about the structure of the edition and the nature of the notes. I have scrutinized the editions on these points, and for a number of them I present the results in the next table. In this table, I also indicate whether the editors ever refer to each other, or to a grammar.

TABLE 2. Some characteristics of the editions[46]

EDITION	'FÜR DEN SCHULGEBRAUCH' *VEL SIM.* ON TITLE PAGE?	PREFACE WITH OBJECTIVES, ETC.?	REFERENCES TO OTHER EDITIONS/ GRAMMARS?
Krüger 1845	no	no	other ed.: —— gramm.: Krüger
Kühner 1852	no	yes	other ed.: 'superiores editores' in general gramm.: Kühner
^{4}Krüger 1854	no	no	other ed.: 'Ze.' gramm.: Krüger
Vollbrecht 1857	yes	yes	other ed.: 'alle Arbeiten früheren Herausgeber' gramm.: 'die verschiedensten'
^{2}Vollbrecht 1861	yes	yes, justification of changes with respect to 1st ed.; sim. in next edd.	as in first ed.

[46] Sometimes I refer to an edition that I have not seen; in these cases the relevant information was supplied by the preface(s) of earlier editions.

TABLE 2 (*cont.*)

EDITION	'FÜR DEN SCHULGEBRAUCH' *VEL SIM.* ON TITLE PAGE?	PREFACE WITH OBJECTIVES, ETC.?	REFERENCES TO OTHER EDITIONS/ GRAMMARS?
Anthon 1867	yes, extensive	no	the only ed. with a bibliography (up to 1845); does not mention his American colleagues Cleveland and Owen
Goodwin–White 1880	no	yes	other ed.: general remark about predecessors[47] gramm.: 'notes adapted to Goodwin's Greek Grammar'
Pretor 1881	no	yes	other ed.: Kühner, Schneider, Vollbrecht, Bornemann, Macmichael gramm.: Madvig
Walpole 1882	yes	yes	other ed.: notably those by Rehdantz, Krüger, Vollbrecht; Goodwin & White ('the best of the English editions') gramm.: Goodwin
Bersi 1886	no	yes	other ed.: Krüger, Breitenbach, Kühner, Matthiä, Rehdantz, Vollbrecht gramm.: ?
⁶Rehdantz–Carnuth 1888[48]	no	no, just a few remarks about the corrections	no references? (printing history not mentioned in the 'preface')
⁷Krüger–Pökel 1889	no	no	other ed.: a great many, also from the eighteenth century, without any bibliographical information gramm.: Krüger
Kelsey–Zenos 1889 (= 1892)	no	yes	other ed.: Rehdantz, Vollbrecht, Matthiä, Taylor gramm.: Goodwin, Hadley–Allen
²Bersi 1893	no	yes, justification of changes with respect to 1st ed., sim. in 1905 ed.	other ed.: as in 1886 gramm.: C. (= Curtius?)

[47] "It is of course impossible in notes like these to give special credit for all interpretations which are wholly or partly borrowed. No small erudition, indeed, would now be required to trace every valuable remark on the Anabasis to its original source or sources. The Editors must therefore express, once for all, their obligation to the long and familiar line of commentators on Xenophon, whose diligence has rendered further originality well-nigh impossible." See further Kraus (above) 11–13, 16–17.

[48] The first edition, the work of Rehdantz alone, appeared in 1863; I have not seen it.

TABLE 2 (*cont.*)

EDITION	'FÜR DEN SCHULGEBRAUCH' *VEL SIM.* ON TITLE PAGE?	PREFACE WITH OBJECTIVES, ETC.?	REFERENCES TO OTHER EDITIONS/ GRAMMARS?
[4]Kelsey–Zenos 1895	no	yes, very brief justification of changes with respect to 1889 ed. (= 1892)	other ed.: as in 1889 gramm.: Goodwin, Hadley–Allen, also Goodwin, *Moods & Tenses*
Couvreur 1896	no	yes, extensive	other ed.: Vollbrecht, Rehdantz–Carnuth, Goodwin–White gramm.: Croiset & Petitjean
Brownrigg 1902	no	no	other ed.: — gramm.: —
Mather–Hewitt 1912 (?)	no	yes	other ed.: — gramm.: Smyth, Hadley–Allan, Babbitt, Goodwin, Goodell
Sorof 1929	yes	yes, but very brief	other ed.: — gramm.: —
Bent 1947	no	yes, but very brief	other ed.: — gramm.: van Oppenraaij–Vermeulen
Antrich–Usher 1980 (?)	in the introduction: for students	yes	other ed.: — gramm.: —

It is clear that some editions pretended to be more than just a school edition. This especially applies to those of Krüger. There is not a single edition by Krüger where we read 'für den Schulgebrauch' on the title page, and he must have assumed, in fact, that by the sheer quantity, the degree of detail, and the quality of his notes his editions were in a class of their own.[49]

[49] This is confirmed in an unexpected way by the Preface to Vollbrecht's edition from 1877. In this Preface, Vollbrecht thanks a number of colleagues and reviewers for their comments, with one exception, an anonymous reviewer who "die Krüger'sche Ausgabe, deren Werth . . . niemand bezweifelt, als Muster hervorhebt" ("who extolls Krüger's edition, whose value nobody doubts, as a model"). While Vollbrecht acknowledges, then, the value of Krüger's edition, he adds in a parenthesis that it is valuable 'nur für Lehrer' ('only for teachers'). Krüger's prestige is also apparent from the fact that his edition of 1854 was simultaneously published in Berlin and (in German!) in London and New York.

From the table it appears that the editors, generally speaking, did not ignore each other. Only Krüger, again, shows idiosyncratic behavior. To be sure, starting with the 1854 edition he occasionally refers to others, but in an absolutely impenetrable way; thus, some notes are followed by 'Ze.' To whom or what this refers remains a mystery.[50] The simplest, and rhetorically most effective, way of letting it transpire that your notes were the apogee of a long tradition was, of course to mention your predecessors—but not by name. This is done by Kühner, Vollbrecht (whose 'alle Arbeiten' is not correct: see below), and most fully and frankly by Goodwin–White (quoted above, n.47). As indicated in the survey, just one single editor gives in his preface a regular bibliography, Anthon from 1867 (1847).

On closer inspection, another feature strikes the eye: while the nineteenth-century British and American (and also the French and the Italian) editors frequently refer to their German counterparts, the reverse *never* occurs. The explanation is simple: not only must the German editors have felt that they would learn nothing from these editions (if they knew them at all), but they could not read English in the first place. Wilamowitz is clear on this point: "Französich sollte gelernt werden. . . . Englisch lag noch ganz allgemein außerhalb des Horizontes; es gab wohl unter den Gästen, die in Kobelnik erschienen, niemanden, der es auch nur von ferne kennte." The gymnasium brought no improvement: "Englisch kannte das Preußische Gymnasium nicht."[51] Wilamowitz regarded himself as a very privileged exception, because he had had the opportunity to learn English as an extra-curricular activity. His remarks are confirmed by Gildersleeve, who observes, "Few of the German classical scholars of my day even pretended to know English";[52] during his studies in Germany, on the rather rare occasions when the use of an English text could not be avoided, he acted as an interpreter.

[50] In the seventh edition (but perhaps also in earlier ones, not seen by me) it appears that an edition by Zeune is meant, without further details. This is probably Johann Karl Zeune, who in the second half of the eighteenth century published editions of several works by Xenophon (with notes in Latin).

[51] "French had to be learned. . . . English at that time [ca. 1860] lay quite generally outside our horizon; among the guests that made their appearance at Kobelnik [his parental home] there was presumably not a single one who knew it even remotely. . . . English was unknown in the Prussian gymnasium" (Wilamowitz [1928?] 59, 78).

[52] Gildersleeve (1930) 366.

Finally, I should point out that in the course of the twentieth century the nature of the editions changes. Normally, the editions I consulted no longer mention any predecessors, or grammars, for that matter. The most telling examples are the editions by Sorof (at least that of 1929) and by Brownrigg (1902) and Antrich–Usher (no date, probably around 1980). A novice to the field cannot but have received the impression that these editions were the result of *generatio spontanea.*

After this introduction I now pass on to a discussion of the linguistic merits of these editions, which will be illustrated from the very beginning of the *Anabasis.*

VI. *Xenophon,* Anabasis *1.1.1–4: What are the Problems?*

Things to be required of a school edition[53]

A school edition, and indeed any edition with notes, should meet at least two requirements. First, in an ideal situation, the editor should know the average level of the intended audience, and adapt the quantity, extensiveness, and degree of detail of his notes to that level. Although, in the case of Xenophon, such a uniform starting point will have been rather exceptional, there was one certainty: almost always the *Anabasis* was the first Greek text to be read in the gymnasium and its look-alikes elsewhere, and the im- or explicit level of the edition should reckon with this fact. This issue will be discussed presently. Second, the notes should do two jobs at the same time: they should give immediate help for a local problem, thereby enabling the pupil to go on; and they should anticipate, if applicable, the presence of the same or a similar problem later in the text, and add a remark to this effect, or—perhaps more conveniently—refer back to the earlier explanation upon arrival at the second (third, etc.) occurrence of the problem, or—still more conveniently—they should repeat the same explanation. I have not examined the editions

[53] I am aware that the school edition as described above no longer exists, at least not for secondary schools. From recent times I have found (for Xenophon) only one descendant of the traditional school edition (Antrich–Usher), but this is meant for beginning students. The demands made here upon a school edition are, therefore, made retrospectively. See more generally on audience requirements Kraus (above) 8–9; on the anticipation of problems see Index, s.v. surprise.

systematically on this score, but generally speaking I have the impression that they meet this requirement.

For the sake of completeness I mention yet another, and far more intricate, issue, that sooner or later confronts every commentator: what to do with a phenomenon for which no real explanation exists, either in grammars or in other commentaries, whether on the *Anabasis* or on other texts? It goes without saying that a pupil may feel slightly frustrated if time and again his attention is drawn to some peculiarity, only to be told that "there is no really satisfying explanation for this phenomenon." Should it be ignored, then? An attentive pupil might very well realize that there is something the matter, and ask a question to that effect. Whereupon the teacher—unless he has found the answer himself—is forced to reveal that there is as yet no answer to the question. Since for a 'cursory' interpretation such phenomena often are not really a stumbling block, this may lead to the wholly mistaken idea that they do not have to be commented upon. On the very first page of the *Anabasis* there are at least three such phenomena[54] (line references are to the OCT edition):

(a) the occurrence of παῖδες δύο (l. 1) alongside the dual τὼ παῖδε (l. 3)
(b) Κῦρον without article (l. 5) alongside ὁ Κῦρος (l. 7)
(c) the oblique optative ἐπιβουλεύοι in l. 12 alongside tense and mood of direct speech, as in ἔσται in l. 15.

All three phenomena are by no means rare; on the contrary, they are widespread throughout the *Anabasis* (not to mention other texts). In all three cases a generally accepted explanation is lacking, although for (b) and (c) some proposals may be found in a few grammars and special studies.[55] As for our school editions, only παῖδες δύο is sometimes provided with a note, which generally has no value at all, except for signaling the phenomenon.[56] The presence or absence of

[54] Still seen from the perspective of a nineteenth-century editor. Ideally, a modern variant of the school edition should also deal with word order phenomena like ἠσθένει Δαρεῖος (§1), ἀναβαίνει . . . ὁ Κῦρος and ἐτελεύτησε Δαρεῖος (§3), on the one hand, and Τισσαφέρνης διαβάλλει and ἡ δὲ μήτηρ . . . ἀποπέμπει (§4), on the other.

[55] E.g., for (b) in Zucker (1899); in my inaugural lecture ('On Definite Persons,' Rijksbaron [2001]) more may be found on the article with proper names; for (c) see Kühner–Gerth (1898–1904) 2.555, Anm. 3 and Amigues (1977) 270.

[56] Thus, Rehdantz–Carnuth: "παῖδες δύο: aber 4, 1, 19 der Dualis: δύο καλώ τε κἀγαθὼ ἄνδρε τεθνᾶτον"; Goodwin–White: "τὼ παῖδε: dual; but above, the plural"; Mather–Hewitt: "παῖδες δύο: a plural noun is often used with δύο." Couvreur

the article with Κῦρος (and indeed with other proper names), and the possible differences between the use, in *oratio obliqua*, of the oblique optative and the tense and mood of direct speech, are nearly always passed over in silence. (There is just one exception: Parker 1882.)

Now, to return to the question of the 'average level of the intended audience,' it appears that, in spite of the fact that all commentators wrote for beginners, in actual practice their opinions differ widely as to what is a grammatical problem, and should therefore receive a note, and what is not a problem. There are remarkably few things which worry *all* commentators. Below, I give first of all a survey of phenomena from *An.* 1.1–4 that are *de facto* treated in six editions that I consider representative of the whole group; then follows a more detailed discussion of the notes that *all* commentators have on the first two constituents (Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος and γίγνονται).

Frequency of the Notes in Four Popular Nineteenth-century (Krüger, Vollbrecht, Rehdantz, Walpole) and Two Twentieth-century (Bent, Antrich–Usher) Editions of Anabasis *1.1–4 (up to and including ἀντ' ἐκείνου)*

Altogether, some 49 words and constructions, which I shall not enumerate here, are provided with a note. In only nine cases do all six editions mentioned have a note, viz., on:[57] §1 γίγνονται, τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου; §2 ἐποίησε, καί . . . δέ, ὡς φίλον, τῶν Ἑλλήνων; §3 ὡς ἀποκτενῶν, ἐξαιτησαμένη; §4 ὅπως ἔσται. In seven cases five editions have a note (on §1 Δαρείου; §2 παρὼν ἐτύγχανε, λαβών; §3 διαβάλλει ὡς,

("Δύο rend inutile l'emploi du duel du substantif") is simply wrong, since δύο is also found with the dual, cf. the instance quoted by Rehdantz. Only Walpole has at first sight an interesting observation; on closer inspection, however, it does not hold. He notes: "The pl. is used w. δύο because no stress is laid on the fact of there being only two; there had been thirteen." An investigation carried out by Guus van der Kraan during the seminar mentioned in n.80 below, however, led to the conclusion that, in the *Anabasis*, δύο in the nominative and the accusative overwhelmingly prefers a plural noun (30 times plural, as against two cases of the dual, 4.1.19, 4.3.10.) So it is the dual rather than the plural that has to be explained. Remarkably enough, this also applies to τὼ παῖδε ἀμφοτέρω: 1.1.1 is the only instance in the *Anabasis* of ἀμφοτερ- appearing in the dual, alongside seven instances of the plural. Perhaps the combination of the dual and ἀμφοτέρω emphasizes the idea that Artaxerxes and Cyrus had to be present as a pair, so: "He wanted both his sons to be present together."

[57] Below, in the discussion of Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος and γίγνονται, it will become clear that when the other editions are taken into account, the picture changes again. Thus, Hertlein has a note neither on Δαρείου καὶ Π., nor on γίγνονται.

ἐπιβουλεύοι, ἀποπέμπει; §4 [ὁ δ'] ὡς). In four cases four editions have a note (on §2 μεταπέμπεται, μὲν . . . δέ; §3 κατέστη, αὐτόν [with ἐξαιτησάμενη]). In the remaining 29 cases the number of editions that have something to say lies on a given problem between one and three.

Leaving numbers aside, even if the commentators see the same problem, the nature of their notes shows the most extraordinary variation. By way of 'warming up' for the detailed treatment of Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος and γίγνονται below, I shall now discuss the way in which the six selected commentaries deal with three other phenomena in the passage in question.

(a). §2 καὶ . . . δέ. A note here is more or less *de rigueur*, since this combination of particles occurs about 265 times in Xenophon, and all six commentaries do, indeed, have a note. Most of them confine themselves to observing, correctly, that the word between καί and δέ is emphasized, and do not commit themselves as to the syntactic function of the particles (Krüger, Vollbrecht, Rehdantz, Bent). Only Walpole and Antrich–Usher have a note on this function. The latter take it that δέ is the connective particle, while Walpole thinks it is καί ('and moreover'), although he leaves the possibility open that it is the other way round. To my mind only Walpole's analysis—which, incidentally, can also be found in Kühner–Gerth—is correct.[58]

(b). §3 ὡς ἀποκτενῶν. Four commentaries note that there is a difference between the future participle with and without ὡς. Only Bent and Antrich–Usher believe, quite wrongly, that the absence or presence of ὡς is irrelevant: "het part. fut., met of zonder ὡς, heeft finale betekenis" (Bent); "ὡς + fut. part., expressing purpose" (Antrich–Usher). This carelessness is puzzling: why did they not just take over Krüger's note, who in this case has by far the clearest wording ("ἀποκτενῶν allein würde den Zweck als bloss erzählt bezeichnen; mit ὡς wird er als Absicht, als Gedanke des Artaxerxes ausgesprochen")?[59]

(c). §3 ἐξαιτησαμένη. Krüger, Vollbrecht, Rehdantz, and Walpole rightly point to the value of the middle, 'Medium des Interesses,' in

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[58] See Rijksbaron (1997).

[59] "ἀποκτενῶν alone would present the purpose as simply narrated; with ὡς the objective is formulated as a thought of Artaxerxes."

Krüger's words, which is appropriate here, since Parysatis is on Cyrus' side all the time. Again, Bent and Antrich–Usher take a different position, since they are silent about the middle; again, this is puzzling. By ignoring the difference between αἰτεῖν and αἰτεῖσθαι, they not only miss the opportunity to add a subtle nuance to the interpretation of the text, but may also induce the students to believe that active and middle are six of one, half a dozen of the other.

Finally, I pass on to discussing the explanatory force of the notes on the first two constituents of §1, Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος and γίγνονται.

The Various Explanations in Chronological Order

(a.) Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος

Just a reference to a grammar in
–Cleveland 1834 ("See F[isk] Rule XVII")
–Owen 1867 (to the grammar of Sophocles)[60]

Merely a translation in
–Hardy 1838 ("Of-Darius and of-Parysatis are-born children two")[61]
–Macmichael 1860 ("*To Darius . . . are born two sons.* Literally, '*are born of*'")
–Anthon 1868 ("*Of Darius and Parysatis are born two sons*")
–Antrich–Usher ca. 1980 ("Dareios and Parysatis had")

We are dealing here with a *genitive of origin*, according to
–Boise 1857 ("lit. *there are born of Darius* etc . . . gen. of origin or author" + reference to Kühner's grammar)
–Vollbrecht 1877, 1907 ("Gen. des Urspr."). No translation
–Parker 1882 ("Goodwin Gr. 169 calls this a genitive of possession and translates 'are born (belonging to) Darius.' It is rather a genitive of source, origin, which is a kind of gen. of ablation.")

[60] Most of his notes are phrased as a question, of the type "What is this mid. voice equivalent to?," followed by references to one or more grammars.
[61] Hardy's book contains a "literal and interlinear translation" of chapters 1–6 of the first book, and a vocabulary; there are no notes.

–Rehdantz–Carnuth 1888 ("Genitiv des Ursprungs"). No translation
–Kelsey–Zenos 1892, but disguised as a question ("why gen.?") + ref. to Goodwin's Grammar ("gen. of source"); in 1895 the question has disappeared; in both cases no translation
–Couvreur 1896 ("génit. de provenance"). No translation
–Edwards (1901) ("'are the children of Darius and Parysatis,'—genitive of origin")
–Bersi 1905 ("Questo genitivo è detto d' *origine*"). No translation
–Mather–Hewitt ca. 1912 ("genitive of source"). No translation

. . . or rather with a *genitivus possessivus*, in the opinion of
–Krüger 1854 ("eine Art des Besitzes: sie wurden (Söhne) des D.")
–Krüger–Pökel 1889 ("eine Art des Besitzes: sie wurden (Söhne) des D.")
–Goodwin–White 1889 ("predicative genitive of possession"). No translation
–Sorof 1929 ("Gen. poss., deutsch: dem Dareios . . . werden (wurden) geboren, eig. zwei dem Dar. und der Par. gehörende Söhne werden geboren")
–Bent 1963 ("gen. possessivus om de oorsprong aan te geven").[62] No translation

ad hoc explanations are given by
–Krüger 1845 ("Der Ge. steht als ob die Eigennamen gleich folgten").[63] No translation
–Breitenbach 1865 ("Die Genitive . . . hängen von παῖδες δύο ab"). No translation

No note at all is given by
–Hertlein 1857

[62] "possessive gen. to indicate the origin." He refers to §116.1 of the grammar of Van Oppenraaij–Vermeulen. There one reads: "Possessivus: geeft de bezitter of oorsprong aan; dikwijls in verbinding met εἰμί en γίγνομαι" ("*possessivus*: indicates the possessor or origin; often in connection with εἰμί and γίγνομαι"), followed by one (artificial) example with ἐστιν: τὸ φεύγειν τῶν δειλῶν ἐστιν. Actually, however, *An.* 1.1.1 is mentioned in §117.1, as an instance of the *genit. originis*. In reprint after reprint the incorrect reference has been repeated.
[63] "The ge. stands as if the proper names followed immediately."

–Matthiä 1859 (just a reference to the grammatical 'Anhang,' which I have not been able to consult)
–Kühner 1852 (but implicitly a genitive of origin)
–Pretor 1877
–Walpole 1882
–Brownrigg 1902

(b.) γίγνονται

Just a translation is given by
–Breitenbach 1865 ("es werden geboren")

It is taken as an historic present

A. Without further comment by
–Brownrigg 1902 ("the verb is historic present")
–Couvreur 1896 ("présent dit *historique*" + reference to the grammar of Croiset and Petitjean, which I have not been able to find)

B. With further details by
(i) "occurs more often in Greek than in . . ."
–Boise 1857 ("which is more common in Greek than in Latin") + a reference to the [school?] grammar of Kühner)
–Sorof 1929 ("welches im Griech. häufiger als im Deutschen gebraucht wird")
–Bent 1963 ("Het praes. hist. komt in het Gr. veel meer voor dan in het Lat., waardoor de betekenis is afgesleten en het weinig of geen meer nadruk heeft dan aor. of impf.")

(ii) "lebhaft," "vivid"
–Krüger 1845 ("hist. Pr." + a reference to his own grammar (p. 164 of the 1873 ed.), where one reads: "Mit Lebhaftigkeit macht der Geist Vergangenes zu ideeller Anschauung der Gegenwart; und so steht das sogenannte historische Präsens im Griechischen viel häufiger als im Deutschen")[64]

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[64] "With vividness the mind turns the past into an imaginary view of the present, and therefore the so-called historic present is much more common in Greek than in German."

–Krüger 1854 ("Das historische Präsens gebraucht der lebhafte Grieche [in Hauptsätzen] viel häufiger als wir und selbst als der Lateiner")[65]
–Macmichael 1860 ("To give liveliness to a narrative, the historian [in Greek as in other languages] will often conceive and speak of past events as if he had them before him in course of action")
–Anthon 1868 ("animation to a narrative . . . more vividly before the mind")
–Krüger–Pökel 1889 ("Das historische Präsens . . ." etc., as in 1854)
–Goodwin–White 1889 ("were born" + a reference to Goodwin's grammar, where the hist. present is probably considered "vivid," just as in the 2nd ed. (see next item); the first ed. I could not consult)
–Kelsey–Zenos 1892, 1895 ("historical present" + reference to Goodwin's grammar, §1252, "used vividly for the aorist")
–Antrich–Usher ca. 1980 ("'Dareios and Parysatis had'; pres. tense for lively narrative as the story begins")

(iii) "dauernd gültig," "permanently valid"
–Kühner 1852 ("Praesens saepius usurpatur, ubi actio verbi e praeterito tempore pertingit in praesens (*entsprossen sein und abstammen*)." He compares the tragic use of τίκτειν, γεννᾶν, θνήσκειν (*todt sein*); also ἀδικεῖν, νικᾶν. "Inuria γίγνονται h. l. pro praesenti historico habetur, cuius usus ab hoc quidem loco alienissimus est."[66]
–Vollbrecht 1877 ("das Präs. von einem Ereignisse, das für die Geschichte dauernd gültig ist")
–Parker 1882 ("'are born.' The historical present is often used with verbs of birth, the relationship being looked on as permanent.")
–Edwards 1901 ("For the idiomatic use of the present tense representing the effects of a past event lasting into present time

[65] "The lively Greek uses the historic present (in main clauses) far more often than we and even than the Roman."

[66] "The present is rather often used when the verbal action extends from the past into the present time"; "It is not correct to take γίγνονται here as a historic present, whose use is totally different from that in our passage."

cf. note on §7,[67] and Propertius v.i.77 *me creat* 'he is my father.'")
–Vollbrecht 1907 ("das Präs. von einem Ereignisse, das dauernd gültig ist")
–Bersi 1905 ("[the pr.] ha talvolta un valore tutto speciale, perché indica un'azione che principiata in passato si estende coi sui effetti al presente")[68]

(iv) cannot choose between (ii) and (iii)
–Pretor 1877 ("This is commonly regarded as an instance of the historic present, by which additional reality is given to the narrative of a past event. Kühner however rejects this theory, and explains the tense by the fact that the action of the verb is represented as continuing down to the present time")

(v) genealogical present
–Rehdantz–Carnuth 1888 ("'stammen'; genealogisches Präsens")
–Walpole 1882 ("*were born.* Rehdantz calls this a genealogical present")

(vi) 'annalistic' present
–Mather–Hewitt ca. 1912 ("historical present, here better called the annalistic or notebook present, which is used in diaries or notebooks to record incidents, especially births, deaths, and accessions")

No note at all is given by:
–Cleveland 1834
–Hertlein 1857
–Matthiä 1859
–Owen 1867

Comments

One of the enduring charms of our profession is that there is, just as with the humanities in general, much room for divergent opinions.

[67] Where we are directed to §1: "[w]ith the idiomatic φεύγω 'I am in exile' cf. note on §1."
[68] "sometimes has quite a special value, since it expresses an action that has started in the past but extends into the present together with its effects." Note the similarity to Kühner's words.

But I submit that the reader will agree with me when I, after surveying this inventory, conclude that in our case the diversity is positively bewildering and, in fact, rather alarming, especially in the case of γίγνονται. How can it be that there is so little consensus of opinion about the interpretation of the first sentence of one of the most widely read classical works? And how is it possible that many commentators see no problems where their colleagues do see them? I will not go into all the proposals, but try rather to create some order in this muddle by making clear what is, in my opinion, the correct explanation for each of these items, an explanation that—and this is perhaps an encouraging thought—*is* included in the above notes.

(a.) Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος
No real explanation of the genitive is given by those commentators who combine, either in a translation or in a note, a dative with a genitive interpretation; these are Macmichael and Sorof, and, implicitly, also Antrich–Usher. These commentators apparently started from the fact that usually the getting or having of children is expressed by the dative; since the latter, however, unfortunately is not there, they take refuge in the clincher "'literally' the text runs . . . but we should translate as if . . .," as is done by Macmichael, or translate with a dative (Sorof), or eschew the problem by translating "Darius and Parysatis had" (Antrich–Usher)—which, incidentally, is the current translation of εἰμι + dative, and clarifies nothing. On top of this, Sorof's translation is simply impossible: as if a story could begin (I translate in my turn): "Two sons belonging to Darius and Parysatis were born"! This nonsense is also due to the fact that Sorof completely ignores the word order of the Greek text, something that more often than not results in unsatisfactory interpretations.

The possessive genitive of Krüger 1854 and 1889, and, presumably inspired by him, of Goodwin–White, cannot be defended either. Krüger's reasoning is so bizarre and unclear that I shall discuss it in some detail in an Appendix, which includes Krüger 1845. Bent is alone in his belief that the possessive genitive is used to express the origin.

All this means that of the explanations proposed only the one that sees the genitive as a genitive of origin (or source) is tenable. This view can be supported by a number of parallels, that in part are

also adduced by Krüger, although he believes that they support his own view (for these see the Appendix).

(b.) γίγνονται

The discussion of just this present could easily fill a full-scale article. The commentators mentioned at B(i) above have thrown in the towel straightaway: they dish up some trivia that do not further our knowledge of the Greek historic present one bit. As for Bent, moreover, who claims that the meaning of the historic present had completely worn off, he fails to tell us what that original meaning was.

The commentators at B(ii) confront us with a particularly tough fellow: the 'vivid' historic present. The assumptions behind Krüger's note are especially worth noticing. In the 1845 edition we are told that "with vividness the mind turns the past into an imaginary view of the present, and therefore the so-called historic present is much more common in Greek than in German." In the next editions the implication of 'therefore' has been made explicit: now 'the' Greek is simply 'lively.' Observe that now the Romans, too, get a scolding. Yes, perhaps they are lively when compared with the Germans, but still not lively enough! What all champions of the vivid present overlook—or, worse, ignore—is the fact that the first four paragraphs of chapter 1 contain no fewer than *seven* other historic presents besides γίγνονται, viz., μεταπέμπεται, ἀναβαίνει, διαβάλλει, πείθεται, συλλαμβάνει, ἀποπέμπει, βουλεύεται. Naturally, if the commentators were true to their views, these ought to be as many signs of vividness, but most of them wisely keep silent on this score.[69] So much vividness in such a short passage is perhaps a bit too much, even for the 'lebhafte Grieche.' Only Macmichael and Antrich-Usher add that μεταπέμπεται is 'used for vividness' as well, but they too fail to tell us how we should take ἀναβαίνει and the rest. It is precisely because of the high concentration of historic presents here that a commentator should be very cautious and should not snatch too quickly at 'vividness' to explain the use of γίγνονται, etc.

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[69] Incidentally, with the sole exception of Walpole, no commentator has a note on ἀθροίζονται. Since this use of the tense, being a generic/habitual present, is totally different from the other eight presents, a note definitely seems appropriate here.

The group at B(iii), headed by Kühner, takes a totally different view. However, in spite of the fact that Kühner in the most vigorous terms denies that γίγνονται is a historic present, Kühner–Gerth do treat it as such,[70] and more specifically as a 'chronicle-like historic present.' Kühner's original view is untenable, since the use postulated by him in this passage, which certainly does exist, belongs to *direct speech*, and is especially frequent in tragedy. This usage, too, is discussed extensively in Kühner–Gerth.[71] As for Vollbrecht, observe that he does not speak about the present being the reference point, but hesitates between 'permanently valid for the story' (1877) and 'permanently valid' *tout court*. In spite of this difference, both interpretations look like variants of that of Kühner. If he means, in fact, the same as Kühner, the objections raised to the latter's interpretation of course apply to that of Vollbrecht as well. Of the other presents in our passage only ἀναβαίνει gets a note, both in Kühner and Vollbrecht; they take it as 'vivid.' On the other presents they remain silent. As for Edwards he, too, has a note only on ἀναβαίνει ('historic present'), adding that it must be distinguished "from the use of the present commented upon in §1."

B(v). On the 'genealogical present' I can be very brief. Unless this term covers the same interpretation as that of Mather–Hewitt (see next category), Rehdantz's category seems to have been created for the occasion. Rehdantz has not a single note on the other presents.

B(vi). From the above it will have become clear that the interpretation as 'annalistic' present, which strictly speaking is also given by Kühner–Gerth ('chronicle-like historic present'),[72] is to my mind basically correct, even though the term 'annalistic' does not tell us much about the *function* of γίγνονται (see below). Mather–Hewitt also have a note on μεταπέμπεται, which they take as a "genuine historical present," without indicating what such a 'genuine' historical present is. On ἀναβαίνει and διαβάλλει they have something similar. Actually, all eight historic presents here have the same function. Far from expressing 'vividness,' they present, in a small compass, those events of Cyrus' life and career that are of crucial importance for

[70] (1898–1904) 1.134. This must be due to Gerth, for in the second edition of Kühner's grammar (1870) γίγνονται at *An.* 1.1.1 is not treated as such. In fact, it is not discussed at all.

[71] (1898–1904) 1.145ff.

[72] Also by Schwyzer–Debrunner (1950) 272.

the story proper. In other words, the passage 1.1–1.4 βουλεύεται is not part of the story but only the *introduction* to the story. This use might perhaps be called 'annalistic,' provided that this term covers the function just mentioned. The story proper begins only with the imperfects ὑπῆρχε and ἀπεπέμπετο of §§4–5, of which the former gives the general background of Cyrus' actions, and the latter the first real action on the part of Cyrus following his βουλεύεσθαι. In this story, too, historic presents occur, first with §9 δίδωσιν. Basically, this present has the same function as those of §§1–4: δίδωσιν conveys the idea that the giving in question was an important event. The effect achieved by this present, however, is very different, because it is followed by a passage which tells us *why* this event was so important.[73]

VII. *Conclusion*

I quoted above (239) a rather unflattering statement by Gildersleeve concerning school editions. Although the possibility cannot be ruled out that the above discussion presents too negative a picture of the editions consulted by me, it is to be feared that Gildersleeve's harsh judgment is all too justified. Actually, as the preceding discussion may have illustrated, the situation is even worse: not only are the editions "almost negligible for the advanced student," for the beginner, too, they virtually all show serious shortcomings, either for Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος or for γίγνονται, or for both constituents, the most widespread one being the failure to explain γίγνονται (and the other historic presents of 1.1–4) in a satisfactory way.[74] As for the 'original

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[73] For a recent discussion of the historic present see Sicking and Stork (1997) 131–69; on the hist. pres. in Xenophon see especially 147–56. Summarizing their analyses, Sicking and Stork observe that Xenophon uses the hist. pres. "for organizing his narrative," since it distinguishes "matter that relates to what is the writer's main concern" from the other elements of the story (156). This view may already be found in earlier studies, notably Eriksson (1943), especially 11, on our passage: "Ein historisches Präsens [ist] in der Lage, ohne vorbereitende Präterita abrupt die benötigte sachliche Unterlage einer Erzählung mitzuteilen" ("A historic present may mention abruptly, without any preparatory past tenses, the factual foundation of a narrative").

[74] Of the editions discussed, that by Mather–Hewitt has to my mind the best notes both on Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος and on γίγνονται; in fact, it is the only one with a reliable note on *both* constituents. This edition, too, however, fails to discuss the historic presents of *An.* 1.1–4 together, and shows some idiosyncracies in other notes, e.g., that on τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου in 1.1.1 ("an end of his life").

contribution' demanded by Gildersleeve: if only the commentators, especially the more recent ones, of course, had done some research, or at least consulted the major grammars[75] and the specialized studies, instead of repeating an *idée reçue* for the umpteenth time!

Appendix: Krüger on Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος[76]

²Krüger 1845
Δ. καὶ Π.: "Man sagt παῖδές εἰσι, γίγνονταί τινι; der Ge. steht als ob die Eigennamen gleich folgten: Δαρείου καὶ Π. γίγνονται Ἀρταξέρξης καὶ Κ. vgl. Gr. 47, 6, A. 5." This, the very first note, is far from clear. Krüger seems to be implying that in view of the presence of παῖδες we should expect the dative; the genitive, however, has apparently been preferred to the dative because of the proper names, although these strictly speaking ought to follow directly after the genitive, i.e., without παῖδες. Since we are referred to his grammar,[77] we may expect to find more information there on the relationship between genitive and proper names. In the relevant section, the 'Ge. der Angehörigkeit' with a 'Prädikatsverbum' is discussed; a subcategory of this genitive is the 'Gen. der Geschlecht und Geburtsort bezeichnet.' I give all his examples from prose, and maintain his way of quoting the Greek text, which is, as will become clear presently, extremely misleading: Πατρὸς τίνος ἐστὶ καὶ μητρὸς ὁ Ἔρως . . . [read: Πατρὸς τίνος ἐστὶ καὶ μητρός . . . (sc. ὁ Ἔρως, to be supplied from the context)]. Πλ. συ. 203, a. ἀγαθῶν [read: τοιούτων] ἐστε προγόνων. Ξε. ἀν. 3, 2, 14. Παυσανίας γένους τοῦ βασιλείου ἦν [read: ἄνδρα γένους τοῦ βασιλείου ὄντα]. Θ. 1, 132, 1. οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων φαύλους υἱεῖς γίγνεσθαι. Πλ. Πρω. 328 [*sic*; = 328c]. Θουκυδίδης οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν [read: οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν (sc. ὁ Θουκυδίδης)]. Πλ. Μένων 94 [*sic*; = 94d]. Ξενόφων πόλεως μεγάλης ἦν [read: σὺ πόλεως μεγίστης εἶ!]. Ξε. ἀν. 7, 3, 19. Τηρεὺς καὶ Τήρης οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς Θρᾴκης ἐγένοντο. [Here, I refrain from giving the actual

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[75] Clear clues for the correct interpretation of both the genitive and the hist. present can be found in Kühner–Gerth.

[76] I have added this rather detailed treatment of Krüger's views to make it clear that the high esteem accorded both to his *Anabasis* editions (cf. above, n.49) and to his grammar, is not, to put it mildly, in all respects justified. I quote the text of Krüger's notes in their original, often painfully succinct, form.

[77] I made use of the fifth edition (1873).

Greek text, which is completely different.] Θ. 2, 29, 2 [= 3]. Notice that not only is there in the actual Greek of the passages quoted by Krüger *not a single* proper name, but even in the form in which he quotes them there is *just one* genitive which is followed by a proper name (Pl. *Smp.* 203a). The value of the reference *ad An.* 1.1 "vgl. Gr. 47, 6, A. 5" is, thus, nil. Surprisingly, Krüger does not mention two almost exact parallels to our sentence, Hdt. 1.102.1 Δηιόκεω δὲ παῖς γίνεται Φραόρτης and 4.160.1 Τούτου δὲ τοῦ Βάττου παῖς γίνεται Ἀρκεσίλεως—perhaps because here, just as at *An.* 1.1.1, παῖς is present?

There remains the intriguing question as to why Krüger does not consider taking Δαρείου καὶ Π. as a genitive of origin/source. The reason must be that, according to K. (in the same note), this genitive is only found in combination with ἐξ or ἀπό. However, the strict distinction made by him between ἐξ and ἀπό + genitive ("'Ἐξ oder ἀπό hinzugefügt bezeichnen Geburt oder Abstammung") and the simple genitive (which designates "Geschlecht und Geburtsort") seems artificial and farfetched—what, for instance, may be the difference between 'Abstammung' and 'Geschlecht'?—and leads in actual practice, as his analysis of *An.* 1.1.1 shows, to unacceptable solutions.

In the next editions of Krüger things have not exactly improved.

[4]Krüger 1854

Δ. καὶ Π.: Here, the first part of the note is identical with that of 1845. Now, however, after "'Ἀρταξέρξης καὶ Κ.," Krüger adds: "Dieser Ge. bezeichnet eine Art des Besitzes: sie wurden (Söhne) des D. Ar. Ach. 47: Ἀμφίθεος Δήμητρος ἦν καὶ Τριπτολέμου· τούτου δὲ Κελεὸς γίγνεται". This is followed by the reference to his grammar. This is not a real improvement. First, Krüger blurs the issue by speaking about "a kind of possession." Second, his analysis is faulty on two counts: (a) to whom exactly does the 'sie' refer, in "sie wurden (Söhne) des D."? Apart from παῖδες δύο there simply *is* no other candidate for the subject function; (b) how can the 'sie,' whoever they may be, *become* somebody's sons, as if they change fathers?[78] Third, the line from *Acharnenses* is a rather dubious parallel, since the text is probably corrupt. And even if the text is correct, only the second part

[78] Except of course by adoption. Indeed, γίγνομαι + gen. can be used to express change of ownership, e.g., at Th. 5.5.1 ἐγένετο Μεσσήνη Λοκρῶν τινὰ χρόνον, "For some time Messene came into the possession of the Locrians."

illustrates his point, for in the first part the proper name precedes rather than follows the genitive(s).

[7]Krüger–Pökel 1889
Δ. καὶ Π.: the note is identical with that of 1854, but there are two additions. "'Αρταξέρξης καὶ Κ." is followed by "vgl. Her. 3, 160," and the reference to the grammar is followed by a second reference, now to "Dial. 48,3,2"; this concerns the second part, in which Krüger presents a grammar of the dialects, especially the epic and Ionic dialects. The passage cited from Hdt. (3.160.2) has: Ζωπύρου δὲ τούτου γίνεται Μεγάβυξος, and somewhat further, Μεγαβύξου δὲ τούτου γίνεται Ζώπυρος. These sentences do, at last, illustrate his original contention, viz., that in constructions with a genitive, proper names follow the genitive. (Recall, however, that according to Krüger in all these cases we are dealing with *possessive* genitives.) As for the reference to the dialect part of the grammar: there, εἰμί + *dative* is discussed, with a brief additional remark about the genitive with πατήρ, which is, therefore, irrelevant for our sentence at X. *An.* 1.1.1.

All in all, Krüger's analysis of *An.* 1.1.1 is needlessly complicated (and initially supported by evidence that has been tampered with).[79] As the passages mentioned above show, there are two—or (if the line from *Acharnenses* is correct) three—different ways to express descent using γίνομαι/εἰμί and the simple genitive:

–genitive of the parent – γίνομαι – name of the child (Hdt. 3.160.2)
–name of the child – gen. of the parent – εἰμί – gen. of the other parent (Ar. *Ach.* 47)
–genitive of the parent – παῖς – γίνομαι – name of the child (Hdt. 1.102.1, 4.160.1)

In view of these constructions an explanation of Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος, in Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος ~ γίγνονται παῖδες δύο, as a genitive of origin seems unobjectionable, presenting us with a fourth variant:

–genitive of the parent – γίνομαι – παῖς – name of the child.

[79] Fortunately, in his revised edition of Krüger's grammar, G. W. Cooper has completely abandoned Krüger's views ([1998] 173). He takes Δαρείου καὶ Π. as an ablatival genitive.

For a balanced discussion of the simple genitive and the genitive with ἀπό and ἐξ see also Kühner–Gerth (1898–1904) 1.374, Anm. 3.[80]

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11. BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS? HISTORIOGRAPHICAL COMMENTARIES ON LATIN HISTORIANS

Rhiannon Ash

Introduction: Some Problems

Although there are certain problems which have an impact on all commentators regardless of the genre of their chosen text, commentaries on ancient historical texts present their own peculiar set of challenges. Fundamental questions about how we should read these ancient historical texts on a detailed level follow on naturally from the over-arching debate about the reliability of the whole genre as a source of accurate historical information and about how we should handle the relationship between history, rhetorical embellishment, and truth. Moles has argued that in matters of interpretation, the literary and historical elements of an ancient historical text are equally important, and he challenges the notion that the literary element is easily detachable: "On this view, ancient works of historiography are like Christmas cakes: if you don't like the almond icing, you slice it off and you've still got a cake—a substantial object uncontaminated by icing."[1] The relative proportions of 'icing' and 'cake' will certainly vary, depending both on the particular author and on the type of episode being described, but even someone who self-consciously sets out to write a 'historical' commentary cannot afford to ignore this issue. Moreover, although these texts have on the whole never been short of commentators, the expectations and needs of the community using the commentaries have certainly changed and developed over the last two decades, and commentators have to insure that they take this into account.

Any commentator on an ancient historical text therefore needs to decide at an early stage where to locate the commentary in relation

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[1] Moles (1993) 90.

to the two poles of history and literature.[2] Some commentators boldly declare their allegiance at the outset in their title, as do G. E. F. Chilver, *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus' Histories I and II* (1979) and G. M. Paul, *A Historical Commentary on Sallust's Bellum Jugurthinum* (1984). That is certainly one way to insure that those using the commentary do not approach it with the wrong set of expectations, although it inevitably whittles down what is probably already a small and specialized readership. Perhaps we should concede, as Howell does, that "it is the inescapable fate of the commentator to be unable to satisfy all his users,"[3] but that still leaves an obligation on the part of the commentator to try to satisfy as many readers as possible. Of course, there is always a danger that in trying to please the majority, the commentator will in the end produce a 'Minerva's Shield' type of commentary (cf. Suetonius *Vitellius* 13.2), where different 'delicacies' are ruined by being blended together to create a tasteless farrago.

The question of scale also becomes a relevant issue in this context. Although some recent commentators on historical texts, such as Oakley, have managed to produce wide-ranging commentaries which are proportionately (and justifiably) long, not every series can give their commentators such scope, particularly if the volume is intended to be affordable for schools and for university students with limited budgets.[4] In an ideal world, where constraints of space (and time and money) did not apply, this problem would not arise; but in practice publishers and general editors need to demand a degree of selectivity and special emphasis from their commentators, particularly if other commentaries on the same text are already available. Nevertheless, even in an ideal world, questions about readability, appropriate lemmata, and the level of help which should be pro-

[2] Of course, these are not the only two poles which might be relevant. For example, Hornblower (1996) 4, commenting on the emphasis of Gomme's historical commentary, suggests: "I suspect that his choice of the word 'historical' for the Thucydides commentary was intended to distance himself from the linguistic commentaries of the nineteenth century. . . ."

[3] Howell (1995) iv.

[4] Oakley (1997) and (1998). Wiseman (2000) 83 concludes his review of Oakley's commentary as follows: "It is a melancholy thought that it will probably be the last such commentary ever to be written in this country, now that the Higher Education Funding Council's five-yearly research assessments effectively discourage long-term projects." See further Fantham (below) 417–9 and in general on target audiences see Henderson 213, 218–9, Rijksbaron 244–6 and Kraus 8–9 (all above).

vided by the commentary would still have to be considered carefully by the commentator. The production of a helpful commentary necessarily involves difficult decisions for the author about what to discard as well as about what to include. As Wiseman has pointed out, "What one wants from a commentator is judgement as well as thoroughness, insight as well as erudition."[5] A commentator's criteria for selecting and presenting information should ideally reflect what will most enhance the imagined readership's experience of reading a particular text. If a commentator imagines that (s)he is primarily addressing fellow-academics in the world of Classics, then that assumption is likely to produce one sort of commentary at the end of the process; but if the same commentator visualizes the audience as being primarily sixth-formers or undergraduates, then that should result in a different sort of commentary from the first. Of course, this distinction between different audiences should not be over-simplified, since there is certainly a community of potential users who stand between (or even beyond) these two groups, and we should remember that even distinguished commentators on classical texts were themselves undergraduates at one stage.[6] However, it does suggest that if a scholar embarks on writing a commentary which is intended for use by sixth-formers and undergraduates, then that commentary is likely to be more successful if that scholar is regularly involved in teaching such people and therefore has a realistic sense of the sort of problems which students often encounter in tackling an ancient text.

Let us return to the strategy deployed by some commentators of declaring their allegiance ('historical' or 'literary') at the outset in their title. This might initially seem helpful, but it is not necessarily a foolproof technique. For instance, Rees, in a review of Nixon and Rodgers (1994), makes the point that "the original decision to divorce literary and historical approaches when facing texts written by literati with political agendas seems odd" and also questions why the commentators include a section analysing diction, allusion, and prose

[5] Wiseman (2000) 81.

[6] Nor is it the case that the two groups cannot be addressed in the same commentary. A good example is Hornblower (1991) and (1996), in which all of the lemmata are translated for the benefit of students, but which are invaluable for serious scholars. Hornblower (1996) 8 makes the following observation about the translation of lemmata: "But there is a more important point than merely the wish to be of service to students. The need to translate, i.e. to think about every single word and phrase without exception, is very salutary for a commentator."

rhythm, given the self-imposed parameters of their historical commentary.[7] Simply declaring that one is writing a 'historical' commentary, therefore, may not necessarily excuse a commentator whose focus shifts to questions outside the perceived scope of that commentary, and it can still leave unanswered questions about whether a 'historical' focus is more appropriate than a 'literary' one (or *vice versa*) for a particular text.[8]

Indeed, most commentators on ancient historical texts purposely avoid pinning themselves down in their title, and choose instead to clarify their working methods in an introduction or preface to the work. So, Martin and Woodman explain that they have not attempted to give an account of the broader historical background to Tacitus *Annals* 4 because their readers have access to two recent biographies of Tiberius.[9] In the first volume of his commentary on Velleius Paterculus, Woodman explains his approach to readers who might have concerns that it is not the most constructive way to approach the text:

> If one believes that in the ancient world the writing of history was primarily a literary activity and that historians were concerned rather with the structured and dramatic presentation of their narrative than with the more 'scientific' aspects of their craft, there is every reason why works of ancient history should require a literary treatment.[10]

This preemptive strike seems to reflect the scholarly climate in which the first volume of his commentary was written, and it is interesting to note that there is no similar defense made in the preface to the second volume of the commentary, which suggests that Woodman's work found an audience more receptive than he had anticipated.[11]

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[7] Rees (1997) 63–4.

[8] There are a number of recent commentaries on ancient historical texts which are specifically identified as historical commentaries in their titles: Reinhold (1988), den Boeft, Drijvers, den Hengst, and Teitler (1995), Bosworth (1980) and (1995), Stylianou (1998) and Murison (1999). There are also a range of such historical commentaries on texts from other genres, especially (but not only) biography: Bradley (1978), Sherwin-White (1966), Konrad (1994), Georgiadou (1997). Those producing commentaries explicitly identified as literary usually focus on verse texts: Conacher (1987), Geyssen (1996), and Shea (1998).

[9] Martin and Woodman (1989) vii.

[10] Woodman (1977) ix–x.

[11] Levick (1979) 61 (as a historian) questions how successfully Woodman "bridges the gap that yawns between historian and literary critic," but her initial worries had receded by the time she published her review of the second volume of the

Other commentators count on the expectations raised by the format of a particular series to define their readership. So, the Clarendon Ancient History Series states that its aim is to provide "authoritative translations, introductions and commentaries to a wide range of Greek and Latin texts studied by ancient historians." Yet under that broad remit, there is still some room for maneuver within individual volumes. For example, Yardley provides an appendix on Livian and poetic usage in the Latin of Justin and Trogus, and Rives offers an excursus on the language of Tacitus' *Germania* in which he does not shy away from citing an example of alliteration in the original Latin (*Germania* 17.2 *proxima pars pectoris patet*): even though he is addressing Latinless readers, the point is still clear.[12] Rives is also prepared to acknowledge that

> any evaluation of the *Germania* as a historical source must also involve consideration both of the literary and cultural circumstances in which it was produced, and of the political and ideological contexts in which it has been interpreted.[13]

Finally, there are some commentators who have wholeheartedly embraced the division between historical and literary elements without rejecting either approach. Koestermann, in the first two volumes of his commentary on Tacitus' *Annals*, took the unusual step of presenting his material with historical and literary elements running concurrently throughout:

> While the running factual interpretation is placed on the upper part of the page, the linguistic elucidations appear on the lower part. Although it was not completely possible to avoid overlap, I have tried hard to achieve a clear separation.[14]

This was a bold experiment, but one which Koestermann abandoned by the time he reached his third volume of the commentary: "If one

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commentary, as is clear from Levick (1986) 56: "From now on, whenever Velleius has to be consulted for the events of the Caesarian and Augustan eras, for his style or his technique as an historian, it will be with this commentary." Seager (1978) does not express any concerns about the literary quality of Woodman's commentary, although Moles (1984) 242 notes that "rather surprisingly, W. does not take his literary concerns as far as he might." Perhaps this just goes to show how different the expectations of the scholarly community about commentaries can be and how challenging a task confronts commentators on ancient historical texts.

[12] Yardley and Heckel (1997) 333–43; Rives (1999) 46–8.

[13] Rives (1999) v.

[14] Koestermann (1963) 53. The translations are mine.

divides one from the other, one is without doubt exposed to the danger of distortions."[15] His divided commentary is helpful in some ways, especially for a 'hit-and-run' user with specific questions about the idiosyncrasies of Tacitus' language in a particular instance, but arguably the style of the commentary on the lower half of the page in the first two volumes is more linguistic than literary in any case. In general, Koestermann leaves the user of the commentary to chase up the wider literary implications of his linguistic comments, as Woodman has recently done in the case of the highly unusual verb *involat* at *Annals* 1.49.3.[16]

Even after the commentator has decided what sort of commentary to produce, historical or literary or an integrated mixture of both (i.e., historiographical), it is still crucial to be flexible within the body of the commentary itself. Some passages in any given ancient historical text will naturally lend themselves better to a 'historical' approach (even for one writing a 'literary' commentary), while other passages will benefit from a more 'literary' approach (even for one writing a 'historical' commentary). So, Brunt has identified particular types of scene where the rhetorical element in ancient historiography is likely to be especially prominent: "Geographical discourses were often introduced in order to import an agreeable variety and colour, and like battle scenes, tempted historians to free inventions to amuse or thrill their readers."[17] Even this formulation, although it makes a valid observation, raises further questions about the relative merits of historical and literary approaches to particular passages in an ancient historical text. Just because (say) a battle scene is shot through with free inventions, that does not necessarily mean that light relief is the only reason for its appearance in the text, nor that unqualified amusement is the only response which the passage would have drawn from an ancient reader. I have recently argued, for example, that although Tacitus' description of a battle between Parthians and a mixed force of Sarmatians, Iberians, and Albanians at *Annals* 6.34–35 is embellished with fictional details which serve (in part) to grip the reader's imagination, nevertheless Tacitus is also making a serious point about the nature of Tiberius' foreign policy

[15] Koestermann (1967) 22.
[16] Woodman (1998) 218–19 and 227–8.
[17] Brunt (1980) 317 = (1993) 187.

by generating a debate about two conflicting ideologies whereby honorable methods of military campaign are constantly vying with what is practical.[18]

If, bearing in mind the need for flexible approaches to different sections of the same text, we turn to Paul's historical commentary on Sallust *Iugurtha* 17–19 (the excursus on Africa), it seems that in this particular section his criteria for writing a historical commentary begin to pull against the nature of the ancient narrative. Paul does acknowledge that there are rhetorical elements of this passage, suggesting that Sallust "writes to entertain and refresh the reader" and stressing that "S. did not intend the excursus to be taken too seriously."[19] Wiedemann's recent article offers a much more nuanced reading of Sallust's digressions than this characterization of the African excursus as simple entertainment,[20] but the significant point for the current discussion is that Paul's comments imply that he is about to shift gears to reflect the distinctive nature of the text at this point. Yet despite this, the emphasis of Paul's commentary for *Iugurtha* 17–19 remains largely historical, as he examines questions of topography, colonization, cultivation, and geographical boundaries.[21] For example, at the end of a discussion of Sallust's term *arbori infecundus* (*Iugurtha* 17.5), Paul notes that "arboriculture is difficult where the inhabitants are nomadic and where the annual rainfall is less than 15 inches (400mm.)."[22] Accurate though this observation may be, it does not really help to illuminate why this excursus (or this particular part of it) might be entertaining and refreshing for a Roman reader. Is the enjoyment generated by the sense of otherness created by the difference between a treeless Africa and fertile Italy, where trees are cultivated easily (cf. Virgil *Georgics* 2.9–135)?[23] Or is the entertainment triggered by the very texture of the language at this point, given that the rare

18 Ash (1999).

19 Paul (1984) 72 and 74.

20 Wiedemann (1993).

21 Wiedemann (1993) 56 n.1 observes: "Paul . . . has little specific to say on the literary functions of the digressions."

22 Paul (1984) 74.

23 See Meiggs (1982) 218–59 for Italy being rich in timber. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus 1.37.4 "Her woodlands on precipitous slopes, in glens, and on unfarmed hills are most impressive; they provide a plentiful supply of fine ship-timber and of timber for other purposes." Pliny *HN* 16.237 refers to an ancient holm-oak on the Vatican hill in Rome which was older than the city itself and which was marked out by an Etruscan inscription.

adjective *infecundus* may be a Sallustian coinage?[24] In any case, we should feel the obligation to press Paul on a broader question, which is fundamental here. Is it in fact appropriate to give the notion of entertainment such a prominent place in critical tools applied to this excursus? Wiedemann focuses on Hiempsal's myth explaining the origins of the Median, Persian, and Armenian contingents of the army which accompanied Hercules and argues that we should see it as a "statement about the difference between a well-ordered state and the anarchy of division"[25] which has wider implications for the text as a whole. These could be considered as rather literary issues which have no claim to be addressed by a historical commentator; but even so, we still need to ask whether it is entirely helpful for a commentator to stick to one particular methodology in commenting on a section of a text which may in fact benefit from rather different critical approaches.

We need to return now to some of the broader problems which commentators have to face. Just as is the case for most commentators, the scholar commenting on an ancient historical text must be aware of the emphasis which has been placed on the material by those who have covered the terrain in previous editions, and consider how readily available these editions are likely to be to the target audience. To produce a commentary which simply filled in the perceived gaps left by one's predecessors could result in an unbalanced or one-sided volume, which may not satisfy the intended readership.[26] So too, referring back without any comment to discussions in previous editions (whether those produced by other people or by oneself) may be helpful for those who have access to a library, but it could prove frustrating to those who are relying on the commentary alone to elucidate their experience of reading the text. On the other side of the coin, reproducing such material is not necessarily a solution which will satisfy every reader. Levick raises this question

[24] Martin and Woodman (1989) 111 discuss Tacitus' use of the related noun *infecunditas* at *Annals* 4.6.4 and speculate that this uncommon word is "perhaps Sallustian (*H.* 3.46)."

[25] Wiedemann (1993) 52.

[26] Wellesley (1981) 223, reviewing Chilver (1979), briefly discusses the relationship between that commentary and its predecessor: "Its strength lies in regions in which its German counterpart, the laborious and learned work of Heubner, is weakest: an interest in the mechanics of the story, a grasp of the historical ambience and a command of prosopography. . . . Its weakness—though Chilver has not been enslaved by the adjective in his title—is the decision to renounce literary analysis."

in connection with the first volume of Woodman's commentary on Velleius Paterculus:

> When the 'first' volume of the commentary appears, will it omit items contained in the 'Tiberian' volume . . . or will it repeat them, so that the possessor of both volumes will be paying for the same material twice?[27]

This may seem rather a materialistic point of view (and one which may not necessarily cohere with the views of every reader of a commentary), but since publishers have to be aware of such concerns, commentators have to think seriously about them too.[28]

Another factor which may have an impact on this question of whether or not to repeat material is whether a multi-volume commentary is published piecemeal over several years or all at once. It is notable, for instance, that in the case of the two volumes of Thomas' commentary on the *Georgics*,[29] which were published simultaneously, there is an introduction in Volume I but this material is not repeated in Volume II. This suggests that the author and the publisher envisaged that those using this commentary would (ideally) purchase both volumes. Thomas says in the first volume:

> The Introduction is found only in the first volume. It could have been printed in each, after the manner of T. E. Page's and R. D. Williams's commentaries on the *Aeneid*, but such a procedure seemed inelegant. And, more importantly, I have not wished to encourage the teaching of only one half of the poem, since the *Georgics* has suffered greatly from being excerpted.[30]

That may be so, but nevertheless there is still a tendency for *Georgics* 4 alone to be used as a set text in schools and universities, which perhaps makes this decision problematic. All of the other commentaries in the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series are designed to stand alone, so the problem does not arise elsewhere.

A rather different case can be seen in Hornblower's two volumes on Thucydides (with a third volume forthcoming), which were not

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[27] Levick (1979) 60. She places 'first' in inverted commas here because Woodman published his commentary on Velleius Paterculus 2.94–131 before his edition of 2.41–93.

[28] On tralaticiousness see Index s.v. and in general Kraus (above) 11–13, 16–17; on publishing pressures see e.g., West (above) 29–32 and Fantham (below) 417–9.

[29] Thomas (1988a) and (1988b).

[30] Thomas (1988a) ix.

published simultaneously.[31] An introduction appears not in the first volume but in the second, partly in response to reviews of the first volume and partly in order to clarify the relation of Hornblower's work to Gomme's earlier commentary on Thucydides. In general, one of the advantages of publishing a commentary in several volumes over a number of years is that commentators can make changes of emphasis or additions to subsequent volumes in response to users of the commentary, as is the case with Hornblower's Introduction. In practical terms, it is probably not so relevant to which volume Hornblower's Introduction is attached, since the multi-volume commentary is most likely to be used by students in libraries where they should have access to all three volumes, rather than being something that they would purchase for themselves. Another multi-volume commentary on the same sort of scale as Hornblower's is Oakley's commentary on Livy Books 6–10, which will also comprise four volumes not published simultaneously. In his Introduction, Oakley outlines his strategy of discussing a particular phenomenon at the first place at which it occurs and compares long-term consistency with short-term inconvenience:

> Occasionally it seemed better to tie discussion of a phenomenon to one of the later passages in which it occurs: this means that in the first two volumes there are some cross-references to notes which have not yet been published; but I hope that long-term consistency will compensate for short-term inconvenience.[32]

This issue of cross-referencing and proleptic discussion is one to which I will return at the end of my paper.

A similar set of practical problems applies to lists of parallels cited from other ancient texts. If a student is reading a commentary without access to these texts, then there is a risk that the parallels will simply lie dormant through not being investigated properly. Wellesley says in the preface to his commentary on Tacitus *Histories* 3 that "if the commentary is found to be largely factual, this is because I believe that most percipient readers, given the available data, are perfectly capable of making their literary judgments unassisted."[33] This raises a number of issues. Firstly, to assume that the readers

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[31] Hornblower (1991) and (1996).
[32] Oakley (1997) x.
[33] Wellesley (1972) vii. See also West (above, 36–8).

of the commentary are basically perceptive and sensitive individuals is certainly constructive, but that does not mean to say that a commentator has the right to assume that his or her readers will find it easy to draw out literary points about a historical text without assistance. Indeed, one could argue that in the case of ancient historical texts, there is a particularly urgent need for the commentator to provide such assistance precisely because of preconceptions in some quarters about the literary qualities of prose narratives (as opposed to poetry). Secondly, Wellesley's comment about the factual nature of his own edition does not allow us to conclude that the commentator in general can afford to ignore practical problems such as the availability of previous editions and the freedom of readers to consult other classical texts. Particularly when discussing points of style, the provision of parallel historical texts, either in the body of the commentary or in an appendix, is often helpful.[34] Indeed, one aspect of Wellesley's commentary which makes it so helpful to use is that he is careful to include not just bare lists of parallels, but Latin quotations (sometimes lengthy ones), from relevant passages in other Classical authors and from Tacitus himself. As a result, his illuminating parallels are much less likely to lie dormant in the commentary.

A Case-Study: Tacitus Histories *2.93*

In order to explore some of the methodological issues outlined above and to illustrate the potential differences between a historical and a historiographical commentary in practical terms, let us turn to a case-study of Tacitus *Histories* 2.93. This passage describes the deterioration of the Vitellian troops in Rome after their triumphant march to the city with their new emperor and notes the incipient rivalry between Vitellius' two generals, Caecina and Valens. It seems

[34] So Martin and Woodman (1989) 85 provide an annotated extract from Sallust *Catiline* 5.3–6 to illustrate parallels with Tacitus' character-sketch of Sejanus at *Annals* 4.1.2–3. In connection with a discussion of *Annals* 2.23–24 (Germanicus' disastrous encounter with a storm on the North Sea), Goodyear (1981) 456–7 provides in an appendix a fragment from a poem of Albinovanus Pedo about Germanicus at sea quoted by Seneca. However, it is unlikely that there would have been space for such an appendix in a smaller-scale commentary, since Goodyear suggests (245) that Tacitus "has not used Pedo here or, if he has, not that portion of Pedo's work Seneca preserves."

an appropriate passage to choose because it contains a potentially interesting mixture of literary and historical elements, but at the same time is not a "purple passage."[35]

> [1] Sed miles, plenis castris et redundante multitudine in porticibus aut delubris et urbe tota vagus, non principia noscere, non servare vigilias neque labore firmari: per inlecebras urbis et inhonesta dictu corpus otio, animum libidinibus imminuebant. postremo ne salutis quidem cura: infamibus Vaticani locis magna pars tetendit, unde crebrae in volgus mortes, et adiacente Tiberi Germanorum Gallorumque obnoxia morbis corpora fluminis aviditas et aestus impatientia labefecit. [2] insuper confusus pravitate vel ambitu ordo militiae: sedecim praetoriae, quattuor urbanae cohortes scribebantur, quis singula milia inessent. plus in eo dilectu Valens audebat, tamquam ipsum Caecinam periculo exemisset. sane adventu eius partes convaluerant, et sinistrum lenti itineris rumorem prospero proelio verterat omnisque inferioris Germaniae miles Valentem adsectabatur, unde primum creditur Caecinae fides fluitasse.
>
> ["As for the soldiers, their barracks were full and there was an overflowing crowd amidst the colonnades and the shrines, so they drifted throughout the whole city, not knowing where to parade, not paying attention to guard duty, and not being kept in trim by hard work. Amidst the enticements of the city and things better left undescribed, they began to ruin their bodies through idleness and their spirits through lusts. Finally, they did not even care for life itself. Most of them encamped in the infamous areas of the Vatican district, as a result of which deaths frequently fell upon the crowd, and since the Tiber lay close at hand, the Germans and Gauls, through their eagerness for the river and inability to stand the heat, weakened their bodies, which were susceptible to diseases. (2) Moreover, the normal military hierarchy was sent into chaos by means of crookedness or corruption. Sixteen praetorian cohorts and four urban cohorts were being enrolled, each to consist of a thousand men. In mustering those troops, Valens was being more audacious, on the grounds that he had rescued Caecina himself from danger. To be sure, with his arrival the party had regained their strength, and through his successful battle, he had thwarted the adverse rumor of his slow march so that the whole army of Lower Germany supported him, as a result of which it is believed that Caecina's loyalty first wavered."]

[35] Latin text from Heubner (1978); translation my own.

Historical Commentary

It is perhaps not surprising that Chilver, given his own interests and the remit of his historical commentary, was particularly keen to clarify the changes made to the military organization as outlined by Tacitus at 2.93.2. As a result, there is not so much attention devoted to the description of the degeneration of the Vitellian soldiers in the first section of the chapter at 2.93.1. This is what Chilver says about the chapter in his commentary:[36]

> **93.1. plenis castris,** the praetorian camp. In Galba's time too there had been overflowing into porticoes or temples, because regiments from outside had entered Rome, I. 31.
> **2. non principia noscere,** 'they did not know where to parade'. The parade ground was outside the commander's headquarters, the *principia*, see App. VII.4 (by the late I. A. Richmond) to Wellesley's edn. of Book III.
> **6. infamibus Vaticani locis.** Trastevere is still known for 'cattiva aria'. For *infamis* ('unhealthy,' perhaps malarial, see Brunt, *Italian Manpower*, 623) cf. Frontin. *Aq.* 88.
> **8. fluminis aviditas,** 'their passion for taking to the water'.
> **9. confusus . . . militiae** etc. I. 31. 14 n. for *ordo militiae* as 'military propriety'; here perhaps 'accepted military organization'. Under Tiberius *A* IV.5.7, the guard was recruited from the older districts of Italy, and throughout the Julio-Claudian period it was rare to bring in provincials, Durry, 240, Passerini, *coorti*, 141ff. Admittedly, three known examples of Vitellian praetorians are ex-legionaries, *ILS* 2034–6 = MW 375, 381–2, and two of these were certainly Italian. But the Vitellian enrolment also involved auxiliaries, i.e. men who were not yet even citizens: see *alaris*, 94.4, and the soldier from an auxiliary cohort on *AE* 1932, 30 (Passerini, cit., 167).
>
> On the other problems raised by *confusus . . . militiae* see Introd., pp. 16ff. But a more difficult question about the urbans remains.
>
> If the new urbans were all Vitellius' men, as seems to be implied by *viginti milibus* at II.94.7, why did they constitute a force on which Flavius Sabinus could rely against the Vitellians in December, III.64.3, 69.5? Many views have been expressed. Fabia, *Rev. Phil.* 1914, 42, thought T. simply wrong in stating that the urbans were reconstituted at all; but T. is not given to imprecision about troops in the city, e.g. II.55.3, and his reference to urbans should mean that he found them

[36] Chilver (1979) 254–5. Chilver uses the Oxford Classical Text by Fisher (1911) and refers to chapters from that edition on a line-by-line basis. One practical aspect of the lay-out on which reviewers commented is the difficulty of identifying where comments on a particular chapter begin and end.

in his source. Momigliano, 146, observed that if Caecina could betray Vitellius, so could his ex-legionaries in the urban troops: G. Vitucci, *Ricerche sulla praefectura urbi in età imperiale* (1956), 96ff., agreed with him, and argued that the rallying of any soldiers to Sabinus was not unnatural once it was believed that Vitellius had abdicated. Wellesley, ed. to III, cit., thinks (rightly) that the urbans who first rallied to Sabinus were officers (for the cohorts could not possibly have crowded into Sabinus' house, III.69.5), and that the advice given to Sabinus to rely on the urbans is part of 'T.'s practice of (putting) into the mouths of his characters arguments which are plausible without necessarily being sound'. Yet it is unmistakable that many rankers joined Sabinus on the Capitol. The question is one on which T. has given too little evidence, but it seems likely that the process of reconstituting all the cohorts (*scribebantur*) was a gradual one, and that the attention to the urbans was not given high priority, especially as the prefect of the city (Flavius Sabinus) would have been in charge. By the time the main Vitellian forces left for the front in September, these units had perhaps suffered little change.

Chilver is fundamentally concerned here with clarification of concrete historical issues. Which military camp was full? Where was the parade-ground usually located? Why did these urban cohorts, recruited under Vitellius, subsequently offer their support to Flavius Sabinus? Is Tacitus wrong in suggesting that the urban cohorts were modified at all under Vitellius? Or is treachery simply an intrinsic part of any civil war? In posing these questions Chilver is, like any commentator, making certain assumptions about his audience. He presupposes that his readers are primarily interested in the historical reality of the civil war, to which this text might allow access, and that they share his interest in military questions. He also assumes that this audience will not need much help with Tacitus' language, although he does translate some phrases (e.g., *fluminis aviditas*) and notes, for instance, that *ordo militiae* means something different here from the same phrase at *Histories* 1.31.14.[37] Finally, Chilver presumes that his readers will have access to a well-stocked library in which they can track down the discussions to which he refers, and he also assumes that those using the commentary can read French, Italian, and (elsewhere) German.[38]

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[37] On the dust-jacket of Chilver (1979), we read: "The commentary is directed in the main to historical themes, though it naturally also attempts analysis of textual and syntactical problems when their solution is vital to establishing Tacitus' meaning."

[38] Talbert (1981) 44 suggests that "this is a commentary which makes no concessions to its readers," but concludes that "for those who persevere his book has much to offer."

Historiographical Commentary

Chilver certainly asks appropriate historical questions of *Histories* 2.93, but, as ever, these are not the only questions which are raised by this chapter. It is possible to create a commentary on this same chapter which has rather a different emphasis, moving away from the historical and towards the historiographical. What follows is an attempt to do this. There are of course the inevitable difficulties about how a new historiographical commentary on the same chapter should interact with Chilver's pre-existing historical commentary (and also with Heubner's commentary) and about whether one should assume that a reader would also have access to these earlier discussions. There is also the question about the nature of the audience. I am assuming that those using the commentary are likely to be students who are looking both for elucidation of the literary qualities of Tacitus' language and for discussion of the impact which that language might have on the interpretation of historical questions. My focus on the former question presupposes that the readers of the commentary are a group with rather different expectations from Chilver's audience. In addition, the scale of the following example of historiographical commentary is clearly more expansive than that of Chilver's comments on the same chapter (so there is a sense in which like is not being compared with like). Moreover, in a final version, some of the points made below could more naturally be discussed in an introduction or located at the point in the text where a particular phenomenon first appears, though there will be further discussion of this second point towards the end of the paper:

2.93.1
redundante multitudine: *redundo*, 'overflow' is here used in a metaphorical sense, just as at 2.32.1. Cf. Livy 1.3.3 *abundante multitudine*, Cicero *In Pisonem* 11.25 *multitudine redundat*, and *De provinciis consularibus* 31 *multitudine redundare*. The idea of water or the sea in metaphors and similes connected with crowds is common (Homer *Iliad* 1.144–6, Demosthenes 19.136, Polybius 11.29.9 and 21.31.9, Appian *Roman History* 3.12.40, Cicero *Pro Cluentio* 138, Livy 28.27.11 and 38.10.5, Virgil *Aeneid* 1.148–53 and 7.528–30, and Silius Italicus *Punica* 13.24–29), but T. adds novelty by creating an image of a sort of human sea spilling out of the barracks and flooding into the city.
urbe tota vagus: This detail may hint at the Vitellian soldiers' foreign identity and predatory nature, since barbarians are often described in such nomadic terms (*OLD* 1b): see 1.79.1 (Rhoxolani), 3.48.1 (tribes on the Pontus), *Annals* 2.52.1 (Numidians), Sallust *Iugurtha* 18.2 (Gaetulians

and Libyans), 19.5 (Gaetulians), Livy 5.44.5 (Gauls), Pomponius Mela 2.11 and 3.107 (Nomads), Lucan 4.677 (Numidians), and Statius *Silvae* 3.3.170 (Sarmatians). It certainly suggests a degeneration of their military skills, since it is usually a bad sign if troops are described in this way (*OLD* 4). For wandering Roman troops see 4.35.2, *Annals* 1.21.1, Livy 2.50.6, Sallust *Iugurtha* 44.5, and Suetonius *Tiberius* 37.1.

plenis castris . . . vagus: T. uses *variatio*. The two ablative absolutes (*plenis . . . multitudine*) function as a temporal / causal subordinate clause and are not syntactically parallel with the nominative adjective *vagus*, which agrees with the collective singular *miles*. R. H. Martin and A. J. Woodman (eds.), *Tacitus Annals Book IV* (Cambridge 1989) 88 note that "the collective singular *miles* (for *milites*) occurs in prose from Quadrigarius, but is common only in Livy, Tacitus and Ammianus." Here, the collective singular *miles* sets up a contrast with the numbers implied by *multitudo*.

non principia noscere . . . firmari: The only other place in which T. uses the combination of *non . . . non . . . neque* is *Annals* 2.37.3 in a speech. Anaphora of *non* is much more common: see A. Gerber and A. Greef, *Lexicon taciteum* (repr. Hildesheim 1962) 963–4. At 3.36.1 Vitellius mirrors the collective apathy of his soldiers in what he is *not* doing: *non parare arma, non adloquio exercitioque militem firmare, non in ore volgi agere. . . .* There, Vitellius' dereliction of duty as emperor and supreme commander is thereby underscored, just as here the soldiers' failure to do their duty is brought out by the string of negatives.

noscere . . . servare . . . firmari are historic infinitives, which T. uses quite often. The following groups are striking: 1.36.2 (five), 1.45.1 (six), 1.81.1 (three), 2.5.1 (three), 2.12.2 (three), 2.30.1 (four), 2.35.2 (four), 2.56.1 (three), 2.70.3 (four), 2.82.1 (four), 3.25.3 (three), 3.36.1 (three), 3.73.1 (eight), 3.84.2 (three), 4.29.2 (five), 4.34.4 (four), 4.46.3 (four), and 5.22.2 (three).

per inlecebras urbis: *inlecebra* is 'a means of attraction, allurement, enticement' (*OLD* 1). Cf. Livy 23.4.4, where Capua is described as a state inclined to luxury, *inlecebris omnis amoenitatis maritimae terrestrisque* and 34.4.3, where Cato, in his speech in favor of the Oppian law in 195 BC, describes Greece and Asia as *omnibus libidinum inlecebris repletas*. T. sets up an implicit contrast here between the corrupt city and the wholesome countryside. For the notion that Rome tended to attract vices, see *Annals* 15.44, Sallust *Catilina* 37.5, and Juvenal 3.62–65. A similar formulation occurs at *Annals* 4.2.1, again in a military context, where Sejanus proposes to move the praetorian camp *procul urbis inlecebris*.

inhonesta dictu: 'things better left undescribed.' By not giving details, T. leaves his readers to imagine for themselves how the dissolute soldiers spent their time in the city. On the question of terms inconsistent with the dignity of history, see F. R. D. Goodyear, *The Annals of Tacitus Volume I* (Cambridge 1972) Appendix 4, 342–3.

corpus . . . imminuebant: "they began to ruin their bodies through idleness and their spirits through lusts." This *corpus / animus* pairing occurs elsewhere in T., most notably at *Annals* 4.1.3 in the character-sketch of Sejanus, which itself recalls a similar combination in Sallust's character-sketch of Catiline (*Catilina* 5.3–4; cf. Velleius Paterculus 127.3). For other *corpus / animus* pairs see *Histories* 1.22.1, 1.31.3, 1.53.1, 2.99.1, *Agricola* 46.3, and *Annals* 2.4.1, 2.33.3, 6.6.2, 6.46.3, 6.50.1, 12.49.1, 15.53.2, and 15.59.3. The combination of *animus* and *imminuo* (*OLD* 3, 'impair, spoil') occurs at Livy 3.38.1, 28.33.7, and 35.26.10.

It is particularly relevant in this present context that the *corpus / animus* concept dominates the prooemium of Sallust's *Iugurtha* with its focus on moral decline. Sallust argues that the *corpus* is ephemeral and vulnerable to temptations, but that the *animus* is (or should be) immune (*Iugurtha* 2.3). However, the Vitellian soldiers are ruining both their bodies and their minds amidst the temptations of the city (*per inlecebras urbis*). Another relevant Sallustian parallel is the description of Sulla's soldiers in Asia: *loca amoena, voluptaria facile in otio ferocis militum animos molliverant* (*Catilina* 11.5). Yet the deterioration of the Vitellian soldiers takes place in Rome rather than in Asia, the place which traditionally triggered moral degeneration. Under the Republic, exposure to foreign (particularly eastern) temptations led Romans to become decadent; but imperial Rome, at the heart of a huge empire, has drawn all enticements to the center, so that Romans no longer need to leave the city to indulge themselves.

The imperfect tense of *imminuebant* suggests that the deterioration took place gradually. The Vitellians were in Rome between about the end of June (see note on *postera die* 2.90.1) and mid-September. Caecina will leave Rome on about September 17 (2.99–100) and Valens on about September 25 (3.36.1). For the dates, see K. Wellesley, *Cornelius Tacitus The Histories Book iii* (Sydney 1972) 195.

infamibus Vaticani locis: The Vatican district of Rome was probably malarial (Vitruvius 1.4.12, Cicero *De Oratore* 2.71.290, Strabo 5.3.4, Silius Italicus *Punica* 8.381), which would mean that soldiers who originated from the north (as many of the Vitellians did) and lacked a natural resistance to the disease would have been vulnerable. R. Sallares, *The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World* (London 1991) 238 notes that the level of resistance to malaria tends to increase as one travels from north to south. Cf. Caesar's troops, who fall ill in Southern Italy after living in the "healthy districts of Gaul and Spain" (*Bellum civile* 3.2) or even the Holy Roman Emperor Otto III, who died of malaria in January 1002 after traveling from Germany to Rome (K. Görich, *Otto III. Romanus Saxonicus et Italicus* [Sigmaringen 1993] 134).

unde crebrae . . . mortes: "as a result of which deaths frequently fell upon the crowd." The use of *volgus* to describe the Vitellians diminishes their status as soldiers. T. omits a main verb or participle and uses the preposition *in* plus the accusative, instead of a simple genitive

or dative without the preposition. Cf. *Annals* 2.47.2 *asperrima in Sardianos lues* and *Annals* 4.2.1 *ut . . . in ceteros metus oreretur.* There may be an added vividness with the suggestion that death is coming down on its prey.
fluminis aviditas: 'eagerness for the river': *fluminis* is an objective genitive and the reference is to swimming in the Tiber to cool down rather than to drinking the water. Whereas previously these Gaulish and German troops are seen vigorously swimming across the Po to confront some Othonian gladiators on an island in the river (2.35), now they are trying to relieve fever by immersing themselves in the Tiber. This is an instance of the *topos* whereby life in the city impairs a soldier's ability to fight (cf. 2.19.1, Tacitus *Annals* 4.2.1, Livy 27.3.2, and Silius Italicus *Punica* 11.410–39). The deterioration is particularly marked because Germans, and especially the Batavians, were famous for their ability to swim competently under different circumstances (2.17.2, 4.12.3). See further M. P. Speidel, 'Swimming the Danube under Hadrian's Eyes: A Feat of the Emperor's Batavian Horseguard,' *AS* 22 (1991) 277–82.
aestus impatientia: This inability to tolerate heat is traditionally associated with Gauls (Livy 7.25.3, 10.28.4, 34.47.5, 35.5.7) and with Germans (*Germania* 4.3, Plutarch *Marius* 26.8). Yet it may also trigger a more particular association between the Vitellians and the Allia Gauls. Both Plutarch and Livy emphasize the Gaulish warriors' distress when they have to confront a debilitating combination of plague and intolerance of heat in Rome. Livy refers to pestilence and dusty air, and calls the Gauls "a race accustomed to damp and cold, and distressed by the stifling heat" (5.48.3). Plutarch refers to a sickness and air thick with ashes, and describes the Gauls' movement "from shady places which offer temperate refuge from the summer heat . . . to a low-lying country with an unnatural climate towards autumn" (*Camillus* 28.2).

2.93.2

pravitate vel ambitu: 'by means of perversity or corruption.'
sedecim . . . scribebantur: For *scribo* see *OLD* 7b 'to enrol, muster (soldiers, an army etc.).' Under Tiberius there had been nine praetorian cohorts (*Annals* 4.5.3), each consisting of 500 or 1000 men, but Sejanus added a further three cohorts (*L'Annèe épigraphique* 1978, 286). Under Vitellius, the total number of praetorian cohorts was raised to sixteen, each consisting of 1000 men. This suggests an increase from either 6,000 or 12,000 to 16,000 men. See further G. E. F. Chilver, *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus' Histories I and II* (Oxford 1979) 16–22 and 254–5.

The imperfect passive *scribebantur* suggests that the modifications took some time to complete. The suggestion that such changes were taking place without Vitellius' explicit approval is shocking. After all, the praetorian cohorts had been responsible in the past for making or breaking emperors, as in the case of Claudius. In due course, Vitellius will

send 14 praetorian cohorts to hold the Apennines (3.55.1), some of whom will be left at Narnia, while others will return to Rome (3.58.1). During the storming of their camp, the praetorians in Rome fight bravely on behalf of Vitellius (3.84.1–3), while the rest surrender reluctantly to Vespasian (4.2.2–3).

Under Augustus there had originally been three urban cohorts to keep order in Rome (*Annals* 4.5.3). They were commanded by the *praefectus urbi* (Suetonius *Augustus* 37). The current holder of this post was Flavius Sabinus, Vespasian's older brother, who had been dismissed by Galba but reinstated under Otho (1.46.1 and Plutarch *Otho* 5.4) and held the post for twelve years in total (3.75.1). Despite his close connection to Vespasian, he had initially made the soldiers in Rome swear an oath to support Vitellius (2.55.1), although there were rumors that he subsequently began to undermine the Vitellian cause on behalf of his brother (2.99.2).

quis singula milia inessent: "each to consist of a thousand men." T. uses *quis*, which is the shortened form of *quibus* (the relative pronoun in the dative plural case), after *insum*. R. H. Martin, '*Quibus* and *quis* in Tacitus,' *CR* 82 (1968) 144–6 concludes that T. generally uses *quis* more often as an ablative than a dative. The verb *insum* can also be followed either by *in* plus the ablative or by a plain ablative. Here, *inessent* is in the subjunctive because it is in a final (purpose) clause introduced by a relative pronoun.

tamquam . . . exemisset: "on the grounds that he had rescued Caecina himself from danger" (*OLD* 7a). *tamquam* plus the subjunctive gives Valens' alleged reason for being more daring in enlisting troops and suggests that there is something spurious or inadequate about the explanation. We are given rather a different impression of this rescue earlier in the narrative when Valens' soldiers almost renew their mutiny *tamquam fraude et cunctationibus Valentis proelio defuissent* (2.30.1). See 2.21.2, 2.26.1, 2.47.3, 2.63.1, and 2.65.1 for other examples of *tamquam* clauses.

eximo, 'set free, relieve, save' (*OLD* 5), is followed by a direct object in the accusative and by an ablative noun after *ex*, or by a simple dative or ablative noun. T. generally prefers the dative, as at *Annals* 1.48.2, 14.40.3, and 48.2.

sane . . . verterat: Here *sane*, 'to be sure,' has an affirmative sense (cf. 2.91.2 above). T. as author acknowledges Valens' contribution to the Vitellian campaign in coming to Caecina's assistance, albeit in more muted language, which reminds us (*sinistrum . . . rumorem*) that Valens' own reputation was flawed. For *convalesco* see *OLD* 1b: 'to gain in power or influence (of persons, opinions etc.).' There may be a pun on the name of Valens, 'Powerful.' For examples of T. punning on names, see A. J. Woodman, *Tacitus Reviewed* (Oxford 1998) 221–2 with n.12.

Valentem adsectabatur: This had not always been the case: see 2.30.2. The fact that the army of Lower Germany began to show their support for Valens should perhaps not have unsettled Caecina unduly:

Valens had after all commanded this force from the start of Vitellius' imperial challenge.
creditur: There were clearly different theories in play as to when and why Caecina had changed his allegiance: cf. 2.99.2 *credidere plerique*. T. often depicts Caecina through other protagonists in the text (external focalization) rather than allowing us to see what he is thinking (internal focalization), so that his precise motives for treachery remain unclear.
unde . . . fluitasse: The alliteration lends emphasis. For the frequentative verb *fluito*, 'to be in a state of doubt or uncertainty,' see *OLD* 4. It is mostly poetical (Lucretius 3.1052, Statius *Thebaid* 5.378, Horace *Satires* 2.3.269 and *Epistles* 1.18.110). Claudian *De bello Gildonico* 1.247 has a strong echo (*fluitante fide*). Plautus *Captivi* 439 has *fidem fluxam*. T. uses the verb in a military context at 3.27.3 (*testudo*) and 5.18.1 (*miles*). In Livy, the verb appears only literally (1.4.6 and 1.37.2).
unde, 'as a result of which,' has a causal sense (*OLD* 11).

In constructing this historiographical commentary I have presupposed certain things about my readership, just as Chilver did about those using his historical commentary. In practical terms, I have assumed that readers have access both to texts of Tacitus' other works and to works by other classical authors, although I have quoted brief extracts where I considered that it would be useful to do so. Likewise, I have quoted verbatim from other commentaries where remarks seem short and to the point (e.g., Martin and Woodman on the collective singular *miles* at 2.93.1), but where such discussions seem too long or detailed to include, I have cited the reference instead (e.g., Goodyear on terms inconsistent with the dignity of history at 2.93.1). In addition, I have decided to omit some references which I could have included (e.g., Schlicher [1914] on historic infinitives at 2.93.1 *noscere . . . servare . . . firmari*) on the grounds that those using the commentary are unlikely to have access to such material. In citing references to secondary literature, Chilver generally tends to be more optimistic than I have been about the works to which his readers will have access, but that may partly be because he is assuming that his audience is rather different from mine. That said, Chilver does summarize important arguments in secondary scholarship rather than leaving his readers to chase up the references for themselves.

It is also conspicuous that lemmata are translated much more often in my historiographical commentary than in Chilver's historical commentary. This partly reflects the increase in the level of linguistic assistance needed by students in 2002 as opposed to 1979, but it is also intricately bound up with one crucial difference between

the outlook of this commentary as opposed to Chilver's, namely the belief that features such as structure and metaphor are 'intrinsic characteristics' of Tacitus' historical technique rather than being 'external adornments,'[39] together with the assumption that access to these qualities is often most conveniently provided through translating the lemmata. One obvious consequence of this different standpoint for my commentary is the need to set up a greater number of lemmata than Chilver does in any given chapter. For *Histories* 2.93 Chilver has five lemmata, whereas I need nineteen (and on the assumption that every word in Tacitus counts, I could easily have included more). In only two cases (*infamibus Vaticani locis* and *fluminis aviditas* 2.93.1) do Chilver and I settle on the same lemmata, and in each instance, I have felt the need to comment at greater length. That process works in the opposite direction too, of course, and Chilver's longest note is on the *confusus . . . ordo militiae* (2.93.2), in connection with the method of enrollment amongst the urban cohorts under Vitellius. One could certainly characterize this difference between the two commentaries neutrally in terms of dove-tailing, but there is perhaps more at stake than this. At one point in this long note, Chilver investigates the question of why, if these urban troops were all Vitellius' men, Flavius Sabinus could count on them in the fight against the Vitellian forces who arrived from outside Rome, concluding that "the question is one on which Tacitus has given too little evidence."[40] This is certainly true, but Chilver's comment suggests that he sometimes sees Tacitus' narrative as a means of giving answers to particular historical questions. On the whole, I would prefer to consider the narrative which Tacitus gives us rather than that which he does not, and to elucidate his artistry in creating this narrative.[41]

In this context, I have certainly made assumptions about the intellectual affinities of my audience. It would clearly be crucial for an ideal reader of this commentary to have an interest in the nuances

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[39] Woodman (1998) 230.

[40] Chilver (1979) 255.

[41] Ma (1994) 76, in a thought-provoking article which is very relevant for this paper, offers samples of French structuralist and empirical historical approaches to the same passage of Plutarch's *Kimon* 1–2, and observes that one of the great absences from both commentaries is Plutarch himself. The opposite should (ideally) be true of a historiographical commentary, whether one prefers to think in terms of Tacitus or 'Tacitus.'

of language, both within the Tacitean corpus and beyond. Although it is necessary to consider carefully where precisely to draw the line in listing parallels[42] and in discussing the subtleties of linguistic usage, it is certainly true that close attention to such detail can lead to important wider observations about an author's historical perceptions. For instance, in this chapter, Tacitus creates the impression that the identity of Vitellius' soldiers is becoming increasingly blurred with that of any other mob: his choice of terms such as *multitudo* and *volgus* and the metaphorical connotations of *redundante* (2.93.1) nudge the reader to draw conclusions about the deteriorating military skills of the Vitellians. Perhaps to a historical commentator such nuances of language might seem self-evident or else not sufficiently rooted in fact to merit further consideration. Nevertheless, this sort of approach is symptomatic of Tacitus' historical technique. If we return to Moles's Christmas cake analogy, it might be the case that some critics would consider such touches as the sort of 'icing' which could be removed from the 'cake,' but that would be to fragment Tacitus' historical approach. Here, the hints that the Vitellians are behaving in the manner of a crowd are not just decorative but have a causal function within the narrative, since they foreshadow and partially explain the eventual defeat of the Vitellian army at the second battle of Bedriacum in *Histories* 3.

There is one further assumption which I am making about the readership of this particular historiographical commentary, which raises questions about the whole structure of the commentary format in general. I have assumed that it is a legitimate and desirable procedure to discuss in some detail future events in the historical narrative (e.g., at 2.93.2 on the subsequent conduct of the praetorians), thereby removing, or at least muting, the element of surprise for a user of the commentary who is also a first-time reader of the text. This technique of collapsing the natural progression of the narrative into a single moment of revelation does little service to the subtleties of Tacitus' historical method.[43] Tacitus often relies on a

[42] See further Gibson (below) 347–9.

[43] West 34 and especially de Jong 63–4 (both above) also discuss this dilemma; the latter distinguishes between users of the commentary, who should be informed about the full extent and complexity of an incident or phenomenon at an early stage and all in one go, and narratees of the text, who will get that same information only gradually. See further Rijksbaron 251–2 and Kraus 6 (both above).

reader retrospectively recalling a detail and reassessing information that at first encounter may have seemed uncontroversial. Of course, the easy way to address this sense of unease is to argue that those using the commentary are not going to be first-time readers, but this would be a naive assumption. Everyone has to read a given text for the first time (and indeed some will only ever read a text closely in the Latin on one occasion), but usually those who do so will choose to rely on a commentary to enhance their experience of reading and to deepen their understanding. Whether the assistance provided by a commentary short-circuits the potential intellectual stimulation created by the author is an important question to be considered, particularly by those commenting on ancient historical texts, where the sequence of the narrative can sometimes diverge from the chronological progression of events in order to create a particular impact on the reader. For example, Tacitus chooses to postpone his account of the first phase of the Batavian revolt in AD 69 until *Histories* 4.12–37, even though the news of the defeat of the Vitellians at Cremona (4.31) picks up on events narrated at *Histories* 3.16–31. Thus, Wellesley comments on *Histories* 3.46.1 *turbata per eosdem dies Germania*, that "the revolt of the Batavian Civilis was in preparation during the months of August to November 69"[44] and thereby anticipates the detailed narrative of *Histories* 4. Certainly, it is difficult to suggest what else Wellesley could have done at this point but we should be aware that in general, the revelation of pieces of information according to the wishes of an all-knowing commentator instead of the author of the text can sometimes be disruptive.[45] Moreover, there is some irony in the fact that for those reading a historical narrative with the aid of a commentary, the constant presence of the commentator can often be more intrusive than the author himself, who usually maintains a reasonably low-profile, apart from in places such as the prologue. In the case of a second-time reader, it does not perhaps have the same sort of impact if a commentator discusses the narrative proleptically in this way.

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[44] Wellesley (1972) 139.

[45] One could draw an analogy between the omniscient commentator and the person who, having seen a film many times before, cannot resist making a revealing comment to first-time viewers: "Ah! The crop-duster scene!" is one such divulgence which I remember being made at the very start of a scene which culminates in a particularly famous cinematic moment. In order not to repeat this pattern, I will refrain from naming the film.

Of course, not every ancient historical text will offer the same scope to a historiographical commentator as Tacitus' works do. Above all, the commentator needs to be flexible and to show judgment, responding both to the shifting nature of the ancient historical narrative and to the particular needs of the modern readership. It is clear that those reading a commentary will usually include both professional scholars and students at school and university level. These two distinct groups are often optimistically addressed as one by commentators, but it may well be that the scholars (unless they are teaching a course) are more likely to use a commentary to look up specific details about a particular passage which is relevant for their own research, while the students are more likely to work their way through a commentary from beginning to end. Under these circumstances, it is certainly valuable for a commentator to facilitate access to Latin historical texts for current students in the first instance, since it is from amongst this group that future scholars will be drawn. Whether the emphasis of a commentary is historical or historiographical is ultimately perhaps less important than how successfully the commentator engages with his or her readers.

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12. HANDLING A PHILOSOPHICAL TEXT

Christopher Rowe

This essay was originally intended to be about the writing of commentaries on ancient Greek philosophical texts. So slippery, however, is the term 'commentary' that it seemed advisable to broaden the scope of the paper, in ways that will emerge, beyond the particular model around which recent discussions of 'the commentary' have tended to center. This is the model recently pilloried, or explored (in one particular manifestation), by Simon Goldhill,[1] and helpfully defined by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht:

> It has always been the task of the commentator and the function of the commentary to overcome [the] asymmetry [between the knowledge which the text in question presupposes and the knowledge of which the interpreter actually disposes], and thus to mediate between different cultural contexts (between the contexts shared by the text's author and a primary readership and, on the other side, the context constituted by those readers who belong to later historical times or to different cultures). Seen from this angle, commentary always provides supplementary knowledge and always fulfills an ancillary function in relation to interpretation.[2]

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[1] Goldhill (1999). The present essay may be seen largely as a series of reflections on various chapters in that volume. (At a late stage, I presented the essay as a paper to [primarily] philosophical audiences at Stanford University and at UCLA. I learned many useful things from the discussion on both occasions, not least that the sort of view I propose tends to be more immediately acceptable to philosophical minds, and correspondingly that the sorts of views I oppose tend to cause relatively little anxiety to such minds [relative, that is, to the reactions they cause in minds accustomed to current debates among classicists—as illustrated by the Most volume]. I have no reason to think, and some reason not to think, that the particular [resident Californian] collection of philosophers in question would turn out to be unrepresentative of philosophers as a whole; conversely there is some evidence—admittedly largely circumstantial, or anecdotal—that classicists have been disproportionately affected by the fall-out from, or [as I would describe it] the misapplication of, certain general theories long familiar, in their more general forms, to philosophers. But of course 'philosophers' are themselves a mixed bunch, and counting heads is no way to decide anything of the sort in question; maybe the radicals always had it right [though I doubt it].)

[2] Gumbrecht (1999) 443.

What is described here might be called the basic or stripped-down version of the model; the next model up in the range is likely also to introduce the reader to different interpretations of the text and its parts.[3] But still the commentator is seen in a kind of service role, providing the sort of information that the interpreter/ordinary reader (i.e., those whom the commentator herself is in principle serving) might in principle have got for himself,[4] but in fact has retrospectively farmed out to someone else.

Modern commentaries on philosophical texts, until relatively recently, often conformed to the same model. Many of the great, standard commentaries (e.g.) on Platonic dialogues, and sometimes even on Aristotle,[5] were essentially designed to provide the reader with sufficient information—on the text, the language, *Realien*, useful parallels, alternative ways of taking a phrase or a sentence—to get him through from line to line.[6] This fact about the commentary tradition was in a way given formal recognition, in the English-speaking world, by the introduction of the Clarendon Plato and Clarendon Aristotle series. The Aristotle series—initiated by J. L. Austin—declares that any discussion contained in its volumes "will always be primarily philosophical and not historical or philological"; while the Plato series "is intended to serve the needs of philosophers . . . interested in Plato in much the same way as those interested in Aristotle are served by the . . . Clarendon Aristotle series," each volume including "exegetical and critical notes on the philosophical content and arguments." This was, more than anything, a response to the market: most readers of Plato and Aristotle were, and are, no longer primarily classicists but philosophers, trained or in training—and the format of the

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[3] "The typical classical commentary offers both comment on the text and an engagement with the interpretations offered by previous commentators" (Fowler [1999] 430).

[4] Gumbrecht deals neatly with the gender issue by treating the commentator as female and the interpreter as male; for convenience I shall follow his example, despite for my own part identifying more closely with the role of commentators (in part, the paper will inevitably be an *apologia pro commentariis meis*: see, e.g., n.10 below).

[5] Plato and Aristotle will in fact provide my core texts throughout; but my argument is intended to be of fairly general application.

[6] 'Even on Aristotle': most Aristotelian texts seem to cry out for a different approach, because of their sheer impenetrability; but (e.g.) Grant (1866) or Burnet (1900) on the *Nicomachean Ethics* are, in essence, straightforward examples of the standard, philologically-driven, commentary.

notes is often designed to help budding philosophers to cut their teeth on some classic material, which leads to a specific kind of 'morselization' of the text,[7] and, on occasion, as a further result, to a relative disregard for (even impatience with) the shape of the authors' own original arguments.

But the two Clarendon series are probably an exception. Insofar as there still exists a tradition of writing commentaries on philosophical texts, its products are more likely to be along the lines of those outstanding hybrids, Sir David Ross's monumental commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (1924) and *Physics* (1936), which combine philosophical and philological skills in about equal measure: so perhaps, e.g. (though the mixture is rather different), the de Strycker and Slings *Apology*,[8] or the continuing Akademie-Verlag series of commented translations of Aristotle.[9] The largest market now, of course, is for translations, sometimes with notes and/or introductions that give them something of the nature of 'commentaries,' and indeed I propose that these not be excluded from the present discussion (as, in my view, it should also not exclude bare translations, insofar as these have many of the same features, and raise many of the same issues, as commentaries);[10] but anyone now writing what would commonly be recognized as a commentary on (what would commonly be recognized as) a philosophical text is likely to feel the need to comment as much on the argument as on the 'historical' and 'philological'

[7] The term is borrowed immediately from Goldhill (1999) 411: "'morselization,' by which I mean the practice by which a commentary divides up a text into units for commentary."

[8] de Strycker and Slings (1994).

[9] Series founded by Ernst Grumach, now continued under the general editorship of Hellmut Flashar (Berlin).

[10] See n.29 below. Somewhere halfway between, on the one hand, the traditional commentary—now more likely, perhaps, to be reserved for less well-trodden works, like the Platonic *dubia* and *spuria* (see e.g., Slings's *Cleitophon* [1999], and Joyal's *Theages* [2000])—and the annotated translation, on the other, stand (e.g.) the philosophical items in the Aris & Phillips Classical Texts series, combining Greek text, translation, and more or less ample commentary, aimed simultaneously at the reader with little Greek and at the scholar (not infrequently, in this area, the same person): this holds, at any rate, for my own volumes in the series, i.e., Rowe (1986), (1995), (1998a). The aims of the few philosophical items in the Cambridge green and yellow series (Dover [1980] and Rowe [1993] have now been joined by Nicholas Denyer's *Alcibiades*—a dialogue which [I understand] he aims to remove from the list of *dubia/spuria*), are not dissimilar, though the format is usually without translation. On the nature of texts which attract commentaries see also Kraus 4 n.15 and cf. the discussion of Henderson (both above).

aspects of the text—even if the only outcome is the thinnest of attempts to do so, or even an apology for *not* doing so.[11]

In a way this ought hardly to be surprising. After all, on the one hand the texts in question are ancient, are written in Greek, and require the multiform skills of the pure-bred classical philologist; on the other, they are philosophical. That is, there is something special, or different, about these texts, namely whatever is indicated by the label 'philosophical.' Or *is* there anything special about them? Is it in fact helpful to fence them off in this way into a different category? Aristotle is hardly ever claimed by anyone who is not a philosopher (unless for his *Poetics*, or as an 'English moralist').[12] But Plato is another matter. Once upon a time both of them—both Plato and Aristotle—will have been of interest, and for some still are, primarily as further quarries for the excavation of Greek idiom,[13] or as more raw material for the textual critic. Now, with the growth of the curiously-named specialization of 'ancient philosophy' (reflecting in part a greater recognition of the possibilities for using the real ancient philosophers not only for pedagogical purposes but for doing constructive philosophy), Platonic as well as Aristotelian texts are perhaps more generally felt as *different* from other, perhaps more 'literary,' texts. Yet Plato remains a contested case. After all, he is undoubtedly a literary artist;[14] what is more, philosophical readers have often adopted a somewhat selective approach in their treatment of the corpus, and have shown less enthusiasm for some parts of it—the less 'philosophical'—than others. More generally, Plato's

[11] When philosophical commentators exclude the non-philosophical, they have—or may feel they have—less need to apologize, because that part of the job has been more often covered. For the reverse situation in modern commentaries on ancient medical and scientific texts, see von Staden (above) 125–6.

[12] "I have been laughed at from time to time, though mostly in the vein of friendly teasing, for beginning a course on the English Moralists with Plato, Aristotle and St Paul . . ." (Willey [1965] 12).

[13] See, e.g., Denniston (1954), which draws extensively on Platonic texts, though not on Aristotelian ones. (In fact, Denniston's successive descriptions of particle usage in any given dialogue amount almost to another form of commentary in themselves; rarely, in my experience—and judgment—does Denniston get the sense of an argument wrong.)

[14] As also, admittedly, is Aristotle, when he wishes to be—a point brought home to me recently by my attempts to translate the *Nicomachean Ethics* (the translation accompanies a philosophical commentary, with full introduction, by Sarah Broadie: published by Oxford University Press, 2002): Books VIII and IX, in particular, are quite unlike the more ascetic fare of the *Metaphysics*, the *Physics*, or (e.g.) the *De Anima*.

typically indirect style tends often to leave it a fairly open question what he is actually up to in any particular text. For these and other reasons, whatever one might want to say about 'philosophical' texts as a whole (however these are to be defined) will not necessarily be transferable to Plato's.

Now one of the things that one might want to say about ancient (Greek) philosophical texts is that they are typically heavy on argument, of the 'if . . ., then . . .,' or 'such-and-such is/seems so, because . . .' variety. Probably this is Aristotle's fault; if anyone is going to count as the archetypal philosopher, for us, in the ancient context, it is as likely to be Aristotle as anyone else. Let this, in any case, stand as one rough indication of what it means for a text to be 'philosophical.' The interpreter's or the reader's concern, here, will primarily be with understanding how the argument works, and the commentator—that is, the ideal one, who combines supreme philological with philosophical insight—will give the interpreter what help she can: if necessary defending a particular reading in the text, explaining peculiarities in the Greek, etc., but above all revealing the *structure* of the argument. And it surely is, for the most part, a matter of 'revealing' structure; of discovering what the argument *actually is*—because, given the words that are actually on the page (after the textual critics have done their worst), there will normally only be one way that the author of the text can reasonably be supposed to have thought he could get to *this* particular conclusion (whatever it may be) from *that* particular starting point or set of starting points.[15] Often arguments will nest inside each other, in such a way as to make a certain reading of a particular stretch multiply inevitable, given only the basic assumption that the author wishes to make sense.

If anyone is inclined to deny this, or perhaps to raise questions about what it is to 'make sense,' I would be inclined to suppose that she has never attempted to deal systematically with an extended

[15] As Chris Bobonich pointed out to me, this is likely to make the job of the philosophical commentator look ridiculously simple (my terms, not his); what about all those occasions when she cannot make the argument even begin to work without additional premises, or when the argument is just plain faulty? Nevertheless, in any typical case it will be true that the author will have thought that he could get from *here* to *there*, by some particular route, and if so any differences between commentators/readers about the nature of that route will be satisfactorily explained just in terms of lack of information, without the need for any (other) general theory of interpretation.

piece of Aristotelian prose, taken (say) from the *Metaphysics* or the *Physics*, or even[16] from one of the ethical treatises. These texts leave the interpreter remarkably little room for maneuver, and where he is unable to make up his mind decisively—that is, about the meaning of a particular sentence, or a group of sentences, or a section, or a chapter[17]—that will be for accidental reasons: e.g., because of uncertainty about the text, or because Aristotle's style is even more clipped and elliptical than usual.[18] Very occasionally he may himself leave us with a deliberate ambiguity (e.g., when punning); but for the most part he is quite evidently arguing for a point. And that *is* evident, not least because he typically starts off a discussion by telling us what he is going to argue for, and ends by telling us that he has argued for it (and the bit in the middle looks, anyway, like an argument for just that). These claims about the nature of Aristotelian texts are not metaphysical claims, although they have metaphysical consequences. They are based on actual confrontation with actual words on pages; and I have yet to meet anyone who emerged from such confrontations with a markedly different experience to report (or without the scars to prove it).

It is the very fact that this is likely to seem, to some, a naïve and outmoded view that makes it so necessary to state it. We have become so used to the simple, or simplistic, opposition between 'realist' or 'positivist' and 'hermeneutic' or 'anti-realist' positions that we forget what the point of those positions was in the first place. *Of course* the 'anti-realists' have a case, and of course it is a case that needs to be urged on every possible opportunity, for fear (if, now, we could ever seriously think we could get away with it) that we might form the habit of assuming that our own reading of a given text is the only reasonable one—or however we choose to put it. But somehow in the rush towards tolerance and away from anything that smacks of authoritarianism and oppression it has somehow just come

[16] See n.14 above.

[17] I leave out larger units, e.g., whole texts: given the complexity of the data, the number of theoretically viable interpretations offered will tend to increase with the quantity of material being considered.

[18] Trying out this claim on (other) practicing Aristotelian scholars, I have generally found them receptive; excruciatingly difficult though it may often be to divine what he means in a particular passage, no one seems to believe that that is because he did not mean anything determinate. ('*Aristotle* thought to leave his meaning indeterminate?')

to be taken for granted that all texts are in this respect the same. In an utterly uninteresting way, we do of course have complete freedom to do whatever we like with any text: to light fires with it, use it as a doorstop, or whatever it may be. But no one seriously challenges that sort of freedom (which includes, of course, the freedom not to have anything whatever to do with a particular text at all). Equally, it is no serious challenge to any important freedom to say that *in this particular case*, if one wants to read the text (as opposed to lighting a fire with it), the conditions, if fully understood, allow only one very specific reading (so that *not* adopting that reading will be as relevant to the purposes of the text as using it to light the fire).

The claim, then, is—as I put it—that the commentator will in this sort of case be 'revealing the structure' of the text (the argument). I also claimed that this was what she will be doing 'above all.' This is because, of course, if she is 'revealing the structure of the argument,' she will actually be providing direct help to the reader towards his fundamental goal of understanding the text. One of the common complaints about commentators in general is that they usually have to be selective about the information they give us, so narrowing our focus as readers. That kind of problem will not apply here. Or is there perhaps a different one? Insofar as the commentator succeeds in identifying the structure of a particular argument, she will actually be usurping the role of the reader—she will actually be doing his work for him; does that not spell a complete loss of his autonomy? The answer to this objection seems easy: the freedom to misunderstand a philosophical text (as it might be, in the ideal case) seems hardly more valuable than the freedom to make mistakes in arithmetic—or burn books rather than reading them. What is more, the commentator may herself in fact be liberating the reader for a more important task: i.e., that of working out whether (he thinks) there is anything of value to be had from what the text has been revealed to be saying—though of course the more 'philosophical' commentator will be at hand here too. With a 'literary' text, richness may depend on or even consist in polyvalence; with an Aristotelian text, polyvalence might even reduce its value.[19]

[19] More than one member of the audiences at UCLA and Stanford (above, n.1) thought that I was inclined to give away too much even on the interpretation of literary texts (where—so it was claimed, and I readily concur—polyvalence is far

Things are inevitably more complicated than this on the ground. There will continue to be fierce disputes about how to read this or that Aristotelian passage,[20] so that[21] the anti-realist (or 'hermeneutic') position remains one that is hard to falsify. Nor do I suggest that the simple assertions I have made in the last few paragraphs are sufficient even to dent it (a quasi-Protagorean relativism will suffice to see off anything one might say about what it 'feels like' to read Aristotle; "of course it feels like that, if you like to think/feel that way"). What I do believe one can reasonably reject, or object to, is the following general claim about commentaries:

> The commentary is often figured as a more impersonal and objective form of scholarship compared to the monograph or the article, despite the distinctly personal tone of many of the great commentaries, from Mayor to Nisbet and Hubbard. This is clearly not so: commentaries like any other genre can only ever give us one person's view.[22]

Such a claim, if stated without restriction or qualification, seems to me to be patently false. Given the constraints on reading *philosophical* texts, or at least Aristotelian ones,[23] a commentary is perfectly capable of giving us more than 'one person's view' of a stretch of text,

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from being either [a] a universal feature or [b] the only source of 'richness'). To the extent that this is a fair criticism of my strategy, I respond simply that this strategy is designed with particular targets (especially in the Most volume) in view, and that if these turned out to be stalking-horses, this would not affect my core argument.

[20] So, for example, in translating Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (cf. n.14 above), I found myself disagreeing with one or more of half a dozen other translators many times over in the space of any single Bekker page.

[21] The inference was contested by a Stanford colleague (whom I omit to name for fear of having misrepresented his point): why should the existence of these fierce disputes not just be taken to indicate (our regular belief in) the possibility of deciding between readings, on the basis of argument and evidence—which the 'hermeneutic' position merely 'liberates' us from having to weigh? It remains true, however, that such disputes in themselves are *consistent* with that (hermeneutic) position; the only (!) question is what kind of disputes they are, and what causes them.

[22] Fowler (1999) 441. It may be, of course, that Fowler means to restrict the application of his statement in some way (cf. n.17 above, or his reference to 'classical *literary* scholars' on 427 [my italics]—though 'literature' clearly includes Lucretius, who is also usually on the 'ancient philosophy' list). But if so, the general 'democratizing' trend (cf. the passage from Gumbrecht next to be quoted in the text) in the current discussion of commentaries, and of scholarship in the wider sense, does not exhibit the same carefulness. For a different view here, on this and on polyvalent texts, see Kraus (above) 1–7.

[23] I should, strictly, say 'some Aristotelian ones'; the *Historia animalium*, for example, is often rather different—especially more exotic, less argumentative—from the picture of the Aristotelian text I have given. (Cf. also n.14 above.)

just as much as it is capable of telling us what the limits are on the possible readings of the syntax of a sentence. (If it is claimed that these limits depend on our judgment, and on what *we*—not being ancient Greeks—think ancient Greek can mean, I repeat that I am concerned only with what we can *in principle* know,[24] and with the ideal case. We may make mistakes, and others may or may not share our perspective, but the *expert*'s perspective will no more be merely 'one person's view' than the best diagnosis by an expert doctor of an obscure medical condition will be merely 'one person's view.')[25]

Commentaries on philosophical texts (of the ideal kind described)[26] will also, to the same extent, 'reach an end.' I quote Gumbrecht again:

> For all that has been said since the 1960s—with special and democratically-minded dedication to the reader's freedom—about multiple meanings as a potential of any individual text and about interpretation as a never-ending task, for all those very sophisticated—and sometimes overly complicated—pictures of the act of interpretation, I think that, in our everyday practice, we expect interpretation to be a task that can be (and normally should be) brought to a conclusion. We expect that, in the average case of an interpretation, there will be a moment when we feel that we have understood the text (or whichever artifact in question), and we normally associate this moment of 'understanding' with the impression that we now know what the author wanted the text to mean or to be. . . . Commentary in contrast appears to be a discourse which, almost by definition, never reaches its end. For while an interpreter, I would claim, cannot help extrapolating an

[24] I.e., what we are not in principle prevented from knowing. While we may reasonably doubt whether we can in fact know all that a native speaker/writer of the language would have known, nevertheless there is no single item (in the realm of syntax) that we *could* not be right about, even though we might not be certain that we were; but here our experience will already begin to overlap with that of the native speaker/writer, who may himself or herself be (have been) claimed by other such speakers/writers to 'make mistakes.'

[25] Nor is the case significantly altered by the fact that Aristotle's text may give us insufficient information—either because it is too elliptical, or—perhaps—because on some given occasion what we have is someone else's (e.g., a pupil's) version of his thoughts. (The layman might be tempted to say that since the expert—whether in commentary-writing or in the making of medical diagnoses—*may* make mistakes, without her or the layman's knowing about it, from that perspective her judgment might as well be 'one person's view.' But this would be a mistake. The expert, *qua* expert, is not just anyone, i.e., any 'one person.')

[26] That the ideal might never be properly realized, or that we might not know for certain when it had been, need not affect the argument; all I require is that there is nothing in principle to *prevent* the ideal from being realized on one or more occasions.

> author-subject as a point of reference for his interpretation . . ., a commentator is never quite sure of the needs (i.e. of the lacunae in the knowledge) of those who will use her commentary. However carefully she may cater to the needs of her contemporaries among the readers of a text in question, she will never be able to anticipate what exactly will have to be explained to the readers of the next generation—and it is mainly this condition which shapes commentary as an exercise and as a discourse that are constitutively unfinished.[27]

This I find an admirable statement from many points of view, in relation to many types of text; for example, it seems admirably to capture the interpreter's necessary suspension of disbelief in his own interpretation, insofar as that depends on thinking away or simply ignoring alternative, and apparently viable, perspectives and readings. But understanding an argument is not like that, or need not be like that; at least in many cases, understanding one of Aristotle's arguments (perhaps only a line, or even a couple of words, long) may be a matter of seeing just that every other way of taking it is plain *wrong*.[28] In conveying this understanding to a reader, the commentator is not only interpreting for him, and not only giving him the 'impression' of '"understanding,"' but actually giving him understanding (once he has understood what she is saying), so that she—the commentator—does 'reach an end' insofar as the primary tasks of reading are concerned.[29] It is frequently the case that a particular way of reading a phrase/sentence/section/chapter is so clearly

[27] Gumbrecht (1999) 444. On the question of how often texts need a new commentary, cf. Dyck (below) 324–5.

[28] I here pass over the possibility, often floated, of 'alternative rationalities,' not because I deny the possibility of such things, but because they seem irrelevant to the handling of texts plainly written from the standpoint of a non-alternative rationality—indeed, in Aristotle's case, written by one of the very people responsible for its systematization (i.e., in the *Organon*). (On the whole set of issues—or a large range of them—raised by translation, interpretation, and the idea of 'alternative rationalities,' see now Wardy [2000]; I regret that I discovered this short but powerful treatment too late to absorb it to any extent into my own argument.)

[29] I.e., before the secondary stage of evaluation begins. In fact, a translation may sometimes do the job as well as a commentary (once again, the lines between the 'commentary' and other forms of discourse appear, and are, permeable); cf. Kraus (above) 3 n.12. 'Accuracy,' with an Aristotelian text, is usually not a problematical notion—however hard it may be to achieve in practice. If so, we shall also need a qualification to Fowler's description of 'the *translation* model,' "whereby the text in some way is transformed into another representation of itself in the act of criticism": Fowler (1999) 429. (*Of course* there will always be the possibility, even the likelihood, of a lack of fit between one language and another; but the more closely argued a passage, the more we shall be able in practice to control the differences.)

appropriate—because of Aristotle's own clearly signaled anxiety to get his point across—that the only reason for disputing it will be allegiance to a general theory about the nature of texts (i.e., that all are by their very nature polyvalent); and it is in any case at least an open question whether such a theory gains or loses by being presented as holding absolutely, without exceptions, especially in light of its—admittedly non-necessary—affiliation to anti-authoritarianism.

Before moving on to the more difficult case of Plato, I propose to give one brief illustration of my claims about the handling of Aristotle (standing as the archetypal 'philosophical' author in the present context). I deliberately choose a difficult passage rather than an easy one, in order to give a sense of the processes by which, as I claim, things will—in the best case—simply fall into place, or can be supposed to have fallen into place.

The passage is at *Nicomachean Ethics* IV.8, 1127b33–1128a4:

> οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῶι βίωι, καὶ ἐν ταύτηι διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου . . .

The first and third sentences here are plain enough (I leave out one or two side issues, which I think can be straightforwardly dealt with):

> Life also includes relaxation, and relaxation includes amusement of a playful sort: here too there is thought to be a way of interacting with others that is fitting—and sorts of things one should say, and a way in which one should say them, with similar limits on what one listens to. . . . Clearly, here too it is possible to go to excess and to be deficient by comparison to the intermediate. . . .

Plainly, too, the third sentence starts a new point, distinct from whatever is at issue in the second; the second also looks disconnected from the first—"But/and talking among (?) people (?) of this sort and listening to people (?) of this sort will make a difference too." The meaning of this second sentence is, on the face of it, underdetermined.

Here is a fairly random selection of comments on and translations of the sentence:

> 1. "ἐν τοιούτοις . . . τοιούτων] Masc. The kind of company will make a difference" (Stewart [1892]);
> 2. "though here it will also make a difference what kind of people they are in whose presence you are speaking, or to whom you are listening" (Peters [1893], 13th edition [1920]);

3. "ἐν τοιούτοις . . . τοιούτων, 'whether those in whose company he speaks are like himself, and whether those by whom he is spoken to are like himself'" (Burnet [1900]);
4. "(and there will be a difference between the saying and hearing such and such things)" (Chase [1911]);
5. "and it will also concern us whether those in whose company we speak or to whom we listen conform to these same rules of propriety" (Rackham [1934]);
6. "though it should be added that it will be of great advantage to us if those who are listening or talking to us have our own code of behaviour" (Thomson [1953]);
7. "Dabei wird es auch nicht gleichgültig sein, in welcher Gesellschaft man etwas zum besten gibt oder etwas zu hören bekommt" (Dirlmeier [1964]);
8. "And it will be an advantage if those in whose presence we talk and to whom we listen accept such standards" (Thomson, rev. Tredennick [1976]);
9. "The company we are in when we speak or listen also makes a difference" (Irwin [1985]).

This by no means exhausts the variation in readings proposed of the same text—some of them similar, some of them markedly different. As a matter of fact some of them look unlikely renderings of the Greek, and do little more than illustrate the dangers of an impressionistic style of translation. But we have absolutely no reason to believe, and good reason for not believing, that Aristotle himself did not mean something specific: something or other (too) will somehow 'make a difference' in relation to this particular form of excellence. If we cannot choose between the available alternatives, that—so I propose—will have nothing whatever to do with any theory about texts, or writing, or anything else,[30] but will simply reflect the fact that, here (and hardly for the first or the last time), Aristotle has just not left us enough information to decide.

There is, however, one set of conditions that any reading of the passage must fulfill: it must take notice of the facts (a) that the sentence in question is tied to the previous one by the 'too,' (b) that the main function of the first sentence is to describe the subject of the coming chapter/section, and (c) that the third sentence is itself

[30] Including any version of 'reader-response' theory: if different readers respond differently (as they do), then either some or all of their responses are mistaken, and the fact of their differences has no significance beyond tending to confirm that the passage is—for whatever reason—a difficult one.

saying something at a very general level about that subject. Take the sentence out of its context, and it could mean any number of things; see it in its context,[31] and the number of possibilities is drastically reduced (which would help to explain why Aristotle was content to express himself so elliptically). Indeed, I should go so far as to claim that once (a)–(c) are recognized, the sense quickly emerges: "It will also make a difference to be talking, or—as the case may be—listening, to other people who are like this," i.e., who have the disposition Aristotle calls εὐτραπελία, or 'wittiness.' He is simply recognizing that the kind of behavior he is about to recommend will be made more difficult to achieve if everyone else in the room operates according to different standards; it takes two to tango. This observation not only makes sense in the context, but has the kind of acuteness we (by this stage in the *Nicomachean Ethics*) have come to associate with Aristotle. Here is a solution—seen by some translators/commentators, but missed by a good number—which is, I claim, good enough for us not to have to bother looking for an alternative. But in case anyone should find it unconvincing, it should be remembered that the case in question was chosen as a non-obvious one; there are thousands of obvious ones.

I now propose to pass on to Plato. As an epigraph to this section of the paper, one could do—much—worse than quote John Dillon, from his paper on the Neoplatonic exegesis of the *prooimia* of Plato's dialogues. Dillon begins by describing

> two basic impulses that lead to the composition of a commentary. The first is the straightforward scholarly desire to explain obscurities in diction or reference in a source work.... The second impulse is one afflicting particular persons of a philosophical or theological disposition, which seeks to explain away inconsistencies or inconsequentialities in, or unworthy aspects of, an otherwise enormously respected work, by showing that the author did not intend a given passage to be taken literally, or that two apparently inconsistent or even contradictory passages can be reconciled by taking them to refer, say, to two different stages of a given process, or to the same phenomenon at two different levels of reality.[32]

[31] To those continually on the watch for displaced sentences/passages in Aristotle, this may well look less powerful an imperative; but given that, if a passage can be seen as fitting into its present context, there is likely to be less reason to seek to move it, it seems as well at least to begin by seriously trying to see whether it *does* fit.

[32] Dillon (1999) 206.

Mutatis mutandis, this applies as much to modern as to ancient philosophical commentators. But Dillon ends his paper in the following way:

> What, in conclusion, is the moral of this investigation? If anything, simply that the task of commenting adequately on a Platonic dialogue, from both of the perspectives which I outlined at the beginning, is probably beyond the capacity of a mere mortal. Chiefly, there seems to be no real possibility of a meeting of minds between those who look to Plato primarily as a repository of arguments (of very varying validity) and those who are concerned to place primary emphasis on the dialogic form of his writings—the difference, as it was wittily put by R. M. Hare, in his delightful introduction to Plato in the Oxford *Past Masters* series, between Pato and Lato. Of course, one can throw light on much <of> what occurs in the dialogues, and provide very useful guidance on many knotty points of interpretation, but the larger question of what the dialogues are *for*, and how they were intended to fit into the overall educational project of the Academy, must, I fear, forever escape us. And yet, of course, we should never give up trying.[33]

So: the commentator can help with a lot of the detail, but cannot decide the macrocosmic issues; here, the interpreter/reader must ultimately rely on his own resources. This view seems to me to be partially right: Plato often appears to present different faces to his readers, and it is hard for us not to be more attracted by one than the other (or the others). Additionally, the sheer number and variety of the works in the Platonic corpus seem almost designed to prevent us from arriving at a single definitive view—should we wish or think it appropriate to arrive at one—of this elusive writer.[34] Yet at the same time Dillon's view strikes me as distinctly problematical, insofar as it appears to leave us, as interpreters, with something like the same kind of latitude that we may reasonably demand in the case of straightforwardly 'literary' texts. For if we have already opted for either Pato or Lato, that will fundamentally affect the way we approach particular dialogues or particular passages within dialogues.[35] This

[33] Dillon (1999) 222.

[34] Cf. also n.17 above, and on serving the macro-level see (e.g.) de Jong (above).

[35] "Pato is an advocate of what Aldous Huxley called 'the perennial philosophy.' He believes in a total difference in kind between the spiritual and the material, the immortal soul and the perishable body, the world of eternal Ideas and 'the world of matter and sense' as Newman called it; and he endows this difference with a moral significance. . . . Lato seems at first entirely different. He is interested in science, especially in mathematics, and thus in logic and the philosophy of language. He taught Aristotle . . ." (Hare [1982] 26).

looks an upside-down way of proceeding; it is presumably, if anything, the texts themselves that should determine our overall interpretation of their author.

Dillon would not dispute this, I imagine, as a general proposition; he is simply denying that Plato's texts are capable of doing anything of the sort. Given the sheer variety of interpretations of the great man that have been offered, and are still on offer (together with the multi-colored nature of the corpus itself), this might appear an eminently reasonable position to adopt. However I think this is to throw in the towel too quickly. In the remaining part of this paper, I propose to give three examples, one on a large and two on a small scale, of the ways in which our presuppositions are capable of affecting our detailed reading of Plato, and of how the balance needs to be restored: i.e., unsurprisingly, by closer work on the detail (by the commentator: who else?), which in turn ought—so I claim—to affect our presuppositions. I shall not insist that all three cases relate to the Dillon/Hare Pato/Lato divide. All, however, vividly illustrate the—in my view, damaging—consequences of denying Platonic texts anything of the sort of determinacy that I have been claiming for their Aristotelian counterparts.

My first example relates to the *Symposium*. Unlike most other Platonic works, this one seems at first sight to be virtually without any hard philosophical argument. But that first impression, I believe, is misleading; for (so I argue elsewhere)[36] the whole of Socrates' contribution to the feast includes—among its many riches—a single and well-articulated, philosophical treatment of a single subject: the nature of human desire. In my own view,[37] Plato is *typically* concerned with argument: argument is what he *does*, more obsessively and more often than he does anything else—and often in the most unlikely-looking contexts. But of course not everyone thinks like that. Witness the following, from the general editor of a recent volume:[38]

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[36] Especially in Rowe (1998a).

[37] One held, not accidentally, but on particular grounds—e.g., the one about to be given; or, in case this begins to look circular, the emphasis placed by Plato's philosophers (Socrates et al.) on the absolute requirement of argument for living one's life. (Perhaps not quite absolute, given Socrates' habit of listening to his *daimonion*—a point made to me in another context by Charles Kahn; but if the authority of the *daimonion* merely prevents him from doing what he would otherwise have done, it might amount in practice to no more than an indication that he is currently using the wrong arguments, and needs to think again—something he might, presumably, also have a gut feeling about by himself.)

[38] Gary Gurtler, in Cleary and Gurtler (1998) xx, commenting on Rowe (1998b).

> [David] Konstan [the official respondent to a paper of my own, advancing the above view of the Socrates and Diotima portion of the *Symposium*] minces no words in arguing that the *Symposium* is not, strictly speaking, a set of inferences at all, [so] making the tortured distinctions of Rowe . . . somewhat beside the point. Later Konstan describes Diotima's method as poetic, rhetorical, even prophetic: not the kind of genre that lends itself to logical analysis. . . .

I take it that this is a kind of *a fortiori* argument: the context in question is of a sort that does not lend itself to logical analysis, so no logical analysis of it is possible. True, the writer's use of the words 'tortured distinctions' suggests that he thinks me to have been stretching the text to get out of it what I claim is there; but, equally, 'beside the point' suggests that we already *know* that a 'set of inferences' would be out of place in such a context. I wonder, however, why it should be so surprising to find Plato's Socrates up to something seriously philosophical. How often is he 'poetic, rhetorical, even prophetic,' to the exclusion of material that 'lends itself to logical analysis'? Or if that begs too many questions, should one not just look and see whether the, or an, argument is there (and not just invented under torture)?

Here seems to me to be a clear case where investigation at the microscopic level ought to be capable of disturbing interpretation at the higher level rather than being determined by it.[39] My second example shows even more clearly the kinds of choices that confront us. At *Statesman/Politicus* 300C5–6, the Visitor from Elea has the following sentence:

> οὐκοῦν μιμήματα μὲν ἂν ἑκάστων ταῦτα εἴη τῆς ἀληθείας, τὰ παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι γεγράμμενα;

of which two very different translations appear to be possible:

> (1) "Then laws would seem to be written copies of scientific truth in the various departments of life they cover, copies based as far as possible on the instructions received from those who really possess the scientific truth on these matters";[40] or

[39] I make this claim having carried out such an investigation; it is an odd strategy to deny the appropriateness of something (as Gurtler seems to me to do) on the basis of a general description which only that something could justify.

[40] Skemp (1992) (probably the most widely used translation, in this and/or Skemp's original 1952 version, in the last half-century).

(2) "Well, imitations of the truth of each and every thing would be these, wouldn't they—those things issuing from those who know which have been written down so far as they can be?"[41]

To cut a long story short, if Plato means (1), then he is proposing a rehabilitation of existing laws (including democratic ones) that is against both the spirit and the letter of what precedes and follows the context in which the sentence appears; if he means (2), then his argument is consistent throughout.[42] That scholars have been prepared to accept (1) suggests a striking readiness on their part to impute inconsistency to Plato; if the principle of charity alone would justify (2), what blocks its acceptance can surely only be a particular view of the general quality of the argumentation in Plato—which is odd, if our view of that quality depends, as it surely must, on his performance in particular contexts.[43]

The third and last example is on the smallest scale, but the most complex. At *Republic* 533A1–5, in response to Glaucon's request for an account of the power of dialectic, and of the road(s)[44] up which it leads, Socrates says

> οὐκέτ' . . ., ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, οἷός τ' ἔσῃι ἀκολουθεῖν—ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι—οὐδ' εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὗ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τἀληθές, ὅ γε δή μοι φαίνεται—εἰ δ' ὄντως ἢ μή, οὐκέτ' ἄξιον τούτο διισχυρίζεσθαι· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτόν τι ἰδεῖν, ἰσχυριστέον.

In G. M. A. Grube's translation of the *Republic*, as revised by C. D. C. Reeve (now probably one of the most widely used in the English-speaking world),[45] this passage runs:

[41] Rowe (1995) (in the lightly revised versions of the translation in Cooper [1997] and Rowe [1999], it is . . . 'the things . . . that . . .'). (I am undecided as to how the μέν in 300C5 should play in the argument; I suppose for the moment that it is consistent with either reading. In general terms, my claim is presently that the two translations are both *possible* readings of the same text, and indeed *equally* possible, given just what we think we know about the Greek language, and just this sentence, without any hard and fast views about what its context is likely to tell us about it.)

[42] For a fuller version of my argument here, see Rowe (1998c) and (2001).

[43] Julia Annas describes the dialogue as "in some ways a record of complication and even confusion" (Annas and Waterfield [1995] xxii). This would be honorable enough; but still Plato will be either less confused or not confused at all if the Visitor is not made to say at 300C, as Waterfield makes him say, "Now, these regulations will reflect the truth in their various ways, since they transcribe as accurately as possible what men of knowledge have said."

[44] Glaucon uses the plural; to avoid presently irrelevant complications I shall substitute the singular.

[45] Grube/Reeve (1992), included in Cooper (1997).

> You won't be able to follow me any longer, Glaucon, even though there is[46] no lack of eagerness on my part to lead you, for you would no longer be seeing an image of what we're describing, but the truth itself. At any rate, that's how it seems to me. That it is really so is not worth insisting on any further. But that there is some such thing to be seen, *that* is something we must insist on.

According to this version, what 'seems to' Socrates, and what is 'not worth insisting on any further,' appears to be that if Glaucon *were* able to follow him, they would arrive at the truth itself. Presumably, then, Socrates has not already traveled the road in question; and he has doubts either about where the road might lead, or about his own ability to get to the destination (or both). Now I am half-tempted to suggest that this is actually a mistranslation, insofar as it seems to take the ὅ in 533A3 as is it were a ὡς.[47]

But even if it is not a mistranslation (and something like it in any case looks defensible with a punctuation other than Burnet's),[48] then it is, surely, an under-translation—as Adam, for one, agrees.[49] What Socrates at least hints at, even if he does not—perhaps, quite—unambiguously say it, is something like this (the crucial parts are in italics, though I also tidy up others—still following Burnet's punctuation):

> You won't be able to follow me any longer, Glaucon—even though there would be no lack of eagerness on my part to lead you—and you wouldn't any longer be seeing an image of what we're describing, *but the truth itself, what appears to me, at least*[, *to be the truth*]—*though whether* [*you would be*] *actually* [*seeing the truth*] *or not, well, that isn't something worth insisting on*; but that there is some such thing to be seen, that really is something we must insist on.

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46 Grube/Reeve here ignore the potential optative + ἄν, for no apparent reason.

47 This was certainly the view of a group of scholars with whom I discussed the same passage (at a conference on Platonic epistemology held in Frankfurt/Main in August/September 2000).

48 See further below.

49 "Here Socrates appears to be a trifle more confident [sc. than he was at 506Eff.] of his own expository powers, though he is careful, as before, to avoid the appearance of dogmatism . . ." (Adam [1902/1963] *ad loc.*). Others Adam cites are disappointed by Socrates' response here (his 'drawing back'), but Adam himself thinks it "possible to form a tolerably clear idea [sc. from elsewhere in the *Republic*, and from other dialogues] of the kind of answer which the Platonic Socrates might have made in reply to Glauco's [sic] invitation": no question, then, about how he takes the relative pronoun, nor does he think there is any question about how to take it (comforting, if not in itself conclusive—like the statement of their views by my Frankfurt colleagues).

If this second translation is right, Socrates is saying/hinting not only (a) that dialectic (whatever that may be) is in principle capable of reaching the end of the road, and a 'vision' of the good, but also (b) that he himself has traveled that road; also (c) that he has no confidence that (he will not insist that) what he would report about it would be the truth. (Glaucon has not made the journey, and that, perhaps, would be enough to explain why he would not understand a full exposition on Socrates' part.)

I have no way of showing that the Grube/Reeve version was influenced by any particular presuppositions about the nature of Platonic philosophy. Reeve (for it is Reeve's revision that is decisive here)[50] may just have been thinking of Socrates' apparently self-deprecating remarks at 506C–E about his own state of understanding of the good (which one might think inconsistent even with a hint that Socrates might in fact have 'seen' it). But Reeve's reading does in fact fit well with Latonic versions of Plato, or more generally with those versions (modern or ancient) that make him more of a sceptic than a dogmatist—since on that reading, Socrates' main point, at least in the relative clause and what follows it, will be to express doubt about what his much-vaunted method of dialectic can, even in principle, achieve, or about what he himself can achieve by it.

By contrast another interpreter, Thomas Szlezák, an open supporter of a variety of Pato, feels able to take the second type of interpretation for granted.[51] Szlezák translates:

> Lieber Glaukon, du wirst nicht imstande sein zu folgen—denn was mich betrifft, so soll es an Bereitwilligkeit nicht fehlen. Und du würdest nicht mehr ein Bild dessen sehen, wovon wir reden, sondern die Sache selbst, jedenfalls was sich mir so darstellt—ob sie nun tatsächlich so ist oder nicht, möchte ich nicht mehr mit Festigkeit behaupten . . .

Szlezák's comments on the passage then include the following:

[50] Here is Grube's original version of the passage: "Not yet, my dear Glaucon, will you be able to follow—it is not that keenness is lacking on my part—for you would no longer be seeing an image of what we are discussing but the truth itself, or so it seems to me. It is not worthwhile insisting that it is so in fact, but we must maintain that one would see something of this kind." This is hard to read, but it seems at least possible to take 'or so it seems to me' as a reference to the account of the destination that Socrates would have given, had he thought Glaucon capable of following; Reeve's modernizing version removes this possibility.

[51] Szlezák (1985) 314.

> ob Sokrates' Ansicht (ὃ δή μοι φαίνεται) sich mit der Wirklichkeit (τὸ ἀληθές) deckt, kann er offen lassen; hingegen ist er sich der Differenz dessen, was ihm die Wahrheit zu sein scheint, zu dem, was er Glaukon hier im Gespräch [sc. in the three similes of Books V–VII] geboten hat, völlig sicher: wenn er Glaukons Wunsch erfüllen wollte, müsste die seit 506E eingehaltene Beschränkung auf ein Bild (εἰκών) der gemeinten Sache fallen, und die Sache selbst [footnote: Die gemeinte Sache ist die Dialektik bzw. ihr Gegenstand, der Ideenbereich, in seiner ganzen Breite . . .] käme zur Sprache (natürlich in seiner Sicht, die er nicht als unfehlbar hinstellen möchte).

This is a striking disagreement, and one that might easily seem to provide further ammunition for those who deplore the power of the commentator/translator (should we not, after all, have all the available readings presented to us; why should we be restricted to just one?).[52] The moral I wish to draw from this example, however, is different. On the one hand, Plato's text *is*, or can be, relatively indeterminate, and certainly less determinate than Aristotle's usually is (no surprises here). But on the other, the text still gives us the power to see *where* it is less determinate, and to discriminate between the less and the more determinate. Further, even where indeterminate, it gives us the power to *set limits* on its indeterminacy: the range of available readings is not infinite, but on the contrary rather carefully circumscribed. For the effect of the sentence in question is surely quite deliberate. Plato, not unusually, wants to eat his cake and still have it: Socrates has at least some serious familiarity with the road—since why otherwise should he say to Glaucon 'you *will* no longer be able to follow'? Or perhaps after all he hasn't: after all, if he is not certain that what he arrived at was the truth, then perhaps he took a wrong turning. And that, in fact, seems to leave us not so very far from where Grube/Reeve left us.

But much even of this is left to be inferred and supplied: the Greek has only "nor would you any longer be seeing an image of what we're describing, but the truth itself, what (?) appears to me, at least—whether actually or not, well, that isn't something worth insisting on"; or (changing Burnet's punctuation) "the truth itself—so it [a thing which?] appears to me, at least—whether actually or

[52] In case the Reeve version does involve a plain mistranslation (though in the end I doubt that it does), I refer back to the original Grube version (n.50 above)—which, as I suggested, is itself capable of different readings, at least one of which would make the passage significantly different from Szlezák's version of it.

not. . . ."[53] The result is to make it difficult to be sure *precisely* what Socrates is saying; and that (I propose) is exactly what Plato wants. The sentence manages to end up in a quite different place from the one it seemed to start from, moving jerkily—as indicated by Burnet's dashes[54]—between a series of fairly ill-assorted, and sometimes ill-defined, parts. Here is a real challenge to the translator, who will probably have to choose between mimicking the style of the sentence and making it decently intelligible to the reader.[55]

But that is another issue. What matters for present purposes is that if the sentence/passage is indeterminate in meaning (or 'polyvalent'), it is a controlled, and controllable, sort of indeterminacy: that is, Plato has put it there, and also given us the resources with which to control it. The key lies in the reference of the relative ὅ. Is it (1) to 'the truth itself' ('what it appears to me, at least, to be'), or is it (2) to the proposition "you would no longer be seeing an image, but the truth itself"? (2) would make as much sense as (1) ("you would be seeing the truth—or so it seems to me, even though I know nothing . . ."); and if the juxtaposition of the relative ὅ and the neuter phrase αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθές at first sight makes (1) the natural option, still 'the truth itself' cannot in fact be the *direct* antecedent of the relative—which again opens the way to (2). (And so on.) I grant that at this point in the discussion one might easily begin to favor the Dillon option, and say that in the end everything will depend on what view one *chooses* to take of Plato (i.e., on whether one is a Patonist or a Latonist). But at the same time we should remember that it is Plato himself who has left things in this fine balance—if, for the purposes of the argument, we may assume our text to be trustworthy.[56] And the reason he has done so, as I have suggested,

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[53] This second alternative, with an additional dash, might justify Reeve's variation of Grube's rendering of the relative (see above). But I think that in any case the way Socrates ends, with a reassertion of the reality of the good, prevents us from supposing that he is *just* reserving his position on whether dialectic is capable of discovering what the good is. See below.

[54] To which we might easily add another: see above.

[55] Here, perhaps, there might be room for Fowler's 'translation model' (n.29 above); though Grube's original version (n.50 above) is perhaps a reasonable compromise, suggesting something of the style of the sentence while also being intelligible, but not too much so.

[56] My other assumption, that the relevant features of the text are not due to simple inadvertence on the author's part, depends simply on the 'principle of charity' (see above).

is to achieve a studied imprecision: Socrates both does and does not know more than he should (i.e., both because of his general disavowal of knowledge, and because of his specific disclaimer at 506). If so, then in a way Reeve and Szlezák are both wrong, and both right; but they are more wrong than right, insofar as they have allowed their *general* view of Plato to color their detailed reading of the passage, and have underestimated Plato's subtlety as a writer.

This is not to suggest that Plato is, finally, transparent. He is still too versatile for us ever to be quite sure, at least at any level above the most microscopic, that we have pinned him down. (One case currently dear to my own heart is the interpretation of the myth of the *Politicus*: which way round do things go in the age of Kronos—the way they do now, or the other way? The evidence is extraordinarily difficult to read. So too, notoriously, with the crucial question about the *Timaeus*: are we supposed to think the world was created, or not?) But this is no reason for assimilating him immediately to the poet and the dramatist, or whoever it is that provides the model for the Goldhill or Fowler notion of a text. Plato is the most cerebral of writers, and—so I claim—demonstrably as committed to argument, of a fairly familiar kind, as his Socrates keeps telling us we should be. What is not directly argumentative is usually—here the Neoplatonists were surely right—in some way or other connected either with the argument or with Plato's ultimate purpose in writing (which, in general terms, is not so difficult to fathom). And there are surely always more keys to the understanding of Plato, in the text, than we have so far found. The reason for that, I take it, has something to do with the fact that he is, at the end of the day, a *philosophical* writer, whose business is not to entertain his reader, or to educate his sensibility, but to get him thinking, and thinking in some pretty specific ways.

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13. TEXT AND COMMENTARY: THE EXAMPLE OF CICERO'S *PHILOSOPHICA*

Andrew R. Dyck

Cicero's philosophical essays domesticated Greek philosophy for Roman readers, thus preparing the way for its influence under the Empire, the Middle Ages, and beyond; at the same time they forged the Latin language into a sharp instrument for philosophical debate and dissection. Cicero's achievement in the *philosophica* was a brilliant but lonely one, and since he had, as a follower of the Skeptical Academy, taken up the defense of a *deserta disciplina et iam pridem relicta* (*N. D.* 1.6), there was no philosophical school with an interest in providing his essays with commentary, as was done for the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Nor, although he recommended to his son the study of his *philosophica* as an aid to forming a style (*Off.* 1.2–3), did they enjoy the kind of currency in rhetorical schools that his speeches had and that spurred Q. Asconius Pedianus in the mid-first century A.D. to supply the latter with commentaries. The first commentary on one of these texts was the one Cicero himself supplied for the laws on religion and magistrates at *Leg.* 2.24ff. and 3.18ff. Here the lemmata are syntactically integrated into the commentary:[1] Cicero is clearly at pains to reconcile optimate opinion to measures he sees as in the interest of the *concordia ordinum* (especially 3.23–26 and 38–39), and he himself constructs an explicit comparison to the *suasio legis* of a proponent in a public meeting (2.24, 3.38). It is not until the fifth century that we meet the first third-person commentary on a philosophical work of Cicero, namely Macrobius' on the *Somnium Scipionis*; ironically, it was only as an adjunct of Macrobius' commentary that the work itself survived. Like his younger contemporaries on the Greek side, Hermias and Proclus, Macrobius was writing in a Neoplatonic vein; the influence of Porphyry is strong, especially the commentary on the *Timaeus*.[2]

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[1] Cf. Cancik (1995) 301.
[2] Cf. Wessner (1928) 175.34ff.

Though some Ciceronian *philosophica* find a place in medieval curricula (*De amicitia, De senectute, Tusculanae disputationes, De officiis*),[3] the Middle Ages were not fertile of commentaries on them. The modern commentary has its roots in the way classical texts have been disseminated and studied since the Renaissance. The first printed editions of Cicero, as of other authors, were of text only, but as the awareness of textual variants grew, it became established practice for the editor to include variants, at first in the outer margin. As the number of printed editions increased, so did the volume of annotation, each editor collecting predecessors' discussions of textual problems and adding his own; the resulting *variorum* editions sometimes reached considerable bulk. In the later phases these collections *in usum eruditorum* begin to approximate the materials gathered in a modern commentary: manuscript readings and those of past editors continue, of course, to be cited, but the discussion becomes less closely tied to the restoration of the text; quotations are identified, parallels for the thought or construction adduced, and a certain amount of exegesis appears. I think, for instance, of the editions of *De officiis* by Graevius (1688) and Heusinger (1783); similar in this regard is the edition of Facciolati (1747), who explicates the context of *se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse* ("he could not flee without personal disgrace": Callicratidas quoted at *Off.* 1.84): "Putabat, se classem removere non posse sine suo dedecore, quod fugere videretur" ("he thought that he could not remove the fleet without personal disgrace because he would seem to be fleeing"). The *variorum* editions are thus the ancestor of the two modern adjuncts of the classical text: the economical critical apparatus, just citing readings and their sources, and the more discursive commentary.

The exigencies of instruction in the ancient languages in schools and universities led to the production, around 1800, of texts with notes; these are at first in Latin, but in the second quarter of the century notes in the vernacular languages come to dominate the market. It is interesting to compare two editions of *De officiis* published within a single decade: O. Bredberg's (Holm 1830), with Latin notes, and that of L. J. Billerbeck and G. C. Crusius (Hannover 1839), with annotation in German. Both draw a good deal of matter from the earlier *variorum* editions, sometimes quoted verbatim; thus

[3] Cf. Curtius (1953) 49–50.

the comment of Faccciolati (1747) on 1.84, quoted in the previous paragraph, reappears in Bredberg (1830). Both also attempt to make the subject-matter more accessible, Bredberg by prefacing chapter-by-chapter summaries to the beginning of each book, Billerbeck–Crusius by inserting running summaries (in italics) in the Latin text; both of these features imitate Biblical typography from as early as the sixteenth century.[4] But Billerbeck–Crusius represents *Zukunftsmusik* in several senses: though the exegesis still embodies a good deal of Latin paraphrase, the vernacular translation now appears (e.g., at 3.15 *cumulate . . . perfectum* is rendered 'überflüssig vollkommen'); and, though parallels are still cited, reference is now made to a standard grammar (that of Zumpt). The vernacular school commentaries were at first rather austere in scope and style in imitation of the Latin notes previously used;[5] though they tended to expand as the genre developed, a practical limit was imposed by the amount pupils could afford to spend on books. The principal hallmarks of the school commentary were thus fixed fairly early on: a fuller attention to subject matter (identification of historical figures, places, battles, etc.), translation of difficult bits, and citation of parallels, with considerable attention given to grammar and style. Inevitably, the ethical treatises regarded as suitable fodder for pupils at school (*Somnium Scipionis, Tusculanae disputationes, De senectute, De officiis, De amicitia*) were the first chosen for such treatment, but by 1879 even such a work as *De Legibus* received a volume in Teubner's series of Schulausgaben griechischer und lateinischer Klassiker.[6]

Alongside the school commentary the nineteenth century also saw the production of learned commentaries, written by scholars for the use of other scholars and advanced students. Indeed the classical commentary can be said to have reached its τέλος between the end of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. In accordance with the 'Totalitätsideal' of Wilamowitz and his generation, the scholarly commentary was greatly expanded, the interpretative

[4] Cf. Greenslade (1963) plates 18ff. On format see further Kraus 6 n.21 and Budelmann, 143–8 (both above).

[5] For England cf. Stray (1998) 96ff.; such tendencies were reinforced by Wordsworth (1838) 246, claiming that "the partial difficulty of expressing himself in Latin was . . . the interpreter's best ally, as the facility of writing in his mother tongue may prove his worst enemy: it saved him from diffuseness and irrelevancy." On the use of Latin in modern commentaries, see Stephens (above) 68–71.

[6] By du Mesnil (1879); similarly, for English readers, Pearman (1881). On the development of school commentaries see also Rijksbaron (above).

net being cast widely enough to include a full and penetrating discussion of content as well as grammar and style. At the same time it was established that the commentator's aim was not merely to elucidate the individual word, phrase, or sentence, but the larger structural elements and ultimately the whole: it thus became accepted to treat the plan and train of thought of an entire section before descending to *minutiae.* Wilamowitz's *Herakles* (1895) and Kaibel's *Elektra* (1896) are early examples of the method, followed on the Latin side by Norden's *Aeneid* 6 (first edition 1903).

Of the commentaries on Cicero's *philosophica* the ones of nineteenth-century vintage still read and cited today are Madvig's *De finibus* (first edition 1839) and Reid's *Academica* (1885). The former accompanies a text pioneering for the stemmatic method;[7] in view of his unrivaled knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity the commentary of the Danish scholar remains a treasure-house of observations worth visiting again and again. The strength of Reid's work, too, in spite of his attempts to do justice to the subject matter, lies in the realm of language and style. Less well-known is the commentary on *De finibus* 1–2 which L. C. Purser saw through the Press at the end of Reid's life (1925); it lacks the detailed introduction of the earlier work. Reid takes issue with Madvig at a number of points but, with primary focus on text and language, is still working on nineteenth-century lines. J. B. Mayor's ambitious three-volume commented edition of *De natura deorum* (1880–85) merits a mention here, though it has tended to be eclipsed by A. S. Pease's still more gargantuan one from the 1950s; Mayor is comparable to Reid in his polymathy and mastery of Ciceronian Latinity.[8]

One obvious flaw in earlier commentaries on the *philosophica* was a lack of relevant philosophical expertise on the part of the authors.[9] This began to change with the new interest in Hellenistic philosophy that set in around the turn of the century and found expression in such projects as Usener's *Epicurea* (1887) or the *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* (four volumes, 1905–24). In the new century the commen-

[7] Cf. Timpanaro (1981) 50 and esp. 57–58; summary 78, "il primo a servirsi dello *stemma codicum* per la ricostruzione dell'archetipo non fu il Lachmann, ma il Madvig. . . ."

[8] Brief sketch by Henderson (1998) 26 and 99.

[9] For the situation of authors of commentaries on philosophical texts today, see Rowe (above) 296–8; contrast von Staden (above) 125–6 on authors of modern commentaries on ancient medical and scientific texts.

tators began to speak authoritatively of philosophical problems in the text and to reflect on the relation of Cicero's text to his sources.[10] The work of contextualizing the content could now begin in earnest. The commentators' work has been enriched by new insights by such scholars as W. Görler and J. Leonhardt, who have taught us to keep a sharp eye out for tiny signs of Cicero's basic skepticism.[11]

There will be conscious influences on an author from works he has read, but there will also be unconscious influences linked to his state of mind at the time of writing. The commentator must ferret these out, so far as possible, by reading the author's own writings and other sources for the period of composition. In Cicero's case the genesis of a work will often be surrounded by a penumbra of discussion in the letters, usually to Atticus. In the case of *De Officiis*, for instance, we need not indulge in speculation about Cicero's state of mind; he tells us plainly enough about the disordered circumstances of writing (esp. 3.1–3), indications which can be supplemented by contemporary letters such as *Att.* 15.13a.2, where he speaks of seeking refuge from interruptions. Such circumstances will inevitably leave their mark on an unrevised text, especially where he departs from his source and invokes Roman examples. A particularly striking instance (as I have argued *ad loc.*, [1996] 392f.) is *Off.* 2.23–9, where Cicero breaks free of the mooring of Greek examples and allows his political concerns to dictate the (meandering) course of the argument; the trend accelerates in Book 3, where he has no connected Greek source and thus can contrive within eleven chapters to cast aspersions on the morality of the conduct of all three 'triumuiri' (3.73ff.).

Cicero the writer on philosophy was not merely a keen student of philosophical texts, but remained a consummate rhetorician. The point seems obvious and yet, perhaps because of the tendency of commentators to focus on microanalysis, it is only relatively recently that it has received the attention it deserves.[12] Indeed, one of Cicero's motives for writing was to lend a more effective advocacy to certain

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[10] Cf., e.g., Heine–Pohlenz (1912) on *Tusc.* 1.61–65.

[11] Görler (1995), Leonhardt (1999); there has also been an idiosyncratic attempt to analyze the theoretical treatises in terms of the parts of forensic speeches: MacKendrick (1989). On contextualization in commentaries see also Kraus 15 n.46 and Laird (both above).

[12] Cf., e.g., Schäublin (1990), delineating the rhetorical agenda of *De natura deorum* 1.

school arguments than their proponents had yet mustered.[13] Nowadays commentators realize that the understanding of no Ciceronian work is complete until the rhetorical strategies that shape the way the argument unfolds have been worked out. Cicero himself may at times have had difficulty formulating exactly what he was about; thus the description of his plan for the following paragraphs at *Leg.* 1.36–39, where he announces a plan to present his views in the manner of the recent philosophers who discuss matter *articulatim distincteque*, rather than *fuse et libere*, and so as to appease the Skeptical Academy, gives no hint that what is coming is actually a version of the preceding reargued in polemical style.[14]

As the demands of writing commentary grow greater, human limitations, despite some help from searchable databases, are not growing much less; but various strategies are available to make the task more manageable. One is to separate the traditionally conjoined tasks of editing the text and commenting on it; in such cases it is, however, highly desirable for commentators and editors to be in close contact, for, as Shackleton Bailey has observed, "a great many supposedly corrupt passages have finally been vindicated by intelligent and informed interpreters."[15] Thus I have tried in my commentary on *Off.* 1.82 to show that the words *de evertendis . . . retinere* can be vindicated for this place in spite of Campe's deletion, accepted by Atzert and Fedeli and, in the form of double-square brackets, by Winterbottom. It would be possible for the commentator's mandate to be narrowed, e.g., to a purely philosophical commentary as in the Clarendon Aristotle series.[16] Yet another approach would be for a commentary to be taken on by a team of specialists in different relevant fields. The idea has been pioneered for *De oratore* by a Dutch team led by A. D. Leeman (1981–); especially promising is the common reading of texts by philosophers and philologists such as produced a fairly recent commented edition of *Academica*.[17]

How often does one need a new commentary on a given text? The editor of a text may, barring discovery of previously unknown

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[13] Cf., e.g., Englert (1990).

[14] Cf. my forthcoming commentary on *Leg.* 1.36–39 and 40–52.

[15] Shackleton Bailey (1975) 31–32 = (1997) 334. On textual criticism in commentaries see also Kraus 1–2, 4 n.14 and Henderson 217–8, 221 (both above).

[16] Cf. Rowe (above).

[17] Schäublin et al. (1995).

manuscripts or other evidence, reasonably aspire to create a κτῆμα ἐς ἀεί, i.e., to have studied the witnesses and mastered their relations so thoroughly as to create a definitive text. Not so the commentator, unless the commentary aims to provide nothing more than a definitive set of ancient testimonia relevant to the text. A commentary being an interpretation, major texts can expect to require at least one commentary per generation. Those that do not receive them tend to drop outside the purview of scholars, and a vicious cycle of neglect sets in, whereby the lack of a current commentary discourages consultation by scholars who might have found the text at least tangentially relevant to their studies.

To illustrate the variation in styles over time let us consider what may well be the most famous single sentence from Cicero's *philosophica*, once used as the epigraph for John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), together with a summary of the treatment of the passage in several different periods:

> *N. D.* 1.84 quam bellum erat, Vellei, velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias quam ista effutientem nauseare atque ipsum sibi displicere.
>
> [How fine it would be, Velleius, rather to be willing to confess not knowing what you do not know than to grow ill spewing forth such stuff and to displease oneself.]

The text here was controverted from early times, with Paulus Mianutius already mooting *ipsum tibi* for transmitted *ipsum sibi*, the conjecture ratified by Davies (fourth edition, 1744) but resisted by Schoemann (fourth edition, 1876) on grounds that the imprecision ('Ungenauigkeit') can be excused because the stricture would apply to Epicureans in general, not just to Velleius. More detail enters with Mayor (1880) who agrees that the transmitted text can stand but also comments on the indicative in *quam bellum erat*, the omission of the subject of *confiteri nescires* (with reference to standard grammars) and the verb *nauseare*, rightly finding the sense 'feel disgust' and correcting several lexica. Pease (1955) comments on the very same points, adducing further parallels and also adding a note on the manuscript spelling of *effut(t)ientem*. None mentions the use of the sentence by Locke.

This example raises the general problem of tralaticiousness, which has brought the art of writing commentary into bad odor of late—so much so that there are cases of junior faculty being advised not to present a commentary as the book to be evaluated in a tenure

case.[18] It is true that commentators too often comment on the same points their predecessors have; is the cause mere laziness, or the similarity of structure of human minds? In any case, one should allow ample opportunity for the text to work upon one's mind so that the problems that seem to oneself the obvious, inevitable ones have a chance to emerge. Each generation can and should pose its own set of questions to the text, a process that can be inhibited by excessive or excessively early influence from one's predecessors (though, of course, there is a proper time for coming to terms with previous scholarship as well).

As long as classical texts are read, readers will continue to want to have commentaries. Perhaps it would help if there were an (implicit) compact between commentators and readers as to what a commentary should provide. To begin with the negative, the reader cannot reasonably expect the commentator to be an expert on every subject dealt with. To achieve that, commentaries would have to be collaborative works of panels of experts (see above, 324). The commentator can, however, be expected to be fairly well informed on the topics dealt with (information based, if need be, on consultation of expert opinion) and to provide references to the relevant ancient sources and current literature. The commentator can be expected to present a carefully thought through interpretation of major difficulties in the text; this may not prove to be an interpretation acceptable to all or even most readers, but the commentary should provide enough data to enable the reader to pursue the matter further and arrive at an independent judgment.

One can, moreover, expect that the commentator's vantage point will enable him/her not merely to interpret the given passage but to see to how that passage functions within the whole and indeed to provide an analysis of the work's overall architecture.[19] The commentator should also shed light on how the work being discussed fits into the larger context of the intellectual history of the topic it

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[18] On tralaticious commentaries, see Kraus (above) 11–13, 16–17 and on the place of commentaries in a professional career see Index, s.v. professionalization.

[19] Commentators on Cicero's *philosophica*, it must be said, have been slow to accept this challenge, Pease, for instance, still taking it as his mandate to comment on individual words or phrases rather than sections of *De divinatione* or *De natura deorum*; better in this regard are recent commentaries published by Cambridge (Powell on *De senectute* [1988] and Zetzel on *De re publica* [1995]).

deals with, how it fits into its genre in terms of style and approach, and how it fits into the author's own life and oeuvre (if these are otherwise documented). 'Contextualization' in several senses is what a commentary is about, and this project should not be limited to the introduction but should be a conscious goal throughout. Thus the commentator's work is not done when the last sentence has been annotated: the commentator has not completed his/her job until the work and its problems have been addressed at a conceptual level, with the completed work of microanalysis forming the basis for macroanalysis.

"[D]ie schönste aufgabe der philologie ist das interpretiren. Ein document voll verstanden ist mehr wert als alle aperçus und alle stoffsammlungen."[20] Not all may agree with this scale of value, but even those classicists who generally advise their students to cultivate late-antique or Neolatin studies admit that there is still ample room for new commentaries on classical authors. I would add that writing a commentary can serve as a *schola philologiae* for young scholars by confronting them with the full range of problems posed by a given text. One hopes that, by redefining the tasks of the commentator and adjusting the expectations of readers as outlined above, the commentary can be rehabilitated as a worthwhile scholarly enterprise.

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14. 'CF. E.G.': A TYPOLOGY OF 'PARALLELS' AND THE FUNCTION OF COMMENTARIES ON LATIN POETRY

Roy Gibson

> The attraction of these great collections [Mayor, Headlam, Pease] is of course that the reader might be able to use the collected material for a different end, might be able to tell new stories on the basis of old data; *and to this end it is better to have too much than too little.* K. J. Dover's commentary on Aristophanes' *Clouds* is rigorously selective, and everywhere shows evidence of its author thinking clearly about what should and should not be included: which it is why it is a much less interesting and useful commentary than the ragbag of craziness which is W. J. M. Starkie's edition.[1]

The citation of 'parallel' texts is a key feature of modern commentaries on classical texts. Parallels are used, among other things, to support a reading in a text, to help construe the text, establish register, identify allusions/intertexts, and build a context for interpretation. In effect, parallel texts frequently constitute the bulk of the system within which the commented text is to be read.[2] Commentators, furthermore, derive great satisfaction from finding parallels, and are everywhere to be found stacking them high and deep on the shelves of their commentaries. As one critic has remarked of the commentary, "there is an aesthetics of opulence and even of exuberance inherent to the genre."[3] But what is this opulence for? Is a wealth of parallels designed to aid the reader's interpretation of the text or merely to display the erudition of the commentator?[4] More fundamentally, what is the nature of the relationship between a text and the system of 'parallels' within which we are invited to read it? What critical processes are elided in the abbreviation—cf. e.g.—which routinely introduces parallels in commentaries?

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[1] Fowler (1999) 436 (italics my emphasis); cf. *idem* (1997) 14.
[2] See Fowler (1997) 14–15.
[3] Gumbrecht (1999) 446. The corollary is a characteristic attribution of 'brevity' to the commented text; see Sluiter (1999) 186.
[4] Similar questions may be asked of footnotes and the quantities of primary and

The epigraph to this chapter perhaps might discourage the asking of these questions. The collections of parallels in the commentaries of Mayor and Pease clearly do aid and stimulate readers, and it must seem superfluous to ask whether what works in practice will function equally well in theory. Furthermore, as Fowler implies, commentaries stout with a wealth of 'parallel' material paradoxically often have longer and more productive lives than their leaner and more selective cousins. However, this enthusiasm for 'excess' is not shared by all, at least to judge by the hostile reviews often handed out to those deemed insufficiently economic.[5] Nor has the critical innocence of the collection of 'parallel' texts gone unquestioned.[6] In order to look further at the theoretical and other problems raised by the use of parallels in commentaries, I use my own commentary on Ovid's *Ars amatoria* 3 as the *locus* of investigation. Produced below are some notes close to—or replicas of—those to be published in a commentary forthcoming in the Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries series. More frequently, however, I use earlier versions of my notes, which second thoughts caused me to alter or discard. The intention is not to provide a commentator's 'Bildungsroman.' Instead, I use my own commentary as a way of showing that the problems discussed are not abstract issues (or a path to criticizing others), but rather are of close concern to commentators and are ones with which I as commentator have wrestled—and expect to go on doing so.[7] (Nevertheless, to avoid wearying the reader with constant personal references, I normally use the third person ['he'] to refer to myself as commentator.)

First, the term 'parallel' itself must be unpacked. Parallel lines, of course, never meet. But there is more to the term than this geometrical image allows. Whether used as noun or verb, 'parallel' is popularly employed to refer to analogy, equality, similarity, or comparability. That is to say, the type of resemblance covered is highly variable. As for the relations of resemblance covered by 'parallel,'

secondary material characteristically they contain; see Nimis (1984), Grafton (1997) 107ff. See also Stephens (above) 84–5 on commentaries on fragmentary texts.

[5] See, for example, the notices given van Dam's commentary on Statius, *Siluae* 2 by Mayer (1986) and Ahl (1986); more generally, Griffin (1995) 13.

[6] See Goldhill (1999) 393–97.

[7] I cannot fail to add that the best I can hope to do is set these problems out in a clear and helpful fashion: my forthcoming commentary—exposed to the response: 'Physican, heal thyself'—has hardly solved them.

these are, in classical commentaries at least, thoroughly heterogeneous. As we shall see below, the relation of resemblance between a particular feature of the commented text, and a set of *comparanda* drawn from the full range of classical literature, may be semantic, syntactic, connotative, conceptual, contextual—or simply one of similarity of content. As von Staden notes, 'parallel' is little more than a collective label of convenience.[8] He might have added that popular usage within the discipline pushes the term to include everything from precise similarity and partial analogy to the sort of correspondence which a sense of charity might term 'muted.' The construction of a typology of parallels below will reveal in some detail the heterogeneous nature of the relations of resemblance, and also introduce us to some of the methodological and other problems raised by the uses to which parallels are put.

1. *Parallels: A Typology*

The construction of a typology, as might be expected, is fraught with difficulties. There is more than one way to analyse parallels and their uses, and to establish one set of types is necessarily to exclude from the critical frame other typologies which different critical agendas may produce. Furthermore, even within its own terms, the set of types produced below is not exhaustive and may contain overlaps. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the typology will provide a useful basis for discussion.[9]

1.1 *Establishing the Text*

Medieval commentaries on the *Ars amatoria* display a rather limited interest in the establishment of the text,[10] but the latter became one of the main interests of early-modern commentaries, such as the famous seventeenth-century edition of Ovid by Heinsius,[11] and here parallels are constantly cited to justify the editor's choice of textual

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[8] Above, 111. For an expression of dissatisfaction with the piecemeal explanation of texts associated with the use of heterogeneous parallels, see Most (1985) 37.

[9] For an earlier attempt to suggest a typology of parallels and to define their use, see Lyne (1978) 3–5.

[10] See Hexter (1986) 39–40, 68–9.

[11] On Heinsius, see Kenney (1974) 57–63.

variant.[12] In fact, the enormous critical success of (e.g.) instances of 'parallel' syntax in justifying a particular reading undoubtedly played a role in the adoption of other kinds of parallel as a wider interpretative tool in commentaries. At any rate, a modern example of the use of parallels to establish the text may be given from *Ars* 3.733f., where Ovid is telling his female pupils in the art of love a cautionary story involving the mythical hunter Cephalus:

> **ille feram uidisse ratus, iuuenaliter artus | corripit** "He, thinking he had seen a wild beast, impulsively snatches up his limbs." *artus* is the conjecture of Merkel for the *arcus* or *arcum* of the MSS. *arcus* may initially appear the more likely reading, as *corripere* is commonly used of snatching up arms (see *TLL* 4, 1040, 55ff.), but is not attested in combination with *artus*. Nevertheless, *artus* is to be preferred, as Cephalus was traditionally associated with a spear (as in the present context) and not a bow. Furthermore, although *artus corripere* is not attested, close parallels may be used to defend the phrase; cf. e.g. Verg. *Aen.* 3.176 (after the visit of the *Penates*) *corripio e stratis corpus*, 4.572 (after the visit of Mercury) *corripit e somno corpus, TLL* 4, 1041, 36ff.

The transmitted *arcus* is declared to be unsatisfactory for the broad contextual reason given, but it is problematic that the conjectured alternative *artus* is not attested with *corripere*, and that the latter verb is often found with a class of noun, namely weapons, of which the text transmitted by the manuscripts is a member. Nevertheless, phrases similar to *artus corripit* can be produced from the *Aeneid.* A close resemblance of syntactical structure—and signified physical action—between the two Vergilian examples and the commented text is argued to make them 'parallel.' This parallelism is argued to underwrite the claims for the plausibility of the conjectured reading.

1.2 *Comprehending the Text*

Parallels are also used to help the reader construe and otherwise make sense of the text. At *Ars* 3.576, for example, the precise meaning of the sentence, although presumably obvious to experienced native speakers, will not be sufficiently clear to modern readers without some detailed linguistic archaeology:

[12] Cf. Dyck (above) 320–1 on the development of modern commentaries from early-modern *variorum* editions.

> **quae fugiunt, celeri carpite poma manu** "With speedy hand pluck the fruit which 'flees.'" *fugere* and cognates are used of food and drink which is 'going off' or passing into over-ripeness; cf. e.g. Cic. *Off.* 3.91 (sc. *quaerit*) *qui uinum fugiens uendat sciens, debeatne dicere,* Pliny *Nat.* 15.40 (of the prices fetched for the common peach) *quod miremur, quia non aliud fugacius.* Fruit is at its sweetest then; cf. Sen. *Epist.* 12.4 (of old age) *conplectamur illam at amemus; plena est uoluptatis, si illa scias uti. gratissima sunt poma cum fugiunt.* The image here then sums up the greater attractiveness of the mature lover, and warns the *puellae* not to delay in taking him.

Here *fugiunt* does not signify 'flee, recede' (in the literal sense)—which might invoke, irrelevantly for the context, the image of Tantalus in the underworld. Rather, in a context summing up the attractions of mature male lovers (not unlike Ovid himself), the verb is likely to have the special sense 'pass into over-ripeness.' 'Parallels' from Cicero and Pliny are cited to establish the existence of this special sense for food and drink. But whereas in the previous textual-critical example the 'parallel' consisted of similarity of syntactical structure, here it resides in semantic 'equality.' One final semantic and 'contextual' parallel is then cited from Seneca to illustrate the special metaphorical resonance of the verb in the shared context of advancing age. This, added to the purely semantic parallels, is understood to make a strong argument for the sense 'pass into over-ripeness' in the *Ars amatoria.*

1.3 *Establishing Register within the Text*

In seeking to give a sense of the style of a passage, the commentator will often seek to locate the text within a particular kind of linguistic discourse. For example, in the course of telling women how to elude their male chaperones and rendezvous with lovers, Ovid asks what chaperones can do when the Bona Dea expels *all* men from her temple—*praeterquam si quos illa uenire iubet* (*Ars* 3.638 'except any that she bids come'). What the translation cannot convey is that *praeterquam si quos* seems to mimic legal phraseology (rather ironic in a context where Ovid appears to be encouraging his pupils to transgress law or custom). In establishing that mimicry, however, none of the available *comparanda* offers precise equality. Rather, broadly comparable examples establish loose semantic and syntactic relations with legal discourse, e.g., Livy 38.38.9 (the text of a treaty) *ne nauigato citra Calycadnum . . . extra quam si qua nauis pecuniam . . . portabit,* Ulpian *Digest* 21.1.12.3 *sciendum est scaeuum non esse morbosum uel uitiosum,*

praeterquam si inbecillitate dextrae ualidius sinistra utitur. Similar imprecision is to be found when a commentator tries to fix a word or phrase within a stylistic register by quantifying the spread of parallel instances across texts and genres. Here commentaries, particularly those on Latin poetry, have tended to concentrate on placing words and phrases between the poles of 'high' and 'low,' 'poetic' and 'prosaic.' Indeed the hope has been expressed that electronic commentaries may offer 'register' as one of their pathways to users: "Only if one clicks on 'register' is one offered a comment on whether a word is poetic or prosaic: and only if one clicks again is one given the data on which the commentator bases her statement."[13] However, as has been pointed out recently with some force, much Latin currently described as 'prosaic' could more accurately be described as 'neutral'; in any case 'prosaic' is based on too broad a category of text to be critically useful.[14] Nevertheless commentaries might benefit from occasionally offering the kind of open-ended philological note in which Charles Brink (apparently) specialized. His fascinating comments on Horace *Epistles* 2.1.107 *damnosa libido*, on first reading, may leave the reader unclear on the stylistic level of *damnosus*. But the evidence is fully and patiently surveyed, invites repeat visits by the reader and tacitly demonstrates that the evidence provided by 'parallel' instances may be complex.

So far we have been concerned with the linguistic *minutiae* of commentaries, and seen that the use of the term 'parallel' in each of these areas encompasses a wide range of type of resemblance, of relation of resemblance, and of quality of resemblance. This is a pattern which is also repeated at broader levels of understanding and interpretation.

1.4 *Contextualizing the Text*

Genre has traditionally been regarded as an important critical guide for contextualizing a work. According to this interpretative strategy, in the case of the *Ars*, 'parallels' with elegy and didactic poetry in terms of content are of particular importance for understanding the

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[13] Fowler (1999) 427.
[14] Adams and Mayer (1999) 3–10.

text. For example, at *Ars* 3.169–92 Ovid gives advice to his female pupils on the subject of clothing. Dress is something that obsesses previous elegists, particularly Propertius, but also appeals to didactic poets, and this is of interest to the commentator on a didactic poem:

> Dress is a subject traditional to didactic; cf. the advice given on the dress appropriate to the jobs of hunting and farming at (e.g.) Hesiod *Erg.* 536ff., Grattius *Cyn.* 337ff., Oppian *Cyn.* 1.97ff. Here Ovid gives advice on the dress appropriate to the job of being caught by men. But in this case the clothes must be suitable not only to the task and terrain, but also to the wearer. For, as in the previous passage (135–68), emphasis falls not on the possible range of material, but on the principle of 'decorum.' Each *puella* must choose the color which suits her personally (187–92).

A comparable generic context, viz., didactic poetry, and loosely similar subject matter can be said to make the passages from Hesiod, Grattius and Oppian 'parallel' to Ovid's advice to women on what they should wear to attract men. As with the semantic and syntactic examples above, parallelism is assumed to make the cited texts somehow relevant to the understanding of the commented text. But note that certainly one (Oppian) and arguably a second (Grattius) of the cited texts post-date the publication of the *Ars*. The commentator may cite later semantic parallels without undue worry, as the slow pace of change in elite literary language often guarantees that texts, sometimes centuries older, will not be irrelevant to comprehending the commented text. But on what ground does the commentator cite the content of later texts to establish or make a point about a tradition which, since the commented text partakes of it, logically must precede the *Ars*? One answer is that the parallels bear the hallmark of 'interpretability.' That is to say, here they highlight nuances in the commented text, provoking useful reflection on similarities and differences between text and parallels. Where other didactic poets give advice on clothing appropriate to the task and the terrain, Ovid adds the further twist that the clothing must also be appropriate to the wearer (his pupils must choose the shade of clothing which becomes the color of their complexion). The parallels, by giving context and significance to Ovid's treatment of his subject matter, suggest the *Ars* text is part of a partially-sunken 'ridge' of generic tradition—a ridge which is now visible only in the isolated islands provided by surviving texts. Or perhaps the Ovidian text,

occurring at a relatively early stage, itself helped to create the tradition, and this fact is implicitly realized by the engagement of later texts (here Grattius) with the basic subject matter of the tradition.[15]

However, 'interpretable' may now appear to have the virtually tautologous sense 'from which the commentator produces meaning.' To put it another way, what is there to prevent the description of parallels as simply a rhetorical device for convincing readers of the validity of the commentator's decision to put particular emphasis on one element in the text—here Ovid's instruction to wear something suited to individual complexions? One answer is that the commentator, after all, has not invented the parallels—that is, at least he has not forged them. More importantly, it is possible to think of 'parallels' which fail to produce context and meaning of comparable richness. For example, how illuminating for the *Ars* 3 passage would be Athena's clothing of Odysseus in the rags of the beggar on his return to Ithaca in *Odyssey* 13? Of course, some sort of meaning for the Ovidian text could be extracted from this 'parallel': in both cases an authoritative figure makes decisions on clothing, and the clothing is suitable to the new situations in which the wearers are about to find themselves. One may be able to go on to say something about clothes being always implicated with the projection of an identity. But the differences in context and content between Homer and Ovid are rather greater than their similarities. In particular, the action of the divine figure in the *Odyssey* is an instruction to Odysseus only in an implicit sense. The *Ars* is bound rather more closely to Hesiod, Grattius, and Oppian by sharing the pivotal feature of explicit instruction from accredited expert to pupil(s)—on a subject established in the repertoire.

By searching for similar subject matter in texts of the same genre, the commentator may then hope to provide new insights into a text. But there is a further problem here: what exactly is genre? Is it a category with quasi-ontological status, or, like the term parallel itself, a label of convenience? If the latter, whose convenience is being served? Ancient classifications of genre do not always overlap with our own. It is well known, for example, that no ancient critic defines didactic poetry separately from epic, no doubt because the 'instruc-

[15] Others may make the more cynical point that, given four didactic texts covering the same subject-matter, readers are bound to try to construct a meaningful narrative from them.

tional' strain was felt to be a fundamental part of epic.[16] Yet we work provisionally with definitions of a separate genre known as 'didactic.' Admittedly, the construction of this category has caused critics fewer misgivings than the attempt to find a single genre for the collection of ancient texts we know as the ancient novel—a group which likewise appears never to have been conceptualized separately in antiquity.[17] Nevertheless, even within the accepted modern category of didactic, problems remain, as the first two exemplars of the didactic 'clothing' tradition above—Hesiod and Ovid—will demonstrate. What, for example, is the proper status of Hesiod's *Works and Days*: instructional poem or wisdom literature? As for the *Ars amatoria*, that poem explicitly advertises its own problematical relationship to its 'genre' by eschewing the standard meter of epic and didactic in favor of the elegiac meter adopted by Roman love poets.[18] As if to confirm this sense of discomfort, modern studies on didactic poetry sometimes exclude the poem from (serious) consideration.[19] It is nevertheless undeniable that viewing the *Ars* within the context of 'didactic'—and elegy—has been richly productive of ways for understanding the poem. Perhaps it would be useful to adopt the view that, as some have argued, genre exists only in its individual realization within a single text. This more flexible approach allows each text to construct its own sense of literary ancestry, and to operate according to its own (intelligible) version of 'generic' rules.[20]

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[16] See Toohey (1996) 5–7, Sluiter (1999) 174ff. (on Homer and the conviction of his ancient commentators about the instructional intent of the text).

[17] On the history and ideological implications of the attempt, see Selden (1994). Ash, Dyck, Rowe, and von Staden (all above) are similarly concerned with the implications of genre in commentary writing.

[18] The choice of elegiacs represents an experiment not repeated, to my knowledge, in a 'didactic' work until the short *De Insitione* by the fifth-century agricultural author Palladius. However, fragments of an early imperial elegiac poem on the science of astrology by the Greek author Anoubion of Diosopolis have recently been published as P.Oxy. 4504–4507. On the rarity of elegiacs as a didactic medium, see further Obbink (1999) 64.

[19] See however Volk (2002). The *Ars* often proves equally disconcerting to critics of elegiac love poetry, who often exclude the poem from studies of the genre, except where it parallels features or confirms interpretations of 'personal' love elegy; indexes to books on elegy frequently reveal a paucity of reference to the poem.

[20] For a convenient summary, see Lee-Stecum (1998) 16–18. For genre as a necessary component of the generation of meaning, see Conte (1989) 442.

1.5 *Identifying Intertexts/Allusions*

'Parallels' have also traditionally played a central role in establishing references by the commented text to external sources. The relation of resemblance implied by 'parallel' in these instances is more difficult to define than in the previous example. Nevertheless, parallels which point to the existence of allusions are often less dependent on comparability of (purely) generic context and similarity of subject matter than those parallels from Hesiod, Grattius, and Oppian above which were argued to contextualize the commented text. An example may be given from a passage in *Ars* 3 where Ovid, in competition with other lovers such as rich men, is trying to promote himself as the ideal client-*amicus* to his pupils who are imagined in the role of patrons (541):

> **nec nos ambitio nec amor nos tangit habendi** "neither ambition nor love of gain influences us." *amor habendi*, an arresting phrase, is attested a further five times in extant Latin. The first instance occurs in the context of the exemplary society of the bees, at Verg. *Georg.* 4.177 *Cecropias innatus apes amor urget habendi.* A further three are found in the equally exemplary context of the Golden Age, but this time the scenario is one of decline therefrom; cf. Verg. *Aen.* 8.327 *et belli rabies et amor successit habendi*, Ov. *Met.* 1.131, *Fast.* 1.195. A (pointed) reference here to the *Aeneid* passage would open the possibility of claims by Ovid to a firmly 'prelapsarian' character for poets. Yet it is arguable that Ovid is referring particularly to Horace's Volteius Mena, a *cliens* ruined by the patronage of one Philippus. In the surrounding context Ovid is presenting himself as a client-*amicus* to the *puellae*, and an allusion to Hor. *Epist.* 1.7.85 *amore senescit habendi* would make the ironic point that poets are not likely to be ruined by their patronage in the way that the Horatian *cliens* was destroyed.

Here close verbal similarity and looser correspondence of theme, it is understood, relate the phrase *amor habendi* in the *Ars* to various *comparanda* in a manner which is productive of meaning for the former. But there are a number of issues which require discussion. First, note the unobtrusive phrase 'extant Latin.' For all we know, Gallus may have used *amor habendi* in a context which provided the richest reading of all for this passage in the *Ars*.[21] Secondly, while the com-

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[21] Nevertheless, it is fair to say that classicists have been acutely conscious of 'ghosts' (cf. Stephens [above] 68 on the obsession of the profession with fragments). It is possible to criticize those who display more interest in what has gone than in what has survived, but one may also see this as the legitimate expression of anxi-

mentator tentatively raises the possibility of a reference to the 'parallel' *Aeneid* passage, the overall tendency of the note is—to some extent—to close down (or focus) meaning by privileging one intertext, namely Horace, over the others. This narrowing of options (or focusing of critical attention) has not taken place gratuitously, as the commentator has given special status to the intertext which, according to his own reading of the passage, appears to possess most significance for the Ovidian passage. That is, the commentator implies that the 'golden age' overtones of *amor habendi* derived from Vergil find less contextual resonance and carry less point in the *Ars* than the 'patronage' connotations derived from Horace; the Horatian themes of the patron-client relationship fit in more closely with the Ovidian context and carry a stronger message. This act of privileging involves focusing on one particular similarity, namely that of comparability of theme. However, if one were to fix on literal verbal similarity as the strongest indicator of closeness of relations between texts—as many critics routinely do—special privilege would be given to the 'golden age' *Aeneid* passage (*amor successit habendi*) over the Horatian example (*amore senescit habendi*), and the primary significance of the passage would change. On what formal ground, then, has the commentator decided to privilege comparability of theme over verbal similarity?[22]

The above discussion presents a microcosm of a vigorous debate currently taking place within the discipline. On the one hand, some critics have emphasized the need for careful discrimination between intentional allusions by an author and accidental confluences of language in a medium where convention and meter narrowed the stock of available phrases and images. Others detect in such discrimination a conservative desire to circumscribe the kind of 'intertextual' event worth commenting on.[23] The *amor habendi* example does not

ety about the disappearance of most of the context for surviving ancient texts. This is an anxiety in fact shared (and sometimes taken advantage of) by commentators. When they say 'e.g.,' what they often mean is: "there are no other parallels known to me, but the spread of the evidence leads to me believe that more must have existed." See also Kraus (above) 20–2.

[22] On *amor habendi*, see also the Introduction to my forthcoming commentary ('The Date of *Ars* 3').

[23] Note the opposition set up by Hinds (1998) 26 between (a) the philological criteria of Morgan (1977) 3 ("similarity in choice of words, position of the words in the line, metrical anomalies, structural development of a particular passage, and other concrete evidence which can be linked to the work of an earlier author");

raise urgent questions of 'intentional allusion' versus 'accidental confluence,' although the commentator's tentativeness about the possibility of a direct allusion to the *Aeneid* passage, and his decision not to attempt to generate meaning from the parallel with the first *Georgics* passage, raise such questions implicitly. Nevertheless, the apparent creation of a hierarchy of reference—with Horace at the top—may be criticized by some.[24] The hierarchy may be defended on the ground that a clearer lead is thereby given to readers of the commentary. One should add that the scrupulous commentator will also aim to provide enough material to allow unsatisfied readers to generate alternative readings. Yet are there benefits to be had from abandoning traditional hierarchies of reference in favor of constructing more horizontal chains of resemblance? Such an argument is well made in the second chapter of Hinds (1998)—although the proportion of critical work done here by adjectives such as 'conservative' and 'fundamentalist' may give pause for thought. Nevertheless, taking as his starting point the lover's lament *me miserum* (Ovid, *Amores* 1.1.25), Hinds follows a chain of 'parallels' for this phrase past the point of indirect or even unconscious Ovidian allusion (i.e., beyond the possible reference in the *Amores* to the programmatic *miserum me* of Propertius 1.1.1). The chain leads out to Cicero's *Pro Milone* and a discussion in Quintilian of the funereal effectiveness of Cicero's *me miserum* in this context. As Hinds points out, this is "part of the cultural matrix from which Ovid's poetic voice emerges," and an awareness of it sensitizes the reader to the nature of the self-pitying and rhetorical cry from a poet writing in a genre aware of its funereal origins.[25]

It was noted earlier that some commentaries already occasionally offer open-ended philological notes. Could commentaries also include more open-ended discussion of chains of resemblance? Certainly commentaries in the past have been able to accommodate something like this. As Goldhill points out, in their different ways the Midrash, early modern *variorum* editions and ancient scholia either string together citations with the intention of multiplying meaning (or multiplying

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and (b) his own axiom about the potentially infinite possibilities for the mobilization of allusion. For a sophisticated restatement of the earlier position, see the useful attempt by Boyd (1997) 19–48 to distinguish between 'parallels,' 'formulae,' and active references in Ovid's *Amores*.

[24] For criticism of this tendency, see, e.g., Fowler (1997) 16.

[25] Hinds (1998) 30–4.

authority?), or list alternative readings without necessarily privileging one over the other.[26] Yet a modern commentary privileging this kind of research would demand publishers prepared to take risks ('how can it be produced economically?'), highly skilled readers with a sense of adventure ('but standards amongst students are declining'), and sympathetic promotion committees ('but what powers of discrimination are on display here?'). A partial analogy from textual criticism may also provide pause for thought. No editor of a text is ever thanked for reporting every variant in a manuscript tradition, or for giving an even hand to a series of modern conjectures. Rather, readers expect discrimination from the editor, while simultaneously maintaining skepticism about her/his constitution of a 'final' text. Is it to electronic commentaries that we must look for more open-ended discussions of chains of resemblance?[27]

1.6 *Identifying* Topoi

Whereas 'Contextualizing the Text' above dealt with subject matter whose repetition elsewhere within a single genre lent it significance, here we are dealing with themes, images, situations, and phrases repeated across a—usually wide—range of genres. The understanding is that the familiar repetition of these items rendered them standard, and that together these standardized items formed a coded system within which writers might understand human experience, social relations, and even nature.[28] Hence establishing the standards or conventions, usually through the compilation of 'parallels' for images and phrases, has been thought a necessary prerequisite for understanding classical texts. Commentaries are, in fact, by tradition the very place where readers expect to find these compilations. The relation of resemblance between a particular instance in a given text and the commentator's *comparanda* is, at root, one of similarity of

[26] Goldhill (1999) 408. But for a more negative characterization of the practices of ancient scholia here, see Most (1985) 38–9.

[27] Certainly electronic resources are already offering readers more choice of textual variant than is possible or desirable in a printed text; see Robinson (1997) 153–65 on the benefits afforded the reader by the simultaneous availability of multiple electronic versions of the text of the *Canterbury Tales*.

[28] On the historical context for this kind of formalism and its (ultimate) critical limitations, particularly in relation to medieval studies and the work of E. R. Curtius, see Cantor (1991) 161–204, esp. 189ff. On *topoi*, see also Hinds (1998) 34–47.

theme and content, but, in metaphorical terms at least, a syntactical relation of resemblance is in operation. The *comparanda*, in theory, provide the (flexible) grammatical structure within which a particular instance may be assumed to function. A classic example of a convention in this sense is the *locus amoenus*. The collection of 'parallel' instances of descriptions of water, grass and trees from other ancient texts will alert the reader to repeated elements in such descriptions, and a focus on similarities to, and differences from such standard elements may help to generate meaning for the commented text.

As with the other types of 'parallel' above, there are issues of methodology and practice which require airing. Two particular problems—the commentator's focus on parallels rather than on the commented text, and the conventionalization of the text through parallels—are discussed in detail at a later stage. Here it is convenient to move on to an important, but little discussed, feature of commentaries, namely collections of parallel material which are in effect 'under-conceptualized' forms of the compilations of conventions discussed above.

1.7 *'Supplementing' the Text*

Commentaries are not only guides to comprehension and interpretation, but act also as works of reference. That is to say, large-scale commentaries traditionally cater both for readers who desire a sustained interpretation of a passage or work, and for more casual browsers, such as those who want substantial amounts of 'hard' information on (e.g.) a cultural or social phenomenon which they remember occurs in a poem, or who want further references for a literary theme. The classic justification for this was offered by Fraenkel in the preface to his *Agamemnon* commentary: "It is my experience, and probably that of others as well, that it is far easier to remember 'X or Y has discussed such and such a phenomenon in connection with that vexed passage in that play' than to have present in one's mind the precise number of the volume of one of the far too many periodicals in which X or Y may have dealt with the matter."[29] One might add that it also makes commentaries stimulating to read, and

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[29] Fraenkel (1950) I.ix–x. On reading commentaries without the text see also Kraus (above) 1–2, 15.

it is not unknown for classicists to read a commentary primarily for itself and not for the text in question.

However, not everyone agrees that this reference-book function is a legitimate one, and many would prefer to see commentaries take on the stricter function of guides to the interpretation of the work in hand.[30] But there is an historical pressure acting on commentators of which account must be taken. Gumbrecht notes a difference between the spatial metaphors which structure our sense of what commentators do and those which are commonly applied to other interpreters allowed more discursive space by their chosen format. The latter are commonly thought of as penetrating a text, looking for meaning below or behind the surface. By contrast, "I think we expect commentators to be 'lateral' in relation to their texts of reference and, consequently, we expect commentators to position themselves in a relation of contiguity."[31] This difference is to be related, Gumbrecht suggests, to the original place of commentaries in the medieval European tradition on the physical margins of a text.[32] Of course one may find counter-examples, from classical antiquity onwards. Galen's commentaries—separate works in themselves—on the Hippocratic corpus suppose deficiencies in the commented text which the commentary itself must make good.[33] Nevertheless, the metaphor of contiguity is sympathetic to the original role of many commentaries as teaching tools.[34] When an opportunity for pedagogy presented itself in the text, the commentator often supplemented and amplified the text in order to instruct pupils in a matter not necessarily central to the work in question.[35] The role of 'teacher' may have disappeared from the modern commentator's self-perception, but the tendency to amplify and supplement remains—as in the case of the following note on one of the eight sexual positions listed by Ovid at the end of *Ars* 3 (at 777):

[30] See the reviews of van Dam's Statius mentioned above, n.5.

[31] Gumbrecht (1999) 445—whose discussion is, however, hampered by a false distinction between 'commentator' and 'interpreter.'

[32] On this phenomenon, see also Budelmann (above) 143–8.

[33] See Vallance (1999) 244, also von Staden (above) 113–5.

[34] For the pedagogical interests of (e.g.) ancient and medieval Homeric commentaries and medieval commentaries on Ovid, see Sluiter (1999) 178–9, Budelmann (above) 162–3, and Hexter (1986) 23. On modern school commentaries, see Rijksbaron (above).

[35] For an illustration, see Sluiter (1999) 188, also Budelmann (above) 157–61.

parua uehatur equo 'the small woman should ride on the horse.' For the *mulier equitans*, cf. e.g. Arist. *Vesp.* 500ff., Men. *Peric.* 484, Machon 168–73, 358–75, Hor. *Sat.* 2.7.50 (of a prostitute) *agitauit equum lasciua supinum*, Petron. 140.7, Apul. *Met.* 2.17, Adams, *Latin Sexual Vocabulary* 165f.; Henderson, *Maculate Muse* 164–6. The *figura* may have been associated particularly with the notorious 'pornographer' Philaenis; cf. Asclep./Posidipp. *AP* 5.202.3 (the speaker makes a dedication) νικήσασα κέλητι Φιλαινίδα τὴν πολύχαρμον, Cameron *GRBS* 31 (1990) 299. The scene is popular particularly with Roman artists; see Clarke, *Looking at Lovemaking, plates* 7–9; 165–7, 172, 202–4, 216–8, 257f.; also Johns, *Sex or Symbol?* 136f.

This note is clearly 'over-adequate' in the amount of material it provides for the interpretation of the lemma. 'Parallels' for the position in literary and artistic sources are listed, regardless of whether these parallels are directly relevant for understanding the text. In reality the compilation of this sort of material is an under-conceptualized form of the documentation of conventions discussed above. Again the relation of resemblance is one of similarity of content or theme, but the set of *comparanda* usually lacks the 'grammatical' ambitions of the convention-compilation mentioned above. That is to say, the commentator makes no strong claim for the 'parallels' offering a coded system within which the lemma may be interpreted. (Later critics may, in fact, be able to discover 'grammatical' ambitions latent within such collections, as Fowler in the epigraph to this chapter hints generations of scholars have done with the collections of material in the works of Mayor, Headlam, and Pease.) In their worst manifestation, such compilations are an inert mass of material which bury the text under a mound of miscellaneous information. But, if properly handled, the kind of information collected in the 'sexual positions' example above, together with the information collected on the other positions in the surrounding couplets, may form a valuable reference resource for the subject. The information is convenient, easily located (after all, *Ars* 3 is famous for its passage on sexual positions) and is massed together in a way that is not usually found even in specialist monographs. Nevertheless, commentators and their readers would do well to keep in mind Hunter's warning that, given the scantiness of surviving material from the ancient world, such collections of material should never be mistaken for 'complete' pictures of part of that world.[36]

[36] Hunter (above) 105.

2. *Parallels: Further Issues*

So far we have been examining the heterogeneous relations of resemblance covered by the term 'parallel' in the classical commentary, and incidentally seen some of the issues and problems surrounding the various uses of 'parallels.' In the second half of this chapter I focus in more detail on further problems and issues raised by the use of parallels (although some are obviously related to those previously raised). The first three are united by what may be termed 'parallelomania.'[37] Given the critical usefulness of parallels documented above, it is not surprising that commentators should cite them so extensively and so readily. But are there limits to the usefulness of parallels?

2.1 *Parallelomania I: 'Useless' Intertexts?*

Earlier we looked at arguments against the circumscription of the kind of 'intertextual events' worth commenting on. Cases labelled 'chance confluence' by some might provide for others an important link in an intertextual chain of parallels. Here we look at a marginal case designed to test the critical endurance of traditional commentators and more radical intertextual critics alike. At *Ars* 3.386, Ovid points out to his female pupils that they are excluded from male sports on the Campus Martius, including swimming in the Tiber: *nec* [sc. *uos*] *Tuscus placida deuehit amnis aqua* ("nor does the Tuscan river carry [you] along with its smooth stream"). A version of the line-ending is found already in the *Corpus tibullianum*, where an unnamed speaker is praying for the recovery of a *puella* who has fallen ill (3.10.8): [sc. *quidquid triste timemus*] *in pelagus rapidis euehat amnis aquis* ("[whatever trouble we fear] let the river carry it to the sea with its rushing waters"). Commentators, alert to the critical possibilities offered by parallels, will note the close similarity, but will then face the problem of what to do with it. And indeed, what can

[37] The term is taken from Sandmel (1962), who has much of interest to say precisely because he is working with a corpus of texts, unlike Latin poetry, notable for its lack of sense of familial links. He tries to distinguish between 'true' and 'alleged,' 'routine' and 'significant' parallels in the Christian Gospels, the letters of Paul, Philo, Rabbinic literature, and the Qumran texts. As Hinds (1997) 115 notes, most classical intertextualists are of the 'soft' variety—and might feel distinctly less comfortable working with such a heterogeneous corpus.

one do with it?—given that the contexts, content and treatment are all rather different.

In his discussion of the limits of 'allusion,' Hinds covers two sorts of representative case. The first is a case where a parallel between two texts provides the opportunity for interpretation, but it is disputed whether allusion from one to the other is intended by the author.[38] E.g., to return to an example cited above, the *me miserum* of the twenty-fifth line of Ovid's first love elegy may be interpreted as a programmatic dramatization of the *miserum me* of the first line of the first elegy of Propertius. But the inexactness of the 'parallel' and commonness of the phrase *me miserum* may cause doubts about the deliberateness of the allusion. The second is a case where scholars are in fact overwhelmed by the apparently self-multiplying possibilities on offer. E.g., the 'many mouths' motif used by Vergil at *Aen.* 6.625–7 has extant parallels in Homer, Ennius, Hostius, Lucretius, and the *Georgics,* all of which allow the possibility of meaningful reference by Vergil to them. But here, given the complexity of the allusive possibilities, many would deny that deliberate 'reference' is at issue and make recourse to the idea of a 'convention' or '*topos*' at work.

The Ovidian *amnis aqua* example presents a set of interestingly different issues. No one disputes that meaning *could* be produced from the *me miserum* or 'many mouths' parallels. But can any meaning at all be produced from the parallel between Ovid and the *Corpus tibullianum*? There appears to be no interpretability at source—unless we resort to the rather minimal conclusion that we see here the participation of the *Ars* in poetic memory.[39] Old commentaries were perhaps able to dodge this problem via a simple 'cf. [Tib.] 3.10.8,' whose subtext was "there's a resemblance here, but I have no idea what to do with it." But modern commentators are under rather more pressure to be more open about what they mean by 'cf.' Does the commentator then exclude or include? To include is to allow later generations the chance of making sense of a 'parallel' from which the commentator has failed to produce meaning—precisely the ground on which Fowler, in the epigraph to this chapter, declared 'it is better to have too much than too little' in a commentary. But

[38] Hinds (1998) 25–47.

[39] Given that this *Corpus tibullianum* text is usually assumed to precede Ovid, the alternative conclusion that the earlier text is claiming generic identity through quotation is hardly open to us.

to exclude is to unclutter the commentary and—no less importantly—to adhere to an economics pleasing in the sight of one's publisher. Does Hinds' axiom—"There is no discursive element in a Roman poem, no matter how unremarkable in itself . . . that cannot in some imaginable circumstance mobilize a specific allusion"—here reach its practical limits?[40]

2.2 *Parallelomania II: The Search for* Topoi

Parallels, as we saw earlier, may be used to establish the conventions and commonplaces relevant to understanding a given passage in a text. Sometimes, as with the 'many mouths' motif mentioned immediately above, an embarrassment of riches is available. At other times, evidence for the existence of a convention behind a particular passage may be scanty. Yet the commentator, conscious of the high value of *topoi* as a critical tool, may expend much labor on trying to document the existence of a conventional element in the commented text. Occasionally this effort may have a peculiar impact on the form of the commentator's note, as in the following example of a note on Ovid's recommendation that pupils take advantage of the privacy allowed for washing in order to communicate secretly with lovers (*Ars* 3.619f.):

> **scilicet obstabit custos ne scribere possis, | sumendae detur cum tibi tempus aquae** "will a keeper hinder you from being able to write, when an opportunity is given you for taking water in your hands?" . . . I can find no close parallel for the comical ruse of writing letters while pretending to wash in private. Note however Arist. *Thesm.* 482ff. (a wife gets out to meet her lover on the excuse of going to the latrine; perhaps cf. Aristaenetus 2.4); also Ov. *Epist.* 21.12ff. (the nurse pretends that Cydippe is asleep in her bedroom, so that Cydippe can write to Acontius) . . .

The commentator has searched from Aristophanes to Aristaenetus via Ovid himself, and has found some parallels, albeit not ones which establish a viable *topos* within which the passage can be interpreted. This is interesting in itself, because surprising: few authors are more 'conventional' than Ovid. But the search for conventions, rather than the comprehension or interpretation of the text, has become the

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[40] On some possible implications of the decision to call a halt to chains of resemblance at a particular point, see Fowler (1997) 24–5.

focus of critical energy. For the commentator who sees the text's primary function as that of mounting a challenge to parallel all of its details, it is ironically rather reasonable to cast the note in the form of a reflection on his own failure to construct a proper *topos*. But what of the reader? Practiced readers of commentaries may indeed still be able to wrest something useful from the note, but this rather involves reading against the grain of the commentator's own text.

At other times the commentator's search for parallels may be more successful and turn up some material which, at first sight, appears surprisingly closely-related, but, on reflection, turns out rather less useful for interpretative purposes than expected. A modern example illustrates the problem well. Umberto Eco, writing about his novel *The Name of the Rose*, discusses an essay written on the work by its Russian translator:[41]

> she remarks that there exists a book by Emile Henroit (*La rose de Bratislava*, 1946) in which can be found the hunting of a mysterious manuscript and a final fire in a library. The story takes place in Prague, and at the beginning of my novel I mention Prague. Moreover, one of my librarians is named Berengar, and one of the librarians of Henroit was named Berngard Marre.... She said that in Henroit's novel the coveted manuscript was the original copy of the *Memoirs* of Casanova. It happens that in my novel there is a minor character called Hugh of Newcastle.... The conclusion of [the translator] is that "only by passing from one name to another is it possible to conceive of the name of the rose."

Eco admits that he delighted in concealing sources of which he was aware within the narrative, and was delighted that critics discovered them; admits too that critics drew his attention to sources of which he was unaware when writing, but certainly must have influenced him unconsciously. But of Henroit's novel he flatly denies any previous knowledge. Some of the coincidences—manuscript, fire, Prague and Berengar—are humorously embarrassing to the author (although Prague, in fact, plays no crucial role in the story), and it is conceded that they may lead astray the reader lacking access to Eco's mind. Yet the author insists that ultimately the 'parallels' are without value, because they fail to lead to an 'interesting' interpretative

[41] Eco (1992) 75–8. The whole of Eco's chapter (67–88) is of relevance to many of the issues discussed here.

path. Aside from the fact that Newcastle and Casanova are not semantically equivalent, Eco points out that, among other things, Hugh of Newcastle plays "a very marginal role and h[as] nothing to do with the library. If the text wanted to suggest a pertinent relationship between Hugh and the library (as well as between him and the manuscript) it should have said something more."[42] This ought to provide a cautionary tale for classicists, commentators above all. So little has survived from ancient literature that, after the joy of finding a parallel, we may consider our job done, and fail to communicate to the reader what we consider the interpretative value of the parallel to be.

2.3 *Parallelomania III: Burying the Text in Conventions*

Even where the interpretative value of 'parallels' is agreed by all, further dangers lie in wait for the commentator who collects them. For parallels, by themselves, may paradoxically reduce a text—otherwise thoroughly 'formulaic' in itself—to the merely conventional, as in the following note on a *locus amoenus*. This is the spot in which Cephalus takes his rest after hunting, and in which Procris will later meet her death from the spear of Cephalus (*Ars* 3.687–98):[43]

> **687–98** The *locus amoenus* is a standard setting for violence and rape; cf. e.g. *Hymn. Dem.* 6ff. (Persephone), Callim. *Lau. Pall.* 71ff. (Teiresias), Moschus *Eur.* 63ff. (Europa), Prop. 1.20.33ff. (Hylas). In the *Metamorphoses* a pool, set in wooded and shady surroundings, is used recurrently as a scene for violence, death, and rape; cf. e.g. *Met.* 2.417ff. (Callisto and Jupiter), 2.454ff. (Diana and Callisto), 3.155ff. (Actaeon), 3.407ff. (Narcissus), 4.296ff. (Hermaphrodite), 5.385ff. (Persephone), 5.585ff. (Arethusa), 10.126ff. (Cyparissus); also *Fast.* 3.13ff. (Silvia and Mars), Parry *TAPA* 95 (1964) 275–80, Segal, *Landscape in Ovid's Metamorphoses* 4–19.

[42] But for discussion of a 'chance' parallel—between the respective Casaubons of *Foucault's Pendulum* and *Middlemarch*—which the author concedes does possess some interpretative value, see Eco (1992) 81–3.

[43] *Ars* 3.687ff. *est prope purpureos colles florentis Hymetti* | *fons sacer et uiridi caespite mollis humus*; | *silua nemus non alta facit; tegit arbutus herbam*; | *ros maris et lauri nigraque myrtus olent*; | *nec densum foliis buxum* ... "There is near the empurpled hills of blooming Hymettus a sacred spring, and the ground is soft with the verdant turf. The wood, of no great height, there forms a grove; the strawberry tree overshadows the grass; rosemary and laurels and swarthy myrtles give their perfume. Nor [is] the box-tree with its thick foliage [wanting]. . . ."

These parallels do have an important role to play, in as much as they establish a convention. They tell us that a pool set in wooded and shady surroundings is a very common scene, and is one in which violent action conventionally takes place. This is useful information, and some progress might be made by setting the text within the traditions to which it so obviously belongs. But unless care is taken, the mapping of the scene onto the conventions which can be abstracted from the parallel passages will consume all the commentator's (and reader's) critical energy. The commentator may be reduced to concentrating on parallel details of low significance (*Ars* 3.689):

> **tegit arbutus herbam** For the strawberry tree as a feature of idyllic landscapes, cf. e.g. Theoc. 5.129, Verg. *Ecl.* 7.46, Hor. *Carm.* 1.1.21f. *nunc uiridi membra sub arbuto | stratus, nunc ad aquae lene caput sacrae.*

The mapping of the text onto the conventions of the *locus amoenus* is a necessary preliminary, but is hardly adequate as a response to the passage as a whole. Perhaps the commentator ought also to be asking "Why is the *locus amoenus* so frequently the setting for violent acts? What does it mean for the reader to watch a violent act taking place here?" For if such violence is implied to be (merely) conventional, then both commentator and reader are effectively absolved from interrogating the violence. A conventional scene does indeed demand the citation of the controlling convention, but a conventional text does not require the reproduction of only the conventional in its interpretation.[44]

2.4 *Parallels as Substitute for Interpretation?*

The note on the *locus amoenus* illustrates other features frequently characteristic of the commentator's citation of parallels. The commentator has collected passages apparently relevant to understanding the commented text, but, aside from indicating similarity of theme and content, leaves the reader to generate meaning for the text from the *comparanda*.[45] To understand why this has happened, we will look

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[44] Cf. Kennedy (1994) 92. The matter is phrased more subjectively by Cantor (1991) 200: "The paradoxical judgement that may be made about Curtius' view of medieval literature is that he gets most of it right, but the boring, not the interesting, part."

[45] Essentially the same criticism was made in 1902—rather ironically—by Walter Headlam; see Goldhill (1999) 394.

in more detail at a note on a passage where Ovid is telling his pupils how to behave at a dinner party (*Ars* 3.755f.):

> **carpe cibos digitis (est quiddam gestus edendi), | ora nec immunda tota perungue manu** "Take up food with your *fingers* (the way you eat counts for something), and do not besmear all your face with dirty hand." The Romans did not use forks; cf. e.g. *Ars* 1.577, Marquardt-Mau, *Privatleben der Römer* 316–8. For criticism of bad table manners, cf. e.g. Eubul. frg.41 K.-A., Ter. *Eun.* 935ff., Lucian *Dial. Meretr.* 6.3, *Merc. Cond.* 14–18. *quidam* is the transmitted reading here . . .

Here the commentator has used the time-honored formula 'for phenomenon ABC, cf. e.g. XYZ.' This has effect of throwing attention out from the commented text towards the *comparanda*. That is to say, Ovid's text is apparently used to illuminate a stereotype, to introduce an interesting set of 'parallels.' Despite the fact that commentary is supposed to valorize concentration on the primary text,[46] here critical energy is in fact channeled away from the text. It is arguable that this habit of listing parallels without comment may stem ultimately from confusion over the basic reason for collecting them in the first place. As we saw earlier, commentaries act in part as works of reference as well as guides to interpretation. But these impulses may become confused, and a set of references which might have a genuine explanatory role may be set out by a commentator in a format, as above, more appropriate to listing a set of 'supplementary' or 'reference' parallels. The reference resource function of the commentary has usurped its interpretative function, and as a result the reader may receive the impression that the listing of parallels *is* interpretation. In fact, the passages cited from Eubulus and Terence etc. could be used to provide an illuminating context for the interpretation of the passage. Together these 'parallels' suggest the existence of a convention which stereotyped the low-born as having bad table-manners. One could use these parallels to ask what is implied about Ovid's own pupils by his assumption that they need to be taught good manners.[47]

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[46] See Ma (1994) 76 and further Kraus (above) 20–1.

[47] In other cases a commentator clearly may have thought hard about the relationship between the parallels and commented text, but has allowed the conventions of commentary annotation to elide the process of interpretation. For an extreme example, see Goldhill (1999) 394–7.

2.5 *Parallels: Centrifugal and Atomizing Effects*

The above note on table manners also illustrates one final problem raised by the citation of parallels, namely the 'atomization' of the text.[48] If parallels remain the commentator's primary focus or basic unit of thought, there may result a tendency to concentrate on finding *comparanda* for the individual elements which make up the commented text. This done, the commentator may consider the job finished, without reflecting on the need to rise to an interpretative synthesis. A fuller note on the 'dinner-party' passage discussed above will illustrate this:

> **carpe cibos digitis (est quiddam gestus edendi), | ora nec immunda tota perungue manu** The Romans did not use forks; cf. e.g. *Ars* 1.577, Marquardt-Mau, *Privatleben der Römer* 316–8. For criticism of bad table manners, cf. e.g. Eubul. frg. 41 K.-A., Ter. *Eun.* 935ff., Lucian *Dial. Meretr.* 6.3, *Merc. Cond.* 14–18. *quidam* is the transmitted reading here, and provides the sense "pluck the food with your fingers (there is a certain way to eat with your hand)." However, better sense is provided by Heinsius' *quiddam*: ". . . (the way you eat [with your hand] counts for something)." For this idiom, cf. e.g. Cic. *Att.* 6.3.4 *est enim quiddam aduenientem non esse peregrinum atque hospitem*, Ov. *Fast.* 6.27 (with Bömer's note). *perunguo* is emphatic ('smear all over'), and is normally used of thick greasy liquids; cf. e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 1.113 *iuuenes ii . . . ueste posita, corpora oleo perunxerunt*, *OLD* s.v. *immundus* is prosaic and avoided in elevated poetry; for statistics see Brown on Lucr. 4.1160.

In this note, isolated elements in the text generate isolated *comparanda*. The note could be rewritten in such a way as to combat the effects of atomization, and to synthesize the apparently miscellaneous information into a coherent picture of the text. Much of the information given in the note could be centered around the stereotype which assumes that the 'low-born' cannot eat daintily with their finger tips, but know only how to stuff their faces using the whole of their hands (particularly evident in the passage from Lucian's *Dialogi meretricii*). With this at the center of the note, it could now be more clearly seen why Heinsius' *quiddam* is preferable: 'the way you eat counts for something,' i.e., the way you eat with your hand

[48] For variously pessimistic discussions of this phenomenon, see Most (1985) 35–8, Ma (1994) 76, Goldhill (1999) 411–20; also (for biblical commentaries) Houlden (1990) 131–2. For more positive assessments, see in this volume Budelmann 153–7, Hunter 101–2, Kraus 10–16 (all above), and McCarty (below) 364–5, 380.

has a social value. Similarly the use of the emphatic *perunguo* ('smear all over') can now be attributed to the fact that the *praeceptor* has a strong social point to make about the avoidance of the appearance of vulgarity. And *immundus* is appropriately used in the context, as the subject matter requires 'low' vocabulary in order for its vulgarity to be made clear to the reader. (In addition, the couplet could also be integrated into the wider interpretation of the passage, which is filled with types of vulgar behavior stereotypically associated with low-born women.) Thus a mass of apparently miscellaneous information can often be integrated in such a manner as to provide a satisfactory attempt at overall interpretation.

However, as the note stands the reader is left to construct a link between 'parallels' which cover a full range of (heterogeneous) relations of resemblance:

1) texts which, on comparison, confirm the absence of Roman forks;
2) texts, comparable in theme and subject matter, which suggest a conventional association between 'poor' table manners and the low-born;
3) texts which provide semantic equivalencies for a Latin idiom.

The material in the note is presented in an essentially 'centrifugal' rather than 'centripetal' manner, and so, as in the previous example, ultimately directs the gaze of the reader away from the text. It could be argued, however, that there are positive aspects to this kind of note. Readers are forced to participate in the construction of sense, since the commentator is not handing it to them on a plate, and are made to realize that they are constructing a sense. Ultimately, however, the responsibility for conceptualization is perhaps left rather too much in the lap of the reader.[49]

Conclusion

Parallels are clearly a useful critical tool, but a lack of clarity about their precise role, allied to an ignorance of their limitations as a critical tool, may result in many of the problems reviewed above. Some of these problems allow interesting critical views onto the whole problem of reading and interpretation. Nevertheless, a commentator's failure to reflect on the issues they raise may result in a text atomized

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[49] Cf. Ma (1994) 76.

by, or buried under, a mass of miscellaneous information, where the reader is given little indication of how to apply the material provided to the job of interpretation, and the text is reduced to a series of harmless commonplaces.[50]

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15. A NETWORK WITH A THOUSAND ENTRANCES: COMMENTARY IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE?

Willard McCarty

For Don Fowler (1953–1999), 'at play in the fields of the Lord'

> Je genauer wir die tatsächliche Sprache betrachten, desto stärker wird die Widerstreit zwischen ihr und unserer Forderung. (Die Kristallreinheit der Logik hatte sich mir ja nicht ergeben; sondern sie war eine Forderung.) Der Widerstreit wird unerträglich; die Forderung droht nun zu etwas Leerem zu werden.—Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinne ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen wir die *Reibung*. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden!
>
> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen* 107[1]

> The extent to which people act with a clear idea of their ends, knowing what effects they are aiming at, is easily exaggerated. Most human action is tentative, experimental, directed not by a knowledge of what it will lead to but rather by a desire to know what will come of it.
>
> R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (p. 42)

1. *Introduction*

In contemporary discourse about art, 'the shock of the old' plays off against 'the shock of the new,' the more obvious and apparently the older phrase. Shock may be particularly necessary against the blindness to art as anything other than decoration, but the new (in the strongly traditional sense of the unfamiliar, strange, surprising, subversive—indeed dangerous) also plays a role in scholarship. The history

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[1] "The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty.—We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need *friction*. Back to the rough ground!"

of technology suggests that inventions have this role, a Janus-faced heads-up not just to peer uncertainly into the future, as may seem my mandate here, but perhaps more to wake up to and learn from the familiar, half-noticed devices which the new threatens to redefine or even displace. So with commentary, a very old, widely distributed and varied form, about whose electronic future I propose to reflect.

The scope of commentary is suggested by the etymology of the word, denoting thought about something, and is documented in the variety of its historical practice. As with the index, concordance, dictionary, and encyclopedia, this variety seems to belie any single name. The fact that we have one and that it stubbornly persists raises the question of essential characteristics. What might these be? The problem I have to consider, the metamorphosis of commentary into electronic form, requires an answer. (Perhaps 'metamorphosis' is the wrong word, since we and not some god command the shape-change; but as in Ovid we focus on a mysterious interplay between change and persistence.) The first question we ask, then, is what must survive into the new medium for the result to be recognizable *as* commentary. I am suggesting a view of the problem analogous to translation in Umberto Eco's sense: the interpretation of a text in two different languages, involving the culture of each ([2001]). The commentary as we know it is an historical product of particular 'styles of knowing,' as Simon Goldhill has said ([1999] 402), developed within the technological medium of the printed codex. Other such styles are available now, and the medium has changed. What are we going to say a commentary is such that these styles, and others as yet unforeseen, may be accommodated—alongside the old, if we so choose?

The analogy of translation breaks down quickly if we think in terms of the 'texts,' i.e., its particular objects. Our problem is not what might happen to any given commentary and is best not confined to a single tradition nor even conceived as a change from one format to another. Specific formats, which the shock of the new helps us to see in detail *as* formats, have something to teach us in their effects, as Fowler notes ([1999] 428), but are not the point here. My focus is on the mutability of format, which is not a temporary effect of a change in media but a new condition of work. This mutability—not the intellectually trivial though highly annoying impermanence against which we 'back up' our precious files or the chaotic variation of approaches we develop standards to control—is that which allows us perpetually to transform our resources and so keep

pace with imaginative change. Hence we need to think in terms of devising and stabilizing means to do so. What tools should commentary makers have to hand? Demographically who will these makers be? What might they be making, exactly?

The recent collection of essays edited by Glenn W. Most demonstrates that there are many answers to the question of what essentially a commentary is ([1999]). So much depends on the perspective from which the question is asked. In the (famously linear) medium of prose, mine must shift around in approach to the converging of commentary practice with computational means, but my eye is always on the crossroads. Indeed, I must roam rather far afield because the questions raised from their sleep by this converging are mostly about fundamentals of communication and reference—of which our genre is a studiously concentrated form. The relevant areas of research are so many and varied that I am constrained mostly to point them out as we pass. The work in some of these is developing quickly; I try my best to read the much more slowly changing tendencies in them—certainly *not* their unknowable future. (Undoubtedly there are several others I have not noticed: *mea culpa*!) My chief concern is as you might expect, the broadly technological, which in this context would not be flippant or pretentious to define etymologically, as the λόγος of a computational τέχνη. Above all my aim is to start us thinking about the qualities of imagination we must call upon to make the best of a very interesting situation.

The constructivist and computational approach with which I begin in fact radically simplifies the question of commentary essentials: all that matters to it are the basic mechanical processes. These are of course hardly sufficient to do full justice to the complexities of the genre, as Most argues for purely formal descriptions. I argue that the realities of actual practice and its complex results are essential to the computational question but postpone consideration of them to the end of the essay. Meanwhile I turn to the machine. I take up the question of its ontology, first to dispose of mental rubbish that vexes technological discussion, second to gesture at the philosophical conundrum that continuously fertilizes it. I then argue that the computer is at root a modeling device. I rapidly survey the history of its development toward end-user realization of this root-characteristic. For us, I argue, the main outcome is research on a world-wide 'digital library' of independently developed components. Proposing that we think in such terms, I consider what economists

call its 'system-wide' effects, dimly visible in the working environment that the Web provides. I touch on dire signs of socio-intellectual disintegration but argue that the evidence for this is an artifact of two errors: (1) imagining the digital library as if we were passive consumers of electronic documents originally designed for print; and (2) thinking in terms of abstract 'information' rather than embodied, mediated knowledge. Then I turn to the qualities of imagination that the complexities of the genre require us to develop lest we lose many of them in translation to the electronic medium. Finally I take up the question of reference to point toward the collaborative research ecology—of disciplines and, as Bateson said, of mind—on which so much depends.

I leave undiscussed possibilities that require our attention but which I have insufficient space to consider, for example the blurring of distinction between commentary and a number of other genres (such as the lexicon) that share its essential characteristics. I also do not discuss the complex political questions, for example of motivation and reward, that any actual future of electronic commentary-making will involve as much as its non-electronic past has.[2]

My title ends in a question to mark the plain fact that what follows is speculation, with summaries of and pointers to interesting research. To the reader wanting reassurance that the electronic commentary is a safe bet the best I can do is to return the late Paul Evan Peters's hearty optimism that at last "we are on the threshold of what can be productively thought of as human-kind's meso-electronic period" ([1994]).[3] This is not to say that the adventurous scholar cannot start experimenting, nor that there is no urgency that we do so, nor that it will not be intellectually rewarding, only that there are few precedents, many hard problems and no guarantees. So I begin.

2. *Mechanical essentials*

Obviously central to the definition of commentary is its relationship to the commented object. By definition commentary depends on its

[2] I am grateful to Simon Goldhill for pointing out my omission of this aspect of my question.

[3] He goes on: "after all the appropriate slack has been cut, the best that can be

object, but the relationship between the two is more complex than simple dependency suggests. The key to the relationship lies in a paradox of interpretation, which takes control of and to a varying degree remakes its object in the very act of its own subservience. The commentary is thus in a sense always primary. Some commentaries are plainly so because they straightforwardly create or constitute their objects.[4] Some are primary by default—they are all that remains of an event not otherwise recorded or an object which has not survived.[5] Performative events, even if repeatable, are sufficiently distinct from their commentaries in kind as almost to make them entities in their own right.[6] Such, though perhaps exceptional cases, help make the point—that commentary fundamentally *refers* but not necessarily or in any simple way *defers* to its object. It directs our attention elsewhere, but as governor of our thinking brings attention back. It leads by following, filtering, shaping.[7] This dynamic, performative aspect of commentary, I will argue, computing promises significantly to increase.

Citation (in the neutral sense of reference without deference) is particularly clear in its application other than to the commented object. Citation is often predominately to extrinsic facts, traditional sources, pre-existing arguments, and secondary discussion that it not only indicates but also summons, manages, and brings to bear on its text. (The point is sufficiently illustrated in Figure 1, discussed in more detail below.)

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said as far as I am concerned is that we are using crude tools with which we are having some uneven but very real success in fashioning crude but functional electronic artefacts."

[4] See John Vallance's notion of the 'non-submissive commentary,' for which his example is Galen on Hippocrates (1999); also von Staden's characterization of Galen's "recuperative elucidation of the obscure ancient voice" ([above] 114).

[5] John Philoponus' sixth-century Greek commentary on Aristotle's *De Intellectu* (a lost portion of the *De Anima*), itself lost and translated into Latin by William de Moerbeke, is an example. Compare J. D. Reed's aim "simply to contextualize Bion's words . . . to establish the meaning they yield against the wider usages of the Greek language, and to locate them within the dialectic of Greco-Latin literary history" ([1997] 87). Further afield are the texts that incorporate fragments of earlier lost works, using them for various purposes, e.g., Parmenides in Plato.

[6] For examples of medieval commentary on music see Reaney (1966); modern commentary on recorded music Philip (1992).

[7] See Fraade on the movements in Philonic commentary, which he likens to a guided journey of the soul to perfection, and his characterization of the commentary author's aim to serve as guide both to the individual reader and to the Alexandrian community ([1991] 10–12).

Citation in turn underlies two other prominent characteristics: the discontinuous morselization of commentary[8] and the sequencing of morsels according to locations in the commented object, thus its literal sub-ordination. Neither is strictly necessary, of course. A. W. Verrall's *The Bacchants of Euripides* (1910) is an example of the commentary essay that discusses parts of the play in the order that suits its continuous argument. Graphical illustrations in literary works, such as the frontispiece to Gambattista Vico's *Scienza Nuova Seconda* (1730) or the engravings in George Sandys's translation of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (1632), may be said to serve as commentary on their texts by spatial juxtaposition and iconographic reference to textually disjunct passages.[9] Thus we may conclude that morselization and subordination are more strong tendencies than necessary characteristics, but they are certainly normal in the commentary form with which classicists are most familiar.

Morselization of a kind is graphically expressed in 'continuous' prose by the convention of paragraphing (and before that by division of *scripta continua* into words and syntactic units), though normally counteracted by explicit transitions and implicit sequences of thought. In the usual sort of commentary these transitional devices are absent, but the implicit original sequence of the commented text of course determines the order in which they appear, and so supplies a continuity of thought. Thus to the reader deeply familiar with the commented text, these morsels may be read as continuous though stylistically choppy prose. My point, looking ahead to the shape-change, is this: that once readers are allowed easily to follow or rearrange morsels in whatever sequence they wish (as in current hypertext fiction), then a further erosion of the difference between continuous prose and morselized commentary will likely begin. In particular once commentary writers start composing for a medium

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[8] The terms *citation* and *morselization* are adopted from Goldhill (1999) 393ff.; my indebtedness will be obvious in what follows.

[9] For commentary in the visual arts see the essays by Katharina Krause, Barbara Borg, and Luca Giuliani in Most (1999); for marginal mss. imagery as commentary on its text see Camille (1992); for page as image Bornstein and Tinkle (1998). Computational techniques of imaging, esp. hypertextual 'image mapping,' hold considerable promise for commentary on visual objects, such as paintings, emblems, and MSS pages, by allowing links to be attached to areas of the image; see Graham (1991), Nowviskie (2002), also Stephens (above) 85–7.

in which reader-determined sequence is a possibility, they are likely to respond, to adapt.

Nothing I have said or will say undercuts citation as a fundamental characteristic of commentary, but morselization and subordination are clearly less deeply rooted in the nature and so future of the genre. This is not at all to say that the latter two will be irrelevant, as they are hardly so in continuous prose, rather that we need to think rather differently about them. I will return throughout to all three characteristics, to say in more detail how I think they work and so how they might be implemented. For now, in accordance with Eco's notion of translation, we need to look directly toward the computational side and particularly at its culture to identify the recipient qualities of computing in which these characteristics may be given shape.

3. *Ontology*

I begin by questioning the ontology of computing. Is our machine a *tool* (implement) or a *medium* (environment)?[10] The question does not arise from a confusion of terms, both of which are apt in particular contexts, nor is it evidence of essentially unrelated applications to which the computer is put. Rather, I argue, it points to an underlying identity, which to grasp—and so to understand the possibilities of the electronic commentary—we first need to remove particularly troublesome mental rubbish about tools and media.

The word 'tool' has both concrete and abstract senses (*OED* n.). In the first instance it is a mechanical 'instrument of manual operation' with effects that shade from the physical toward the immaterial. Figuratively, however, it names anything used to effect something, whether the things in question are material or not; for example a person, a political doctrine or a philosophical method may be employed as a 'tool.' Like other devices with which we formulate and express thoughts, the computer significantly combines both senses: it is a

[10] Computing and communications (the chief context for computer-as-medium) have become inseparable: the world-wide telephone network is widely observed to be the world's largest computer; the main purpose of the computer, Terry Winograd argues, is to further communication among people ([1997] 150).

physical instrument (with various concrete as well as cognitive effects) and, as Régis Debray has argued for the codex, a pre-existing "symbolic matrix, the affective and mental schematisation in whose dependence we bind ourselves more or less unconsciously to the world of meaning" ([1996a] 140f.). We may wish to dispute how unconscious this binding now is: as I have suggested, the shock of new technology has awakened us to the ways that the book effects it, and the qualities of computing, with which we are just now re-binding ourselves, are quite conscious objects of attention (although as I will explain, maintaining awareness of them is no easy matter). Nevertheless, the point is that in both contexts tool and medium are really two sides of the same coin: the tool is an effecting medium, and the medium is an affecting tool. Both *mediate*, i.e., change as well as communicate: the tool action, the medium knowledge.

When I said earlier that commentary writers are *likely* to respond to the changed conditions brought about by computing, I thus meant not so much to suggest a probability as to point to the indeterminate though strong interrelationship of tendencies between us and our devices—the lines of force, if you will, binding us to the world of meaning and action.

To some degree all tools mediate (e.g., a chisel, which itself shapes how the sculptor works out and in a sense thinks out meaning). The more cognitively receptive the medium, however, the more insistently 'the content of the form' (White [1987]), requires our attention. The infinite regress implicit in that tricky turn of phrase suggests, however, that we enter on deeply problematic ground: indeed, the dichotomy of form and content is but one version of perhaps the oldest conundrum in the philosophy of mind, the 'mind-body problem.'[11] Unsurprisingly, then, for computing we find two equally unproductive but quite popular escapes offered in the literature.[12] These escapes frequently take shape in another version of the mind-body problem, namely the nature-nurture argument. Thus on the one

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[11] See *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, s.v.; Onians (1951) s.v. *anima, nephesh, psyche*, which documents how complex the philosophical and religious traditions are on this point.

[12] As Debray has said, we need to thread our way toward "a third-alternative critical stance between the apocalyptic and apologetic tones, between the classical humanities' 'nothing essential can be technological' and the latest futurisms' 'everything is essentially a technical question'" ([1996b] 125).

hand the determinists argue for nature, talking as if development and use of the device were hardwired, like a genetic code, hence essentially unaffected by users, their culture, or historical contingencies. Our task, according to their view, is to discover this nature, then yield or resist depending on whether the determinism is cast in positive or negative terms. On the other hand the instrumentalists, as I am calling them, speak for nurture. They hold that such a device is 'just a tool'—i.e., not also an effecting medium, hence no more than a means of accomplishing whatever the nurturing tool-user has independently in mind. The tool may have particular capabilities and features, which are variously agreeable to our purposes, but these exist simply to be used or not as instruments of a pre-existing intention. How we think and what we want to do remain essentially unaffected by the qualities of the tool.

For commentary-making, then, we would appear to face a proverbial Scylla-and-Charybdis: either the computer will revolutionize the practice according to a pre-written script we need only decipher, or it will make no difference at all that we cannot now imagine from what we already know. These alternatives are, as I indicated, equally false; they both falsify the situation by taking flight from our central problem into realms of abstraction. Before we steer carefully between the monsters, however, we should observe that each has its grain of truth. The determinist's is that the medium/tool we use shapes practice: "Just as the dwelling comes before the dweller, or the earth before the peasant," Debray has pointed out, so the book comes before the writer of books ([1996b] 139). The instrumentalist's contrary truth is that the outcome is in the hands of the maker. This maker, whether writer of books, singer of tales, painter, or sculptor, works both with and against the inherited form. Thus, for example, the epic poet's *in medias res* in response to the imposed linearity of textual or oral presentation,[13] or indeed the inherent non-linear intertextuality of written language.

The history of technology demonstrates clearly enough that tools materialize ideas and that ideas arise from the use of tools. Hence the teleological notion, especially popular for computing, that the tool is a kind of prosthesis, an artificial limb of the mind/body, as

[13] Arguments for or assertions of a revolutionary non-linearity in hypertext have muddied the waters; see esp. Rouet and Levonen (1996) 12–15, Dillon (1996).

it were, that supplies what we formerly lacked.[14] Indeed, the psychologist Merlin Donald has argued in *Origins of the Modern Mind* that our species has evolved cognitively through a progressive externalization of consciousness in tools and other cultural artifacts. Thus although tools do not encode their own future, as the determinists would have, they do contain tacit knowledge of how their inventors conceptualized the world and related to it. Our old tools, however outmoded (or not), are never simply to be discarded, rather they need to be decoded for the methodological knowledge they contain. I will return to this crucial point later.

History also shows that although the relationship of tool-mind to tool-body remains enigmatic, we somehow manage to exploit the mediating effect of new tools intelligently, indeed to assimilate this effect. Nevertheless, puzzling out the future—for the commentary or for anything else technologically mediated—presents us with the severest cognitive and practical difficulties, as Geoffrey Nunberg has argued. The central problem he identifies is seeing past our own tendency to 'naturalize contingent features of the current order of things' ([1996] 105), as for example when futurologists of the 1950s envisioned how the house*wife* decades hence would do *her* work. But predicting outcome deserves James O'Donnell's condemnation as 'a mug's game' not merely because it is often badly wrong, profitless to the prophet and useful to others only in retrospect ([1996] 47f.), rather chiefly because it distracts us from our proper job—indeed, the only job we can actually do to prepare ourselves as commentary-makers. This is, I would argue, to understand how best to engage with our tools and materials so that (to paraphrase Lisa Samuels' phrase from Jerome McGann) we may constructively imagine what we do not yet know ([1997]). Prediction is no help at all: it stands back from direct, messy involvement, away from Wittgenstein's 'rough ground,' and so verges on the deterministic fantasy, as if the problem we faced were to puzzle out what in any case will happen. We cannot know.

Nor are our uneducated desires any better. Thus a commonplace response from the computing help-desk—a description of various relevant things computers can do, followed by the question, 'what do

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[14] See Lyotard (1984) discussed in Landow (1997) chapter 6; the literal incorporation of the idea in the closely related speculations about the merging of technology and life in a 'bionic future,' for which see Zorpette and Ezzell (1999).

you want to do?'—leaves us as much at a loss: it merely restates the question within the mindset of existing methods on the one hand and on the other the current possibilities and limitations of computing. Even if it does not assume that old means are simply replaced without fundamental change to the methodology or results, it certainly gives the practitioner no help in imagining how the new can be developed and what the consequences to scholarship might be. Actual examples of electronic reference works are somewhat better than lists of possibilities and promises; they at least demonstrate concrete lines of development. But examples are of course limited to what has been done, and done so recently that the consequences and implications are only beginning to emerge. Examples are very few, as Hans Walter Gabler recently noted for electronic textual editions ([2000] 115).

Help appears, however, once we begin to look around the disciplinary terrain for how other equipment-orientated fields combine ideas, instrumentation, and material in their research.[15] As I have argued elsewhere (McCarty [2002]) a primary source is the history, philosophy, and sociology of science and technology, often gathered under the rubric of 'science studies' but also pursued in each of the disciplines separately. Whether, as Richard Rorty has suggested, we are verging on an end to the epistemic wars between C. P. Snow's 'two cultures' ([2000] 23), the study of science from without has during the last two decades become preoccupied with questions particularly relevant to us.[16] As a result we now have to hand powerful means of understanding collaborative and experimental knowledge-making in which equipment plays a significant role. For my purposes here the philosopher Ian Hacking's analysis of how hypothetical entities become real is particularly suggestive. Assertions (such as my own) that tools are 'agents of perception and instruments of thought,' the metaphor of prosthesis and the historical idea of cognitive externalization have a common limitation, namely that they do not bring

[15] I say 'equipment-orientated' advisedly for the help these fields have to offer my particular set of questions, not to suggest that commentary-making or any other area in which computing is applied is or should become equipment-centered.

[16] Three closely interrelated developments particularly: (1) a deconstruction of objectivity, including but not limited to social-constructivist theories of knowledge, for which see Galison (1999) and the references in McCarty (2002); (2) an attack on the supposed unity of 'the scientific method,' beginning with Feyerabend (1975); and (3) a sustained focus on experimental science as a primary form of knowledge-making rather than as a handmaiden of theory, for which see Hacking (1983).

us to the present moment when knowledge is actually discovered—or, as science studies would significantly have it, *made*. Hacking's philosophical analysis, for example of the microscope, proposes a more complex, subtle and active role for our research tools, as the means we use to make things real by manipulating them ([1983]). Since, as he argues, there is no one scientific method, and since experiment does not necessarily follow theory (although in particular cases it may), we should view our research tools as heuristic instruments for expanding not merely our abilities (as in Donald's view) but more the world we real-ize. It is in this sense that I suggest we regard the electronic commentary as an experimental, constructivist undertaking with no need for a pre-existing theory or scheme of what it should be.

4. *Modeling*

The software engineer William Kent prefaces his classic study *Data and Reality* with a warning message to mapmakers: "highways are not painted red, rivers don't have county lines running down the middle, and you can't see contour lines on a mountain" ([1978] xix). Kent is writing about knowledge-representation,[17] which is for us perhaps the most basic intellectual activity computing has to offer. His point is that like maps representations are *models*:[18] fictional, at best verisimilar constructs we use to stand in for phenomena otherwise out of reach. Modeling is a pragmatic, experimental activity, whose intellectual aim is to discover the consequences of the model. Because models are fundamentally not true, modeling is chiefly a

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[17] Knowledge-representation is a subfield of artificial intelligence concerned with the design and use of computing systems for representing knowledge, including the kinds of reasoning that can be done with such systems; see Unsworth (2001). Kent is concerned more broadly with the intellectual problem of how (human) knowledge translates into data and data-structures, e.g., in a database system. For commentary-making as I am considering it here the primary form of knowledge-representation is hypertextual and related markup, as discussed below.

[18] I am using this polysemous word in the sense common to physics and related fields, "a manipulable representation of an object or process constructed for the purpose of study"; cf. *OED* n.2a: "A representation . . . of some material object artificial or natural, showing the proportions and arrangement of its component parts. *Working model*, one so constructed as to imitate the movements of the machine which it represents"—not in the sense of a Platonic ideal. For the literature on modeling up to 1994, see McCarty (1994) 278–80.

quest for *meaningful failure.* The best model, that is, comes as close as possible to a perfect and complete representation of what is known about the phenomenon in question yet fails perfectly to duplicate its behavior. Its failure as an artifact of engineering is its success as an instrument of science.[19]

Scholarly forms and formulations, I would argue, have in broad terms always been thus: in principle the truth about a commented text, for example, fits uncomfortably within the strictures of the commentary form, whatever that may be, just as categories by nature never do complete justice to the categorized. Hence the melancholy sentence of the Preacher (that there is nothing new under the sun) might seem final, but as with the mechanical qualities we see in the traditional artifact, here too the continuity is in respect of particular features determined by the computational perspective. From this perspective, then, a commentary is a *model* of what is known and thought about its text, and the tradition of commentary on this text is a history of model-building and rebuilding. (I return to the question of perspective in Section 8, below.) In consequence of it we tend to become especially aware of the tentativeness and impermanence which have always characterized scholarly works but perhaps not been so obvious. The electronic medium also, however, provides the means radically to shorten the time-scale of change by making changes relatively easy to accomplish. Building becomes more obviously re-building. Play, in the sense of *serio ludere,* is encouraged. Scholarly monumentalism, at least in its present form, becomes very difficult to maintain or credit.[20]

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[19] On failure see Unsworth (1997), McCarty (2002). Rescuing the failure of systematic constructs from the dustbin suggests an answer to the central problem of *die Geisteswissenschaften* ('human sciences') with which Gadamer begins *Truth and Method.* Unlike the sciences, in which research strives to discover regularities and so to subsume individual cases to a law, the ideal of the humanities, he notes, "is rather to understand the phenomenon itself in its unique and historical concreteness" ([2000] 5). Modeling, as I have argued, implements regularities provisionally, without the normative status of law, in order to illuminate that concreteness.

[20] Monumentality is precisely a contested issue for the print medium, where the grand scale and relative permanence of monuments are instantiated in the costly physical book. Usually 'monument to scholarship' is a term of high praise, but it can also suggest uncritical reverence or other anti-intellectual ways of construing authority. Indeed, authority and monumentality are interdependent ideas. The electronic medium brings permanence (though not grand scale) into question, and with it what we mean by authority, how it is established and maintained. Unfortunately the grander scale required to explore authority and permanence in the electronic

5. *Devolution*

The role of modeling in scholarly applications may now seem obvious, but it has only been so for a relatively short time. The longer-term developments that have enabled us to think in its terms deserve a brief look, since they lead us to several quite important consequences of what we might call the constructive mutability of computing.

The history in question is not simply about the development of faster, cheaper and more capacious machinery. It also shows the increasing sophistication of systems toward stability and standardization on the one hand and accessibility on the other. We witness, that is, the gradual transfer of ability to construct artifacts from highly specialized technicians to ordinary users—simultaneous with the increasing technical sophistication of these users.[21]

In hardware the transfer of ability has happened through the evolution of what until recently was called the 'microcomputer' and the spread of the Internet. Especially in the form of the World Wide Web the Internet completes the decentralization of computing by giving individual machines access to other machines and to the computer-as-network. Thus the indefinitely extensible if not chaotic variety from which individuals may select *ad libidinem*. It gives scholars the means by which they may collaborate and the possibility of a distributed working environment, about which more later.

In local software the basis for devolution of constructive power has been laid by the change from a serial computing environment to the concurrent design we now use, with its asynchronous, interactive graphical user interface (GUI).[22] Serial computing, which more or less mandated the completion of one program before the next

medium is not allowed me here; see Frye (1976) for suggestions, and for a discussion of various aspects of size in commentaries see Kraus (above) 8.

[21] Several people, such as Mark Weiser and Donald Norman (1999), argue for the 'disappearing,' 'ubiquitous,' or 'invisible' computer, i.e., for the machine completely to become an unremarkable part of everyday artifacts, continuing the development that has resulted in the hidden applications of computing in cash-point machines, automobiles and so forth—perhaps a contemporary example of the externalization that Donald argues for ([1991]). Note Andy Clark's remark that "We use intelligence to structure our environment so that we can succeed with less intelligence. Our brains make the world smart so we can be dumb in peace!" ([1997] 180). My argument, however, concerns scholars and others who learn by making and re-making things self-consciously.

[22] See Winograd on 'interaction design' ([1997]).

could be run, made interaction with machines clumsy and slow. Programs therefore tended strongly to monolithic, 'black box' designs, in which the user provided the input and received the output but had little direct responsibility for the process. What scholars did on the machine thus tended strongly to diverge from their other work in both the sequentiality and opacity of the computing applications. Even custom-built software separated the conception of problems (domain of the scholar) from the computational means of working them out (bailiwick of the programmer) and so came at a significant cost. It did not just keep computing to the few. It made the importance of computing for scholarship difficult to understand by focusing attention on the necessarily expensive, relatively inflexible product rather than the interactive, heuristic process. It thus inhibited us from understanding that at issue is a reconceptualization of our artifacts and how we relate to them, not a faster and cheaper means of producing the old kind.

In contrast the asynchronous, concurrent design of the GUI not only permits several programs to run simultaneously, it also strongly favors the development and use of 'component' software, i.e., independently developed, interoperable primitives designed to be used and reused in the construction of unforeseen larger processes, somewhat as alphabetic letters are assembled to spell arbitrarily many words in many languages.[23]

Admittedly the ordinary user can see only hints of such a future for software applications. Currently he or she has a choice between two constraining alternatives: either to adapt a miscellaneous collection of mostly commercial applications to his or her purpose, seldom if ever satisfactorily, or to adopt a closed, essentially unmodifiable system of components that have been carefully designed to work with each other. Experience suggests that however we define our primitive operations, the set of them is not closed. A toolbox system that offers internal compatibility at the expense of openness seems doomed, particularly since its hidden constraints and assumptions are bound to work against the more fundamental changes in method. Scholars need a means of inventing new primitives and building new tools easily.

[23] Note the particular example of the development in hypertext systems from monolithic design to so-called 'open hypertext,' for which see Wiil, Nürnberg and Leggett (1999).

Much therefore remains to be done before we can easily construct approximate computational analogues of what we do (and invent new devices) by assembling and customizing component software. But the direction of technological progress seems clearly to be opening up an opportunity for us to become designers of our own tools. As Brown and Duguid have recently noted in *The Social Life of Information*, "We are all, to some extent, designers now" ([2000] 4).

In parallel with the devolution of constructive power, large-scale, widely accessible repositories of data have been developed in the humanities and social sciences. For us the earliest examples are textual collections such as the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (TLG), first on magnetic tape then CD-ROM.[24] More recently the World Wide Web has given access to lexical databases and 'archives' of images and aural data as well; for classics the primary example is, of course, the Perseus Digital Library (Smith, Rydberg-Cox, and Crane [2000]). Though wisely made for immediately pragmatic reasons, the decision of the TLG Project to produce the Greek text without software for manipulating it is paradigmatic of a fundamental division between basic resources of data on the one hand and various standard ways of transforming and combining them on the other.[25] Even when, as with the Perseus Project, both are kept under one roof, the design which cleanly separates data from software allows two important flexibilities: the development and straightforward application of new tools, embodying new ideas, to old data; and the application of tools across data-sets, extending even to otherwise very different disciplines.

6. *Library*

Thus we find ourselves staring at a new manifestation of an ancient idea: the research library, in which diversity of reading practices is encouraged by a fundamental separation of singular and relatively unchanging resources from their manifold and highly changeable uses. Indeed, the idea of aggregated, flexibly structured knowledge

[24] For the history of the *TLG* see the remarks in Brunner (1993); Berkowitz (1993) especially n.3.

[25] For the relationship between the object-orientated model (which combines software with data) and the library model of aggregated sources separated from any particular uses of them, see Bradley (2002, forthcoming).

is fundamental. Digitization of such resources produces the incunabular and now commonplace 'digital library,' by which is meant the searchable electronic collections built up by a conventional institution in a single place.[26] To borrow a phrase from Jerome McGann, this incunabular library is I suspect 'in winding sheets rather than swaddling clothes' ([1997]), however, since networking offers the possibility of a far more powerful means of aggregating digitized knowledge: a singular and world-wide[27] library constituted from geographically distributed, independently developed resources.[28]

For a moment, rushing past without brushing aside the formidable difficulties standing in its way, let us imagine such a working environment (of which the current Web, including such things as the Perseus Project, gives but a hint). Within this environment, in 'cyberspace,'[29] scholars could extract what they need to produce commentaries either in printed form as now or as relatively book-like packaged electronic 'products' with various improvements and extensions to the print-based form.[30] These would then go onto the shelves or into the electronic collections of relatively conventional libraries. The potential for us in the devolution of constructive power is more radical than that, however. As a singular, world-wide entity, the digital library offers us the possibility of devolving responsibility for what is now the scholarly end-product to the end-user, who would put together the commentary he or she needed from the relevant bits and pieces wherever they might be found, e.g., textual editions, other commentaries, lexicons, image archives, secondary literature,

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[26] For this sense of digital library, see Fox and Marchionini (2001), who introduce the most recent issue of a major computing journal on the subject; Perseus is explicitly a digital library in this sense (Crane et al. [2000a]). I recognize but do not discuss here the idea of the 'hybrid library,' which combines printed and electronic resources.

[27] The term 'world-wide' presumes, of course, a definition of 'world' in which such things as use of a digital library are possible. I therefore use the term with implied scare-quotes.

[28] On the world-wide digital library and the central problem of interoperability see Paepcke, Chang, García-Molina, and Winograd (1998).

[29] A metaphor (very) loosely used to characterize in spatial terms what people do with computers. The term was coined by William Gibson in his novel *Neuromancer* ([1984] 51). For an attempt at definition see (e.g.) the *Principia Cybernetica Web.*

[30] Many if not most of the CD products we now have are historically conservative in this sense, e.g., the *OED on CD-ROM*, the *CETEDOC Library of Christian Latin Texts*, or *The Wife of Bath's Prologue on CD-ROM*: self-contained entities that marry source material to the means for its analysis.

morphological parsers, concordances, and so forth. Hence authorial responsibility would be shifted to preparation of these bits and pieces for whatever combinations might later be made. I call this henceforth 'the DIY commentary.' The widely scattered (indeed, also world-wide) academic cottage-industry, together perhaps with some forms of institutional support, is fully capable of the loose collaboration necessary to produce a sufficient stock of such resources and so to allow for the DIY commentary.

Imagining the benefits is not hard: more or less immediate access to primary and secondary sources in full, including the sort of plural, eclectic primary text advocated by Robinson (2000); construction of *variorum* commentaries;[31] interconnection with lexicons, morphological parsers, and other sorts of automatic analysis tools; inclusion of images, hence potentially a much larger role for them;[32] the 'folding comment' and reader-determined paths described by Fowler ([1999] 427); and so forth. Such imaginings, several already realized in the Perseus Project, are what we can expect from anyone familiar with the basics (though implementation is very hard). In fact we need little more than the work of Perseus, amplified and extended to a distributed cottage-industry of scholars, to suggest them. This work is crucial to our understanding of what we face because our previous experience, it turns out, is in practice not as helpful as we might think. "We have found theoretical extrapolations to be of little use in developing digital libraries," Crane and colleagues have recently written. "A densely interlinked interactive medium has proven so different from the print environment . . . that we find it hard to predict with any accuracy what will and will not work" (Crane et al. [2001b]). Here, however, I want to put aside the immediate accomplishments of Perseus and whatever benefits a world-wide digital library might bring so that we may focus on the problem-horizon.

The chief technical problem is *interoperability*, i.e., the ability of independently designed components to communicate successfully with-

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[31] A particularly notable example of the possibilities is provided by the *Stellenbibliographie zum* Parzival *Wolframs von Eschenbach*, which uses computationally simple techniques to create a line-by-line commentary (probably otherwise a practical impossibility) from existing, ongoing scholarship; see Yeandle (1998).

[32] See Sandys' commentary on the *Bacchae* (1900) for its use of images; the images and other visual aids in Perseus. In his comment on lines 661–2 (Figure 1), Dodds remarks that he found no snow when he climbed Cithaeron in April; is it inconceivable that an embedded video of Cithaeron within a scholarly commentary, or indeed selected enactments of scenes, would be helpful?

out specific knowledge of each other, and wherever possible without human intervention (Paepcke, Chang, García-Molina, and Winograd [1998]). Geography is technically irrelevant, except when bandwidth is a problem: the components will normally be distributed only because the makers are. What matters is that each component is able to handle any arbitrary input and produce within the domain of its intended use an artificially intelligible response. Although this is in fact a very difficult problem that no one currently knows how to solve,[33] we nevertheless have good reasons for hope: it is firmly on the 'critical path' of current digital library research in computer science; indeed, it is crucial to the projected development of most if not all large-scale computing systems. It is very clearly what people in the industry want to happen, so if it is soluble it very likely will be realized, though in what form and which decade is impossible now to say.

The social and political problems of the worldwide digital library may turn out to be much harder, beginning with objections to the very notion of public, openly collaborative work (which implies a social ideal not to everyone's taste) and reaching to strictures on kinds of information that some will insist for professional, national, military, religious, or other reasons must not be distributed. Anyone who thinks that the commentary is entirely free from such considerations should look more closely at its history (Most [1999]). But even if within the confines of a safely academic discipline we are not thus vexed, the central question of our common purpose remains: do we *want* the DIY commentary—or any other particular change in the practice of commentary-making that the electronic media promise?

[33] To get some idea of the difficulty consider, for example, the apparently straightforward situation in which a software component requests definition text from an online lexicon. Of all the potential problems that might arise, consider only those following on the request for definition of a homographically ambiguous form, such as Latin *maris* (up to six possible solutions). A question requiring an answer for only one of these could not be resolved without reference to context; automatic analysis might eliminate some possibilities for this particular question, but in general resolution of such ambiguous cases would require 'natural language understanding' software better than anything we now have—or some combination of software and intervention from the user. Furthermore, access to lexical information would need in general need to be recursive (i.e., to allow for repeated accesses with refined queries) to discover whether analysis of the context was required and if so of what kind.

7. *System-wide effects*

How can we know whether we want it? The quite difficult intellectual exercise which I think this question requires of us is to puzzle out the consequences insofar as we can project them from current circumstances. Here I prefer to adopt a term from economics and so think about 'system-wide effects'[34] of the DIY approach. Of course, framing the effort in terms of interacting components in a system is by nature an exercise in modeling and so cannot tell the complete truth. It disciplines us, however, to think in terms of a whole (and so to define what we consider the whole to be), to resolve it into its components, and to work out their interactions. The effort is for us thankfully subsumed within the broader, ongoing analysis of electronic publishing.[35] Here I have space only for a few examples of what that analysis suggests about the commentary.

Scholarship as we conceive it naturally depends on our ability to document the sources we use, secondary and primary. One system-wide effect (of which we already have a foretaste from the Web) is revealed when we ask in what sense the DIY commentary *is* a document. How is the user of a temporary, perhaps even unique construct to record a meaningful, lasting reference to it? A technical answer is more or less already available: components would carry an identifier, not entirely dissimilar to a 'uniform resource locator' (URL), so that any particular DIY 'document' would be in the first instance something like a table of contents.[36] The harder, ontological question remains, however. Current bibliographic references are to commonly-held objects; the DIY reference would be to a potentially, even normally unique, private construct. In other words, Duguid notes, we face the potentially serious intellectual and social problem of *demassification* ([1996] 83ff.). If standard reference sources are replaced by idiosyncratic ones, what then happens to scholarship? Duguid observes "the increasing ease with which socially complex technolo-

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[34] I am grateful to Colin Day for the term (e-mail 23/06/97); see Day (1995). Systems theory is a field of its own; see Bateson (1972), Klir (1991).

[35] The best work so far is the collection of essays edited by Nunberg (1996), but see also the articles in the *Journal of Electronic Publishing.*

[36] Multiple tables of contents for a single pool of online articles is now a commonplace; indeed the idea is a natural consequence of hypertext. A more complex implementation would be required in a DIY scheme but could be solved with no great technical effort.

gies can be made not just for broad masses of people, but for small groups and individuals. . . . In brief," he declares, "centrifugal forces of individualization and separation are coming into conflict with centripetal social needs, which were met previously and unproblematically through shared or common material objects" ([1996] 84), e.g., the printed book. One outcome, already visible online, is the attempt to produce and consume information "with less reliance on impersonal forms and more on personal warrants for legitimation," as with hypertext and especially as hypertext is depicted in the liberationist rhetoric about it ([1996] 84). Historical precedents suggest a crippling, paradoxical consequence may result: privatization rather than the democratization of knowledge preached by the liberationists, i.e., a highly problematic retreat from public forms and institutions into civil society, "glimpsed in some of the more Hobbesian enclosures of cyberspace," as he says ([1996] 88).

The threat of demassification seems cause enough for the fearful cry of *o tempora, o mores!* and so a retreat from DIY. This threat is real enough for caution, but more needful of our attention are the assumptions implicit in the system whose effect demassification is. I will return to the point in a moment.

Another system-wide effect begins with Debray's point about the pre-existing matrix that intellectual forms supply. Let us, for example, imagine a future E. R. Dodds writing his commentary on the *Bacchae*[37] for a fully implemented digital library.[38] Given the strong tendency of the electronic medium for morselization, and so for a loose structure of interlinked but unbound components, let us say that the future Dodds composes his substantial introductory essay on Dionysus, Dionysiac religion and traditional elements in the *Bacchae* with the possibility of its independent status in mind. The question

[37] In this essay I use Dodds (2nd edition 1960; 1st edition, 1944) as my standard example of the classical commentary. The *Bacchae* has been the subject of commentary for over 500 years, since the Aldine edition of 1503, and it has been extensively studied for the last two centuries. I chose Dodds' commentary in particular primarily because of certain formal features that would challenge a DIY design: an introductory essay that may be regarded as an independent contribution to scholarship; citation and use of numerous secondary sources of varying kind; long discursive glosses; variation in types of reference; masterful concision; a fine sense of audience.

[38] To make matters simple (though entirely unrealistic), I assume that this library offers no more than we can comfortably project on the basis of current technology, and I suppose that non-technical problems, such as copyright, have been solved.

then is, how will pre-knowledge of digital unboundedness affect composition of the essay? (The short answer is, we do not know.) Later on I will return to the matrix-effect in a much more obvious form, but for now I want to indicate the emerging *disaggregation* problem, as it is called.[39] This problem also turns up in one of the more popular issues exercising those who think about writing in the hypertextual medium, namely argumentation, which traditionally leads the reader through a strictly pre-determined sequence. What happens when reader-determined sequencing of morselized prose must be treated as a given?[40] No one is certain, but recent work suggests that the matrix-change does not put an end to argument, rather establishes new conditions for it and requires corresponding rhetorical means. *Mutatis mutandis* the future Dodds will be writing a rather different sort of essay—though again we do not know how it will be different.

An important conclusion to be drawn is that *dis*aggregation is a by-product of our imitative way of conceptualizing the electronic medium, as if our task were to translate pre-existing printed documents and the working methods that produced them into electronic form. From a creative, writerly perspective the change looks very different: it means rethinking those methods so as to anticipate their endless, unpredictable *re*aggregation by future readers—or in more familiar terms, their recontextualization. (Note what has happened here: the possibility of creative adaptation to our changed circumstances makes the system we analyse much less brittle.)

What might such anticipation involve? Unboundedness implies that recontextualization is plural, ultimately unpredictable. Current experience with the Web is sufficient to show that although a pastiche of found objects can be serendipitous, the prospect of a 'docuverse'[41] indefinitely expanding and yawning before us like some "dark |

[39] Brown and Duguid include both demassification and disaggregation among the aspects of what they call the '6-D Vision' of disintegrating forces; they argue that this vision is flawed by its narrow concern with abstract information ([2000] 22). See Nunberg (1996), which I use extensively below.

[40] See Carter (2000); the other references in McCarty (2000) III.B.2. The argument that sequences of logical or structural entitles in hypertextual documents are less rigidly determined than those in a codex is a subtler and more difficult one to make than would appear. I assume it here but argue the essence of the case in Section 10, below.

[41] The term 'docuverse' was coined by Theodore Holm Nelson to denote what we now call the digital library, though in a radically ideal form; see Nelson (1982).

Illimitable Ocean without bound, | Without dimension . . ." (*PL* 2.891–3) is not usually what we need or want.[42] The question is how to exercise or plan for control.[43] Explicit descriptors within each component (i.e., metadata) is a commonplace solution. Perseus, for example, is focusing primarily on "ways in which documents can be designed from the start to interact with other objects in the digital library" (Crane et al. [2000b]).[44] Complementary research in 'adaptive hypermedia' is based on an explicit profile of the reader (including his or her information-seeking behavior) to tailor-make the product.[45] Automatic adaptation essentially mechanizes the writer's traditional attention to audience, which has of course been implemented in various features of the printed codex from the beginning. The historical Dodds, for example, adopted an explicit (mechanical) device in his 1944 commentary: square-brackets, with which he enclosed material intended for the scholars but not the 'schoolboys' in his audience ([1960] vi).[46] Indeed, commentaries automated along such lines promise help in the needed effort to reach a wider variety of audiences.

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[42] Nunberg suggests that we not "try to close off the collection in some arbitrary way, but . . . provide benign [Ariadnes] (both automatic and flesh and blood) who can help users thread their way through the maze" ([1996] 129). Our situation is, however, somewhat different from Theseus's, as the docuverse has no center to delimit the quest and no fixed shape or singular thread to discipline experience. Milton's Chaos seems more to the point—or the 'book of sand' in the short story of that name by Jorge Luis Borges.

[43] Here I deliberately ignore current solutions and ongoing research in computer science that assume arbitrarily structured documents such as one finds on the Web. In other words, I assume that the DIY commentary is written for a matrix that we are now figuring out how to design.

[44] Research also proceeds under the heading of retrieval and extraction of information from the Web; see Amitay (2001). For reports on related work, see the journal *Markup Languages*.

[45] For a technical overview of adaptive hypermedia see De Bra, Brusilovsky, and Houben (1999); McCarty (2000) III.C.2 'Adaptive and dynamic hypermedia.' The adaptive approach was suggested in the 1970s by Gordon Thompson, who proposed a 'serendipity machine' based on automatic observation of a person's information-seeking behavior ([1979]). A simple but effective implementation is used by the online bookseller amazon.com to suggest related items.

[46] As Figure 1 shows, he also marked his audience more subtly, for example by spelling out the names of Latin playwrights and their plays, thus 'Seneca . . . *Thyestes*,' and by citing the minimum information needed by a well informed (but not mind-reading) reader, e.g., 'Verrall's notion that 662 is interpolated . . .' (not citing Verrall 1910, the only possibility) or 'ἀνεῖσαν χιόνος L. Dindorf, to avoid . . .' (carefully pointing to Ludwig rather than his brother Wilhelm). See Section 10, below; also Stephens (above).

The demands of recontextualization are, however, both more serious and more promising than that. Dodds' humorous admission that he had often silently 'pillaged' his predecessors ([1960] vii) is a scholar's conventional recognition that explicit referential gestures are only the proverbial iceberg-tip of a massive, implicit intertextuality. Because implicit conversation among texts is inherent to language, as among other artifacts to culture, much will not change in the transition to electronic forms. Reference will, however, be affected in at least two ways: obviously, by the manual and automatic forging of hypertextual links; less obviously, by the loss of physical closure imposed by the codex, within which reference has operated since the invention of that device. What happens when the physical fact of that closure is no longer a condition of work—when, for example, the parts of a commentary are no longer bound together and so their intertextuality is not privileged? I will return to these questions later.

I began my analysis of system-wide effects by discovering the threat of demassified information, then at least partially answered that threat and other disintegrative tendencies by shifting from the more or less passive user's perspective to the active experimenter's. The former amounts to a kind of determinism, as does the liberationist's scenario of 'information wanting to be free'[47]—and getting the chance at last. But, as that intriguing personification suggests, a deeper problem is to be found in what Nunberg has trenchantly called the 'impression of information' ([1996]).

Information is an astonishingly successful idea. In popular usage it even characterizes the era in which we live, 'the Information Age.' Its colorless, odorless, tasteless ubiquity makes it exceedingly difficult to grasp critically—which fact, and the uneasy feeling that comes before it, should make us very suspicious. Nunberg defines it in the material sense as "a uniform and morselized substance . . . indifferent not just to the medium it resides in but also to the kind of representation it embodies . . . a *noble* substance" (that '*wants* to be free') as unreactive and unchanging as the Pythagorean soul, . . . *errat et illinc | huc venit, hinc illuc, et quoslibet occupat artus.*[48] Nunberg argues

[47] The battle-cry, 'information wants to be free,' is usually attributed to Stewart Brand; see Clarke (2000), who traces its lineage tellingly to John 8:32—and note the crucial differences!

[48] Nunberg (1996) 116f. (my emphasis), *OED* s.v. 'noble' a., Ovid, *Met* 15.165f.

that our impression of this curiously powerful and elusive substance is, however, an artifact of the very system it characterizes: it originates, he shows, in "certain practices of reading and the particular representations that support them" ([1996] 110, 114f.). Hence, "information is a mode of reading" ([1996] 123). Its properties—"metaphysical haecity or 'thereness,' transferability, quantized and extended substance, interpretative transparency or autonomy—are simply the reifications of the various principles of interpretation that we bring to bear" on the information-genres: newspapers, modern reference works, census reports etc. ([1996] 116). Its material properties, as he says, reify "the material properties of the documents that inscribe it"; its semantic properties "are the reflexes of the institutions and practices that surround the use of these documents" ([1996] 120).

If the informational mode of reading is bound up with the materiality of its documents, then the 'impression of information' should be faltering with the growth of electronic forms. This seems counterintuitive: digital data, like the Pythagorean soul, is capable of indefinite transformation without change. But again, only in the informational mode of reading are we apt to think that meaning inheres in these data and not in their embodied form. Furthermore, Nunberg argues, computing undermines this mode and the genres which support it by failing to preserve their social and material boundaries.[49] Hence the signs of disintegration we observed in the autochthonous forms of electronic communication are likewise artifacts of the informational perspective ([1996] 124f.). Perhaps, as has been suggested, these are comparable to the anomalies in a moment of Kuhnian 'extraordinary science,' when the crisis they force precipitates a major shift in how we conceptualize the world.[50] In any case, as a number of cogent essays have recently argued, the partiality and reductiveness of 'information' clearly do not help us with the embodied qualities of knowledge on which wise use of computational forms depends.[51]

[49] Thus Nunberg argues that online self-publishing, which increases the proportion of writers to readers, works against the impression of objectivity and autonomy on which information depends, and the proliferation of such documents against our ability to circumscribe authority ([1996] 125–9).

[50] See Kuhn (1970) 84–91, to which I refer for the historical point that major changes are sometimes preceded by apparently minor problems with the order of things. I avoid the term 'paradigm shift' because of its confusing popularity.

[51] See the essays collected in Nunberg (1996), Zeitlyn, David and Bex (1999), Brown and Duguid (2000). For visual data see Arnheim (1969), Tufte (1990).

8. *Imagination*

I have argued that the major difference in the offing—or at least the only one about which we can be confident—is the opportunity to create and experiment with models of commentary. This can be done immediately, though in a very limited way, using a mixture of local and online resources.[52] In the short to medium term major work is almost certainly to be circumscribed by the localized 'big science' projects, such as Perseus. I have argued, however, that far more interesting possibilities for the future of commentary-making appear to lie elsewhere, in the convergence of user and maker of tools in a world-wide digital library. There are numerous technical, social, and political impediments, but as I argued the history of computing clearly demonstrates this convergence.

Modeling is not an activity with which many commentary-makers are likely to be familiar: the tools for it have only recently become available in the humanities, and conscious play with the devices of scholarship is not commonplace. Nevertheless it is quite literally happening all around us, in business, government, and the sciences, where verisimilar scenarios and simulations provide the basis for real choices. Modeling is thus deeply implicated in social changes that do affect us, profoundly if only indirectly. Such peripheral activity is professionally important to classicists because it means that familiarity with modeling is not very far off; nearly everything is in place for us to alter our practice accordingly. Indeed, to note with Goldhill (1999) that glossing changes as socio-intellectual fashions change seems tantamount to observing that the practice is one long modeling exercise. Once we admit that thought, the codex is apt to appear self-evidently to have been a modeling device from the beginning, though a rather slow and clumsy one, and the various commentary forms we inherit models. Electronic tools (having become by the change in perspective no longer different in kind) will then correspondingly appear as different chiefly by the quantitative measures of speed and

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[52] See, for example, the *Vergil Project* (Farrell [1995–]), *Trajan's Column* (McMaster Column of Trajan Project, 1999), the *Stellenbibliographie zum* Parzival *Wolframs von Eschenbach* (Yeandle [1998]), the Rossetti Archive (McGann [2000]). For classics Perseus and the online version of the *TLG* can serve as major components in locally constructed reference works; see my *Analytical Onomasticon . . . Sampler* for an example (McCarty [1999]).

cost, with a nod to qualitative effects derivable from those or related to concerns seemingly of little immediate interest to the practice.

A slippery slope, indeed, at the bottom of which lies a muddled confusion of old and new, in which computational modeling seems nothing essentially more than what we formerly did and *vice versa.* The operative word here is the adverb *essentially*: accept its force and the inherited form becomes impossible to see as it was, even approximately. Significant aspects of it are rendered invisible to us before we even begin to attempt translation. The potential of the machine is likewise obscured.

The problem I am pointing to does not lie in the computational perspective *per se*, which we must assume in order to see which features of commentary translate into the electronic medium. Rather the problem is with seeing henceforth in any other way but the computational. Yet of course we must. Faithful translation (in Eco's sense) requires that we interpret commentary—the activity, not any specific format—simultaneously in the two very different media with respect to their cultures. If we can do this, then specific features lost or mangled in translation become visible, and attempts to re-create them in the idiom of the new environment can follow.

Earlier I recognized but postponed consideration of Most's point that purely formal analysis cannot do full justice to the complexities of the genre. Since, as Nunberg says, we have the greatest difficulty seeing which of these are contingent, we must pay attention to them all, in their cultural context as faithful translation demands, though as outsiders looking in. Whether we choose actually to implement any particular feature of old commentary practice in the new depends on a number of factors beyond my present scope, for example the theory of language that the former assumes (see Boyarin [1999], Goldhill [1999]). We must, however, be able clearly to imagine what we once knew as well as what we don't know.

In history, for example, the former kind of imagination is central to the question of how the story of anything may be understood once the world that informed it is gone.[53] This is not simply a matter of getting one's facts and motives right. Thus M. I. Finley, in *The Use and Abuse of History*, sees the emergence and continuing health

[53] The historiographical literature is immense; see Collingwood (1946; 1994), with the summary of more recent work by the editor.

of his discipline not in scrupulous spade-work as such, though that is *sine qua non*, but in its struggle to separate from its origins in poetic myth so that it may tell a different kind of story ([1975] 11–33). In the introduction to his *Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker* Leopold von Ranke makes the same point (adding to it the separation of history from moral instruction), then famously comments that his work 'will bloß zeigen, wie es eigentlich gewesen ist': it '*wants* only to show how it *actually* was.'[54] This statement has provoked, Finley notes, an endless debate; I want to make but a single point with it. Yes, fulfillment in the trivial sense is 'a fantasy impossible of realization,' as O'Donnell says ([1996] 48f). But with the ethnographer Clifford Geertz I argue that just because one cannot fully grasp other people (or past phenomena) 'in their immediacy and their difference'[55] does not mean the effort is vain: impossibility drives it on,[56] disciplines and deepens it, redefines the pivotal *eigentlich*.[57]

Thus the scholarship I advocate for software design is fundamentally of as well as in the humanities and can be every bit as intellectually demanding as our native fields. (No doubt like historiography it deserves an equal intensity of debate as well.) In any case I think we can be quite optimistic about its application to commentary-making. We have actual use of printed commentaries to study and draw upon and the still-living practice of their production, to some degree *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. More than most disciplines classics has fostered the historiographical imagination that Finley describes, even if at times truth has seemed a matter merely of prodigious *Sitzfleisch*. Nothing essential to the task is foreign, and only some of it new.

The computational perspective discovers other kinships as well, in earlier scholarship. Take, for example, the strikingly congruent approach to allusion that Ziva Ben-Porat worked out 25 years ago in

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[54] "Man hat der Historie das Amt, die Vergangenheit zu richten, die Mitwelt zum Nutzen zukünftiger Jahre zu belehren, beigemessen: so hoher Ämter unterwindet sich der gegenwärtiger Versuch nicht: er will bloß zeigen, wie es eigentlich gewesen ist" (Ranke [1824 = 1874] vii).

[55] Geertz (2000) 74; see esp. the previous chapter, 'Anti Anti-Relativism,' 42–67; Geertz (1973) 30.

[56] "I have never been impressed by the argument that, as complete objectivity is impossible . . . one might as well let one's sentiments run loose. As Robert Solow has remarked, that is like saying that as a perfectly aseptic environment is impossible, one might as well conduct surgery in a sewer" (Geertz [1973] 30).

[57] See, for example, Eric Voegelin's idea of history created 'through retrospective interpretation' ([1956] 128).

a systematic explication of this 'device for the simultaneous activation of two texts' ([1976] 107). Similarly, Steven Fraade exemplifies an equally congruent way of thinking about commentary in his more recent literary and socio-historical analysis of the Midrash *Sifre to Deuteronomy*, in which he focuses in detail on how the genre works, specifically with regard to the processes of reference and engagement of the communities in which the *Sifre* functioned. Somewhat further afield, in the wilder realms of cultural and literary theory, are the postmodernist writings on textual plurality and openness, for example Roland Barthes' *S/Z*, from which Fraade and my title both quote. Such scholarly kinships put powerful analytic means in our hands, though we do need to take care what claims we make about them.[58]

Don Fowler's broadly postmodern agenda is likewise a source of optimism for the commentary, his imagery of flowering and fertility pointing the possibilities for making our intellectual problems worse, as he says, rather than solving them. At this moment (and, I have argued, by nature) computing is particularly well suited to assist problematization. Indeed, Jay David Bolter argues, the commentary and computing seem particularly well met on both sides ([1993]). The computational perspective may rearrange our intellectual topography and so require our agnostic skepticism, but the fact is that commentary provides close to an ideal means of exploring many of the scholarly capabilities of computing without fatal compromise, as he suggests. Fowler notes that, for example, commentary is open 'in principle' to the indefinite accretion (and so to plurality) which computing makes trivial to accommodate; an argument that the physical facts of book publishing have thwarted a tendency in the idea of commenting that computing particularly favors would appear to follow. The mechanical essentials that I argued for—citation, morselization, and subordination—may be highlighted by computing but are also characteristics that pre-date it. They map easily if not almost perfectly into the technology of reference, i.e., hypertext—and push it, as we will see.

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[58] Unless we are regarding these conceptually related works themselves as historical artifacts, we use them creatively in support of what we do. The formerly popular notion of a 'Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology,' to quote the subtitle of Landow (1997), makes the historical error and, as Fowler notes, "is naïve: deferral of meaning is a property of text *per se*, not of any realisation of it" ([1999] 430).

Fowler observes that the openness of commentary lies "not in anything essential to the form but in the reading practices that it encourages" ([1999] 440). His observation is precise: the mechanical characteristics of this form as we now have it stimulate but do not necessarily cause the accretive response: the fact that one has a cabinet perfect for the display of curiosities does not force one to keep a *Wunderkammer*, although it may be said to encourage the practice.

Space prevents me from little more than gesturing toward the kind of imagination that the marriage of computing and commentary requires. The intellectual struggle to develop it is especially exhilarating because of the genuine kinships we discover along the way—signs, I think, that we are bringing together what (at least for us) belongs together—without which of course there would be no point to any of this.

9. *Collaboration*

In our translational analysis of commentary the historiographical imagination (let us call it) is shared by the several disciplines we need to involve. We may think of them as meeting in an interdisciplinary commons—literally, a collaborative center of specialists; figuratively, the ideal computing humanist's mental equipment; or (possibly best) some combination.[59]

The computer scientists Darrell Raymond and Frank Tompa have emphasized in their fine analysis of the *Oxford English Dictionary* that some mechanical features of the artifact are immediately obvious, while others can only be inferred from actual use, hence from the community that use defines.[60] The overlap of their field with the social sciences points to the fact that the methods of the latter are apt to be better for this than introspection or informal survey because to a significant degree users' knowledge about use is tacit, and the discipline of eliciting reliable answers out of variable subjects is not

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[59] In any case, I would argue, it has implications for our disciplinary curricula, especially at the M. A. level; (post)graduate programs are in development at several institutions on both sides of the Atlantic.

[60] Raymond and Tompa (1988); for typical research of this kind, though based on considerably less complex artifacts, see the articles by Marshall in McCarty (2000).

a trivial one.[61] The historian, possibly several of them, is schooled to discover what was tried but did not work and to understand relevant contingencies as such (see Hesse [1996], O'Donnell [1996]). The philosopher is disciplined to avoid easy escapes from the unresolvable conundrum underlying the relationship between form and content. He or she is also good for a robust epistemology of experimental knowledge-making to counterbalance the historian's tendency to privilege happenstance over principle. For the commentary or other artifact of literature, the literary critic is the one to work out how the historically situated ideas of language and literature are reflected in it—how (in Goldhill's words) a particular 'style of glossing' betrays an equally particular 'style of knowing.'

As a result of the (internal and/or external) collaboration, we can expect better knowledge of how the traditional artifact works as a device—a question to which I will return again shortly; its interrelationships with those it serves; the dependencies of its form and functions on the constraints of the matrix for which it was conceived; the opportunities missed or virtues abandoned for no good reason; and finally, as suggested, its socially constructed nature.[62]

The limitations of others are as always rather easy to spot. The harder question is how not to embed our own historically provincial limitations so deeply into our devices that we cannot easily remake them. In political terms, how do we go beyond a mere change in government to provide for a continuing revolution? I have suggested in effect that the computer offers us more than just another turn of the wheel, that we misuse it if we do not exploit its constructively changeable nature to keep pace with imaginative change. Although plurality is part of the postmodern agenda, it seems to me

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[61] The role of tacit knowledge in software design and beyond is a very active area for research, beginning particularly with Polanyi (1962) and (1966); see also for example Suchman (1987), Bodker, Greenbaum and Kyng (1991), Hutchins (1995), Nardi (1993) and (1996), Brown and Duguid (1996), Östman (1997). For tacit knowledge in the study of experimental scientific practice, see Collins (1992).

[62] This remains a useful term despite its over-stretched applications. As Hacking points out, social constructivism turns on the idea that an artifact or practice (e.g., the commentary as we know it) "is not determined by the nature of things . . . [but] was brought into existence or shaped by social events, forces, history, all of which could well have been different" (Hacking [1999] 6f.). Although social-constructivists often go further, to criticize, discredit or attempt to dismantle the phenomenon in question, all my argument requires is that no feature of the commentary beyond its mechanical essentials be regarded as intrinsic to the device.

that in allowing for maximum diversity of constructions we are not restricting the electronic commentary to that or any other agenda, now or in the future. Nevertheless, if we do our job well diversity will become more difficult to suppress and Fowler's call for "an emblem not of monumental solution but of the continuing fertility of problematization" far harder not to act on ([1999] 441).

10. *The rough ground*

An essential stage in the analysis is a thorough survey of actual examples. Before setting any limits, consciously or otherwise, we need to bring into focus the stubborn variety of commentary practice, which is a great deal more so than we might expect. In this penultimate section I want to look at variety in commentaries under two heads: the components of the works we call commentaries, and the referential gestures used in the commentary notes.

As for components, it is all too easy to generalize subconsciously from a favored commentary and so proceed on the assumption that give or take a minor bit the genre as a rule comprises a standard list of parts, e.g., preface, introductory essay, edited text, notes, indices and bibliography. Even within the single discipline of classical studies, for a single ancient text, a survey of artifacts quickly disabuses us of such a notion, however.[63] The formal variety is, as I said at the outset in raising the question of essentials, sufficient to make us question use of the same name to cover all instances. Between the covers of a book (any genre, in fact) are surprisingly few constraints. Intended audience is one cause of variety I have touched on, but the resulting variation goes much further than Dodds' use of square brackets to warn the 'schoolboys' in 1944 away from expert notes. A more recent commentary to the play assumes, for example, that the monolingual reader has no classical education whatever and so provides pronunciation help for the proper names (Bagg [1978]). I

[63] I exclude as invalid as well as unwise the proviso that in an artifactual analysis we only consider 'serious' commentaries, thus possibly excluding, for example, Gilbert Murray's on the *Bacchae* in 'The Athenian Drama for English Readers' series (1911), perhaps even Geoffrey Kirk's considerably more sophisticated commentary on the same play with English translation (1970). I am also very cautious to label any instance of the variety we find as meaningless. For the range of classical commentaries see also Kraus (above) 8, also (on translations) 3 n.12.

cite this example not to argue that we need to accommodate a widening range of readers (which we do) in his way (perhaps not), rather to illustrate how an assumption of audience permeates the work. This becomes significant to analysis of components when we note how physical boundedness defines the immediate context for anything within a codex. Thus the author can reasonably assume that the reader has read what comes before, has been otherwise exposed to its physically present 'paratext' or will look around within the book if puzzled.[64] Hence a great number of tiresome things do not need to be stated for each part of a bound book in order to avoid massive disorientation—a very well recognized and much discussed problem in cyberspace.

In the face of this variety, which would seem fatally to compromise the separability of components, commentary in cyberspace may appear in danger of heading for quite a different result, one fears: interoperability at the high cost of conformity. The technical problems are indeed very hard. A well-known tendency in computer science is to simplify hard problems so that, as David Hilbert wisely remarked, they are difficult enough to entice the researcher but not so completely inaccessible as to mock at his or her efforts (Hilbert [1900] 254). Agonistic collaboration seems inevitable, but we need to be prepared for it by understanding the extent of the problem—the now discovered 'fertility of problematization' that the codex fostered—the solutions we might turn to and what compromises (if any) we might be willing to make.

Such problems continue all the way down to the commentary paragraph, which likewise displays substantial variety, from the tightly focused discussion of textual variants particularly characteristic of earlier examples to the discursive mini-essay with footnotes.[65] In the later examples, citation is not simply or perhaps even primarily to the text commented on but especially to the wealth of primary and secondary material conventionally brought into play. The final question

[64] See Genette (1987), (1997) for "those liminal devices and conventions, both within and outside the book, that form part of the complex mediation between book, author, publisher, and reader" (frontispiece).

[65] For the former see (e.g.) Elmsley (1821) or Hermann (1823); for the latter Dodds (1960), with Cruickshank (1893), Sandys (1900) and Tyrrell (1928) approaching. One would suppose that the separate commentary volume, such as Roux (1970), would especially favor the mini-essay. See further Budelmann 157–61 and Henderson 227 (both above).

I wish to raise is exactly *how* this wealth is and might be brought into play.

Citation is especially important for my purposes because it so obviously converges on an analogous computational device, the hyperlink. Indeed, it is this convergence of devices that prompts us to think the commentary an ideal genre to computerize. We must therefore be very cautious. Stuck (e.g.) on the tribrach in line 662 of the *Bacchae* and puzzling over the cogency of Dindorf's suggested emendation, it is all too easy to end our thinking with the thought that it would be really rather nice if Dodds' commentary were on the Web and so his reference *ad loc* to 'Descroix, *Trim. iamb.* 159, 162' only a click away.

This thought would be the right one, without qualification, if 'citation' and 'hyperlink' were entirely synonymous or if they referred with minor variation in meaning to the same phenomenon, but they are not and do not. The distinction between them is in fact of such importance that, it would be fair to say, the future of commentary in the electronic age depends on our understanding it.

'Hyperlink' is a curiously elusive term, though not quite as slippery as 'hypertext' or the more general 'hypermedia.' The problem with these terms is that they are ill-defined abstractions we mistake as well-defined, concrete things. They are nevertheless very useful because no one yet knows the full range of possibilities for implementing referentiality; meanwhile they serve as stopgaps for expressing in a vague sort of way what we can only partially, though significantly, realize. The hyperlink as most of us experience it, on the Web, is widely recognized to be brutally simplistic in the context not only of what is described in technical typologies and specifications but even of stand-alone systems built decades ago.[66] The experts who write about the possibilities tend silently to assume this context, so that the rest of us are less than able to follow. How possibly, we are apt to wonder, can hypertext be all *that* powerful when what we see on the Web is clearly not?[67] I note again with-

[66] For technical specifications and standards, see especially DeRose (1989) and McCarty (2000) II.A. The superior sophistication of several early systems is a commonplace; see Van Dam (1988), DeRose and Van Dam (1999), and the entries listed in McCarty (2000) II.A.

[67] I acknowledge that simple, even simplistic things can be deployed in powerfully consequential ways, but here I am concerned rather more narrowly with the semantics of reference within the link.

out stopping to develop it further, the need for a meeting of minds: we would benefit considerably from the literature of hypertext research (McCarty [2000]); computer scientists correspondingly, from the commentary literature.

Allow me to illustrate the difference between hyperlink and citation by considering some specific examples from Dodds' commentary on *Bacchae* 661–2, included here as Figure 1. I will make only a few rather simple points about this particular patch of rough ground.

661–2. 'Where the white snow's glistening falls never loose their grip.' If this means, as some suppose, that it never stops snowing on Cithaeron, the exaggeration is monstrous; it is still considerable if we take it to mean that the snow lies in places all the year round (I found none when I climbed the mountain in April). We may have here nothing more than a conventional poetic commonplace (Meurig-Davies, *Rev. Ét. Gr.* lxi [1948], 366); but I suspect that Eur. insisted on the snow because it was the right setting for a strange tale of maenadism: on Parnassus, and probably on Cithaeron too, the ὀρειβασία was a mid-winter rite. Like most southern peoples, the Greeks felt (and still feel) snow to be a little uncanny: to early poets the snowflakes were, like the lightning, κῆλα Διός, 'shafts of God,' a threatening visitation from the skies (*Il.* 12.280, cf. Wilamowitz, *Die Ilias u. Homer*, 216). So Sophocles, describing the horror of Niobe's eternal vigil upon Sipylus, says χιὼν οὐδαμὰ λείπει (*Ant.* 830). **βολαί** usually 'acts of throwing,' can also mean 'things thrown,' just as βαφαί can mean 'things dipped' (e.g. poisoned arrows, *Her.* 1190). The translation 'radiance' (L.S.)[9] is quite unjustified. For **εὐᾱγεῖς**, 'bright,' cf. Parm. 10.2 εὐᾱγέος ἠελίοιο and other passages quoted in L.S.[9] The original spelling may have been εὐαυγεῖς, as in διαυγής, τηλαυγής, ἀξαυγής (πώλων . . . χιόνος ἐξαυγεστέρων, *Rhes.*304).[1] [Verrall's notion that 662 is interpolated, the messenger having broken off his sentence at ἵν' οὔποτε, is surely incredible. And the line seems to have been known to Seneca, who was misled by it into citing the absence of snow on Cithaeron as a symptom of extreme drought, *Thyestes* 117f.—ἀνεῖσαν χιόνος L. Dindorf, to avoid the tribrach composed of a single word coinciding with the foot. But this rhythm, which is rare in Aesch. and Soph. (except in the first foot), is admitted relatively often in the later plays of Eur. (Descroix, *Trim. Iamb.* 159, 162). There are at least five other instances in the *Bacch.*: second foot, 18, 261, 1302; fourth, 731, 1147.]

[1] Cf. now G. Björck, *Das Alpha Impurum*, 147.

Figure 1

Let us begin with the reference in Figure 1 to 'Maurig-Davies, *Rev. Ét. Gr.* lxi [1948], 366.' My argument in particular is that this citation is not identical to a hyperlink which takes us (in a loose sense) to the referenced page, nor is it the same kind of thing unless we choose to restrict ourselves to a very high level of generality—and so lose our footing on Wittgenstein's *Glatteis*. Since printed reference and hyperlink are in two different media and have markedly different attributes, our effort in translation significantly obscures both if we think of them as the same. Nor is it correct to assume that one (the link is the technologist's obvious candidate) improves upon the other: this would prejudice our results by downgrading attributes of the supposedly inferior one before we were able to see them both for what they are. They are simply different.

'Maurig-Davies, *Rev. Ét. Gr.* lxi [1948], 366' and other printed references are, we might say, highly coded, conventionalized sets of instructions on how to find the items in question, should you choose to seek them out at some considerable trouble, expenditure of time and perhaps money. Such deterrents have the effect of putting what seems to have been in the author's judgment quite secondary, here Maurig-Davies' *ipsissima verba*, out of reach. To have quoted them would have been to make a very different kind of statement. How would one translate such a reference faithfully into electronic form? The possibility of immediate leap into the full-text of the article might well distort the commentator's intention even further, and so foreshorten his expressive range.

A second example. "For **εὐᾱγεῖς**, 'bright,' cf. Parm. 10.2 εὐᾱγέος ἠελίοιο and other passages quoted in L.S.[9]" turns on Goldhill's 'grounding problem of the commentary format,' the infamous *cf.*[68] My point here is that the reader is almost certain to have a copy of the ninth edition of the Liddell and Scott *Lexicon* to hand and so (unlike the previous example) is apt to look up the passages to which Dodds refers, hence also to encounter the other senses of the word, "2. of actions, *holy*, *lawful*... 3. of offerings or services, *undefiled*: hence, *lawful*...." Would a hyperlink directly into the full *Lexicon* suit perfectly, or would the future Dodds wish to shape the reader's expe-

[68] Goldhill (1999) 397; Gibson (above) 331–56. I will not attempt an analysis of Dodds' usage but refer the reader to Goldhill (393–409) for an extensive unraveling of another case.

rience, e.g., by causing the first sense to appear highlighted or by selecting it exclusively? (Both would require a more sophisticated linking technology than available on the Web, but that is only a matter of implementation.)

A third and final example. In reference to the snow on Cithaeron, the commentator adds parenthetically, "I found none when I climbed the mountain in April," and he goes on to make some anthropological observations about the Greeks. The image of Dodds climbing the sacred mountain to be *there*, at the site of the ὀρειβασία, speaks volumes, but which of these do we judge relevant to the purpose? Would a future Dodds want to substitute or add a video clip of an ascent? As for the anthropology, one can imagine (as so often in this great commentary) wanting to go off to read much more, especially if anthropological interests brought one to the *Bacchae* in the first place. So, might the future Dodds supply a hyperlink to a monograph on the uncanny in meteorological phenomena?

Questions of authorial intention seem legitimate to ask of citations: they are nominally, after all, encoded actions. One wants to know, as Goldhill points out, what one is expected to do. Unresolvable as this sometimes is, its technological function in this historical moment is to ask what might comprise an adequate artificial language in which to make our cyberspatial references. The goal is to put in hand an adequate set of referential building-blocks, so that the making of worthy online commentaries can proceed, and to have perhaps in other hands the means to devise other building-blocks as use of the first, bootstrapping set reveals. If I am right about the development of computing, then history, computer science, and the mass market are all unwittingly on our side. Like a patient in a hospital, we can feel considerably more secure than otherwise because we have a very, very interesting case.

11. *Conclusion*

I fear that most of the above will repel my intended audience of classicists with a formidable vision of unexpected difficulties, as if one were to reach out for a light-switch but encounter an untried treatise on electricity—or more accurately, its future author, still unclear about what to say. This was not, I think, the kind of problematization that Fowler had in mind when he praised the great

Norden for opening up difficulties in *Aeneid* 6.469 ([1999] 442). Yet, I would argue, all of the above is in the spirit of his mischievous, deeply intellectual purpose, to make the important things harder to ignore, to help us stay awake.

Consider what is on offer immediately: the chance not merely to rethink everything to do with the commentary form, rather more to do so in constructivist terms. These terms are made meaningful by the tools we now have, which although primitive do allow us successfully to fashion "crude but functional electronic artifacts" (Peters [1994]). These are far from adequate—our artifacts should always seem so—but they are enough in the world of things to encourage powerful thought-experiments. In the world of computational things we tend to value intricate, complex, algorithmically sophisticated tools, and so to undervalue what we have, "a stone adze in the hands of a cabinetmaker" (Bush [1965] 92). Yet the hand-operated printing press, handmade type, ink, and paper were also 'crude but functional'; if we look to our books we can see what inventive souls did with them.

So many basic matters have been stirred up by the advent (note that word!) of computing that we need to be very alert and hardy enough to chop through all sorts of tangled mental growth on our way to the imagined garden. Or so it may seem. In the book by Peter Matthiessen whose title I quote in the dedication, the jungle is one place seen successively through the eyes of three people: a Protestant missionary, a Catholic priest, and a native. One tends readily to recognize oneself in either the first or the second; the native, however, is at play, and for him the jungle is 'the fields of the Lord,' or—in an alternate translation of Isaiah 32:12—'the fields of desire.' Engaging the old problems yet again, in a new and interesting form, is a sign of life.

Is there anything new under the sun? I think of the Israeli poet Yehuda Amichai's poem on his thirty-second birthday:

> And my good deeds grow smaller
>
> and smaller. But
> the interpretations around them have grown huge, as in
> an obscure passage of the Talmud
> where the text takes up less and less of the page
> and Rashi and the other commentators
> close in on it from every side.

With no disrespect to all the commentators, computing can send them packing when they're not wanted, bring them back, make them primary, concord their words, and so on, as can be imagined. The activity which computing greatly, newly enhances is endless, serious play. Perhaps the most important new thing for us is the prospect of dealing more imaginatively, deftly with tradition than we could before. And commentary practice also looks forward in another sense, to a greatly expanded though solidly traditional role it could take. In the disaggregated docuverse, what is so clearly needed is the knowledge of how to reaggregate. Commentary is our expression of that knowledge.[69]

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[69] I am grateful to Gregory Crane for pointing out that "the web, which tends to present 'morsels' . . . creates a vacuum that clamors for commentary. . . . [T]he comment attached to the fragment one is reading will become more and more prominent, because *that* is how text is going to be experienced and because it's *easy* to link text to commentary" (e-mail 5/6/01).

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16. COMMENTING ON COMMENTARIES: A PRAGMATIC POSTSCRIPT

Elaine Fantham

Four years ago I had the privilege of responding to four talks at a panel of the American Philological Association, which now form three chapters and part of Christina Kraus's Introduction to this book: their variety on that occasion reflected well most of the aspects of the *genus commentariorum* which are now more richly represented in this volume. My most vivid memory from that occasion is of Heinrich von Staden's superb analysis of Galen's mode as a commentator, which revealed the ancient doctor's work as a *tour de force* of perhaps justified egotism. For Galen the medical expert exploited his 'Commentary' on a Hippocratic treatise on gynecology, both to demonstrate his superiority to the author of his text and to eliminate by tacit refutation the teachings of the intervening medical school of Empiricists. Ostensibly loyal to his Hippocratic authority, Galen did not stop at confirming and elucidating the Hippocratic scriptures, but vindicated his own erudition, by drawing on writers within and beyond the medical corpus. Thus the commentator outshone his subject-text, bringing to his readers not subordinate material, meaningful only in combination with 'Hippocrates,' but a fuller and more rhetorical text to be studied in its own right. As von Staden went on to show, no well-trained modern philologist is in a position to assume such dominance over this technical text. Nor, for all his self-advertisement, did the learned Tzetzes overshadow his texts, nor—to go outside the covers of this book—did the humanist Beroaldus or the poet and teacher Pierio Valeriano whose commentaries on Virgil were the theme of Julia Gaisser's recent delightful Presidential Address to the APA, published in the Association's *Transactions* for 2001.[1]

The theme of Susan Stephens's paper could be seen as the challenge to a learned commentary of a very fragmentary poetic text—Callimachus' *Hecale*—and issues of originality and accessibility raised

[1] See also Gaisser (1993).

by certain features of Hollis's presentation. To what extent can or should commentators take over a previous editor's text and *apparatus criticus*? Is it now time to abandon the use of Latin in favor of English as the modern *lingua franca*? These are questions depending not only on the writer's conception of her audience, but on the cost-implications of technical printing for the publishers, and so indirectly on the size of the destined audience. The old-established Oxford series for which Roland Austin composed the commentaries on which John Henderson and I were reared was used by sixth forms as well as undergraduates and was kept inexpensive by reprinting the Oxford Classical Text, from which the commentator was allowed to dissent in his notes. Fifty years ago the commentators could write, and the students could read, a clear Latin introduction: now perhaps the best justification for the use of Latin is as a courtesy to foreign philologists whose command of Latin is superior to their command of English. (Britons are still poor linguists in comparison with, say, Dutch and Norwegian scholars, but have better reason as members of the European community to make this gesture than Americans, who write for a far larger national audience.) I will return at the end of this essay to issues of economic and linguistic accessibility.

Chris Kraus has now subsumed into her Introduction her original survey of the many special issues involved in writing commentaries on a historian: the nice distinction between a historical and historiographical commentary is further developed by Rhiannon Ash's analysis: in a sense this distinction has now polarized. It may be unfair to deny original historical thought to some minor ancient writers, and treat them merely as sources to be mined for additional data and lost sources, but few except specialists feel the need for commentaries on Diodorus, or on Dionysius' *Antiquities*. As students decades ago we thought Hellenistic and imperial Greeks writing on Rome fit only to be consulted in the bilingual Loeb Library, and clearly the editors of the Loeb series expected this. These authors are more often read now in annotated paperback translations, some of which rise to the level of real commentaries. Thus, for example, the importance of the centuries covered by Cassius Dio and the quality of the new historical commentaries explains the warm welcome given to Reinhold's commentary on the Triumviral books and Murison's work on the Flavian period despite Dio's lack of historical acumen.[2]

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[2] Reinhold (1988), Murison (1999). These and future volumes of the Dio com-

Other historians, the great historical writers from Herodotus to Tacitus and Ammianus, have the personalities, prejudices, and artistry that demand a commentary on their actual language, and the kind of historiographical approach we associate with Tony Woodman, not too far from the aims of Irene de Jong in setting about her exciting narratological commentary on the *Odyssey*. What is the author getting at? How has he told this story, and why has he included X, omitted Y, and deferred Z? I confess to a preference for this kind of commentary: but for practical purposes it will need to provide adequate coverage of both grammatical details and historical background.

In the original panel discussions it was perhaps Roy Gibson's shrewd scrutiny of the Parallel and its criteria of legitimacy, that came closest to my own experience of writing commentaries. Certainly like other commentators I admit to an uncritical love of parallels. I suppose that when we read any good poetry our attention is seized by the verbal configuration of the text. Until recently commentators would note and cite echoes of earlier poetry without considering how the associated passage contributes to the reader's interpretation. But the work of Gian Biagio Conte[3] and a new generation has changed the way we read, and many critics (notably Alessandro Barchiesi and Stephen Hinds)[4] recognize certain 'echoes' of a poet in a successor as comment upon his predecessor. After Gibson's analysis we shall all have sharper consciences. As for the referential function of commentaries, serving as private encyclopedias, I do wonder to what extent they are still consulted for lexical material and *Realien*, given the instant and comprehensive access to electronic texts and hypertexts.[5] If I wanted to discuss the use of rose petals, or votive tablets, or the imagery of woman as sea, or the non-gendered use of *deus*, I would turn to Nisbet and Hubbard's commentary on *Odes* I.5, which would offer an excellent start—but there are few texts quite as familiar as Horace's *Odes*. Or again one might remember that

mentary (general editors P. M. Swan and J. W. Humphrey) are published by the APA and OUP. On translation as commentary see also Kraus 3 n.12 and especially Rowe 297, 304 n.29 (both above).

[3] His early work is conveniently accessible in English as *The Rhetoric of Imitation* (1988).

[4] This is true of all Barchiesi's literary criticism, beginning with *La traccia del modello* (1984), and of most of Hinds's work, now crystallized in Hinds's study of allusion as a poet's weapon in revising literary history (1998).

[5] On hypertexts, hyperlinks, and their use in teaching see O'Donnell (1998) 163–6.

there was a reference to infibulation somewhere in Juvenal without being able to recall the Satire or line number. Without this how far could the searcher get in tracking down the topic in Mayor or Courtney? (Here indeed an editor's coyness might prevent the reader grasping just what was in question: we need the fearlessly explicit approach of Sir Kenneth Dover's commentary on the *Clouds*.[6])

What can I contribute after so many thoughtful discussions, not only inside these covers, but in the broader scope of Most's *Commentaries—Kommentare*?[7] First, I would like to return to what may be the best known ancient commentators, Donatus and Servius. If they have not been discussed separately in this volume, it is because we now have the admirable tools of Robert Kaster's monograph *Guardians of Language*, his articles on Servius, and most recently his edition and commentary on Suetonius' *De Grammaticis*.[8] In this Kaster provides a model division between the roles of introduction and commentary. The broad sweep of the Introduction is used to open up a vision of Roman education enriched by Kaster's own gift for asking the searching question and reading cultural phenomena in a new light, while the commentary combines essential discussions of concepts and biographical detail with wider career and character sketches of each *grammaticus*. As he shows in the earlier articles, Donatus and Servius adopted the basic policy of showing why what their chosen author wrote was right and good, as they used the text of Terence or Virgil to teach young students rhetoric and ethics. Then—as sometimes even now—the *Aeneid* was viewed as a model of leadership, and the educator's idea of the *utile* privileged moral and political over purely linguistic values.[9] But the text was a model of Latin style and diction to the students and the grammarians directed their reading with commendations like *bene fecit quod* . . . or an approving adverb. Only very occasionally is the function of the commentary as advanced language instruction revealed in a caution to the student against imitating some idiom adopted by Terence or Virgil for a special or local effect.

The modern commentator, too, tends to write out of admiration

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[6] See Dover (1968) and the *editio minor* of 1970.
[7] Most (1999).
[8] Kaster (1980a), (1980b), (1988), and (1995).
[9] See especially the discussions of Henderson and Laird, both above.

for his author (indeed he will be counterproductive if he feels distaste or contempt for the dead text). But so long as he is writing about a poetic text he has no central concern to prove the truth of its statements. As Ovid says, *nec tamen ut testes mos est audire poetas* (*Amores* 3.12). Historical writing, in contrast, was supposed to have the veracity of court testimony. Students of ancient history now pursue the factual record in other ways—such as epigraphy, archaeology, or demographic models. They go to the great historical writers of antiquity to learn from their analyses of human political behavior or military and naval strategy, or perhaps to enjoy their artistic deployment of *ethos* and narrative technique, rather than as means of retrieving historical details. Among ancient commentators perhaps only the writers on philosophical texts, generally adherents of a philosophical school, felt a pressure to establish both the ethical validity and the metaphysical consistency of, say, Aristotle's or Chrysippus' arguments comparable to that of the scientific commentator. Probably Christopher Rowe and Andrew Dyck find themselves motivated not only by the desire to understand Plato and Cicero, but also to find justification for their authors. Certainly I felt, when reading Rowe's treatment of philosophical argumentation, that for him the question of what Plato wrote in obscure or textually disputed passages was inseparable from that of providing the best, i.e., wisest, meaning for the obscurities of the text.

Learning from One's Own Commentaries

We are all shaped by our education, and I suspect that the awkward transition from an age of textual criticism to one more purely literary left me with a hybrid approach to writing commentaries. But since I have written three commentaries, and should have learned something from the mistakes made in composing them, it will perhaps be useful to recall why and how I embarked on each one. Certainly each text entailed special considerations relevant to some or many future commentaries. For quite distinct issues arose in attempting to interpret Roman tragedy, historical epic, and Ovidian aetiological elegy.

First, though, to justify the word 'interpret.' A truly philological commentary would abstain from any ideological as opposed to lexical interpretation. The scholar-poet Housman could maintain the

austere ideal voiced in his Cambridge inaugural,[10] by including in his major critical editions only such comment as was necessary to justify his textual choices. Restricting himself in this way he lavished his acumen on the intellectually challenging Manilius (Vols. 1–5, 1903–30), but also on the highly ideological Lucan (1926). But this may also be the reason why he never published his work on Propertius: not only was Propertius intellectually too complex to control between two book covers, but he was emotionally too intense to treat with cold rationality. Now, a century later, a purely philological commentary would not meet the demands of most readers, who expect not only a full social or mythological context but a 'reading' of the poem and its literary contextualization.

Although most commentators are provoked into research and writing by a powerful interest in a text and may feel they have a personal understanding of its author, it would be unfair to push their own interpretations without giving a fair hearing to previous or dissenting accounts. Commentators on the poetry of the Principate nowadays divide into those who seek out its subversive potential and those who accept panegyric or loyalist elements as intended for a literal reading. Thus British scholars are much less inclined to spy subversion in imperial Roman texts than most of their American peers. As Philip Hardie pointed out in his recent review of Thomas's *Virgil and the Augustan Reception* (2001), Virgil was read for centuries in Europe without anyone discerning his distaste for courts, monarchs, or imperialist wars. Nor does it seem possible for any commentator on Ovid, Lucan—or, say, Statius' *Silvae*—to maintain neutrality on this fundamental issue. I would argue that commentators have a responsibility to privilege literal or traditional interpretation, if only because the publication of their commentary will preclude another one on the same text (and scale) appearing for a decade or more. It is also the case that radical new interpretations are more effectively presented in the form of an argumentative monograph.

The only answer may be to declare openly one's own reading and acknowledge the other 'school of thought' (while advancing arguments against its acceptance!). I have come to realize that for me 'subversive reading' of Roman poetry offends by assuming blindness in the imperial reader, and acts against my sense of literary and

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[10] Housman (1969).

social propriety. Of course the imperial addressee does not deserve the hyperbole of panegyric, and may even, like Domitian, be vicious and devious. But a poet who is not compelled to write panegyric, and still composes *encomia* that mock their addressee, is abusing the genre and writing in bad faith. How much of the fashion for finding subversion is due to distaste for authority, or from a naïve political prejudice arising from modern situations that seem, but are not, parallel (Democracy and Presidents good; Monarchy and Emperors bad)?

This is perhaps an interpretative issue more complex than the routine assumption of irony, or the continuing dissension over 'pessimism,' or 'optimism,' in Virgil, or the competing roles of Hellenistic and Latin poetry, Greek and Italian cultural values, in constituting his poetry. Each of these issues of tone and attitude must in all honesty be raised in an introduction to any commentary, while remaining too big to be handled within the commentary proper without distracting the reader from the details of the text.

There is room for more than one kind of commentary even on Senecan tragedy. Thus Richard Tarrant, the scholar whose *Agamemnon* (1976) set a new standard for an edition and commentary with a textual and philological focus, later began to think in terms of a different kind of commentary primarily for a student audience, which resulted in his palmary *Thyestes* (1985) in the APA textbook series. For this less informed readership he explored larger literary issues across the whole text and in relation to Seneca's poetic heritage, and broke new ground in our understanding of both this tragedy and Senecan techniques. Thus, for example, he analysed Seneca's reworking of the murderous cannibal episode of Tereus, Procne, and Philomela from Ovid *Metamorphoses* 6, and reversed conventional readings of Thyestes as a *sapiens*, by demonstrating the discrepancy between the character's 'Stoic' maxims and his weak and self-indulgent practice.

This model commentary did not yet exist when I came to write my 'literary commentary' on Seneca's *Troades*, nor were the senior undergraduates in my class ready to learn from Tarrant's *Agamemnon*. Yet they were too mature to be satisfied by Kingery's workmanlike three-play volume (1964). Many of them had read the *Aeneid* and knew Virgil's account of the fall of Troy: some had also studied Euripides' *Troiades*. This, and the play's sympathetic representation of suffering, led me to work on *Troades*: it was as much the theme of the fall of Troy as the individual Senecan drama that prompted

me to conceive a commentary (Fantham 1982) that would trace the developing treatment of this theme through Seneca's conscious allusions to Virgil's and Ovid's epic narratives and his equally conscious changes to the language, action, and characterization of Euripides. In drama, the need to maintain the identity of the speakers militates against the kind of pointed authorial allusion—*palam mutuandi causa ut agnosceretur*—which we have been taught to recognize in epic narrative and poets' editorial interventions: Seneca's Virgilian or Ovidian echoes were more like orchestration, adding color and depth to the educated readers' reception.

The density and importance of these generating texts lent themselves, I thought, to a different form of commentary, a running interpretation which combined Senecan *dianoia* with his adaptation of poetic models in a continuous interpretation like that of Gordon Williams' Horace, *Odes* 3 or John Barsby's Ovid, *Amores* 1. My hope was to avoid the indigestible fragmentation of the usual commentary format, and de-emphasize the lemmata as mere signposts linking commentary to text rather than privileging them with a higher level of significance than words not lemmatized.[11]

No commentator on a Greek tragedy would fail to consider its casting and staging, and like Tarrant I felt that even if both external and internal evidence militated against Seneca's plays being composed for stage production, the onus was on the commentator to consider what difficulties would be entailed in staging Seneca's text: it would have been careless for me not to explore how *Troades* could have been staged in the first century of our era. (Modern technical equipment and eclecticism of conventions would make how we might now choose to stage the play a very different question.) When Seneca wrote exit lines for a character in one scene but not in another it could not mean that the character did not exit. Rather, such inconsistencies suggested that if tralatician features of dramatic writing such as exit lines or entrance monologues spoken aside often, but not always, came to Seneca's pen, it was because he was not interested in presenting the plays on stage. (Zwierlein's thorough review of all the plays [1966] had also revealed practical problems in Senecan

[11] Two of the problems signaled by Kraus's Introduction are the canonizing of lemmata, and the fragmentation of the text: but Kraus seems to accept the fragmented form of the commentary as inevitable. See also the discussion of de Jong (above) 62–4.

dramaturgy such as the potential acrobatics of Medea climbing to the roof-top carrying one dead and one living child.) The divided textual tradition of Seneca's text as we have it does not consistently define his choruses, but again there would be little need to define them if the lyrics were merely recited. I reproach myself now with not recognizing that the contradictions between the first and second choral odes of *Troades* could be explained by assigning the latter to a second choral group, something taken into account by the scribe who wrote in the chorus heading of the A-family. And yet the dramatist wrote nothing in his text to identify them. The divided tradition also meant that there were over a dozen places where it was hard to decide between two acceptable readings of the text, which in some cases left traces of my indecision in conflicts between my text and commentary. Any editor has to print a single text, but I realize now that I should have given more consideration to competing readings or interpretations. We learn from our successors, and the recent full-scale commentary of Atze Keulen has been able, through careful adducing of parallels in language and thought from Senecan prose, to resolve some textual problems on which Zwierlein, Boyle, and I differed. Indeed, Keulen's command of the Senecan moral texts illustrates another lesson for the commentator on poetry: not to be blinkered by generic expectations, or neglect prose writings as an important source of evidence.[12]

One may expect the same readers to be interested in Lucan as in Seneca, and here too my commentary (Fantham 1992) was provoked by undergraduate teaching. In 1985 the only English-language commentaries on single books of Lucan were Getty's admirable Book 1 (1940), and Dilke's (1960) reduction of Postgate's Book 7 (1913). Postgate's Book 8 (1917) was out of print, but Mayer had already brought out a lively literary commentary accessible to students.[13] I fastened on Book 2, because it introduced the reader to all three leading figures, Cato, Caesar, and Pompey, in speech and action, and because it represented a microcosm of civil war at Rome itself

[12] Keulen (2000). Senecan prose is much more central in European classical studies.

[13] Mayer (1981), published by Aris and Phillips. The distinctive feature of their series is their printing of a facing translation, to which, rather than to the Greek (or Latin) they key the lemmata of their commentaries. They have now brought out many useful commentaries, using special editors such as C. Collard for their Euripidean tragedies and A. E. Douglas for the Ciceronian philosophical works.

(in the retrospective of Marius, and Sulla's occupations) and a purposeful echo of the fall of Troy in Pompey's evacuation. But an equally strong motivation to comment on Lucan's historical epic came from interest in the last generation of the Roman Republic, which had fascinated me as an undergraduate. Until the late 1960s the Oxford program offered no literary option after Honour Moderations, the examinations taken before the end of the second year. Inevitably undergraduates received a better training in history than in literature, and studied it with more maturity. One result was that most serious students turned to research in ancient history, while the few who persisted in devoting themselves to literature entered the graduate program with inadequate preparation.[14] But at least our training in history equipped us to comment on texts with substantial historical content.

A commentary on one book of an epic may be a good medium for introducing a class to the poet, since in theory it will equip the reader with the methodology to make his or her own commentary for subsequent books. But the teacher has to accept the sad fact that the student will probably only ever read that one book, and the commentator does have some obligation towards the epic as a whole.[15] It would not be enough for me to refer the reader to Getty's Book 1 if she had no access to it, so I tried to give a fair sense of Lucan's introduction to the epic (and the civil war itself) in the first book. And I was motivated by the conviction that Lucan had composed the first two books as a diptych, meant to be read together as introduction to the civil war and its combatants. Different conceptions of thematic unity within the epic might have driven me to try to include the opening sequence of Book 3 with Pompey's dream of Julia, or Caesar's peaceful occupation of Rome and violation of the sacred treasury. But while a good poet will foster tension between book endings and episodic units (witness the opening of *Aeneid* 7 or *Metamorphoses* 2) commentators usually restrict themselves to the formal book-units.[16]

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[14] While scholars with experience of teaching outside Oxford such as Eric Dodds and Eduard Fraenkel gave wonderful seminars which we all attended, our formal undergraduate training depended largely on our college tutors, and mine limited herself to instruction in Greek and Latin prose composition.

[15] Did Lucan complete his epic? I do not think so, but the proposition was argued by Rambaud (1960), and most recently by Masters (1992), ch. 7.

[16] This touches on the issue of segmentation, raised by Goldhill and Gumbrich

Commenting on Lucan also raised the question of relating his 'historical' narrative to history as he knew it—two questions, in fact. The first, which I answered only indirectly,[17] concerns the ideological perspective of a writer under Nero looking back at the loss of liberty. What is implied by the contrast between *scelera ista nefasque | hac mercede placent* ('even such crimes and guilt are not too high a price to pay [i.e., for the Principate]' 1.37–8) and the diatribe of 7.445–59 that turns the deified Caesars into Rome's revenge on the unfeeling gods? The second question, on which I focused, was the simpler issue of events narrated. For this Lucan's source was almost certainly Livy, whose civil war books survive only as summaries (the *Periochae*), but modern readers do have available an eyewitness contemporary narrative on a comparable scale, Caesar's *Civil War*. In fact both Rambaud and Masters[18] have argued that Lucan was actually responding to Caesar, and even broke off where he did in Book 10 because Caesar had broken off his *Civil War* at Alexandria.

Rather than trying to reconstruct Livy's lost treatment of the Civil Wars, I limited myself to matching Lucan's second book against the reports of the same three months in Italy by Caesar and later writers. A history student would not learn much from this basic survey, but neither would she have learned much from Lucan, or expected to do so. Any one composing a commentary on Silius Italicus is in a better position to compare poet and source-text since the corresponding books of Livy have survived. Meanwhile it has largely been left to Dutch and German scholars to provide commentaries on other books of Lucan's epic.

Most recently I turned to Ovid's *Fasti* (Fantham [1998]), after writing a number of articles about different aspects of the work which treated issues of content and context ranging across all six books.

in Most (1999) and by Budelmann and Kraus in this volume. If Lucan chose to include Caesar's visit to Troy and Alexandria after his Libyan narrative in the excessively long Book 9, should this prevent one commentator from limiting himself to the Libyan narrative, or another from including the Caesarian scenes of Book 9 with what we have of Book 10?

[17] This decision was not the result of any restriction of space by the editors of the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series: rather I did not think it possible to give a clear and straightforward account that would do justice either to the hydra-headed issue of subversion or to the elaborate studies of political and literary dissidence under Nero of Rudich (1993, 1997). I take the traditional line that Lucan's change of attitude reflects the deterioration in Nero and in their personal relationship between AD 60 and 65.

[18] Above, n.15.

My interest arose from enjoyment of Ovid, and a growing concern with Roman antiquarian treatment of their inherited religion (I despair of ever making sense of the original cults and their associations).

But Ovid was in some ways a dangerous choice for a conservative critic. The poet's biography and his self-conscious artistry have attracted scholars eager to apply modern literary theory to classical texts—whether narrative or discursive—and yet these theories were derived from interpreting highly evolved modern fiction. The dissonance between the poet's personal credo and the new imperial morality and ideology also led critics to read irony and subversion where negative connotations run counter to the poet's stated intent, and would have been contrary to the poet's interests. How far should a commentator go in introducing discussion of metapoetical or subversive interpretation, rather than focusing interpretation on a literal reading? This touches on the issue of reader response-ability raised in Kraus's Introduction. How much can or should be left to the reader? The orator or poet, so Aristotle argues, ought to leave something unsaid so as to engage the reader actively with the text. Just as the commentator who explains every nuance risks blunting or losing the reader's interest, so he risks preempting the reader's freedom of interpretation by interpreting the text against the grain. The first-time reader may have his work cut out to understand the primary, literal, significance of an ancient text, but, then, most first-time readers have teachers, and any commentary should leave the living teacher who can engage in debate with something to contribute.[19] The commentator naturally hopes for experienced readers who will come to his exegesis with a prior familiarity with the text, and these may feel cheated if he does not engage with current theoretical approaches. Yet many of these are ephemeral, and will hasten the commentary's obsolescence. The very power of imagination which is so precious in the creative writer can be a detriment to the critic and a hazard to the reader.

It was, then, a risk in more ways than one to attempt a commentary on part of Ovid's *Fasti.* There was of course the great five-volume commentary of Frazer (1929), with its extraordinary anthropological

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[19] Here is a case for Socrates' preference (attributed to Thamos in *Phaedrus* 275a–6b) for the question and answer of spoken dialogue over the written text which can neither defend itself nor answer questions. On first-time readers and commentaries see also Ash (above) 240–1.

learning.[20] But scholarship on Roman religion had since moved forward and been transformed by Dumézil[21] and two generations of German and French experts had contributed to our understanding of the Augustan religious revival, even if the origins of Roman rituals remained beyond reach. There were also newer commentaries on *Fasti* itself, notably the major two-volume commentary of Franz Bömer,[22] versed in both Roman religion and Ovidian poetry. Unfortunately his work is unaffordable and almost unusable for English speaking students: although Bömer's introduction and headnotes are valuable, his physically crowded lemmata simply give (at times incorrect) cross-references within the commentary, or send the reader to track down library copies of German works of reference. Of the shorter commentaries, those of Le Bonniec on Books 1 and 2 were difficult to obtain, leaving only J. F. Miller's modest Bryn Mawr commentary on Book 2.[23] Finally the new (and since twice revised) Teubner of Alton, Wormell, and Courtney (1977) provided both an aid and a stimulus to commentators.

It was a natural interest in the prominence of divine and human females in the April narratives, combined with the stimulus of Stephen Hinds's splendid monograph, *The Metamorphoses of Persephone*, that determined my choice of Book 4. Recent international scholarly exchanges have been particularly fruitful in individual and cooperative studies of Ovid's transformation of his literary inheritance and formal poetic techniques, but have also alerted the reader to his unscrupulous fertility of invention. With this image of Ovid's inventiveness in mind, my starting point was the question, "how does the poet escape the parameters of his calendar frame, putting a new

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[20] Frazer's text and translation survive, with a selection from his appendixes on ritual, in his Loeb volume which has fortunately been kept in print (= Frazer [1989]).

[21] Again, a pattern of substitution for conventional commentaries on the original text is exemplified by Boyle's new Penguin translation, with Woodard's comprehensive notes incorporating the theories of Dumézil on religious development and etymology. See also above, n.2.

[22] Bömer (1957–8). See on this work the shrewd review of Kenney (1959) especially 257.

[23] Le Bonniec (1961), (1969); Miller (1985). Given the excellence of Miller's published scholarship on Callimachus and Ovid it is to be regretted that he did not have scope for a fuller commentary. Nevertheless, the compact Bryn Mawr series provides useful and affordable classroom texts for US undergraduates and should be better known in the British Isles (www.brynmawr.edu/Acads/Langs/classics/commentaries.html).

spin on Greek myths or Roman pre-history" (we barely touch on later history in the *Fasti*). In more general terms, "how does he introduce and remodel material to give it his own elegiac color?" Investigation only confirmed my belief that Ovid knew and had read the antiquarian writings available in his day, and differed from them only by choice, not from ignorance.

Readers of my Introduction may want to know why I chose to give so much space to the evolution of Roman aetiological elegy from Hellenistic elegy. This too was from a conviction that no one had yet offered in compact form (and for those without enough Greek to read the fragments of Callimachus) a straight narrative of the diverse record of Hellenistic elegy before and after Callimachus. By 1990 there were admirable studies in English of most of the Hellenistic poets, and chapters of the Greek sections of the *Cambridge History of Classical Literature* that could be read by students not equipped to read specialized commentaries on Callimachus' *Hymns* or even find their way around the Loeb *Aitia*. But none of these aids displayed the full variety of (fragmentary) elegy, nor did Alan Cameron's complex and radical *Callimachus and his Critics* make it easy to synthesize his scattered discussion of the applications of elegy. This was something I had needed myself as a student and resolved to supply as best I could.

Inevitably the commentary itself repeatedly raised the problem analysed by Gibson of determining criteria for admitting parallels and precedents. If Ovid, as "Virgil's best reader,"[24] was alluding to the *Georgics* or *Aeneid*, the student needed to know this, and to mark any change of tone or emphasis; if Ovid was inverting or alluding to his own earlier language in the erotic elegy, or writing variations on his treatment of the same episode in *Metamorphoses*, as Hinds (1987) had demonstrated so effectively for the Persephone narratives of *Metamorphoses* 5 and *Fasti* 4, the student needed to know; indeed it was in my eyes one of Ovid's most personal skills that he would play variations on phrases as well as whole narratives, and this seemed to require a mass of parallels, given in quotation, not just a string of references.[25] The reader will not look up references for herself

[24] On Ovid as implicit commentator on Virgil cf. O'Hara (1995–6).

[25] In this respect the editorial guidelines of the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series were rightly generous. Only quotation would show both Ovid's techniques of self-quotation and his shifts of diction between erotic elegy, epic, and the

unless she has the book close at hand, and texts in our ancient languages are becoming increasingly hard to get outside Oxford and the two Cambridges.

The Future of Commentaries and the Commentaries of the Future

This brings me from narrowly personal considerations to the more important issue of future commentaries. Thorough philological commentaries are still published in Holland (often in English) and in Germany, but published at almost prohibitive cost. In France the Budé bilingual editions of *Éditions les Belles Lettres* have expanded their 'Notes Complémentaires' to go beyond glossary and factual or mythical background into some literary issues (but matters of grammar and syntax are not included). Have the Budés, by this concession, themselves driven out the formal commentary? Italian scholars of Latin can find many publishers to produce their work, but incline to the *Saggio* or collections of *Studi* rather than to commentaries. But suppose we confine ourselves to the English-speaking world. Who will produce the commentaries of the future, and who will publish them? In England doctoral graduates have produced the bulk of Oxford's recent 'red' volumes: I think of Harrison's *Aeneid* X, Coleman's *Silvae* IV, or Dewar's *Thebaid* IX. These are mature, revised works, in no way at a disadvantage in comparison with the volumes in the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series, which tend to be produced by older scholars in and out of Cambridge. If the classical text itself is off-beat or the commentary constructs an independent text on the basis of reexamining the tradition, especially if it is written on a generous scale, the edition may qualify for the prestigious Cambridge 'Orange' series (Classical Texts and Commentaries). And there are genuinely independent publishers like Francis Cairns' ARCA imprint, which published Paul's *Historical Commentary on Sallust's Bellum Jugurthinum* and Boyle's two commentaries on Seneca's *Phaedra* and *Troades* and has now brought out three of McKeown's projected four volumes of introduction, text, and commentary on Ovid's *Amores*.[26]

intermediate didactic elegy of *Fasti*. See also the discussion of Gibson (above), and on the reader's participation see especially Kraus 20–2; *contra* Rowe 306 n.30 (both above).

[26] The full scale which Cairns affords his authors is a service to scholarship, but at a cost to the reader, tending to limit ownership to libraries, reviewers, and specialists.

Few of these are affordable for teaching purposes, despite the heroic efforts of Bristol Classical Press in reprinting precious evergreens like Austin's *Pro Caelio*. A British classicist may now attract less interest if he risks writing a commentary as his doctoral thesis than if he finds some striking modern idea about gender or narrative technique to illustrate from his chosen author. The situation is far worse in the United States and Canada. I had to warn two excellently trained graduate students off writing the commentaries to which they aspired, because it might reduce their chances of employment (and even more of the publication necessary for tenure) They wrote potential monographs instead, and are now teaching in first-class universities on either side of the Atlantic.

Which US publishers will publish commentaries above the elementary level? I am deeply grateful to Princeton for publishing my *Troades* in 1982, but I am pretty sure they would not do it again. Michigan have just brought out Dyck's definitive commentary on Cicero, *De officiis*, and Oklahoma brought out two volumes of W. S. Anderson's *Metamorphoses* (1972, 1997) but in general American scholars look outside their own country to publish commentaries.[27] Can we hope to change this? We cannot expect publishers to accept what readers will not buy, and both the number and incomes of advanced classics students are against the prospect of a good buying public for classical commentaries.

Could we teach students to value and use commentaries? That seems the best hope, but beyond the intermediate textbook market, they will be too few for the book trade to supply. Why, then, would any young scholar choose to write a commentary, which will be harder to publish than a monograph and command less respect from tenure committees?

There is of course, the electronic text. But here the problems become the reverse of those afflicting the commentary in book form. An electronic commentary could be disseminated at no cost—and bring no reward to its author. Without some kind of international

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[27] Thus in the last decade O'Donnell published his three-volume commentary on St. Augustine's *Confessions* with Oxford University Press (1992), while Mastronarde's commentary on Euripides' *Phoenissae*, which won the APA's Goodwin award, was published in the Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries series (1994) and Zetzel's commentary on Cicero, *De re publica* appeared in the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics (1995).

copyright law, electronic publication is handing over one's work to privateers. The author will have all the burden of input without benefit of copy-editors, and at the moment would have to fight to get his scholarship recognized for career purposes. We all know that it is now possible to publish camera-ready copy, and we have all found out that this puts the entire burden of preparing the manuscript on the struggling author. Worse, as educational journalists explain with pride that electronic publication will permit constant update, they are ignoring the painful implication for the author, that she will be expected to devote any free time to incessant update; thus the old book will never be done and the new book never started. Whose labor is this labor-saving device saving?[28]

Instead let us be grateful for the commentaries we have, and organize professional awareness to recognize specific needs and to focus demand on providing commentaries for texts that will be read by advanced students internationally. Each generation will need new commentaries and we must work to foster new kinds of commentary to meet those needs.

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[28] On the issues raised in the last paragraphs see especially Stephens 85–7 and McCarty 375–83, both above.

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A few concepts are treated so pervasively throughout the volume that we have either not indexed them or have done so only selectively.

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